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This dissertation offers a historical investigation of liberalism as a unified yet internally 
variegated intellectual field that has developed in relation to “colonial capitalism.” I examine the 
impact of colonial economic relations on the historical formation of liberalism, which is often 
overlooked in the scholarship on the history of political thought. Focusing on the British Empire 
between the late-seventeenth and early-nineteenth centuries, I analyze three historical cases in 
which the liberal self-image of capitalism in Britain was contradicted by the manifestly illiberal 
processes of displacement and coercion in its imperial possessions. I situate this contradiction 
within the debates on property claims in American colonies, the trade relation between Britain 
and its Indian dominions, and the labor problem during the colonial settlement of Australia and 
New Zealand. Corresponding to the three nodal questions of “property,” “exchange,” and 
“labor,” I analyze the works of John Locke, Edmund Burke, and Edward Gibbon Wakefield as 
three prominent political theorists who attempted to reconcile the liberal image of Britain as a 
commercial and pacific society with the illiberal processes of conquest, expropriation, and 
extraction of British colonialism. Highlighting the global and colonial as opposed to the national 
or European terrain on which modern economic relations and their political theorization have 
emerged, I emphasize the need to situate the history of political thought in a global context. I 
conclude that the historical evolution of liberalism cannot be properly grasped without an 
account of the colonial origins of global capitalism and of the problems of legitimacy these 
colonial origins posed for political theory. 
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  1 
INTRODUCTION 
  
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, “empire” and “imperialism” once again 
appeared on the scholarly agenda. “Empire” found renewed lease on life in the American 
invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, and perhaps more importantly, in the intellectual defense of the 
Anglo-American imperialism as the historical promoter of a distinctly liberal political and 
economic global order. Part of this defense was an extension of the globalization debates of the 
1990s and emblematized by Michael Iganiteff’s Empire Lite.1 The more avowed and 
controversial advocacy of empire entered circulation with Niall Ferguson’s books Empire and 
Colossus, which eulogized the British Empire and advised the American empire to derive some 
lessons from its predecessor.2  
Around the same time Ferguson published his imperial apologetics, the field of political 
theory witnessed a growing interest in the intersection of imperial histories and modes of 
political reflection, which ran counter to Ferguson’s conclusions.3 The main thrust of this 
scholarship has been to denounce the liberal portrayals of the British Empire by unearthing the 
philosophies of exclusion and practices of subordination that typified its history.4 Curiously, 
however, there has been a striking incongruity between Ferguson’s liberal depiction of the 
British Empire and the scholarly critiques that lambast it on the grounds of its illiberality. 
                                                
1 Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan (Toronto: Penguin, 2003). 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s influential Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000) can also be 
considered as an extension of the “globalization talk” of the 1990s. See Giovanni Arrighi, “Hegemony Unravelling,” 
New Left Review 32 (2005): 23-80. 
2 Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), and Empire: The 
Rise and the Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 2003). 
3 For an excellent overview of the recent scholarship on political theory and empire, see Jennifer Pitts, “Theories of 
Empire and Imperialism,” Annual Review of Political Science 13 (2010): 211-35. Also see the collected essays in 
Craig Calhoun, Frederick Cooper, and Kevin Moore (eds), Lessons of Empire: Imperial Histories and American 
Power (New York: New Press, 2006). 
4 This interpretive trope is perhaps best captured by the title of a recent collection of essays edited by Jack P. 
Greene, The Exclusionary Empire: British Liberty Overseas, 1600-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010). 
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Whereas Ferguson’s praise for Anglophone imperialism centered on the latter’s role in 
globalizing liberal economic institutions such as private property and free trade, the 
overwhelming majority of critical studies in political theory have revolved around ideologies of 
universalism and cultural difference cast in the register of politics of representation. Simply put, 
it has been argued that British imperialism was afflicted with a persistent gap between, on the 
one hand, universal liberal values that the empire purported to represent and on the other, the 
historical fact of colonial difference that such universal claims failed, or could not but fail, to 
accommodate.5 It was this gap, it has been held, that authorized and justified the exclusion, 
oppression, and violence that the British Empire visited upon its colonial possessions, which 
marred its history with illiberality. 
 The major problem I see with these critiques is that their culturalist focus fails to counter 
Ferguson’s institutional-economic endorsement of the British Empire. For Ferguson does not 
deny the politics of exclusion and subjugation in the history of the British Empire but exonerates 
the latter by casting it as the protagonist of economic globalization. Deplorable violence and 
human costs in British imperial history are first conceded with a disarming frankness and then 
emplotted as unfortunate and incidental to empire’s liberal mission. The liberality of empire is 
ultimately vindicated, not only by the dissemination of private property, free trade, and the rule 
of law across the globe, but also by the Anglo-American capacity to lament the violence that 
                                                
5 Originally, this theme has its roots in postcolonial theory, as exemplified by Partha Chatterjee’s idea of the “rule of 
colonial difference” and Dipesh Chakrabarty’s notion of “history 2.” See Partha Chatterje, The Nation and Its 
Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), and The Black Hole 
of Empire: History of a Global Practice of Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); Dipesh 
Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2000). A powerful iteration of this theme in political theory can be found in Uday Mehta, 
Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1999). 
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inevitably attends all empires.6 The bad conscience about the violent past of the empire 
reconfirms that the British imperialists were liberal at heart. Against such presentist and 
economic “balance sheet” arguments for liberal empire, culturalist indictments of liberalism’s 
inability to accommodate colonial difference command little traction. 
 The historical study presented here shows that, first, the liberal intellectuals of the British 
Empire were actually much less comfortable with imperial politics than Ferguson himself, and 
secondly, pace the culturalist interpreters of “liberalism and empire,” the source of discomfort 
for liberal thinkers was not so much the cultural alterity of the colonized peoples but the coercive 
economic transformations that the British undertook in their imperial possessions. As I explicate 
below, amongst the European colonial empires, the British were peculiarly situated in perceiving 
their commercial capitalist economy as an essentially liberal formation that defined the British 
national character. This liberal conception of commercial capitalism, however, came into 
frequent contradiction with the illiberal processes of conquest, extraction, and exploitation that 
pervaded and undergirded the British imperial economy as a whole. The ensuing tensions 
between the liberal self-image of capitalism and its illiberal colonial operations in the early-
modern British Empire constitute the principal object of inquiry in this study.  
 My main objective is to demonstrate that three fundamental notions of liberalism, 
namely, private property, market exchange, and free labor could not be theorized as self-identical 
and universally valid ideas, not because the universal validity of these ideas were contested by 
other cultures encountered during Britain’s colonial expansion, but because the material 
processes that gave rise to the objective referents of these ideas were underwritten by political 
coercion. I maintain that private property, market exchange, and free labor could be imagined as 
                                                
6 For a trenchant critique of this mode of imperial emplotment, see Jeanne Morefield, “Empire, Tragedy, and the 
Liberal State in the Writings of Niall Ferguson and Michael Ignatieff,” Theory and Event 11 (2008). 
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progressive, emancipatory, and thereby normatively universal only to the extent that the 
constitutive violence inscribed in their genealogy was disavowed, that is, kept out of sight, 
explained away, or incidentalized. By shifting the focus from cultural representation to political 
economy, I relocate the source of colonial difference that British liberal thought had to negotiate 
from who the colonized are to what the colonizers do. This is not so much to abandon the 
politics of universalism that preoccupies the extant studies of liberalism and empire as to 
demonstrate its mediation by the coercive practices of production and exchange, conquest and 
displacement, extraction and exploitation that belong to the global history of capitalism. Nor 
does political economy comprise “just another” dimension of the connection between liberalism 
and empire. If the study presented here were simply to “add economy and stir” to the politics of 
universalism, it would remain an external critique of empire in the sense that it would posit the 
British Empire as a given and simply augment its record of cultural exclusionism with a list of its 
economic injuries to the colonized. Instead, I approach political economy as intimately 
constitutive of the British imperial structure, the internal contradictions of which were a source 
of doubt, anxiety, and endogenous critique that the liberal intellectuals of empire, like John 
Locke, Edmund Burke, and Edward Gibbon Wakefield, had to confront.  
I maintain that without giving attention to imperial political economy and liberal 
thinkers’ accounts of it, these specific internal contradictions remain out of sight, and one is left 
with a blanket politics of universalism that hinges on the exogenous binary between the cultures 
of the colonizer and the colonized. Such blanket conceptions run into difficulties in explaining 
why certain historically specific social relations and not others were deemed to be universal, or 
why certain cultural differences were translated into deficits and braided into civilizational 
hierarchies while others were deemed to be irrelevant for purposes of colonial rule, exploitation, 
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and expropriation. Nor are the culturalist interpretations successful in providing a systematic 
account of how and why the perceptions of social alterity varied across different historical 
contexts and encompassed the colonizers as well as the colonized. I contend that a theory of the 
contradictory mutual constitution of capitalism and liberalism, which I elaborate in Chapter 1, 
could supply a more powerful analytic frame for dissecting the interplay of liberal universals and 
colonial difference than can be offered by culturalist approaches. 
A major reason why the centrality of political economy has eluded the existing analyses 
in political theory and empire is the justified allergy to the twentieth-century Marxist critiques of 
imperialism that reduced, if not completely ignored, the operationality of racial difference and 
civilizational hierarchies in colonial violence, oppression, and exploitation.7 What has 
subsequently replaced Marxist reductionism, however, is a debilitating intra-textual mode of 
inquiry, in which accounts of liberalism and empire consist mainly in extrapolating liberal texts 
in imperial contexts without theorizing the imperial contexts in question.8 In contrast, I argue that 
situating the history of liberal thought in relation to what I call “colonial capitalism” can generate 
a more accurate account of how liberal universals and cultural particularisms were parsed out in 
the early-modern British Empire. As I sketch briefly below and demonstrate fully in Chapter 4, a 
colonial-capitalist analytic reveals that discourses of civilization and colonial difference 
interacted with the dynamics of global capital in ways that traversed the ostensible divisions of 
race and class and folded the colonizers themselves into the civilizational categories of savagery 
and barbarism. 
                                                
7 For a recent critical reconsideration of postcolonial misgivings about Marxism, see Vivek Chibber, Postcolonial 
Theory and the Specter of Capital (London: Verso, 2013). 
8 In an exemplary formulation, Uday Mehta writes, “with regard to the issue of exclusion in Locke, one needs no 
such extra-textual supplementing.” Mehta, Liberalism and Empire, p. 57. 
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“Bringing the economy back in,” then, is necessary for highlighting a dimension of the 
colonial empire that is indispensable for a global history of liberal thought. The notion of 
colonial capitalism that I develop in Chapter 1 works towards a heterodox Marxian theory of the 
imperial context that remains cognizant of the postcolonial critique of reductionism and 
diffusionism leveled at Marxian approaches. My account of colonial capitalism is based on a 
colonial retooling of central concepts of Marxist political economy, such as primitive 
accumulation, capital-relation, and real and formal subsumption, which I believe can furnish us 
with crucial theoretical resources for reconstructing the historically specific contradictions that 
liberal thought grappled with in the early modern period. Viewing the history of liberalism 
through critical political economy brings into focus the coercive economic transformations that 
underpinned the global emergence of capitalism and strained the efforts to imagine capitalism as 
a market system based on juridical equality and contractual freedom. In the case of the British 
Empire, the extra-legal appropriation of land in the Americas, forcible unequal exchange in 
India, and elaborate strategies of bonded labor in Australia and New Zealand each represents a 
vital moment in the development of global capital networks and a challenge to narrate this 
development as the triumph of private property, market exchange, and free labor as universally 
valid liberal values. The writings of the liberal intellectuals of the British Empire supply us with 
an inventory of the tensions between the liberal imaginings of the global capitalist economy and 
the constitutive violence in and through which the latter came into existence. A detailed 
investigation of these tensions in the works of John Locke, Edmund Burke, and Edward Gibbon 
Wakefield is elaborated in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of this study. 
 In what follows, I offer a brief overview of colonial capitalism as an analytic framework 
for theorizing the imperial context of liberal thought. I then discuss the methodological reasons 
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for focusing on the British Empire between the late-seventeenth and early-nineteenth centuries in 
substantiating this inquiry as well as for identifying Locke, Burke, and Wakefield as exemplary 
liberal intellectuals of the empire. I conclude with a sketch of the interventions that this study 
stages in the fields of political theory, the history of political thought, and political economy. 
 
Colonialism, Capitalism, and Liberalism 
The pivotal notion in the analysis presented here is “colonial capitalism.” I have chosen 
this term to signify the historically genetic relationship between capitalism and colonialism 
rather than denote the post hoc colonial instantiations of capitalism as a self-contained economic 
system. The fundamental premise that informs this notion is that capitalism has historically 
emerged within the politico-legal framework of the “colonial empire” rather than the “nation-
state.” This perspectival revision entails several theoretical correlates. First, it involves 
abandoning the idea of capitalism as a socially homogenous system that remakes the world in its 
own image and, instead, grasps capitalism as a heterogeneous and contradictory global social 
formation composed of diverse relations of production and exchange.9 This move cuts against 
the grain of many “diffusionist” accounts, liberal and Marxist alike, which locate the birth of 
full-fledged capitalism in Britain and envision its outward surge to the rest of the world through 
colonialism and imperialism.10 In contrast to such narratives of “capitalist globalization,” the 
analysis offered here invokes the “global inceptions of capital,” where capitalist relations do not 
precede colonialism but develop in and through colonial networks of people, commodities, and 
                                                
9 This position builds upon the works of world-system theorists yet departs from them by foregrounding the notions 
of real and formal subsumption as the key to unravel the contradictory heterogeneity of global capital. I expound on 
this point in length in Chapter 1. 
10 A seminal, if somewhat oversimplified, critique of diffusionsism is offered by James Blaut, The Colonizer’s 
Model of the World: Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History (New York: Guilford Press, 1993). For a 
full discussion of diffusionism and its critique amongst Marxist scholars like Robert Brenner, Ellen Meiksins Wood, 
Immanuel Wallerstein, Giovanni Arrighi, and Samir Amin, see Chapter 1. 
  8 
ideas. The imagery adequate to this conceptualization is not the tidal wave of capitalism 
sweeping the world and reducing all relations of production to the exploitation of wage-labor 
freely contracted on the market. Instead, it resembles the discontinuous weaving and coagulation 
of a global web, a planetary network of value chains that harness together an archipelago of local 
sites of production and consumption. Within this picture, such phenomena as colonial land grabs, 
plantation slavery, and forced deindustrialization of imperial dependencies configure as crucial 
moments in the global formation of capitalism, rather than being atavistic residues of feudalism 
or pre-capitalist social forms awaiting to be abolished by capitalism proper.11 
The place attributed to colonialism in my analysis goes beyond the narrow economistic 
calculi of the benefits derived from the colonies in terms of labor, raw materials, and markets.12 
While this economic dimension is certainly significant, more important is the status of the 
colonies as spaces of imagination of and experimentation with new forms of productive 
organization, exchange, and labor control that were geared towards the maximization of profit. A 
survey of imperial economies, from the Atlantic to the Asian subcontinent, reveals that the 
expropriatory and exploitative practices established in such colonial sites were too brutal to 
conceive, let alone realize, in Europe. The relevant variable here is the position of the colonies 
beyond the purview of the European custom and conventions, which gave the colonial 
entrepreneurs such as planters, slave traders, merchants, and chartered company men a much 
freer hand in their dealings with the colonial populations in reshaping systems of production and 
exchange.13  
                                                
11 For an insightful and provocative set of essays that substantiate this methodological approach to global capital, see 
Jairus Banaji, Theory as History: Essays on Modes of Production and Exploitation (Leiden: Brill, 2010). 
12 Exemplary of the economistic dismissal of empire is Lance E. Davis and Robert A. Huttenback, Mammon and the 
Pursuit of Empire: The Political Economy of British Imperialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
13 The key work behind the insight that the status of the colonies beyond the European law and custom enabled more 
brutal forms of violence (both amongst Europeans and between Europeans and non-Europeans) is Carl Schmitt, The 
Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum (New York: Telos Press, 2003). 
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What is brought into sharp relief by the ruthless and violent methods of colonial 
reorganization of exploitation is the originary role of extra-economic and extra-legal coercion in 
the emergence of capitalist relations on a planetary scale.14 The term I employ to capture the 
process of forcible and uneven integration of colonial sites to global capitalist networks is 
“primitive accumulation,” originally coined by Karl Marx and expanded by Rosa Luxemburg.15 I 
take issue with the historicist confines of this term as used by Marx and Luxemburg, who cast 
primitive accumulation as a process of homogenization that obliterates all non-capitalist social 
forms and institutes in their place relations of wage labor characteristic of nineteenth-century 
British industrial capitalism. In contrast, “primitive accumulation” refers in this study to the 
subordinate articulation as well as the assimilation of non-capitalist relations of social 
reproduction to the logic of capital, whereby ostensibly non-capitalist social forms become 
endogenous moments in capital’s global reproduction. Conceived thus, primitive accumulation, 
always present but especially blatant in its colonial variant, marks the element of political power 
constitutive of the capital-relation, exercised by the imperial core or by colonial agents who 
assumed or usurped it. 
 This is not to imply that the imperial metropoles were exempt from the violence of 
primitive accumulation. On the contrary, various forms of dispossession and bondage dotted the 
European landscape in the early modern period. However, first, metropolitan forms of 
expropriation and exploitation were not as ruthless as their colonial counterparts. For instance, 
African chattel slavery was decisively an Atlantic creature, and even white indentured labor, 
which was quite widespread in England, turned into virtual slavery once transported to 
                                                
14 Geoff Eley, “Historicizing the Global, Politicizing Capital: Giving the Present a Name,” History Workshop 
Journal 63 (2007): 154-188. 
15 Karl Marx, Capital Vol. 1: Critique of Political Economy (London: Penguin, 1976), section 8; Rosa Luxemburg, 
The Accumulation of Capital, (London: Routledge, 2003), part III. 
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Caribbean plantations. Secondly, such expropriation and exploitation could be contested as well 
as justified by variously invoking and interpreting the laws and customs of the land, which on the 
one hand, reined in the extremities of primitive accumulation, and on the other, offered a 
politico-legal medium of struggle, reversal, and above all, explanation. The colonial primitive 
accumulation was otherwise. The lack of a common political, legal, or customary framework 
foreclosed the possibility of a similar recourse to contestation and negotiation. As a result, the 
violence of capitalist transformation at the colonial frontier not only played out more brutally but 
also called for different ideological frameworks for its justifications. At this point, the imperial 
framework of analysis advocated here proves especially fruitful as it allows a direct engagement 
with forms of force and violence that escape the grasp of methodological-nationalist accounts of 
capitalism in Westphalian and Weberian trappings. 
 If a theory of colonial capitalism comprises one half of the framework of analysis, the 
other half is an account of liberalism. I treat liberalism as an intellectual and discursive field 
unified by the principles of juridical equality and contractual freedom, yet internally variegated 
by the negotiation of these principles against the specific context of colonial capitalism. 
Contractual freedom and juridical equality, or “primal norms of liberalism” as I label them, are 
less explicitly stated postulates than fundamental dispositions, which display striking historical 
persistence, relative geographical indifference, and a certain modularity that renders them 
compatible with as dissimilar political philosophical strands as natural jurisprudence, ancient 
constitutionalism, and utilitarian positive legalism.16 Whether expressed in the image of the state 
of nature, peaceful commerce, or market transaction, these primal norms gesture at a vision of 
free exchange as the model of human interrelations. Perhaps not surprisingly, the field of 
political economy, as it has evolved since its seventeenth-century origins, harbors the most 
                                                
16 For a similar point, see Jennifer Pitts, “Free for All,” Times Literary Supplement, September 23, 2011. 
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explicit and coherent attempts to elaborate and codify the main tenets of this liberal vision. The 
enshrinement of liberalism in political economy is crucial for the purposes of this analysis, 
insofar as political economy has developed in tandem with global capitalism and asserted itself 
as the appropriate language for apprehending and explaining its dynamics.17 
 As sketched above, however, the global emergence of capitalism was anything but a story 
of consensual exchange between juridical equals. The rift between, on the one hand, the political 
coercion driving the formation of global capital circuits, and on the other, the essentially liberal 
conception of this emergent social formation brings us to a problematic that is at the heart of this 
study. This is a historical contradiction between the liberal self-image of capitalism and the 
illiberal process in and through which it has come into being. The tension in question is not a 
simply a confrontation between liberalism and capitalism as two exogenous phenomena, but 
marks a torsional relationship of “contradictory mutual constitution” between liberalism and 
capitalism. Put briefly, the historical process of primitive accumulation creates the concrete 
social relationships, such as alienable private property, market exchange of commodities, and 
legally free individual labor, around which liberal values of contractual freedom and juridical 
equality can crystallize and solidify. At the same time, the extra-economic and extra-legal 
coercion inherent in primitive accumulation encumbers the genealogy of liberalism with a 
heteronomous element of violence that cuts against the grain of liberal sensibility. 
On the other side of this dynamic, the imagination of capitalism as an essentially liberal 
phenomenon underwrites the renewed authorization of and the continued acquiescence in the 
expropriation and exploitation integral to the colonial capitalist enterprise. The nature of this 
ideological connection is akin to the “necessary misrecognition” of capitalism as a liberal market 
system, as opposed to a cynical interpretation of liberalism as a hapless public relations figure 
                                                
17 Andrew Sartori, “British Empire and Its Liberal Mission,” The Journal of Modern History 78 (2006): 623-42. 
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that covers up the social displacement and exploitation entailed by capitalism.18 Ideology 
understood as necessary misrecognition commands greater explanatory rigor for the question 
under study, because those invested and active in the colonial capitalist enterprise had to justify 
their actions above all to themselves and to their peers, and only then, if at all, to the victims of 
colonial primitive accumulation. Liberalism, and liberal political economy in particular, 
therefore stands as a historical and practical force in establishing and securing capitalist relations.  
 
The British Empire and Middle-Class Intellectuals 
The contradictory unity of liberalism and capitalism does not arise in a historical vacuum, 
nor does the liberal misrecognition of capitalism take place automatically – which brings us to 
the British Empire and its middle-class intellectuals. The reason for embedding this inquiry in 
the history of the British Empire between the late-seventeenth and early-nineteenth centuries is 
twofold. First, the British Empire, especially after the Seven Years’ War, represented the largest 
self-avowed empire that spanned the globe and was arguably more operative than other 
European colonial empires in the formation of global webs of capital.19 The second reason is the 
particular imagination of the British Empire, both by the Britons and by other Europeans, as the 
“empire of liberty,” that is, an imperial polity that embodied and disseminated liberal principles, 
which set it apart from the agrarian absolutism of France or the rapacious imperialism of Spain.20 
Thus, even though the British Empire had in common with its French and Spanish counterparts 
the same element of colonial violence, conquest, and enslavement, it was the peculiarity of the 
                                                
18 I borrow the term “necessary misrecognition” from Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses,” in Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays (London: New Left Books, 1971). 
19 See, for instance, Nuala Zahedieh, Capital and the Colonies: London and the Atlantic Economy, 1660-1700 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
20 Anthony Pagden, Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France, c. 1500-c. 1800 
(New Haven, Yale University Press, 1995). 
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Britons to conceive of themselves as a “maritime, commercial, Protestant, and free” people.21 
The Spanish theological debates revolved around whether the conquered indigenous peoples of 
America were subhuman and therefore could be rightfully enslaved, while the main question for 
the French was how to justifiably exclude the French Empire’s non-European subjects from the 
republican principles of equality enshrined in the Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen. In 
contrast to the theological medium of the Spanish and the republican idiom of the French 
debates, controversies about the British imperial enterprise were couched in the language of 
political economy as a mode of ethico-political reflection constitutional argumentation. In other 
words, while all European empires had to confront the problem of colonial violence, only in the 
case of Britain, where a commercial-capitalist economy was integral to the self-definition of the 
national character, did this problem take the form of a contradiction between capitalism and 
liberalism. This is the main reason why the British Empire is particularly well suited for 
examining the challenge of colonial capitalism. 
For investigating this problem, I have focused on three critical conjunctures in the history 
of the British Empire, in which the tensions between the liberal self-image of capitalism in 
Britain and its illiberal colonial operations came to a head. The first of these is the status of the 
property claims during the colonization of America in the seventeenth century. The second case 
concerns the changing nature of the Anglo-Indian trade after the conquest of Bengal in the 
eighteenth-century. The third and final case centers on the problem of colonial labor supply that 
prompted British migration to Australia and New Zealand in the nineteenth century. In addition 
to presenting significant concrete problems of imperial economy and administration, these 
conjunctures also spurred momentous theoretical debates in which the very moral foundations of 
the British colonial capitalist enterprise were at stake. It is in the crucible of these debates that 
                                                
21 David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
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the liberal contours of the ideas of “property,” “exchange,” and “labor” were hammered out, yet 
in ways that marked them with scars of colonial violence in and through which their concrete 
referents came into being. 
Property, exchange, and labor provide crucial conceptual handles for our investigation in 
their capacity as hinges that connect, on the one hand, capitalism and liberalism, and on the 
other, political economy and political theory. In the first case, the history of global capitalism is 
one of a planetary reorientation and reconfiguration of property structures, exchange relations, 
and regimes of labor in a historically determinate social organization of human beings’ metabolic 
relation to the non-human world. At the same time, property, exchange, and labor constitute the 
three pillars of the liberal triumphalist narratives that celebrate human liberation and progress in 
the image of private property, free exchange, and free labor. Secondly, property, exchange, and 
labor comprise the building blocks of the field of political economy. The irreducibly ethico-
political content of these notions challenge the conventional portrayals of political economy as a 
precursor to the technical-administrative discipline of economics. Questions of freedom, 
equality, justice, and the good life, and visions of purposeful human existence that have shaped 
the conceptual histories of property, exchange, and labor squarely locate political economy in the 
domain of political theory. 
It is therefore in the register of political economy as a species of political theory that this 
study excavates and reconstructs the contradictory unity of liberalism and capitalism.  In the case 
of the British Empire, this inquiry assumes the form of the following question: how could the 
Britons maintain a liberal image of their commercial-capitalist economy in face of the systematic 
displacement, expropriation, and exploitation that underpinned it in the colonies? My answer to 
this question centers on middle-class intellectuals, and specifically John Locke, Edmund Burke, 
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and Edward Gibbon Wakefield, who made influential attempts to explain and navigate the misfit 
between the liberal principles propounded in the British metropole and the violation of the same 
principles by British colonial capitalism. I examine the intellectual efforts of these figures in two 
overlapping registers. On one level, the works of Locke, Burke, and Wakefield staged a practical 
intervention in particular problems raised by colonial capitalism in their respective historical 
conjunctures. In the writings of these figures, the British political elite and colonial entrepreneurs 
found the theoretical resources with which to imagine the imperial endeavor in the semblance of 
a liberal project. On another level, these intellectuals’ direct engagement with the imperial 
conundrums of their time turn their works into textual surfaces on which we can trace the 
historically specific contradictions between the liberal self-image of capitalism and its illiberal 
colonial realities. The methodological consideration behind selecting Locke, Burke, and 
Wakefield – and not, for instance, Adam Smith or David Ricardo – is their multiple and 
conflicting commitments to British colonial capitalism and to liberal principles rooted in 
metropolitan political economy. The theoretical attempts to reconcile these competing 
allegiances, I argue, provide us with an index to the historical vagaries of liberalism and 
capitalism. The rigor of this indexicality (the acuity with which Locke, Burke, and Wakefield 
apprehended, articulated, and addressed the problematics of property, exchange, and labor) 
undergirds the canonicity of the first two thinkers and calls for more closely studying the third. 
I designate the efforts to cast colonial capitalism in a liberal mold as strategies of 
“disavowal.” Such strategies involved an array of theoretical maneuvers, myths, narratives, and 
fictions, which operated less by occluding the contradiction in question than by demonstrating 
that the contradiction did not exist in the first place.22 Native Americans, who were expropriated 
                                                
22 For the notion of disavowal, I draw upon Sybille Fischer, Modernity Disavowed: Haiti and the Cultures of Slavery 
in the Age of Revolution (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004). 
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under English colonialism, turned out to have indirectly consented to the status of their lands as 
natural commons open to free appropriation; the plunder of India by the British East India 
Company represented the corruption of the British commercial principles rather than their logical 
conclusion; and the reduction of British settlers in New Zealand to agricultural proletarians 
followed from a settler contract by which the settlers voluntarily opted for their own 
dispossession. In short, extra-economic and extra-legal violence that drove capitalist 
transformation throughout the imperial economy was declared contingent, incidental, and 
individual; above all, it did not reflect the essence of capitalism, which allegedly remained liberal 
to the core. 
 
Liberalism, Empire, and Beyond 
 The most immediate intervention of this study is in the recent “imperial turn” in the field 
of political theory.23 A growing spate of scholarship has squarely established the indispensability 
of a global, imperial interpretive lens for reappraising the history of Western political thought, 
which has developed in the context of “state empires.”24 However, as mentioned above, these 
reappraisals are limited by their framing of the subject matter in terms of the interplay between 
the liberal universals espoused by European thinkers and the cultural alterity embodied in 
Europe’s colonized other. A question rarely posed is the specific markers of the universality that 
attaches to the claims of liberalism or the specific nature of cultural particularities that confront 
them. I believe the sweeping invocation of the “particularity of the European experience 
usurping the place of the universal” often falls short of addressing this question. Why, for 
instance, did John Locke deem monotheism irrelevant yet monetarization crucial in deciding 
                                                
23 See Pitts, “Theories of Empire and Imperialism.” 
24 James Tully, Public Philosophy in a New Key, Vol. 2: Imperialism and Civic Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008). 
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whether land in America stood as natural common and therefore open to free English 
appropriation? On what basis did Edmund Burke differentiate between Indian, African, 
American peoples, championing the first against British oppression while prescribing a despotic 
discipline for the second and envisioning the total extermination of the third? More broadly, how 
to explain that enclosing and improving settlers who embodied the civilizing mission of the 
British Empire in the seventeenth century were scorned as degenerate and uncivilized in 
metropolitan discourse when we arrive at the nineteenth century? Whence do the historically 
specific parsing out of the particulars derive, and more importantly, can we devise an analytic 
framework, however provisional, that can piece together these discrete historical instances into a 
meaningful, if discontinuous and incomplete, picture? 
 The study presented here suggests some answers to such questions by pointing to the 
history of global capital as at once a material condition for and a challenge to liberal universals. 
Capital, as a social force with a conceptually universal and spatially global horizon, represents 
the conditions for articulating catholic visions of human progress in the image of private 
property, world market, and free labor. At the same time, the distinctly illiberal processes of 
coercive transformation in and through which capitalist relations arise on a global scale disrupt 
the self-identity of liberalism and obstruct its universal realization. The paradoxical relationship 
between liberalism and capitalism can be expressed more adequately as an endogenous dynamic 
of “competing universals” than as challenges posed by cultural difference to the universal moral 
claims of the West. Viewed through this lens, the economic exploits of the colonizers 
themselves, what the colonizers do instead of who the colonized are, enter the field of vision as a 
source of colonial alterity that needs to be judged by the bar of liberal values enshrined in 
metropolitan political economy. The colonial entrepreneurs who are operative in the formation of 
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global networks of capital, and who thereby lay the conduits through which liberalism can 
extend its claims beyond the confines of Britain, ironically find themselves denigrated in the 
very same terms imputed to colonial peoples, namely, as “despotic” planters, “savage” settlers, 
and “barbaric” chartered company men. It is in the colonies that the friction between the 
universal horizon of capital and the universal aspirations of liberalism sets off the brightest 
sparks. 
I believe the systemic tension outlined above can shed light on historical moments in 
which liberal thought colluded with other political discourses so as to navigate the challenges of 
colonial capitalism. Recent scholarship on liberalism and empire has generated an impressive 
inventory of historical instances in which liberal notions, when confronted by problems of 
colonial rule, are shown to lock arms with narratives of inexorable universal human progress, 
cosmopolitan pluralism, and insurmountable cultural difference.25 To my knowledge, there has 
been no direct attempt to tackle this puzzling promiscuity with which liberal discourse mobilized 
diverse and even conflictual social and political philosophies. I hazard some reflections in 
response to this puzzle, mainly in Chapter 1 and the Conclusion. My guiding conjecture is that 
one major reason liberal thought had to enlist other political discourses was to suture the rift 
opened up in its universal moral claims by the manifest unfreedom and inequality that 
accompanied the historical development of capitalism. The heterogeneous, economically uneven, 
and politically asymmetric networks of imperial political economy, and the different modalities 
of colonial primitive accumulation through which they materialized, can serve as a useful 
heuristic for thinking together the various cross-pollinations between liberalism and other 
political discourses. 
                                                
25 See, respectively, Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe; Sankar Muthu, Enlightenment Against Empire (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2003); Karuna Mantena, Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal 
Imperialism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
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 Furthermore, the colonial genealogy of capitalism holds implications of potential interest 
to those students of political economy who are skeptical towards the ubiquitous conflation of 
capitalism and the market, and the subsumption of both under the rubric of the economy. The 
idea that the market is a natural and spontaneous institution has long been discarded in favor of 
the distinctly political and legal interventions required to establish market relations. Yet, what 
largely persists is a notion of the economy, still treated as roughly coextensive with the domain 
of the market, as separate from if dependent on the sphere of politics. For example, Douglass C. 
North distinguishes exogenous “institutions” from the economic sphere which they circumscribe, 
structure, and make possible.26 Even a most astute critic of capitalism like Karl Polanyi speaks of 
the capitalization of social reproduction as “marketization” and as the disembedding of the 
“economy” from “society.”27  In contrast, going over the history of capitalism with the comb of 
colonial primitive accumulation reveals that distinctly non-market and politically coerced forms 
of production and exchange were crucial moments in the emergence of “liberal political 
economy.” For example, bringing within the conceptual ambit of capital such productive forms 
as the slave-plantation complex or the peasant household under debt-peonage explodes the 
Marxian and liberal definitions of labor under capitalism as a species of private property freely 
contracted on the market.28 
                                                
26 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990). 
27 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 2001). 
28 Jairus Banaji, “The Fictions of Free Labour: Contract, Coercion, and the So-Called Unfree Labour,” Historical 
Materialism 11 (2003): 69-95. Of course, the great divide between the liberal and the Marxian positions on wage 
labor is that the former valorizes it as the sign and seal of freedom while the latter critiques it as a new form of 
bondage (“wage slavery”) in which one is free to choose one’s own master or to starve to death. The relevant I 
emphasize here is not principally about the differential construals of legally free wage labor, but concerns the status 
of legally unfree labor as a modern capitalist social form rather than a pre- or non-capitalist relation of 
subordination. Pioneering in this line of theorization are Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1944); C. L. R. James, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San 
Domingo Revolution (New York: Vintage, 1963). 
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 The same critique can be leveled at the neoliberal theories of the “economy” as a 
putatively self-identical sphere of production, exchange, and consumption, the internal dynamics 
of which can be indirectly managed but cannot be altered by political processes. This conviction, 
while almost doxic in our time, has early modern roots, as Chapters 2, 3, and 4 demonstrate. It 
can be traced back to the seventeenth century, when John Locke located the birth of both landed 
and moneyed property prior to the birth of political societies  (a staple axiom of contemporary 
libertarian philosophy); it can be observed in Edmund Burke’s argument that statesmen can give 
“direction” but not “law” to the workings of the commercial society (prefiguring Friedrich 
Hayek’s distinction between taxiis and logos); it prevails in Wakefield’s stark equation of 
capitalist social relations with civilization per se. The same chapters also demonstrate, however, 
that the projection of an image of the modern economy as an apolitical domain of human 
existence depended on the constant disavowal and incidentalization of the originary violence 
behind capitalist relations through various metaphysical fictions and myths. Private property, 
market exchange, and free labor could be extolled as liberal only to the extent that their 
ideational boundaries were vigilantly watched and their coercive and illiberal underpinnings 
were systematically disavowed. By the same token, contemporary neoliberal discourses can draw 
upon and claim to vindicate these early-modern articulations of the economy as a distinct sphere 
only through a second act of disavowal. The apolitical semblance of the economy and its alleged 
continuity from the time of Adam Smith to the days of Milton Friedman is upheld by jumping 
over (ignoring, incidentalizing, or dismissing) a century-and-a-half of intense class conflict, 
Marxian critique, and socialist experimentation in its Soviet and Third World variants – in other 
words, weaving a fiction of the “invisible hand” bringing about the “end of history.” In contrast, 
while not denying that practical efficacy of the “economy” as a potent discursive construct, I 
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conclude that “political economy” is the adequate conceptual umbrella under which to analyze 
capitalism as a social formation. 
By extension, the prism of primitive accumulation also brings into focus the role of 
sovereign-legal-disciplinary apparatuses in producing and reproducing subjects that are woven 
into the capitalist social formation through work and enterprise. This offers an important 
complement to Foucauldian analyses of “governmentality” understood as a liberal rationality of 
rule under capitalism, or as the new institutionalist economics would label it, a mode of 
managing the economy by shaping incentive structures.29 A view of the legal, executive, and 
administrative measures propelling the socioeconomic transformations of the early modern 
period suggests a markedly illiberal history behind the liberal strategies of government. 
Parliamentary Enclosures, vagrancy laws, workhouses, impressment, transportation, preemptive 
crown rights, states of emergency, and internal colonization schemes, just to name a few, alert us 
to the omnipresence of extra-economic force in the fashioning of productive and governable 
subjects, subjects instilled with “correct” incentives, subjects that belong to and define the 
domain of the economy. In the history of colonial capitalism we can glimpse into the “prehistory 
of liberalism,” that is, the transformation of ungovernable “peoples” into governmentalized 
“populations.” Equally importantly, the imperial perspective can enlarge our focus beyond 
Europe and bring into view empire-building projects as sites of political experimentation. This 
theoretical move can open the way to analyzing the emergence of modern state institutions and 
rationales of rule as part of the broader terrain of “imperial governmentality.”  
                                                
29 See Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France, 1977-1978, ed. Michael 
Senellart (New York: Picador, 2007), and The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978-1979, 
ed. Michael Senellart (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008). 
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 Another important implication of the conceptual revisions suggested in this study is to 
rethink “capital” as a political as opposed to an economic category.30 The idea that capital is 
inherently political, or the “political immanence of capital,” concerns the field of political theory 
perhaps more immediately than it does political economy. Questions of capitalism and political 
economy are palpably marginal in the dominant political theory debates today, as a cursory look 
at the chief political theory journals or the political theory divisions of major conferences would 
attest. Perhaps the most telling instantiation of the neglect is the growing interest in the political 
thought of Hannah Arendt, which has visibly pervaded the field in the last decade. I find the 
widespread fascination with Arendt’s philosophy suggestive mainly because of her persistent 
effort to purge from the domain of politics everything pertaining to social reproduction, or in her 
famous coinage, the “social question.”31 It is with a kindred orientation, I believe, that many 
contemporary theorists speak of “the political” overwhelmingly in terms of action, language, 
agon, and aesthetics. I am afraid there is reason to suspect that the elisions and difficulties that 
traverse Arendt’s effort to cordon off the political from the social (and the economic relations 
that structure the social) also reflect on the field of political theory. Arendt wrote with 
remarkable worry and acumen about the “rise of the social” and the “society of the laborers” as 
the retreat of politics before administration.32 Yet she left the historical origins of capitalist 
modernity, which she traced back to the “expropriation of the poor” (that is, primitive 
accumulation), largely unexamined. In contrast, if we construe primitive accumulation, which 
gives birth to the society of laborers in the first place, as a decisively political as opposed to 
economic process, then we inscribe a political element at the heart of the “social question” that 
                                                
30 For a recent effort in this direction, see Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, Capital as Power: A Study of 
Order and Creorder (New York: Routledge, 2009). 
31 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Viking Press, 1962). 
32 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1958). 
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Arendt tries in her theory to sequester from the realm of politics. Conversely, we expand the 
conceptual domain of political theory to encompass questions of dispossession, expropriation, 
exploitation, and – yes – class. Political theory would neglect these questions to its own 
detriment in the present conjuncture, where political claims are staked in the register of social 
justice against the reign of austerity in the Global North, Chinese style “authoritarian capitalism” 
is driving a wedge between liberal democracy and capitalism, and the competition for natural 
resources in the Global South is raising the specters of “neocolonialism.” 
 Finally, by approaching contemporary global capitalism as the enduring legacy of 
imperial configurations of economic, legal, and social forms, which have outlived formal 
decolonization, this project draws attention to the colonial provenance of contemporary visions 
of progress qua “development.” Despite repeated acknowledgments of its failure, the idea of 
development has shown remarkable resilience in its mutation through manifold institutional-
discursive forms, ranging from colonial dual mandates to national industralization schemes to 
basic needs approaches to entrepreneurship models.33 Under the bewildering variety of the 
semantic content of development, one can discern a persistent politics of universality keyed to 
the indispensability of economic growth, itself predicated on a fuller marketization and 
capitalization of social reproduction.34 A closer inspection of the tropes and rationales forwarded 
to justify such social reconstructions reveals uncanny resemblances with some of the arguments 
mobilized for the transformation and integration of the colonies to global capital networks in the 
early modern period. For instance, advocacy for microcredit schemes in India in the name of 
“empowerment through market” carries the echoes of the seventeenth-century emphases on 
                                                
33 Kalyan Sanyal, Rethinking Capitalist Development: Primitive Accumulation, Governmentality and Post-Colonial 
Capitalism (New Delhi: Routledge, 2007). 
34 Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic Growth, and the Politics of 
Universality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
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commercialization as the mark of social advancement, which set England apart and over 
America and Ireland. Likewise, programs for instituting alienable property rights in urban 
shantytowns in Peru or common lands in Nigeria draw on the conviction that there can be no 
prosperity without private property, a conviction that came to its own in the eighteenth-century 
debates over why precolonial India was economically stagnant and why it needed a “Permanent 
Settlement” of property. The recent push for establishing agro-business plantations in Africa and 
turning small-scale subsistence farmers into commercial entrepreneurs or agricultural laborers 
not only revitalizes colonial narratives of terra nullius, but also taps into the nineteenth-century 
premise that smallholder agriculture and peasantry are inherently stationary and outside the 
purview of modernity as we know it.  
Highlighting these institutional and ideological continuities is not to imply that our 
present moment is simply a re-enactment of the early-modern drama of primitive accumulation, 
for doing so would fall prey to the methodological-nationalist historicism that this project 
confronts. The point is not to cast the “new enclosures” in the image of the English Enclosures 
redux (capitalism “finally” arriving in the Global South). Rather, it is to discover what is “new” 
in the irreducibly global history of the manifold, continuous, and interlocking cycles of primitive 
accumulation, through which today’s Global South has always already been incorporated, 
violently and unevenly, into the global inceptions of capital. The global perspective on 
capitalism as proposed here does not so much alert us to the resurgence of a colonial past as 
remind us of our enduring colonial present. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
COLONIAL CAPITALISM AND THE DILEMMAS OF LIBERALISM 
 
Introduction 
 In the past two decades, the field of political theory has witnessed an efflorescence of 
scholarly work on “empire.” No doubt accelerated by the growing general interest in empire and 
imperialism in the light of post-9/11 American foreign policy,35 a significant adjustment of 
scholarly lenses has been underway since the early 1990s for detecting the broader inflections of 
Western political theory by the enduring colonial legacies of European empires. This timely, 
even belated, “imperial turn” has generated a growing corpus of research that explores the 
manifold forms and multiple trajectories in which the history of European colonialism and the 
formation of Western political thought intersected and influenced each other. Subjected to the 
imperial litmus test are not only decorated names in the pantheon of political thought, such as 
John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and Alexis de Tocqueville, but concepts that constitute the very 
furniture of thought in contemporary political theory, including state, nation, citizenship, social 
contract, constitutionalism, republicanism, liberalism, conservatism, cosmopolitanism, and 
modernity.36 What traverses this diverse and even conflictual scholarly landscape is a 
concurrence on the irreducible imprint of colonialism on Western political theory, and more 
specifically, the challenge posed by colonial difference for the universal aspirations of 
Enlightened European philosophy. 
                                                
35 The emblematic figure in the active promotion of the imperial ideal is, of course, Niall Ferguson, the author of the 
books Empire and Colossus. For a left response to Ferguson’s eulogy to empire. see Collin Mooers (ed.), The New 
Imperialists: Ideologies of Empire (Oxford: One World, 2006).  
36 For an excellent overview of this literature organized along thematic and disciplinary lines, see Pitts, “Theories of 
Empire.” The appearance of such an article in the Annual Review of Political Science indicates that “empire” has 
gained sufficient prominence and heft as an object of inquiry in the field of political science. 
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 A particularly prolific line of inquiry in this scholarship has focused on “liberalism and 
empire,” with Britain providing the most popular cases of study because of its purported status as 
the locus classicus of liberal thought and the largest self-avowed empire that has walked the 
earth. In a seminal work on the “mutual constitution” of liberalism and empire, David Armitage 
famously quipped that roughly from the late-seventeenth century onwards the Britons imagined 
themselves to be a “maritime, commercial, Protestant, and free” people.37 The dilemmas of 
professing liberalism and possessing an empire have since then become a staple object of 
inquiry, primarily along two analytic axes. The first axis regards the problem of domination and 
freedom, and asks a question that relates to republican as well as liberal sensibilities: how could 
a people championing political freedom justify subjugating other peoples?38 The second axis 
concerns issues of universalism and difference, and critically interrogates the responses of 
universalistic dispositions when confronted by social diversity. These two axes intersect on 
Britain’s problematic position as a polity averring universal liberal values yet ruling over a 
multiplicity of culturally different peoples. Set against this problematic, British liberal thought’s 
dealings with cultural alterity in an imperial world is taken to expose the outer boundaries of its 
inclusionary claims.39 
 What remains profoundly underexplored in this scholarship is the political economic 
dimension of the British Empire, which tends to reproduce the familiar rift between intellectual 
and material history by relegating the latter to the province of economic historians. This neglect 
is most unfortunate, not least because the political economic considerations were a major driving 
                                                
37 Armitage, Ideological Origins, p. 173. 
38 A pace-setting article that places this problematic in historical frame is P. J. Marshall’s “A Free Though 
Conquering People: Britain and Asia in the Eighteenth Century,” in A Free Though Conquering People, ed. P. J. 
Marshall (Ashgate: Variorum, 2003). Marshall’s focus is on eighteenth-century liberal conceptions of freedom. For 
a civic humanist perspective on republican liberties and their troubled relationship to empire, see Armitage, 
Ideological Origins. 
39 This argument is widely used as a structuring trope in the postcolonial literature and the “new imperial history.” 
Its exemplary formulation can be found in Mehta, Liberalism and Empire. 
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force behind the construction of empire and its direct impingement on the lives of the colonized. 
But perhaps more importantly for the kinds of questions pursued in this scholarship, the 
economic policies and practices enacted in the colonies by private and public agents themselves 
posed a species of colonial alterity that British liberal thought had to grapple with. The pervasive 
emphasis on political domination over the culturally alien “colonial other” obscures as much as it 
reveals, insofar as it overlooks the profound gap between the liberal self-image of capitalism in 
British metropolitan thought and the coercive economic exploits that British capitalist enterprise 
encompassed in the colonies. For when one surveys the British imperial formation in the “long 
eighteenth century,”40 which frames the study presented here, one is struck by the twin 
trajectories of steady imperial expansion and economic reconstruction spanning a geography 
from North America to New Zealand,41 and the formation of a corpus of liberal political 
economy in Britain stretching from John Locke to David Ricardo.42 As British settlers, chartered 
companies, and colonial governors were deploying armed force for appropriating land in North 
America, for establishing plantations in the Caribbean and procuring slaves from the African 
west coast (themselves to replace white bonded laborers), and for turning the terms of the East 
Indian trade in their favor, enlightened names in Britain were theorizing the sanctity of private 
property, moral and economic virtues of free labor, and the equity and utility of free trade. 
                                                
40 This historical marker roughly encompasses the period the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the great Reform Act 
of 1832. For a historical overview of British social history in this period, see Frank Gorman, The Long Eighteenth 
Century: British Political and Social History, 1688-1832 (London: Arnold, 1997). For a literary approach to this 
historical context, see Paul Baines, The Long Eighteenth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
41 See John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783 (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1989), Chris Bayly, Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780-1830 (London: Longman, 
1989), Anthony Pagden (ed) The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. 1: The Origins of Empire (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998). For the earlier waves of English colonial expansion, see Kenneth Andrews, 
Nicholas Canny, Paul Hair, and David Quinn, The Westward Enterprise: English Activities in Ireland, the Atlantic, 
and America, 1480-1650 (Detroit: Wayne University Press, 1979). A broader overview of European colonial 
expansion can be found in John Weaver, The Great Land Rush and the Making of the Modern World, 1650-1900 
(Montreal, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003). 
42 For an overview, see Phyllis Deane, Evolution of Economic Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1975). 
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Certainly, some of the proponents of these principles figured amongst the most illustrious critics 
of empire.43 However, many chose the path of theoretical experimentation with reconciling the 
liberal image of British commercial economy and its illiberal colonial anchors and supports.44 
 The study presented here addresses the lacuna in the existing literature on liberalism and 
empire by highlighting the theoretical attempts to navigate the contradiction between the liberal 
self-image of capitalism in Britain and the illiberal processes that underpinned the emergence of 
capitalist relations in the colonies. Wherever they conquered and colonized, the British integrated 
indigenous societies and ecologies to their commercial-capitalist networks by significantly 
altering the relations of social reproduction on which these societies rested. Economic integration 
often took extractive and exploitative forms and involved considerable deployment of political 
and military might. The processes of forcible and unequal economic integration into a global and 
heterogeneous network of capitalist production and exchange, which I label here “colonial 
capitalism,” represented an anomaly, and at times an anathema, to the liberal market conceptions 
of capitalism with which the British metropole identified. Such colonial violence often had to be 
judged at the liberal bar of metropolitan political economic thought. 
 For triangulating this problematic, this study examines three momentous historical 
conjunctures in the history of the British Empire, in which the contradiction between the liberal 
self-image of capitalism and its illiberal colonial manifestation condensed around the problems 
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of “property,” “exchange,” and “labor.” I situate these problems respectively in the colonial 
contexts of seventeenth-century America, eighteenth-century India, and nineteenth-century 
Australia and New Zealand. If the liberal self-image of the British colonial capitalist enterprise 
were to be upheld, and therefore its legitimacy and longevity secured, English settlers’ land-
appropriations in American colonies, the nature of Britain’s trade with its Indian dominions, and 
the status of migrant labor in the Antipodes had to be clarified, and the political coercion shaping 
these contexts explained. I focus on John Locke, Edmund Burke, and Edward Gibbon Wakefield 
as three middle-class intellectuals who, being theoretically invested in the pacific commercial 
conception of British capitalism and politically invested in the British imperial structure, 
grappled with the challenges and aporias arising from accommodating colonial capitalism within 
the cast of liberal political economy. 
 Property, exchange, and labor provide us with crucial handles for unraveling these 
aporias by virtue of their centrality to both capitalism and liberalism. On the one hand, the 
reorientation of property relations, exchange systems, and labor organization in the colonies 
towards the profit principle has been essential to the formation of global networks of capital 
accumulation. Imperial force, directly or indirectly, played a crucial role in this process. On the 
other hand, these three notions have also featured as core values in narratives of liberal 
triumphalism that herald the advent of private property, free trade, and free labor as marks of 
human progress. As I hope to demonstrate, private property, free trade, and free labor could be 
imagined as emancipatory and extolled as progressive only to the extent that the forcible 
expropriation, unequal exchange, and dispossession that went on in the colonies were kept out of 
sight, disavowed, or otherwise navigated in discourse. Colonial capitalism as an analytic frame 
for interrogating liberalism thus reveals the ideological boundary-work that permeates the latter’s 
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genealogy, as it brings into view the formative impact of intellectual efforts to broker between, 
on the one hand, the core liberal principles of contractual freedom and juridical equality, and on 
the other, capitalist economic relations that have emerged through colonial violence. When their 
liberal self-image traveled with Britons to other shores, it crashed against colonial capitalism and 
revealed its fragility. It fell upon liberal intellectuals like Locke, Burke, and Wakefield to brace 
the hull. 
 
I. Empire Strikes Back: An Overview 
 History, literature, and anthropology have been grappling for the past four decades with 
the colonial genealogy of the forms of knowledge they deal in.45 Political theory joined this self-
reflective effort quite late. Scattered attempts made in the 1980s to extend interpretive horizons 
to Europe’s colonies remained for the most part neglected.46 The publication of James Tully’s An 
Approach to Political Philosophy in 1993 marked the beginning of the “imperial turn” in 
political theory, which has since transformed the field primarily by problematizing the 
authenticity of modern political concepts previously understood as reflecting exclusively 
European historical experience.47 The new attention to the metropole-colony nexus has attuned 
many scholars to the instances where theories they studied were “addressed to the problems 
discovered in the colonial contact zones.” Paul Gilroy summarizes this new perceptivity when he 
writes, “[e]ven when practical and administrative issues were to the fore, the discussion of what 
                                                
45 Anthropology has been at the forefront of critical self-reflection about the discipline’s colonial origins and 
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46 For example, see Celia McGuiness, “The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina as a Tool for Lockean 
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we can broadly call colonial government encompassed disputes over universality, sovereignty, 
freedom, democracy, property, and justice.”48 In a certain sense, this was the discovery of the 
obvious. The proliferation in Europe of a distinct set of political discourses that we 
retrospectively systematize under the rubric of modern political theory historically coincided 
with the world-historical formation of colonial empires. “European constitutional states, as state 
empires, developed within global systems of imperial and colonial law from the beginning,” 
which means that the problems of government that these states faced could not have been simply 
domestic.49 For the thinkers enshrined in the canon of political theory, meditating on the problem 
of government from the sixteenth century onwards ineluctably entailed meditating about the 
problem of colonial government. “It is now widely understood that a full understating of these 
thinkers’ ideas, as well as the broader traditions they have contributed, requires attention to 
imperial and global contexts and concerns.”50 Thus opened to colonial investigation have been 
traditions of liberalism,51 republicanism,52 conservatism,53 the Enlightenment,54 and their 
essential notions such as contract,55 sovereignty,56 law,57 and constitutionalism.58 Significant 
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debts have been incurred in the process to scholars of postcolonial theory who had been on the 
frontlines of interrogating the established European modes of knowledge and thought from a 
colonial perspective.59 Consequently, writing on the history of European political thought 
without acknowledging its imperial entanglements is now vulnerable to charges of a myopic 
disciplinary, if not normative, Eurocentrism. 
 Liberal thought has received the most intense and sustained attention in the imperial turn. 
“Liberalism and empire” has come to capture a host of contradictions and ambiguities pertaining 
to the relationship between, on the one hand, the principles of subjective rights, rule of law, 
limited and representative government, and toleration of ethical pluralism, and on the other, 
imperial practices of domination and foreign rule, unaccountable and untrammeled power, and 
disenfranchisement and exclusion. Tully set the pace for the initial spate of scholarship by 
compellingly implicating John Locke’s political theory in the justification of the dispossession of 
Amerindians by English settlers, and later unearthing similar imperial complicities in other 
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members of the liberal pantheon, including Emeric de Vattel and Immanuel Kant.60 Barbara 
Arneil and James Farr deepened the study of Locke’s colonial involvements, while Uday 
Mehta’s interpretation of Locke, James Mill, and James Stuart Mill in Liberalism and Empire 
represented the zenith of indicting liberalism as an inherently imperialist political philosophy.61  
After Mehta’s catholic critique, scholarship on liberalism and empire bifurcated, as new 
works emphasizing liberalism’s ambivalence vis-à-vis empire appeared alongside the 
established, though increasingly nuanced, accounts of liberal-imperial liaisons. Vicki Hsueh 
underscored the hesitations that permeate Locke’s colonial writings.62  Emma Rothschild 
explored the epistemological ambiguities and political dilemmas surrounding colonial joint-stock 
companies in eighteenth-century debates in political economy,63 while Sankar Muthu and 
Jennifer Pitts plumbed the late eighteenth-century Enlightenment thought for committed 
criticisms of European empires. Muthu’s reconstruction of an anti-imperial stance from the 
works of Adam Smith, Dennis Diderot, Immanuel Kant, and Johann G. Herder drew attention to 
an anomaly in a period of growing imperial confidence.64 Pitts, while consigning Nicolas de 
Condorcet and Alexis de Tocqueville to the “turn to empire” in France, defended the Scottish 
Enlightenment against Christopher Berry’s imputations of imperial complicity, and even 
redeemed Jeremy Bentham who had been perceived as the imperial legislator par excellence.65 
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Despite significant disagreement over interpretive frames, this scholarship has evinced 
remarkable consistency in attributing anti-imperialist dispositions to Edmund Burke and 
convicting James and John Stuart Mill as irredeemable theorists of the British Empire. The 
rejoinder came from Margaret Kohn and Daniel O’Neill, who disclosed the civilizational 
hierarchies in Burke’s thought that rendered it compatible with imperial agendas, and 
complicated John Stuart Mill’s take on empire in a gesture that echoed Lynn Zastoupil’s take on 
Mill.66 Yvonne Chiu, and Robert Taylor further mined Mill’s works to argue that his was not a 
blunt support for civilizing imperialism but a systematic and catholic theory of historical 
development.67 The perceived tension between the abstract universals of liberal thought and the 
cultural pluralism that it had to confront in the colonies was cast into doubt by Karuna Mantena’s 
brilliant study of Henry Maine, in which she showed liberalism to be quite compatible with 
essentialist discourses of cultural difference when “indirect colonial rule” was the strategy of the 
day.68 
 What strikes one in this scholarship is the preponderance of, first, the cultural and 
representational focus of analysis, and second, the position of the culturally alien “colonial 
other” as the pivot of liberalism’s troubled relationship to empire.69 Ann Laura Stoler, for 
instance, defines “colonial studies” as “a field devoted to the nature of European empires, their 
                                                
indirect yet influential figure colonial legislation in India (an interpretation that colors Mehta’s account) belongs to 
Eric Stokes’s English Utilitarians and India (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959). 
66 Margaret Kohn and Daniel I. O’Neill, “A Tale of Two Indias: Burke and Mill on Empire and Slavery in the West 
Indies and America,” Political Theory 34 (2006): 192-228; O’Neil, “Rethinking Burke”; Lynn Zastoupil, John 
Stuart Mill and India (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994). An earlier attempt to piece together Burke’s 
ambivalences on empire is Frederick Whelan’s Edmund Burke and India: Political Morality and Empire 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996). 
67 Robert Taylor and Yvonne Chiu, “The Self-Extinguishing Despot: Millian Democratization,” The Journal of 
Politics 73 (2011): 1-12. 
68 Mantena, Alibis of Empire. 
69 For an excellent overview of some of the prominent works in this field, see Sartori, “British Empire. 
  35 
rationales and representations of rule.”70 For Mehta, concrete historical instances of political 
exclusion under liberal imperialism are “elaborations” of the exclusionary principles at the heart 
of liberalism as an abstract philosophy.71 Pitts declares the “central concern” of her book to be 
“how the thinkers under study analyzed and judged unfamiliar societies.”72 In her contribution to 
the postcolonial project of “dismantling the deep assumption that only white people are fully 
human,” Catherine Hall’s emphasis falls on the position of the colony as the “representational 
constitutive outside” of the metropole.73 Likewise, Mantena restricts the object of her study to 
“conceptualizations of universalism and cultural diversity” as they evolve “in response to a 
changing set of imperial dilemmas,” and considers how “philosophical claims about human unity 
and diversity were negotiated, contested, and reconstituted on the practical terrain of imperial 
politics.”74 Finally, in a full-blown expression of the post-colonial and post-modern moorings of 
the “new imperial history,” Kathleen Wilson centers on “the importance of difference” in the 
unstable constitution of a multiplicity of raced and gendered subject-positions in the 
“interconnected and interdependent sites” of the British Empire.75 
One could argue, certainly with some simplification, that most of the arguments on 
liberalism and empire share a basic grammatical structure in which representational order always 
takes precedence in the analytic sequence. Liberalism as a political philosophy stakes its claims 
in inclusive terms, precisely because its language is abstract and applies indiscriminately to a 
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“universal constituency.”76 However, these universal claims, such as the moral equality of all 
individuals and their right to define and pursue their own ethical conceptions, are predicated on 
culturally specific and tacit qualifications, which are forced into daylight when confronted by 
alien cultures on colonial shores. From this confrontation ensues a range of epistemic 
perplexities and anxieties, including the crumbling of pre-colonial cosmologies, the ever-present 
sense of precariousness that accompanies the secular belief in European superiority, and the 
guilty recognition of “self-deception in every act of domination.”77 Colonizers respond to the 
challenge of colonial difference with a range of discursive strategies for mitigating the 
dissonance between the alleged universality of liberal claims and their practical denial to the 
colonized. These include qualifying the requisite faculties for exercising these universal rights78 
or allocating differential levels of “reasonableness” to colonized peoples and attenuating their 
license for independent historical development.79 Mapping colonial difference onto historicist 
timelines of stadial evolution, whereby the “rule of colonial difference” always tells the 
colonized that the time for self-rule is “not yet” there,80 is compounded by differentiated 
rationales of colonial government based on presumed civilizational hierarchies,81 or by turning 
cultural difference itself into a hinge of paternalist discourse and colonial rule.82 In its extreme 
versions, empire is confined to the “single dimension of the pedagogical project of 
modernization or civilization.”83 
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The issue I would like to raise is less with the particular works mentioned above than 
with the overall tendency endemic to the scholarship on liberalism and empire to overlook the 
dimension of political economy. In an recent edited volume on empire, Jomo K. S. writes, “[i]t 
must be a sign of the times we live in that a contemporary conference on the ‘Lessons of Empire’ 
has so little consideration of recent economic theories of modern capitalist imperialism.”84 In 
Jomo’s view, contemporary imperialism is still in need of a critique that could match in 
perspicacity the notable early-twentieth century analyses of modern imperialism elaborated by 
Rudolf Hilferding, Vladimir. I. Lenin, and John A. Hobson, and Rosa Luxemburg. The reductive 
and teleological grammar that structured such Marxian theories of imperialism and “displaced 
[colonialism] into the inexorable logics of modernization and world capitalism”85 is certainly to 
blame for their fall from grace, but itself not an adequate explanation.86 One could also attribute 
the discomfort and neglect with economic arguments about empire to the path-dependent 
influence of the “cultural” and “linguistic” turns on the imperial turn.87 There are grounds to 
worry that these theoretical interventions have thrown the baby out with the bathwater when their 
critique of crude economism, present in Marxian and structural-functionalist explanations alike, 
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tipped over into jettisoning all serious engagement with capitalism. Geoff Eley’s observation is 
on the mark: 
So far, interestingly, much of the ‘Black Atlantic’ argument has tended to be formulated around questions 
of citizenship and personhood focused by the impact of the French Revolution, most classically with 
respect to the Haitian Revolution and the wider insurrectionary radicalisms and aspirations to freedom in 
the Caribbean, rather than around the modernity of capitalism as such. There’s perhaps a way in which the 
big turning away from social history to cultural history has occluded our ability to see this primary form 
of ‘the social’ very confidently any more or even to write at all about the origins of capitalism in the 
earlier manner of the 1960s and 1970s.88 
 
One major problem with this disposition is that it ends up presupposing the material presence of 
empire as little more than a given for the liberal intellectuals under study. Economic motivations 
and political considerations that animated dynamic processes of imperial construction and 
reconstruction are for the most part bracketed, apart from some fleeting remarks to a vague 
notion of “commercial greed” that is supposed to explain imperial expansion.89 To put it 
succinctly, while most accounts of liberalism and empire engage in a contextual explication of 
liberal texts, they rarely relate such explications to a conscious theory of the imperial context.90  
Andrew Sartori captures this problem well when he writes, “the key to unraveling the 
shifting ambiguities of liberal attitudes toward empire might lie in a more rigorous attempt to 
embed the conceptual structure of liberal thought in the sociohistorical contexts of its 
articulation.”91 As I elaborate in the next section, there are important theoretical and interpretive 
insights to be derived from returning to a heterodox, non-teleological, and globally oriented 
Marxian political economic analysis of empire as the context for interrogating liberal thought. 
This is not to glibly assert that “economy matters,” but rather to call attention to the structural 
dynamics that propelled, shaped, and delimited the courses of imperial expansion, and generated 
                                                
88 Eley, “Historicizing the Global, pp. 164-5. 
89 See, for instance, Mehta, Liberalism and Empire, p. 163. 
90 For a rigorous discussion of methodological problems that attend textual analysis and contextual approach, see J. 
G. A. Pocock, “Theory in History: Problems of Context and Narrative,” in The Oxford Handbook of Political 
Science, ed. Robert Goodin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
91 Sartori, “British Empire,” p. 624. 
  39 
a whole new gamut of contradictions that called for political theorization.92 I maintain that these 
contradictory dynamics belonged to the historical formation of global capitalism, which 
essentially proceeded through colonial processes of economic integration and restructuration, 
exploitation and extraction, reform and destruction.  
Suspicion towards economic analyses of empire is in part a suspicion towards Marxian 
conceptions of capitalism as an autonomous and totalizing economic force. Overcoming such 
aversion necessitates clearly outlining its sources in Marxist analyses of imperialism and 
demonstrating that Marxian thought harbors the resources for devising a materialist approach to 
the position of empire in the history of global capital. In orthodox Marxian narratives, 
colonialism and imperialism erupt as the violent effects of the expansionary thrust of capitalism. 
Capitalism is born in Europe but cannot be contained there; it thereby spills over into the rest of 
the world to remake it, as Marx wrote, “in its own image,” or as Lenin argued, to postpone its 
crises.93 Ironically, Whiggish or Schumpeterian accounts of capitalism are shaped by the same 
diffusionist spatiotemporal grammar. Capitalism originates in Europe, and its commercial and 
cosmopolitan nature logically presupposes the gradual economic integration of the world.  This 
natural and pacific tendency, however, is disrupted and distorted by the atavistic imperialism of 
the European states. Whether capitalism is wedded to imperialism or pitted against it, it is 
assigned national or European origins and imagined to diffuse, for better or for worse, to the rest 
of the planet.94 
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I contend that instead of such “capitalist globalization” narratives, we should think about 
the “global inceptions of capital.” A move in this direction would be to conceptualize capitalism 
as a historical formation that has emerged in and through colonial networks, themselves soaked 
with the political power of empires and various actors therein, including metropolitan and 
colonial governments, chartered companies, and settlers. These agents’ colonial activities were 
operative in the proliferation and consolidation of planetary webs of production and exchange 
that constituted the infrastructure of global capitalism, even though bringing about global 
capitalism did not rank among their meditated priorities. Imperial centers, colonial governors, 
planters, settlers, merchants, and missionaries held very diverse and even conflicting social and 
economic aspirations which were often frustrated; colonial extraction and exploitation did not 
always pay off; economic considerations always had to be negotiated against local ecology and 
indigenous societal structures; plans to restructure production and exchange to maximize profit 
ran into frequent resistance; in short, the formation of global networks of capital conformed less 
to an image of smooth outward “expansion” from Europe than to a jagged genealogy local of 
struggles and strategies interconnected by imperial flows of people, commodities, and ideas.  
The essential theoretical point I would like to propose is that these processes compel us to 
supplant the nation-state with the “colonial empire” as the space in which to situate the world-
                                                
Locke and Agrarian Capitalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Origin 
of Capitalism: A Longer View (London: Verso, 2002); David McNally, Political Economy and the Rise of 
Capitalism: A Reinterpretation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); Eric J. Hobsbawm, The Age of 
Capital, 1848-1875 (New York: Scribner, 1975). The incidental role assigned to the colonies in the rise of 
capitalism is compounded by their construal as the passive recipient of the socioeconomic developments taking 
place in Europe. In a bold work, James Blaut criticizes such narratives of capitalist globalization for being extruded 
through “the colonizer’s model of the world,” and specifies the meta-theory that structures this model as 
“diffusionism.” Blaut argues that diffusionism operates as a “truth regime” by regulating the legitimacy of 
knowledge and plausibility of narratives of capitalist modernity, in which Europe figures “as the perpetual 
fountainhead of history.” Blaut, Colonizer’s Model, pp. 7-17. Blaut’s observation that diffusionism is a deeply 
ingrained grammar of thought rather than an explicit discourse is vindicated by the controversies triggered by Martin 
Bernal and Susan Buck-Morss’s apostate attempts to de-center and displace European civilization and philosophy 
beyond Europe. See Martin Bernal, Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization (New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press, 1987); Susan Buck-Morss, “Hegel and Haiti,” Critical Inquiry 26 (2000): 821-65. 
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historical development of capitalism. A crucial corollary of the colonial perspective on 
capitalism is a special emphasis on the role of political power, exercised by the imperial core or 
by colonial agents who assumed or usurped it, in effectuating the “authoritative political ordering 
of space”95 in which capitalism as a historically specific “mediation of exploitation and 
accumulation” germinated.96 In other words, the notion of capitalism I deploy here denotes an 
inherently political and historically colonial formation. 
Once positioned in relation to capitalism as an inherently political and historically 
colonial formation, the conundrums of liberal thought appear in a new light. The cultural 
difference of the colonial other becomes compounded and mediated by the political economic 
agendas of the imperial actors. What these actors do to the colonized, and not just who the 
colonized are, emerges as a central issue to be confronted by liberal thought. If capitalism is as 
much a political category, which encompasses the deployment of non-market coercion and extra-
legal political violence for (re)organizing production, distribution, and exchange in the colonies, 
then it unsettles the liberal understandings of capitalism as a fundamentally market phenomenon 
resting on the contractual freedom and juridical equality of individuals. Adjusting our lenses to 
imperial political economy therefore necessitates that we look beyond “the unfamiliar” embodied 
in the colonized97 and consider the economic exploits in the colonies as a source of strain on 
liberal universals. Frederick Cooper neatly encapsulates the broader problem: 
                                                
95 George Steinmetz, “Imperialism or Colonialism? From Windhoek to Washington, by Way of Basra,” in Lessons 
of Empire, ed. Calhoun et al. p. 147 
96 Enrique Dussel, “The “World System”: Europe as “Center” and Its “Periphery,”” in Colonialism and Its Legacies, 
ed. Levy and Young, p. 109. A comprehensive theorization of capital as a historically determinate form of mediation 
of exploitation is provided by Moishe Postone, Time, Labor, and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx’s 
Critical Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Similarly, Massimo de Angelis differentiates 
between capitalist and non-capitalist class societies, which otherwise share the common trait of exploitation and 
extraction of surplus, on the basis of the limits to the extraction of surplus value – that is, whether extraction of 
surplus is limited by the concrete needs of the dominant classes or unhinged by the drive to accumulate value. De 
Angelis, The Beginning of History: Value Struggles and Global Capital (London: Pluto, 2007), p. 45. 
97 Mehta, “Liberal Strategies,” and Liberalism and Empire. 
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That certain issue networks in France and Britain saw the space of empire in moral terms and argued that 
enslavement or abuse of subject populations violated imperial integrity did not prevent imperial 
governments and settlers from being brutal and exploitative, but it did ensure that scandals would be a 
periodic feature of imperial governance in democratic states: over slavery, massacres, colonial wars, 
forced labor and poverty.98 
 
Recast in the register of political economy, we need to highlight as a source of colonial alterity 
the colonial breach of the metropolitan principles undergirding the colonizers’ liberal self-
perception. This is what I call the challenge of colonial capitalism to liberal thought. 
 
II. Colonial Capitalism as an Analytic Frame 
The notion of “colonial capitalism” that I adopt here as the theoretical linchpin of my 
argument needs careful explication, not least because “capitalism” itself is notorious for its 
protean character, the ambiguity of its referent, and the wildly different analytic uses and 
political causes to which it has been enlisted. The term “capitalism” operative in the analysis I 
present here denotes a heterogeneous and contradictory global social formation composed of 
diverse relations of production and exchange that are sutured by the principles of (1) mediation 
of access to the conditions of work and subsistence by the imperative to generate value, or the 
capital-relation, itself monetarily expressed in the profit principle,99 (2) overall orientation of the 
productive enterprise to the constant accumulation and expansion of value via reinvestment of 
profits,100 (3) omnipresence of compulsion and coercion (open or tacit) in the creation and 
reproduction of the capital-relation. These abstract principles belong to what Chakrabarty, 
extrapolating from Marx, labels the “universal logic” or “being” of capital, which makes possible 
one to delineate the historical “becoming” of capital, or what I call here the “global genealogy” 
                                                
98 Frederick Cooper, “Modernizing Colonialism and the Limits of Empire,” in Lessons of Empire, ed. Calhoun et al., 
p. 66. 
99 Here I broadly follow Marx’s labor theory of value. See David Harvey, The Limits to Capital (London: Verso, 
2006), especially chapters 1-4; Postone, Time, Labor. 
100 Immanuel Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004). 
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of capitalism.101 An attention to the global genealogy of capitalism, I argue, calls for a 
conceptual reappraisal of capitalism as “colonial capitalism.” 
A good starting point for unpacking “colonial capitalism” is Subrahmanyam’s 
fundamentally socioeconomic notion of the “colonial empire,” which he defines as “a particular 
type of empire that is fundamentally characterized by the exploitative economic relations 
between an imperial core and a subject periphery.”102 Economic exploitation of colonial 
peripheries by capitalist core countries is hardly a novel observation; however, a lot hinges on 
where one situates colonial exploitation in the history of capitalism. Appending colonial 
exploitation to the frills of the capitalist mode of production amounts to excluding it from any 
meaningful theory of capital by locating capital’s genesis in Europe and its post factum 
repercussions in the colonies. In this case, one does not need to know about colonialism to 
understand the inner composition and dynamics of capital, since there is no necessary 
relationship between colonialism and capitalism. In contrast, if we designate colonialism to be 
coeval and intertwined with the origins of capitalism, then we not only expand the terrain of 
social relations that we ought to analyze for understanding capitalism, but we also displace 
Europe as the putative cradle of capitalist modernity.  
Since my reappraisal is susceptible to a certain misunderstanding, I would like to 
emphasize at the outset that adopting a colonial perspective on the origins of capitalism does not 
                                                
101 Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe, pp. 63-6. This universal logic and the historical institutional formations 
from which it is abstracted also clarify the distinction between “capital” and “capitalism.” Chakrabarty captures this 
distinction elegantly when he writes, “[t]he logical presuppositions of capital can only be worked out by someone 
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Ibid, pp. 63, 70. In contrast to Chakrabarty’s effort to retain both notions, Michel Foucault suggests dropping the 
term “Capital” altogether in favor of “capitalism.” Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics. 
102Sanjay Subrahmanyam, “Imperial and Colonial Encounters: Some Comparative Reflections,” in Lessons of 
Empire, ed. Calhoun et al., p. 220. 
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amount to denying the revolutionary reorganization of social reproduction that boosted the 
productivity of social labor in Europe. Nor does it imply that the place of colonialism in the 
history of capitalism consisted exclusively in the inaugural plunder of resources. Capitalism is 
not simply the hoarding of what eighteenth-century political economists called “stock,” but an 
epochally specific constellation of social relations. While the colonial mobilization of raw 
materials was essential for the vision and materialization of global capitalist structures,103 the 
significance of colonialism in the history of capitalism goes beyond simply providing material 
supplies. More importantly, colonial loci and networks were central in their capacity as social 
spaces for providing the concrete conditions for imagining and experimenting with new ways of 
organizing social production for profit, which would be difficult to conceive and even harder to 
attempt in Europe.104 Finally, these two elements are compounded by the fresh fields of 
investment, expanded markets (themselves spurred by colonial settlement and investment), and 
novel forms of economic enterprise called forth by colonial ventures.105 Together, these planes of 
possibility comprised a global social topography, in which new historical modes of imagining, 
planning, and practicing humans’ relationship to one another and to the nonhuman world became 
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104 Most importantly, the Atlantic slave plantation, far from being a precapitalist formation or an anomaly in an 
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possible. These novel modes of imagination and practice coalesced into the global constellation 
of social relations, the historically determinate cosmography of power and property, that we call 
capitalism.106 This is not so much to argue that the “industrial revolution” of the early nineteenth 
century did not take place in Britain as to maintain that its historical conditions of possibility lay 
well beyond the islands. 
Karl Marx and Rosa Luxemburg’s theories of “primitive accumulation” represent early 
and invaluable attempts to posit the history of colonialism as originary and integral to the history 
of capitalism. In the last section of Capital, volume 1, Marx defines “primitive accumulation” 
(ursrprüngliche Akkumulation) as the “process that creates the capital-relation … the process 
which divorces the worker from the ownership of the conditions of his own labor,” thereby 
turning social means of subsistence and production into capital, and immediate producers into 
“free” wage-laborers whose subsistence would then be conditional upon their producing surplus-
value for capitalist employers.107 Primitive accumulation encompasses the expropriation of direct 
producers through the deployment of “extra-economic force” by state- or non-state actors, and 
thus constitutes the political crucible in which the capital-relation is forged. 
One can discern a peculiar (and as I show below, productive) tension in Marx’s account 
of primitive accumulation. On the one hand, his rigorous formal definition of the term (the 
separation of direct producers from the social means of subsistence and production) seems to 
dovetail with, if not exclusively abstracted from, the period of English Enclosures and Highland 
Clearances, which were essential to the consolidation of “agrarian capitalism” in Britain.108 On 
the other hand, his deployment of the same term seems to overflow this narrow formalism when 
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he includes the colonies in the history of primitive accumulation, that is, the history that has 
made the capitalist mode of production of possible: 
The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement, and entombment in mines of 
the indigenous population of that continent, the beginnings of the conquest and plunder of India, and the 
conversion of Africa into a preserve for the commercial hunting of blackskins, are all things that 
characterize the dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief moments 
of primitive accumulation.109 
 
Direct appropriation of natural resources, forced labor, and unequal exchange in the colonies, 
along with the organized armed coercion that made them possible, are openly deemed to be 
moments of “primitive accumulation” despite their obvious misfit with Marx’s explicit definition 
of the concept. Marx, to his great credit, braids metropolitan and colonial histories around the 
axis of primitive accumulation, whereby the colonies figure as prominently as the metropole in 
the “prehistory of capital.”110 However, Marx’s revolutionary reformulation of capital’s origins 
comes embroiled in a contradiction with his historicist disposition to imagine modern history as 
the homogenization of social relations across the planet under the universalizing onslaught of 
capital. All that solid melts into the air, social and historical particularities are eradicated in the 
polarization between the owners of capitals and wage-laborers, and the internal contradictions of 
capital are universally consummated.111  
                                                
109 Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, p. 915 
110 Ibid, p. 875. 
111 Marx’s social theory and his account of the historical development of capitalism harbors unmistakable elements 
of historicism that have made him a target of sustained attack, especially from postcolonial scholars. In one respect, 
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ravages of primitive accumulation. For an insightful perspective on the “universalizing” role of primitive 
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A similar tension also marks Luxemburg’s brilliant study of the constitutive role of 
political violence in extending capital’s reach, penetrating and transforming non-capitalist social 
forms like subsistence farming, petty commodity production, and feudal agrarianism.112 
Luxemburg’s acute theorization and careful historical reconstruction of “colonial policy as 
primitive accumulation” remains indispensable for an understanding of colonial capitalism. 
Similarly, her crucial insight that capital structurally depends on the exploitation of non-capitalist 
social domains remains a guiding beacon for analyses of classical and contemporary forms of 
imperialist exploitation.113 Unfortunately, Luxemburg’s horizon, like Marx’s, is circumscribed 
by a teleology of homogenization in that she proleptically posits the end of capitalist world 
system the moment it realizes itself fully, that is, overruns the last bastion of non-capitalist social 
relations.114 
I think the incommensurability between the formal theorization and the historical 
description of primitive accumulation in Marx and Luxemburg offers a useful wedge for 
cracking open the historicist narratives of capitalism and reconstructing from their fragments a 
notion of capitalism as a political and colonial formation. We need to reappraise Marx and 
Luxemburg’s insights into the dynamics of capitalism, primitive accumulation, and colonialism 
by relocating them to a theoretical register where the notion of “capital” functions as “not so 
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much […] a teleology of history as […] a perspectival point from which to read the archives.”115 
While retaining the conceptually universal and spatially global horizon of capital,116 this 
theoretical move compels us to rethink capitalism along three definitive axes, whereby we move 
towards a workable notion of “colonial capitalism.” These three axes are (1) the global and 
colonial inceptions of capitalism, (2) the multiplicity and heterogeneity of interdependent and 
contradictory social forms which it comprises as a world-system, and (3) the originary, that is, 
both foundational-historical and structural-quotidian, element of extra-economic coercion and 
political force that directly and indirectly (re)produces it.  
The first of these reconceptualizations takes issue with the internalist schemas of 
“methodological nationalism” which hypostatizes the nation-state as the ultimate politico-legal 
context for explaining the emergence of capitalist relations. This position is best exemplified by 
the idea of autochthonous capitalism that structures histories of “British capitalism” and the 
“British working class,”117 but it also persists in political economic analyses of imperialism that 
                                                
115 Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe, p. 63. My specific reconstruction of the history of colonial capitalism is 
methodologically indebted to Chakrabarty’s postcolonial reading of Marx. 
116 As diverse perspectives on Marx’s theory of capital as postcolonialism and autonomism concur on the universal 
socio-spatial horizon of capital. Partha Chatterjee, for instance, defines capital as “global in its territorial reach and 
universal in its conceptual domain.” Chatterjee, Nation and Its Fragments, p. 235. Massimo de Angelis’s 
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93 above. 
117 I am referring here to the competing Marxist histories of capitalism during the “transition debates” of the 1960s 
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chronicles the discontinuous history of the polyglot global working class. 
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ask whether empire was profitable for Britain.118 A more compelling position, on which I build 
here, considers capitalism as emerging in and through hierarchical, uneven, and discontinuous 
colonial networks, rather than arising prior to and later instrumentalizing these networks. In this 
“non-diffusionist” approach, capital accumulation structurally occurs on a “world scale.” 
Imperial metropoles are less autonomous national centers than privileged hubs or epicenters in 
rhizomatic networks of capital accumulation, hubs that exert a preponderant influence in 
organizing value chains and claim a disproportionate share of the surplus produced globally.119 
                                                
118 This line of criticism is forwarded most notably in Anthony Brewer, Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical 
Survey (London: Routledge, 1980). Also see Davis and Huttenback, Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire. Invoking 
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connections: Trade, Economy, Fiscal State, and the Expansion of Empire, 1688-1815” in The Oxford History of the 
British Empire, Vol. 2, ed. P. J. Marshall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 76. Kenneth Morgan, 
“Mercantilism and the British Empire, 1688-1815,” in The Political Economy of the British Historical Experience 
1688-1914, ed. Donald Winch and Patrick O’Brien (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). Secondly, and more 
importantly, the methodological-nationalist approach to empire remains stuck with an understanding of capital as 
“stock,” rather than viewing it as a complex social relationship, the structural conditions of which are non-economic 
and hence cannot be reduced to profit-loss calculus. With such reductive presuppositions, this perspective drives its 
stakes in the wrong question, “was empire profitable?” More apposite questions would be “would capitalism as a 
world system be possible without colonialism? How has the entwinement of colonial and capitalist genealogies 
molded the history of the present? What are the social relations it has created (and destroyed), networks and flows of 
human beings, resources, and ideas it has fostered (and curtailed), global and local norms it has promoted (and 
demoted), and the enduring hierarchies and inequalities it has generated?” 
119 Some of the touchstones of this “non-diffusionist” conceptualization of the global and colonial inceptions of 
capitalism include the following. For the Atlantic, see Williams, Capitalism and Slavery; James, Black Jacobins. For 
Asia, see, Janet Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989); K. N. Chaudhuri, Asia Before Europe: Economy and Civilisation of the Indian Ocean from 
the Rise of Islam to 1750 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990); Sanjay Subrahmanyam, “Connected 
Histories: Notes towards a Reconfiguration of Early Modern Eurasia,” Modern Asian Studies 31 (1997): 163-74. For 
integrative global accounts, see Blaut, Colonizer’s Model; Samir Amin, Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique 
of the Theory of Underdevelopment (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974); Amin, Imperialism and Unequal 
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Put obversely, colonial networks that span the globe from Americas to the antipodes constitute 
the conditions of possibility of capitalism, rather than auxiliary conduits through which 
autochthonous metropolitan capital flows to the rest of the world. 
 The second theoretical move follows from the first and takes us beyond the 
understanding of capital as a homogenizing historical force that obliterates non-capitalist, 
especially “traditional” or “indigenous,” relations of social reproduction. Instead of a tidal-wave 
image of capitalism surging outward from the imperial-capitalist cores and flattening all social 
difference that stands in its way, it draws our attention to the heterogeneous and interdependent 
multiplicity of local relations of production and exchange that configure into a world system of 
capital accumulation.120 The historicist bias, shared by Marxian and mainstream theories of 
development, judges the extent of capitalist maturation by the degree to which wage-labor 
regulated by free markets becomes the predominant form of organizing production. This 
occludes a crucial historical fact and a structural feature of capitalism, namely, its capacity to 
“articulate”121 a plurality of ostensibly non-capitalist social forms into the global configuration of 
                                                
Development  (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977); Amin, Eurocentrism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1989); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System (New York: Academic Press, 1975); Wallerstein, 
Historical Capitalism: With Capitalist Civilization (London: Verso, 1995); Fernand Braudel, Civilization and 
Capitalism: 15th-!8th Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). 
120 De Angelis offers a lucid formulation for tracing the structural heterogeneity of capitalism from its inceptions to 
its present moment: “the transatlantic trade circuit M-C-M’ [profit principle] is an early example of global 
articulation of different conditions and activities of production and reproduction, different socio-economic 
compositions of labour, different class compositions, different cultural languages of struggles, different 
subjectivities. From the perspective of capital and its reproduction, it is a global articulation of different techniques 
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commodities in the trade circuits. M-C-M’ value practices, in other words, stated to pervade production and 
preproduction and increasingly turn life practices into ‘work.’” De Angelis, Beginning of History, p. 49. 
121 The notion of articulation as used here refers to the interlocking and mutual configuration of a multifarious array 
of legal and political forms of labor control and surplus extraction, whereby local social structures that do not figure 
as immediately governed by the logic of capital-relation nonetheless become a moment in the broader circuits of its 
circulation and realization. For the insight that capitalism as a system of production rests as much on the articulation 
as on the assimilation of ostensibly non-capitalist social relations, I am indebted very much to the studies of Marxist 
anthropologists like Sidney Mintz and labor historians like Gyan Prakash, Jairus Banaji, Rakesh Bhandari. See 
Sidney Mintz, Sweetness and Power; Gyan Prakash, Bonded Histories: Genealogies of Servitude in Colonial India 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Rakesh Bhandari, “The Disguises of Wage Labor: Juridical 
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accumulation. These include forms of unfree proletarian labor (be it actual as in plantation 
slavery or virtual as in sharecropping), free non-proletarian labor (such as family labor in cottage 
industries and commercialized peasant agriculture), neither free nor proletarian labor (for 
example, forms of debt peonage in petty commodity production). Jairus Banaji offers a very 
succinct formulation of this process: 
In short, historically, capital accumulation has been characterised by considerable flexibility in the 
structuring of production and in the forms of labour and organisation of labour used in producing surplus-
value. The liberal conception of capitalism which sees the sole basis of accumulation in the individual 
wage-earner conceived as a free labourer obliterates a great deal of capitalist history, erasing the 
contribution of both enslaved and collective (family) units of labour-power.122 
 
Set in this topography of heterogeneous productive relations, wage labor figures as only one 
form extracting surplus value, which is relatively (and only relatively) salient in the imperial 
metropole.123 
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formally correspond to Marx’s notions of “real subsumption” and “formal subsumption” of labor under capital, 
formulated in the appendix to Capital, Vol. 1. The strategic constellation of real and formal subsumption in the 
historical formation of capitalism also registers an objection to Giovanni Arrighi’s identification of capitalism 
exclusively with “creative destruction.” See Arrighi, Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century 
(London: Verso, 2007), chapter 3. 
122 Banaji, “Fictions of Free Labor,” pp. 85-6. Banaji uses the examples of antebellum slavery in Southern US, 
nineteenth-century Indian family labor recruited through the “advances system,” and labor tenancy in South Africa 
in order to substantiate the point that those labor relations that are formally non-capitalist, when articulated to the 
loops of capital accumulation, function as capitalist relations as they reproduce and augment the total social capital. 
Rakesh Bhandari builds on Banaji’s position to argue that formally free wage-labor “only normally takes that form 
within a hegemonic and fully developed capitalist mode of production.” Bhandari, “Disguises of Wage Labor,” p. 
85. I would complement Bhandari’s observation by adding that formally free wage-labor can take place in the 
hegemonic mode of production precisely because its hegemonic position (in the colonial context, its metropolitan 
status) allows it to transfer surplus (in the form of colonial subsistence goods and raw material) from the colonies 
that render wage labor a profitable (not to mention morally exalted) mode of labor organization in the metropole. In 
other words, the mobility of labor afforded by free labor, which is indispensable to the revolutionary dynamism of 
capitalism and therefore its systemic reproduction, is intimately dependent on the existence of immobile and unfree 
forms of labor. In a fleeting passage, the asymmetric interdependence of diverse labor forms in the global inceptions 
of capitalism is incisively captured by Marx when he writes “[i]n fact the veiled slavery of the wage-labourers in 
Europe needed the unqualified slavery of the New World as its pedestal.” Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, p. 925. 
123 The restricted scope of wage labor is further qualified by Eley who adds to modern colonial slavery the 
“importance of domestic servitude for the overall labour markets and regimes of accumulation prevailing inside the 
eighteenth-century Anglo-Scottish national economy at home. … In the most basic of social historical terms, for 
example, servants in their many guises formed one of the very largest and most essential working categories of the 
later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (that is, precisely in the core period of industrialization), yet seldom 
figure anywhere in the established accounts of either the capitalist economy or working-class formation. So if we 
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Part of the socioeconomic heterogeneity that characterizes the capitalist system is 
accounted for by the plurality of social systems and ecological circumstances that colonial 
entrepreneurs encountered in the colonies. The other part owes to local and contingent struggles 
that opposed these entrepreneurs’ attempts to redesign property relations, productive activities, 
and exchange systems according to the profit motive. Such resistance significantly delimited and 
shaped the social terrain to which profit-seeking groups had to adapt, forcing them to work 
within the circumstances that they could not alter.124 Finally, colonial capitalist processes of 
restructuration and articulation themselves constitute a source of heterogeneity, for the strategies 
adopted for integrating non-capitalist social relations into global circuits of capital engendered 
novel productive practices and structures of social control, and in fact created and entrenched 
what appears from the teleological modernist viewpoint to be residues of precapitalist, 
“backward,” “traditional,” or “regressive” lifeworlds.125 
                                                
take seriously on board this centrality of non-industrial work and the fundamental importance of service, domestic 
labour, and everything that’s accomplished in households, while adding it to the driving importance of enslaved 
mass production, then our conventional understanding of the histories of political economy and working-class 
formation will surely have to change. … the claim of waged work to analytical precedence in the developmental 
histories of capitalism no longer seems secure.” Eley, “Historicizing the Global,” pp. 165-6. 
124 These struggles and the stumbling blocks they throw in the way of capitalist transformation visibly surfaced in 
the design and implementation of colonial indirect rule, when aspirations for reconstituting the socioeconomic fabric 
were curbed by the prospect of social upheaval that such transformations would entail. The British colonial 
administrators, Bernard Porter remarks, were “nervous of the sorts of liberal ‘reforms’ that the middle classes 
favoured, but which were likely to unsettle their ‘natives’ and consequently make them more difficult to control.” 
Bernard Porter, Empire and Superempire: Britain, America, and the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2006). Steinmetz likewise notes that “[a]lthough the quest for markets and raw materials was certainly a leading 
motive in the acquisition of many colonies during the late nineteenth century, the problem of native regulation 
became paramount once these regimes were up and running, often overshadowing immediate economic 
considerations.” Steinmetz, “Imperialism and Colonialism?” p. 144. David Washbrook offers a masterful analysis of 
colonial conundrums of social stability and economic transformation in British India in his “Law, State, and 
Agrarian Society in Colonial India,” Modern Asian Studies 15 (1981): 649-721. Such conundrums were not 
restricted to vast colonial possessions ruled by leading imperial powers, like British India, as George Steinmetz’s 
analysis of German colonialism attests. See Steinmetz, The Devil’s Handwriting: Precoloniality and the German 
Colonial State in Qingdao, Samoa, and Southwest Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). Ominously, 
social stability and economic transformation coincided only under forms of settler capitalism, which thrived on the 
marginalization, if not total extirpation, of the indigenous populations. 
125 This point finds its seminal elaboration in theories of “development of underdevelopment” worked out by Samir 
Amin and Andre Gunder Frank. This is a crucial corrective to the modernist entrapments of neoclassical and 
Schumpeterian theories of capitalism, which can observe the social rupture and transformation wrought by 
capitalism only through the grid of “creative destruction,” or what Marx called the revolutionizing of the means of 
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Therefore, while the term “colonial capitalism” is in one sense tautological given that the 
historical extension “capitalism” necessarily encompasses colonialism, retaining the adjective 
“colonialism” holds twofold value. First, it serves as a heuristic reminder of the colonial 
genealogy of capitalism, which often disappears in methodological-nationalist approaches that 
reproduce, in one form or another, transition narratives in Europe.126 Second, and more 
importantly, it underscores the widely disparate social and political forms under which the 
colony and the metropole configure in global networks of capital, without sanctioning the 
economic relations in the metropole as “capitalism proper” and declaring those in the colony to 
be anomalies, distortions, or residues of precapitalist relations. 
 The third axis for rethinking capitalism targets the idea of capital as an economic 
category and the liberal conflation of the “economy” with the “market.” The economic 
conception of capital assigns it to a domain of production and exchange structured by the crystal 
of voluntary transaction between juridically equal persons. The political implication is that 
power asymmetries and relations of subordination that inhabit capitalism are unintended 
                                                
production. History of colonialism supplies us with the most reliable repository of such correctives. David 
Washbrook draws attention to the “de-industrialization and de-urbanization” of the vast Indian hinterland, and notes 
that if the British rule in India is approached from the angle of global political economy and uneven development, 
“its character begins to take on a very different appearance. The predominant effects which it had (both intended and 
unintended) were less to transport British civilization to the East than to construct there a society founded on the 
perpetuation of ‘Oriental’ difference as Edward Said has put it. India became a subordinate agricultural colony under 
the dominance of metropolitan, industrial Britain; its basic cultural institutions were disempowered and fixed in 
unchanging ‘traditional’ forms; its ‘civil society’ was subjected to the suzerainty of a military despotic state.” 
Washbrook, “India, 1818-1860: The Two Faces of Colonialism,” in Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. 3: 
The Nineteenth Century, ed. Andrew Porter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 397, 399. For the 
economic “peripheralization” of India under British rule, also see Andrew Sartori, Bengal in Global Concept 
History: Culturalism in the Age of Capital (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), p. 53-60. For the creation 
and perpetuation of “caste” in India as an instrument of colonial intelligibility and administration, rather than a 
“backward” Indian social structure, see Nicholas Dirks, Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern 
India (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001). 
126 For example, see Douglas C. North and Robert P. Thomas, The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic 
History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). 
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consequences incidental to the interplay of individual transactions.127 In contrast, a focus on the 
colonial origins and imperial moorings of capitalism inscribes the element of political (that is, 
extra-economic and extra-legal) violence at the heart of the capital-relation. Luxemburg’s quip, 
“[i]t is an illusion to hope that capitalism will ever be content with the means of production 
which it can acquire by way of commodity exchange” distils the essence of the imperial 
endeavors that established plantations in the Americas, dismantled the textile industry and 
commercialized agriculture in India, and “opened” up China to free trade.128 The employment of 
“force as a permanent weapon” in the formation of these locales of surplus extraction and 
networks of accumulation stamps capitalism with a political imprint, “not only at its genesis, but 
further on down to the present day.”129 A perspective that treats political violence as originary 
(ursprünglich)130 in the genealogy of capitalism, a system that compels most human beings to 
reproduce their lives on the condition that they produce surplus for the global value chains, 
                                                
127 A modified version of this stance also colors certain Marxian analyses, which distinguish capitalism from 
previous systems of exploitation by the strictly economic (as opposed to political and coercive) modality of power 
that undergirds the extraction of surplus. See, Ellen M. Wood, Empire of Capital (London: Verso, 2003). 
128 Luxemburg, Accumulation of Capital, p. 350. The moments enumerated by Luxemburg belong to the colonial 
chapter of a planetary process of capitalization. The metropolitan aspects of the same process encompassed initially 
illicit and then legal enclosure of common lands, which created dispossessed laborers in Britain, who were forcibly 
inculcated with a work discipline under the heavy hand of vagrancy laws and maximum wage legislation. 
129 Ibid, p. 351. The integral status of political power in the constitution of capital in this respect could be construed 
as the theoretical expression of the enduring current of imperial power in the genealogy of capitalism as a history of 
the present. “As in earlier phases of Western imperialism, the lineage that underlies all the rest is the global military 
paramountcy of the leading imperial power. For the majority of the world’s population would not acquiesce in the 
present dependency, exploitation, inequality, and ‘low-intensity democracy’ for a minute if it were not backed up by 
the overwhelming force of arms.” Tully, Public Philosophy, Vol. 2, p. 28. 
130 Here I follow Walter Benjamin’s differentiation of a philosophical notion of origin (Ursprung) from the 
historicist of idea of genesis (Entstehung): “The term origin is not intended to describe a process by which the 
existent came into being, but rather to describe that which emerges from the process of becoming and disappearance. 
… That which is original needs to be recognized as a process of restoration and re-establishment, but, on the other 
hand, precisely because of this, it is something imperfect and incomplete. There takes a place in every original 
phenomenon a determination of the form in which an idea will constantly confront the historical world … Origin is 
not, therefore, discovered by the examination of actual findings, but is related to their history and their subsequent 
development.” Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama (London: Verso, 1998), pp. 45-6. An 
originary conceptualization of primitive accumulation treats it not as a consummated “stage” in the history of 
capitalism but as a persistent undercurrent that cyclically intensifies and erupts at moments of crisis and 
restructuration of global capitalist relations. An excellent essay that drives this point home is Massimo de Angelis, 
“Separating the Doing and the Deed: Capital and the Continuous Character of Enclosures,” Historical Materialism 
12 (2004): 57-87. Also see his Beginning of History, chapters 10 and 11. 
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refuses to relegate it to a concluded chapter of history after which the pacific mutualism of the 
market, “Freedom, Equality, Property, and Bentham,” reigns supreme.131 What Dipesh 
Chakrabarty contends for the “victory of the modern” also holds true for capitalism, that is, it has 
“always been dependent on the mobilization, on its behalf, of effective means of physical 
coercion … “always” because this coercion is both originary/foundational (that is, historic) as 
well as pandemic and quotidian.”132 The genetic relationship between capital and political force 
finds its most systematic expression in its identification with the state, or in Fernand Braudel’s 
words, “capitalism only triumphs only when it becomes identified with the state, when it is the 
state.”133 
The multiplicity and variance of the colonial processes of expropriation and exploitation 
effectuated by political violence shatters the narrow confines of Marx’s formal definition of 
primitive accumulation and necessitates a more capacious redeployment of the concept.134 I think 
one way of increasing the extension of “primitive accumulation” while maintaining it adequately 
rigorous is to define it as a (1) political process of forcible transformation whereby (2) non-
capitalist relations of social reproduction are restructured through extra-economic coercion (3) in 
ways that articulate them to the global networks of capital accumulation. As James Tully puts it 
quite bluntly, primitive accumulation as a “historical invasion and restructuring of the non-
European world,” has “dispossessed non-Europeans of political and legal control over their 
                                                
131 Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, p. 280. 
132 Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe, p. 44. 
133 Fernand Braudel, Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and Capitalism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1977), p. 64. For more recent appraisals of the nexus between sovereignty and capital via primitive 
accumulation, see Tim di Muzio, “The ‘Art’ of Colonisation: Capitalising Sovereign Power and the Ongoing Nature 
of Primitive Accumulation,” New Political Economy 12 (2007): 517-39. For a more ambitious attempt to rethink 
capital as power, see Nitzan and Bichler, Capital as Power. 
134 Marx himself gestures at a capacious conceptual extension of the term when he alludes to mechanisms like the 
national debt, international credit system, and protectionism under the rubric of primitive accumulation, a point later 
taken up by Luxemburg and Harvey. Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, pp. 919-24; Luxemburg, Accumulation of Capital, 
chapters 30 and 31; Harvey, New Imperialism, chapter 4. 
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resources and economies, and modified, subordinated, or replaced their forms of organization 
with the institutional preconditions of western legal and political domination, economic 
exploitation, and military control.”135 This process comprises not only the radical and traumatic 
overhaul of the relations of social reproduction (for example, the reconstruction of property 
systems or labor organization) but also the articulation of existing social forms (markets, 
commodity, and money) to the logic of capital by destroying them as independent social forms, 
whereby even the ostensibly non-capitalist or “feudal” social practices (peasant proprietorship, 
serfdom, slavery) become moments in the global reproduction of capital.136 Expressed in 
comprehensive terms, primitive accumulation marks the historical process that introduces a 
fundamental reordering and reorientation of social reproduction towards the imperatives of 
capital accumulation – even if such reorientation is not experienced as capitalism eo nomine.137 
The magnitude and profundity of these historical transformations carries them beyond the 
bounds of the simply “economic,”138 and renders primitive accumulation, in Partha Chatterjee’s 
                                                
135 James Tully, “Lineages of Contemporary Imperialism,” in Lineages of Empire, ed. Duncan Kelly, p. 14. 
136 Capital encounters the “older forms” of commercial capital and interest-bearing capital “in the epoch of its 
formation and development. It encounters them as antecedents, but not as antecedents established by itself, not as 
forms of its own life-process. In the same way as [capital] originally finds the commodity already in existence, but 
not as its own product, and likewise finds money in circulation but not as an element in its own reproduction.” In the 
course of its development, capital “must therefore subjugate these forms and transform them into derived or special 
functions of itself” – or in other words, assimilate or articulate historically non-capitalist social forms as moments of 
its own reproduction. Karl Marx, Theories of Surplus Value: Volume IV of Capital (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 
1971), p. 468. Marx lays down the foundations of this theoretical discovery in his exploration of the interrelationship 
between money and capital as two distinct social phenomena. See Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the 
Critique of Political Economy (London: Penguin, 1993), especially “The Chapter on Capital.” 
137 “First, people experience deprivation and oppression within a concrete setting, not as the end product of large and 
abstract processes … Workers experience the factory, the speeding rhythm of the assembly line, the foremen, the 
spies, the guards, the owner and the pay check. They do not experience monopoly capitalism.” Frances Fox Piven 
and Richard A. Cloward, Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed? (New York: Vintage, 1977), p. 20. 
138 For instance, Thomas Holt remarks, “life’s goals for most humans who have walked this earth are better 
described in terms of the relative absence of scarcity and peril than in the full achievement of satisfaction and 
security” – a point he demonstrates through an analysis of the paths chosen by the former slaves in the West Indies, 
who shunned wage labor even if it meant higher income, and opted for small proprietorship and petty commodity 
production organized in autonomous villages. Thomas Holt, The Problem of Freedom: Race, Labor, and Politics in 
Jamaica and Britain, 1832-1938 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), p. 5. Likewise, David Brion 
Davis, following Karl Polanyi, cautions against reducing the socioeconomic transformations wrought by 
Parliamentary Enclosures, above all the “dehumanization of labor,” to the question of “real wages,” instead 
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stark formulation, “nothing else but the destruction of the precapitalist community, which, in 
various forms, had regulated the social unity of laborers with their means of production.”139 
  
III. Dilemmas of Liberalism 
The notion of colonial capitalism outlined above offers theoretical leverage on what 
Jennifer Pitts labels “the British Empire’s systematic injuries,” which include “massive resource 
extraction, establishment of catastrophic systems of bonded labor, deindustrialization, 
entrenchment of “traditional” structures of authority, and insertion of subsistence farmers into 
often wildly unstable global markets … proletarianization, emiseration, chaos, and misrule.”140 
Pitts’s curious choice of distinctly liberal terminology (“injury”) to describe these processes is at 
once limiting and revealing. It is limiting insofar as it steers the critique of empire and its 
economic havoc towards questions of moral offense and eclipses the political economic status of 
these processes as colonial primitive accumulation. On the other hand, it is revealing precisely 
because the concept of “injury,” which presupposes a relationship of consensual interaction 
between moral equals, informed the standards of a commercial ideology whereby liberal thinkers 
in the British metropole judged the political economy of the empire. This pacific commercial 
ideology squarely rested on a political economic worldview that germinated in the mid-
seventeenth century and gained the upper hand among the English intellectual and political 
circles with the Revolution of 1688. Embraced mainly by the Whigs, this worldview turned on 
                                                
emphasizing the laceration of the social fabric by the displacement from land. It is not coincidental that both authors 
focus on processes of primitive accumulation (enclosure and enslavement), which do not simply constitute the 
capital-relation, but in the process destroy or subordinate all those ways of life and forms of social reproduction that 
are inimical to the accumulative drive of capital. David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of 
Revolution, 1770-1823 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975), pp. 402-3, 464-8. 
139 Chatterjee, Nation and Its Fragments: 235. “Capital that is global in its in its territorial reach and universal in its 
conceptual domain” is what turns the parochial conceptions of Western Europe, such as state and civil society, into 
the universals of modernity. Ibid. pp. 234-238. 
140 Pitts, “Political Theory,” p. 220. 
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the assumption that the basis of material prosperity was manufactures rather than land.141 By 
disentangling wealth from land, a finite resource, and hitching it to labor, whose productive 
powers could be augmented by human artifice and improvement, Whig political economy 
reconceived commercial exchange as a positive-sum game and conquest as an impolitic and 
immoral economic strategy.142 Perhaps the most famous expression of this position was to be 
found in Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, in which he explained “why ‘numbers of men 
are to be preferred to largenesse of dominions,’ why, in other words, countries with relatively 
weak natural resources were able to feed their populations without recourse to conquest.”143 
This political economic worldview offers a guiding thread for navigating another 
notoriously protean term central to this study, namely, liberalism.144 Even when confined to its 
                                                
141 Here I rely on Steven Pincus’s reinterpretation of the political economy of the seventeenth century, which 
compellingly repudiates the civic humanist and the institutional-economic explanations alike. Steven Pincus, 
“Neither Machiavellian Moment nor Possessive Individualism: Commercial Society and the Defenders of the 
English Commonwealth,” American Historical Review 103 (1998): 705-36; Pincus, 1688: The First Modern 
Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). 
142 One should note, however, that while the idea of positive-sum game in commerce made a dent in mercantilist 
zero-sum assumptions, this by no means implied a laissez faire policy. Whig political economy advocated the state’s 
presence in the economy as ardently as its Tory contender. See Pincus, “Neither Machiavellian Moment” and 1688; 
O’Brien, “Inseparable Connections”; Morgan, “Mercantilism.” 
143 Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff, “Needs and Justice in the Wealth of Nations: An Introductory Essay,” in 
Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. Istvan Hont and Michael 
Ignatieff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 41. 
144 Few questions in modern political philosophy have been as fraught with fierce disagreement as the place of 
liberalism in the early modern period, not least because the term “liberalism” as we understand it did not enter 
circulation until the early-nineteenth century. Civic humanists, most prominently J. G. A. Pocock, have rejected the 
possibility of tracing the roots of liberalism back to the seventeenth century and pilloried what they perceive ato be 
the Marxist historians’ effort to reconstruct a long and continuous genealogy for their nemesis. The response has 
come from Isaac Kramnick, who locates the origins of eighteenth-century “bourgeois radicalism” in early modern 
England. More broadly, a major interpretive fault line has run between, on the one hand, subscribing to civic 
humanism and natural jurisprudence as the hermeneutic key to understand seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
thought, and on the other, scholars who are firm in their conviction that liberalism was launched in the seventeenth 
century, if not with Thomas Hobbes then certainly with John Locke. An orthogonal solution has been proposed by 
Duncan Ivison who coined the term “proto-liberalism” to signify the pre-nineteenth century philosophical premises 
which would coalesce into the more readily recognizable contours of liberalism. See J. G. A. Pocock, The 
Machiavelliean Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1975); C. B. Macpherson, Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1962); Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953); 
Ivison, “Locke, Liberalism, and Empire.” Also see, Isaac Kramnick, Republicanism and Bourgeois Radicalism: 
Political Ideology in Late-Eighteenth Century England and America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990). The 
political economic conception of liberalism I adopt here follows the path opened up by Pincus’s “Neither 
Machiavellian Moment” and 1688. 
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putative locus classicus, Britain, liberal intellectual landscape comprises a wild array of political 
philosophies, ranging from the “applied theology” of John Locke to the secular sociological 
analysis of the Scottish Enlightenment,145 from the conservative Whiggism of Edmund Burke to 
the unabashed radicalism of Jeremy Bentham. Yet what persists with remarkable regularity 
across diverse strands associated with liberalism and turns it into a unified yet internally 
differentiated intellectual field is a fundamental adherence to the principles of contractual 
freedom and juridical equality underwritten by the rule of law. As I demonstrate in the 
subsequent chapters, contractual freedom and juridical equality constitute primal normative 
premises of liberalism in their regularity over centuries, the relative geographic indifference of 
their claims, and their accommodation in otherwise quite dissimilar philosophical strands, be it 
John Locke’s natural jurisprudential philosophy, Edmund Burke’s ancient constitutionalism, 
conjectural history of the Scottish Enlightenment, or scientific political economy of the 
Utilitarians. Contractual freedom and juridical equality therefore fit neatly within the contours of 
the universalist tendencies Pitts ascribes to liberal thinkers, “in the sense that they adhered to the 
principles that all human beings are naturally equal and that certain fundamental moral principles 
are universally valid.”146 As two such fundamental principles, contractual freedom and juridical 
equality represent not so much clearly specified and coded rules of conduct as  “a set of 
characteristic dispositions” or “inclinations” that have “always been articulated in universal 
terms and entertained universal ambitions,” yet always already inflected by “various 
circumstances.”147 The pivotal term that condenses these dispositions and structures liberalism as 
                                                
145 John Dunn, “From Applied Theology to Social Analysis: The Break between John Locke and the Scottish 
Enlightenment,” in Wealth and Virtue ed. Hont and Ignatieff. 
146 Pitts, A Turn to Empire, p. 3. 
147 Jennifer Pitts, “Free for All.” I denote contractual freedom and juridical equality as “primal norms” or ur-tenets 
because of their quasi-formless yet formative character. While these principles do not find a definitive 
phenomenological expression that can fully correspond to their abstract logic, they are clearly recognizable as 
animating principles behind a variety of discourses that we would subsume under liberalism. Not unlike 
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a political economic discourse is “commerce,” a term that is at once descriptive-particularistic 
and normative-universal. Commerce at once refers to the historically determinate set of relations 
of production and exchange obtaining in the seventeenth century and christens these relations 
with a cosmopolitan morality and civilizational superiority under the sign of “commercial 
society.”148 
Understood as a species of moral economy rather than its antithesis,149 political economy 
in early modern Britain served “not just as a technical language of administration but also, and 
perhaps more fundamentally, as a language of “political and constitutional argument” through 
which could be imagined a new form of polity.”150 The increasingly popular self-conception of 
the British as a commercial people ensued from the imagination of the British Empire as an 
“empire of trade” that unified its metropolitan and colonial constituents by an ethos of material 
                                                
Chakrabarty’s theorization of the necessary yet discrepant relationship between the universal abstract logic of capital 
and its global historical forms, I maintain that contractual freedom and juridical equality constitute the abstract logic 
of liberalism that is definitively discernible in, yet not reducible to, its variegated historical development. 
148 The term “commercial society” is central to this project for three reasons. First, this term is roughly the early-
modern cognate of what is understood to be a free market society today, which combines political liberalism and 
capitalist economic relations. Secondly, it is significant in its moral overtones, insofar as “commerce” denoted in 
this period not merely economic transaction but “sociability” in general, that is, all sorts of free, voluntary, peaceful 
social exchange between individuals and societies. Anthony Pagden remarks that commerce “was far more than the 
simple exchange of commodities” but signified a broader mode of communication bringing about “a deeper human 
awareness of the identity and singularity of others,” an expression of reciprocity that held individuals together as 
members of a single family. Third, the Scottish Enlightenment conception of “commercial society” as a socio-
historical category referred to a multiplicity of social, political, economic, and moral dimensions, which placed its 
referent at the terminus of the known historical development of human communities, formalized in the four-stage 
stadial theory of the Scottish philosophers. Pagden, Lords of All the World, p. 180. The most comprehensive 
treatment of the Scottish stadial theory is J. G. A. Pocock’s magisterial Barbarism and Religion (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
149 For a critique of the argument that classical political economy “de-moralized” the domain of material production, 
circulation, and consumption, see Emma Rothschild, Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the 
Enlightenment (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); Donald Winch, Riches and Poverty: An Intellectual 
History of Political Economy in Britain, 1750-1834 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Gertrude 
Himmelfarb, The Idea of Poverty: England in the Early Industrial Age (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984). 
150 Armitage, Ideological Origins, p. 166; Sartori, “British Empire,” p. 628. 
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and moral improvement, bonds mutually beneficial exchange, and the “civilizing and 
humanizing power of commerce.”151 
The liberal thrust of political economy in the fashioning of the British self-image was 
countered, however, by colonial conquest, extraction, and enslavement through which this 
empire of trade came into existence.  
Above all, as we have seen, colonial administrations were concerned to retain or enhance control over 
land and labour. Superficially, this concern clashed with judicial and administrative philosophy of 
contemporary Britain which was imbued with ideas of freedom of contract, freedom of trade and free title 
to land. In fact, the regulation of civil society in the colonies was intended to create the conditions for 
‘civilisation’ by constructing modern landed elites and industrious peasantries through the exercise of 
state power.152  
 
The tension was obvious to the British intellectual and political elite; nonetheless, the chances 
that its recognition would effect policy change remained limited for two reasons. The first reason 
concerned the historical conjuncture of inter-state rivalry in which Britain found itself. The 
political, economic, and military competition with the United Provinces in the seventeenth 
century and with France in the eighteenth century imprinted on the minds of the contemporaries 
that empire, especially for an island country like Britain, secured the wealth and prosperity that 
was indispensable for domestic peace and national power.153 The second reason had to do with 
the limits of the historical experience and the ideational horizon of economic policy that it 
circumscribed. As Patrick O’Brien reminds us, 
very few critics of mercantilism and Imperialism writing between 1688 and 1815 developed an alternative 
blueprint for national development. … Nearly everyone at the time perceived that economic progress, 
national security, and the integration of the kingdom might well come from sustained levels of investment 
                                                
151 Anthony Pagden, Peoples and Empires: A Short History of European Migration, Exploration, and Conquest from 
Greece to the Present (New York: Modern Library, 2001), p. 86. 
152 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, pp. 217-8.  
153 “The deepening commitment to empire by British government was driven above all by a sense of insecurity. 
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in global commerce, naval power, and, whenever necessary, the acquisition of bases and territories 
overseas.154 
 
In other words, mercantilism or the “old colonial system” that hinged on the deployment of the 
organized power of the British state represented less an aberrant political intervention in the field 
of global commerce. It provided the politico-legal framework within which “commerce” could 
emerge as a historical reality and an object of contemplation in the first place.155 
The ideological challenge at this historical conjuncture therefore arose from straddling 
the simultaneous embrace of Britain’s commercial self-image and the imperial foundation of her 
power and prosperity. On the one hand, the British distinguished themselves in opposition to 
what they believed to be land-based despotism and expansionism of their Continental neighbors 
as well as of Asiatic kingdoms. The idea of a maritime and commercial people implied a belief in 
the fairness of the voluntary exchange of commodities and experiences between parties whose 
moral right to pursue their interests was respected, or succinctly put, a vision of “free exchange 
as the model of human interrelations.”156 On the other hand, it was no a secret that the making of 
Britain’s overseas commercial ties, and consequently the seed-bed of the modern economy and 
material prosperity, followed an imperial course of colonial conquest, military extortion, and 
enslavement of one kind or another. Even the colonial settlers, who were hailed in the British 
imperial ideology as the offshoots of republican liberty planted in overseas “colonies,” in 
contradistinction to the military garrisons of conquered “dependencies,”157 had an ambivalent 
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position. They also frequently figured as “the bane of empire,” the “most avaricious, and in 
particular, the most careless of other peoples’ human and economic rights … the most racist of 
imperialists; usually arising from their need (as they perceive it) for land and labor”158 – a feature 
that brought settlers in frequent friction with the Colonial Office and missionary groups. No 
wonder, then, to many Britons “colonialism meant coercion.”159 A consistent theoretical 
position, if not moral purism, in confronting this contradiction would entail either a radical 
critique of imperial policy, which certainly had its exponents like Smith or McCulloch,160 or a 
fatalistic acceptance that a liberal nation could not be but the worst despot over peoples it 
colonized, as was conceded by Hume.161 To play on the double valence of “primitive,” primitive 
accumulation under colonial expansion was not only primitive in the sense of “originary” of 
capitalist relations; it also marked a moment of civilizational regress, embodied in the “savage” 
or “barbaric” actions that propelled such expansion. 
Despite such denunciation and dissent, however, the regard for the British Empire as the 
“empire of liberty” carried the day, as riddled as it continued to be with ambiguities and 
anxieties. The resilience of the commercial self-image of the British Empire in the face of the 
political violence repeatedly exposed in its colonial capitalist networks poses a curious puzzle. 
Such resilience cannot be explained solely by pointing to the increasingly pro-imperial public 
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opinion in late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century Britain.162 For not only the contradiction 
outlined above dated back to the middle of the seventeenth century and extended well into the 
nineteenth, but the sway of public opinion on the course of imperial policy was at best 
questionable during 1780-1830 when proconsular imperial expansion coincided with political 
conservatism in Britain.163  
I contend that a more plausible explanation for the persistence of the liberal self-image of 
British colonial capitalism should be sought in the works of middle-class intellectuals who were 
committed at once to the liberal values enshrined in political economy and to Britain’s colonial 
capitalist economy that undergirded her national prosperity and power. Such intellectuals catered 
to the British political elite the theoretical resources for furnishing an undeniably imperial 
political economic order with an ultimately liberal character.164 I say “ultimately” because the 
simultaneous defense of British colonial capitalism and its liberal image did not involve simply 
rejecting the violence of colonial primitive accumulation; rather, it wove together a series of 
discursive strategies, rhetorical maneuvers, and literary fictions in order to demonstrate that the 
British imperial economy and the British polity remained at heart wedded to liberal values 
without denying the violence it visited upon the colonized. Targeting imperial ideology as a 
perennial “exercise in lofty denial” remains a facile critique, not least because few, if any, who 
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were vaguely informed about the colonial affairs subscribed to this strategy.165 I maintain instead 
that the theoretical fulcrum of upholding a liberal self-image of colonial capitalism was 
disavowal, an attitude that is always coupled with the recognition of a disturbing reality. 
Disavowal should be understood not as a thick, impenetrable silence, a state of mind that 
consigns the disturbance to the realm of the unspeakable or unrepresentable, but rather as a quite 
voluble strategy that is “productive in that it brings forth further stories, screens, fantasies that 
hide from view what is not to be seen.”166 
 This approach challenges the assertions that “the conflict between the domestic [i.e. 
liberal] and the foreign [i.e. coercive] regime proved too contradictory to bridge” and 
consequently “hypocrisy is the tribute imperialism pays to democracy.”167 Despite its tempting 
simplicity, reducing the various strategies to reconcile liberalism and imperialism to the logic of 
duplicity and cynicism is difficult to sustain, if only because a survey of the imperial ideology in 
Britain between late-seventeenth and early nineteenth century shows the British upper classes 
and policy makers to be “ideologically gullible [but not] hypocrites.”168 Imputations of a 
conscious instrumentality to liberalism as an imperial ideology forget that such ideologies and 
their various performances “primarily targeted their fellow Europeans. It was above all their own 
countrymen and political leaders that colonists had to convince of the legitimacy of their actions, 
not indigenous peoples.”169 And as the following chapters show, many contemporaries found the 
conflict between metropolitan and colonial regimes, if not resolvable, then certainly manageable. 
Secondly, arguments from cynicism presume a neat compartmentalization between unambiguous 
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interests transparent to their bearers, and fabricated symbolic systems whose instrumentality is 
likewise clear to those who deploy them to conceal their true interests. Such an interpretation 
obscures the ways in which the various agents of the British Empire perceived their interest 
within the historically circumscribed system of signification they inhabited, itself dependent on a 
concrete constellation of social practices that structured imperial networks.170 Most importantly, 
it overlooks the greater efficacy of expropriation and exploitation when their perpetrators are 
sincere believers in the morality and propriety of their actions, that deeply staked in the 
controversy over the meaning of these actions are the very self-conceptions of the expropriators 
and exploiters. Pocock eloquently encapsulates this dynamic when he writes “though the 
ideology of agriculture and savagery was formed to justify this expropriation, it also articulated 
things which the [European colonizers] very deeply believed about themselves … They were not 
only expropriators, and this made it easier for them to deny that expropriation was what they 
were doing.”171 
 In this sense, liberalism was decisively not just the ideological handmaiden or 
epiphenomenon of capitalism. Nor did it represent nothing more than a modality of historicism 
that denied the colonized the full subjective capacities for self-rule.172 Rather, it comprised a 
mode of theoretical reflection and a system of values, which, while finding its conditions of 
possibility in the historically situated concrete practices formative of capitalist relations, could 
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not be isomorphically mapped onto these practices. Processes of enclosure, commodification, 
and dispossession originating in the seventeenth century gave birth to private property, 
commodity, and free labor as historical objects on which theoretical reflection could fasten and 
around which liberal tenets such as the private, consent, contract, and self-ownership could 
germinate and crystallize.173 At the same time, however, these very conditions of possibility 
saddled liberalism with contradictions inasmuch as these conditions came into existence through 
the forcible obliteration of the “strange multiplicity” of lifeworlds, both in Europe but more 
dramatically in the colonies.174 Various forms of social mediation that regulated access to the 
means of social reproduction fell before the sharp edge of colonial capitalism, which instated the 
jurisprudential notions of the market and the individual agent of subjective rights as the origin of 
contractual government, thereby inscribing the liberal dichotomy between state and civil society 
in the universal “narrative of capital.”175 However, the irreducible element of political violence at 
work in the laceration of social fabric as well as in its reformation along capitalist lines could 
always become too intense, visible, and thereby offensive to liberal sensibilities. The forcible 
social transformations that enabled the formation of worldwide capitalist networks could be 
undertaken by their perpetrators, supported by their accomplices, and accepted by spectators only 
insofar as these transformations could be ideationally recast as the expansion of the conditions of 
liberal values, that is, commercial or market relations as the social domain of subjective rights. In 
light of this torsional constitutive relation between liberalism, capitalism, and political violence, 
which became most salient during periods of intensified colonial primitive accumulation, 
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instrumental and epiphenomenal approaches to liberalism appear untenable. If liberalism’s 
relationship to capitalism is to be conceptualized under the rubric of ideology, then it ought to be 
a concept of ideology that hinges on the necessary misrecognition of capitalism as an essentially 
market phenomenon through the disavowal of its political immanence and the extra-economic 
coercion in its colonial inceptions.176 In sense, colonial capitalism can be construed as the 
“constitutive outside” or the “prehistory” of liberalism. 
If such disavowal underwrote the renewed authorization of and the continued 
acquiescence in the expropriation and exploitation inherent in the colonial capitalist enterprise, 
then the more sincere the disavowers were in their conviction that British capitalism essentially 
conformed to liberal values, and the more universal the terms of their discourse were, the greater 
was the cogency and sway of their strategies for explaining and justifying British colonial 
capitalism. The combination of these qualities in certain middle-class intellectuals, like Locke, 
Burke, and Wakefield, I argue, is what renders their works privileged grounds for observing the 
dynamics of disavowal. For these figures evinced a bona fide dedication to a secular, materialist, 
and progressive purpose for the British society and in fact for humanity, a purpose that was 
closely yoked to the idea of improvement, accumulation of wealth, comforts and conveniences, 
and condensed in such tropes as the “common stock of mankind” (Locke), “universal opulence” 
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(Burke), and “accumulation of capital” (Wakefield).177 Correlatively, the British imperial project 
appeared to be as much a vehicle for approximating this purpose by carrying out the world-
historical mission of spreading commercial civilization as an instrument for ensuring Britain’s 
survival as European great power.178 Against this background, intellectuals like Locke, Burke, 
and Wakefield did the most remarkable job in articulating and navigating the aporias attendant to 
professing liberal political economic values like contractual freedom and juridical equality at 
home while violating these very principles through expropriation and bondage in the colonies. 
Their efforts to imagine British capitalism as essentially liberal, commercial, and pacific, to 
cordon off this essence from the illiberal eruptions of colonial dispossession and exploitation, 
and to represent the violence of colonial primitive accumulation as something incidental to 
British capitalism rather than the very process in and through which it necessarily developed, not 
only shaped the ways in which modern capitalist economy was theorized in the British political 
thought. These theoretical attempts also impacted the intellectual topography of liberalism by 
forcing its constitutive premises into an open confrontation with the illiberal elements of 
capitalism.179 
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IV. Overview of The Study 
I designate three historically significant moments in which the conflict between the 
liberal self-image of British capitalism and the political coercion operative in its formation 
gained visibility within the debates over property, exchange, and labor. These are (1) the land-
appropriations in America that enabled the formation of Atlantic colonial capitalism through 
mercantilist policies of conquest and settlement, (2) the forcible integration of the Indian 
subcontinent to global and especially British circuits of capital under the East India Company 
rule, and (3) the establishment of agrarian capitalism in Australia and New Zealand. This is not 
to suggest that the question of property engulfed the field in the seventeenth century or exchange 
in the eighteenth and labor in the nineteenth. These three nodal points of political economy 
composed not so much a linear sequence, in which each displaced the previous one, as a triadic 
constellation.180 Specific world-historical conjunctures in the global genealogy of capitalism 
foregrounded different elements of this triad as the most urgent theoretical question for securing 
a solid moral footing for the British colonial capitalist enterprise.181  
The first two of these issues, property and exchange, materialized in response to the “two 
key practical problems arising from European commercial and imperial expansion:”182 
legitimization of colonial settlement in the New World, which consumed massive intellectual 
and ideological energy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,183 and controversies over 
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global commerce in the eighteenth century, fueled by the struggles to establish predominance in 
the Asia trade.184 The third issue, labor, had been brewing in the tumult of social dislocation and 
proletarianization in an increasingly urban and manufacturing Britain, but its full scale eruption 
had to await the intersection of working class unrest in the metropole and the gradual 
emancipation of slaves in the Caribbean colonies in the first third of the nineteenth century.185 
Viewed through the lens of colonial primitive accumulation, these three historical moments 
encompassed coercive processes through which non-capitalist social forms were assimilated or 
articulated to extant webs of accumulation. Land tenure, distribution of resources, and the 
organization of production in the colonies were radically re-ordered and re-oriented in epochally 
specific ways that would promote profit and accumulation: exclusive private property, 
commodity chains, and dispossessed labor. These three issues, marking the coordinates where 
the stakes of capitalist development as well as their normative theorization were driven, found a 
deep resonance and elaboration in the works of John Locke, Edmund Burke, and Edward Gibbon 
Wakefield, by virtue of their position as liberal middle-class intellectuals invested in the British 
colonial capitalist enterprise and entangled in the thick of the world-historical conjunctures that 
shaped it.186 
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The next chapter dissects the nodal point of “property” through an examination of John 
Locke’s works. Few thinkers in seventeenth-century England were as peculiarly situated as 
Locke, who was a theorist of property in the natural jurisprudential tradition, an advocate of the 
emergent commercial order under the Whig oligarchy, and an English colonial administrator in 
the capacity of Secretary to the Council of Trade and Plantations, Secretary to the Lords 
Proprietors of the Carolinas, and later a member of the Board of Trade.187 Locke’s theory of 
property not only exerted a singularly formative influence on what is now conceived as the 
liberal tradition. He also systematized and innovated on the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
debates over the legitimacy of European land-appropriation in the Americas, debates in which 
one found open declamations of European incursions into the New World, and which involved 
such illustrious names as Francisco de Vitoria, Bartolome de las Casas, Hugo Grotious, and 
Samuel Pufendorf.188 
I argue that Locke’s defense of moral freedom and equality of all human beings under 
God’s natural law (a theological understanding of contractual freedom and juridical equality) 
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collided with the imperative to advance the English colonial cause by appropriating lands in the 
Americas at the expense of its indigenous inhabitants.189 Several excellent studies have already 
documented the incubation of Locke’s theory of property in the context of England’s and more 
specifically Lord Shaftesbury’s colonial ambitions. Locke’s labor theory of appropriation, it has 
been argued, constitutes an ideological attempt to invalidate Amerindian and other European 
claims to dominium in America.190 Little attention has been bestowed, however, upon the role 
played by Locke’s peculiar notion of money in his justification of indigenous dispossession, 
mainly because considerations of capital accumulation have for the most part been left out of 
colonial interpretations of Locke’s theory. Viewed through the prism of colonial capitalism, the 
theoretical import of Locke’s notion of money assumes proportions equivalent to that of labor 
inasmuch as it expresses a fundamental reorientation to the material world, which is 
accumulative and futural in its thrust and exclusive and expropriatory in its social effects. On the 
one hand, as an abstract medium of exchange and accumulation of value, money injects a 
distinctly capitalist character into Locke’s teleological advocacy of the improvement of the earth 
for the benefit of humanity (“increasing the common stock of mankind”), which forms the 
backbone of his theory of property. On the other hand, the peculiar “universal tacit consent” that 
Locke assigns to the origin of money paradoxically introduces an exclusionary tendency into his 
universal and inclusive principles of natural liberty, moral equality, and entitlement to property. 
Locke’s famous quip, “Thus in the beginning all the World was America, and more so than that 
is now; for no such thing as Money was any where known,” signals the importance of 
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monetarization as the line of separating the domain of property from natural common. It thereby 
designates America as open to free and just appropriation by English settlers as representatives 
of an improving and monetized economy.  
Money’s status in Locke’s theory of property as the crux of capitalist accumulation and 
colonial dispossession, combined with the putative universality of its origin as well as of the 
purpose it serves, renders it the stage for Locke’s ingenious negotiation of the tensions between 
colonial capitalism and liberal universals. What Locke inaugurates here, I maintain, is a 
magnificent reversal of the conventional terms governing the reception and understanding of 
property relations and social justice. Through a specific modulation of the relationship between 
“the common” and the “common stock,” Locke turns a capitalist conception of private property 
into the door opening to universal prosperity and thereby authorizes the enclosure of American 
lands in the name of humanity. 
 The third chapter turns to the question of “exchange,” which it localizes in the 
controversies over the purpose of the British East India Company after it assumed political 
power in India in 1765. These controversies revolved around the theoretical problems broached 
more generally by the expanding field of operations and increased political clout of colonial joint 
stock companies in the eighteenth century, problems that concerned above all the nature of 
political power, commerce, and the relationship between the two in a context of intensified 
imperial expansion and rivalry.191 Edmund Burke stood in the midst of these controversies as a 
self-professed student of political economy, a member of the parliament and the chair of the 
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Select Committee of the Commons charged with investigating the administrative disputes in 
Bengal under the Company rule. His investigations acquainted him with the vagaries of 
maintaining an imperial presence in India while making that presence conformable to the 
principles of liberal political economy which he wholeheartedly advocated.192 
 Burke’s espousal of liberal political economy belonged to a discursive universe quite 
different than that of Locke’s natural law philosophy, as it was rooted in a combination of 
ancient constitutionalism and Scottish Enlightenment conjectural history.193 While parting ways 
with cosmopolitan visionaries of commerce like Smith and Kant, Burke was nonetheless quite 
clear that contractual freedom and juridical equality ought to obtain across the economic space 
circumscribed by the British imperial power, and that this space unequivocally incorporated the 
Indian dominions.194 Instead of the reign of commercial principles, however, he observed the 
economic intercourse between Britain and India to consist in forcible and unequal exchange, in 
which political power operated for aggrandizing the East India Company agents at the expense of 
Britain’s Indian subjects. The open contravention of Burke’s ideal of “imperial commerce” by 
the Company’s practices of “imperious commerce,” I maintain, should be adopted as the 
perspective for interrogating Burke’s fourteen-year long struggle to reform the Indian 
administration and impeach Warren Hastings, the former Governor General of Bengal. Burke’s 
writings and speeches on political economy and empire betray a sincere conviction that the 
metropolitan principles of his commercial ideal could be applicable to the imperial possessions 
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whereby the metropole and the colonies could trade as equals under the rule of law guaranteed 
by the imperial constitution. While Smith and others concluded that economic exchange under 
the shadow of imperial relations was destined to be extortionate, Burke’s commitment to an 
imperial Britain as a child of providence and an agent of civilization foreclosed decolonization as 
a desirable course of action. In a bid to reconcile empire and commerce, Burke opted for 
castigating the British economic exploits that impoverished and exploited Indians as aberrations 
from the values of equity and public utility that defined the essence of Britain as the most 
enlightened and prosperous nation in Europe.195 In this respect, the language of corruption that 
he employed for lambasting the East India Company represented less a defense of classical 
values against the social dislocations of capitalism than an index to the contradictions between 
the liberal commercial conception of capitalism and the profoundly illiberal political modalities 
through which colonies were articulated to its global networks. 
 Consequently, I argue that just as Locke attempted to articulate and guard a liberal 
conception of capitalist private property by subsuming colonial expropriation under a universal 
teleological narrative of temporal inclusion and common good, Burke strove to mold 
“commerce” in the image of an essentially voluntary and mutually beneficial exchange between 
juridical equals by expunging from its conceptual extension the necessarily unequal and 
asymmetrical relations of exchange that typified colonial capitalism. Consigning such inequality 
to the contingent and reprehensible contamination of commerce by political power, Burke 
contributed to the imagination of commerce as categorically distinct from the political sphere 
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even as it relied on the latter for its conditions of possibility.196 Locke’s theorization of private 
property and money as prepolitical relations thus finds unexpected echoes in Burke’s gesture 
towards commodity exchange as a genetically nonpolitical phenomenon. 
 The question of “labor” as it figures in early nineteenth-century political economy 
constitutes the object of analysis of the fourth chapter. A common source of concern for the 
political economists of the period (aligned as they were along the Ricardian orthodox and the 
Malthusian heterodox camps), the question of labor manifested itself in two guises. The first of 
these was perceived as a population problem at home. There appeared to be a growing mass of 
pauperized, unemployable, and redundant bodies in Britain.197 The problem presented itself not 
simply as an economic puzzle but as a political trouble as the pressures of labor militancy, most 
notably Chartism, stoked fears of social revolution amongst the British political elite which now 
included the middle classes. The second dimension of the labor problem (re)emerged with the 
abolition of first the slave trade and then slavery in the British colonies.198 The abolition 
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expanded the social and geographic background against which the labor problem was analyzed 
in British political economy. Macroeconomic theories of investment, employment, and 
accumulation meshed with moral conjectures about self-ownership, enterprise, and work ethic. 
 While an obscure figure in the canon of political economic thought, Wakefield’s name 
and ideas circulated widely in these debates, especially as they concerned the alleviation of the 
domestic labor problem by resettling superfluous hands in the British colonies.199 A Benthamite 
and a heterodox follower of Smith’s political economy, as well as an active promoter of 
colonization and a leading entrepreneur in the corporate settlement of South Australia and New 
Zealand,200 Wakefield criticized such schemes of “pauper shoveling” for the fiscal impracticality 
of their implementation as well as the moral undesirability of their results. Wakefield’s avid 
readership on the socio-economy of the colonies cultivated a perceptive understanding of capital 
as a social relation rather than material stock, which informed his analysis of the economic 
distress in Britain as well as his indictment of pauper relocation plans. On the one hand, 
Wakefield contended that Britain suffered from an overaccumulation of capital that rendered 
both capital and labor superfluous.201 On the other, siphoning excess labor and capital off to 
Britain’s imperial possessions, while temporarily relieving the metropole, culminated in a form 
of civilizational relapse in the colonies, as would-be laborers dispersed over cheap colonial lands 
and became smallholding subsistence farmers. This tendency vitiated the conditions of 
possibility of a class of wage laborers, which for Wakefield formed the fundament of 
commercial civilization. Unsystematic colonial settlement threw the settlers back to a state that 
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occupied the rung of “barbarism and self-sufficiency” in the stadial theory of the Scottish 
Enlightenment,202 a rung which was reserved for the non-European indigenous populations.203 
Wakefield advised to counter this perceived threat to the civilized self-image of the 
Britons by mobilizing executive imperial power for artificially creating a class of wage laborers 
in the colonies. Proclaiming preemptive crown rights and placing an artificial (though not 
arbitrary) price on all colonial lands would engender and perpetuate a class of proletarian 
laborers in the colonies, while the prospects of eventually becoming a landowner would motivate 
the pauperized population in Britain to emigrate of their own volition. In effect, Wakefield’s 
proposed colonial policy sought to replicate in a preemptive manner what the English 
Enclosures, Parliamentary Enclosures, and Highland Clearances had historically accomplished in 
the metropole, namely, the expropriation of the peasantry and the creation of a class of 
proletarians through the explicit deployment of non-market, extra-economic force. The 
contradiction between the liberal imaginings of capitalism as a market phenomenon and the 
originary element of compulsion in its genealogy thus found renewed salience in Wakefield’s 
plans to restitute agrarian capitalism in the colonies. For resolving this contradiction Wakefield 
resorted to utilitarian fantasies of contractual dispossession by invoking a deliberated consensus 
amongst mankind, later replicated by colonial settlers, to divide themselves up into the owners of 
capital and those who work them for a wage.  
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Wakefield thereby disavowed the political violence constitutive of “labor” through 
fictions of consent and summum bonum. In these fictions, “labor” qua wage labor not only 
remained a neutral category of political economy but also solidified as the sign and seal of 
“freedom” understood as self-ownership and defined in contradistinction to slavery or indenture. 
The renewed rift opened in the universals of contractual freedom and juridical equality by 
colonial capitalism was sutured once again. 
 
Conclusion 
 In a comprehensive review of the recent literature on the British Empire and its liberal 
mission, Andrew Sartori keenly diagnoses a lingering problem for the new imperial history. For 
all its trenchant critique of imperialism and its insight into the instabilities attending to the 
balancing act between liberal universals and colonial particulars, the culturalist approaches to 
empire face difficulties in responding to contemporary re-valorizations of empire, like that of 
Niall Ferguson, which sweep such cultural considerations aside and stake their claims in the 
“practical-institutional” terrain by “link[ing] liberalism to the socioeconomic transformation of 
the modern world.”204 Unmistakably, if somewhat awkwardly, located in the waveband of liberal 
triumphalism underwriting globalization narratives, Ferguson’s account celebrates the role 
played by the British Empire in the integration of the world into “a global system of economic 
dependency, based on the liberal practice of commercial exchange, and leading to the ‘optimal 
allocation of labour, capital, and goods.’”205 Against such vindications of empire as the historic, 
if forgotten or disowned, hero of institutional and economic globalization, scholarly excursions 
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into the interplay of difference between the metropolitan self and its colonial others hold little 
traction.  
Conceptualizing property, exchange, and labor as practical and conceptual hinges 
between the global genealogy of capitalism and the development of liberal thought promises a 
triangulation of the historical tensions between liberalism and capitalism, as it attunes us to the 
systematic elisions, disavowals, and representational warps in liberal discourse, which thicken 
when the concrete historical formation of capitalism refuses to fold neatly onto its representation 
in liberal imaginary. Adjusting our analytics to the troubled interface between liberalism and 
colonial capitalism entails a move from interrogating how liberal thinkers “negotiated in 
different ways the tensions between universalistic moral commitments and a recognition of 
particularity,”206 to asking “[w]hat is the real significance of the text’s one-sided 
misrepresentations that magically transform early-modern mercantilist aggression into the 
beginnings of what Ferguson understands to be a multilaterally beneficial process of 
“globalization”?”207 By recasting the objective structures of global political economy as a central 
component of liberalism’s relationship to imperial rule, we shift the focus to the practical 
efficacy of ideas in the renewed authorization of colonial socioeconomic transformations that 
occasioned glaring and morally reprehensible human costs. The works of liberal middle-class 
intellectuals like Locke, Burke, and Wakefield, who tried to square the colonial capitalist 
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structure of the British Empire with their genuine commitments to political and economic 
liberalism, provides us with a handle on this problematic. 
Secondly, the analysis presented here suggests that inquiry into the history of liberalism 
would remain incomplete unless it takes into account this history’s mediation by capitalism as an 
immanently political and historically colonial formation. A survey of the contradictions between 
liberalism and colonial capitalism offers a materialist perspective on liberalism’s historical 
vagaries, particularly by identifying those formative moments where liberal thought had to enlist 
other political discourses, such as historicist narratives of progress or culturalist ideologies of 
difference, in order to suture the rift opened up in its universal moral claims by the manifest 
unfreedom that accompanied the historical development of capitalism. Put differently, 
liberalism’s uneasy alliance with capitalism as a historically colonial and inherently political 
formation can provide a hermeneutic key for reading cross-pollinations between liberal thought 
and different strands of social and political philosophy. Such a perspective answers to Karuna 
Mantena’s call for a more careful theorization of the relationship “between historical and 
conceptual transformation, between the external and internal sources of intellectual change,” by 
contributing to the makings of a materialist model for explaining the historical heterogeneity of 
liberalism as a unified intellectual field.208  
Casting off methodological-nationalist presuppositions and conceiving of empire as the 
politico-legal order in which modern capitalist relations have developed enhances our analytic 
focus on the liberal notion of “economy” in at least two ways. First, by re-presenting 
contemporary global capitalism as the enduring legacy of hierarchical configurations of 
economic, legal, and social forms forged in imperial crucibles, it brings into sharp relief the 
historical role of political violence in the formation of modern economic relations. By that very 
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critique, it gestures at the dissolution of “economy” as a purportedly non-political category and 
the restoration of “political economy” as it was construed at the moment of its historical genesis: 
a field of knowledge, a system of inquiry, and a correlative ensemble of governmental 
techniques, which developed in tandem with the transformation of social reproduction along 
capitalist vectors, and which treated their object (capitalist social formation) as thoroughly mired 
in power relations, social hierarchies, ethical conceptions, moral regulations, and metaphysical 
antecedents209 – in short a species of political theory. This is far cry from the contemporary 
definition of political economy as a relationship between economy and politics, themselves 
presumed to denote unproblematic and self-evidently distinct domains of reality.210 Obversely, it 
brings into view the constant ideological boundary-work through the disavowal of the political 
and colonial underpinnings of capitalism. It alerts us to the role played by the disavowal of 
capitalism in imagining and popularizing the category of the economy as a domain of production 
and exchange devoid of political coercion. Methodologically, highlighting the global, rather than 
the national or the European, as the space in which capitalist relations of social reproduction 
have emerged furnishes us with another crucial register of analysis for placing the canon of 
social and political thought within a global context.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
IN THE BEGINNING, ALL THE WORLD WAS AMERICA: 
JOHN LOCKE’S GLOBAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 
 
Introduction 
 In the forty years following the publication of Leo Strauss’s Natural Right and History, 
Locke scholarship followed the compass of “life, liberty, and property” for mapping out the 
territory of Locke’s political thought. As Straussian, Cambridge, and Marxist schools contended 
over questions of intent and implication, text and context, reconstruction and extrapolation, a 
timid and marginal line of interpretation began to appear on journal pages in the 1980s.211 When 
it finally made its debut in James Tully’s An Approach to Political Philosophy, its effect was 
analogous to the discovery of an uncharted, if not entirely unknown, continent. What oriented 
this new scholarship was Locke’s quip “Thus in the beginning all the World was America,” 
which Tully and subsequent scholars took to be more than simply an illustrative appendage to 
Locke’s theory of the state of nature. Cast in the light of Locke’s personal and professional 
involvement in English colonialism, Locke’s direct and indirect allusions to the colonies in his 
manuscripts, notebooks, and correspondence laid the groundwork for a new interpretive 
perspective that placed his thought in a decisively Atlantic context.212  
My aim in this chapter is to reappraise Locke’s political thought and in particular his 
theory of property in the context of seventeenth-century colonial capitalism rooted in the Atlantic 
system. Specifically, I hope to meld the insights generated by the “colonial turn” in Locke 
scholarship with those rooted in the earlier socioeconomic analyses of Locke’s works. My main 
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argument regarding Locke’s theory of property consists of three interlocking parts. First, Locke’s 
theory of property expressed a specifically capitalistic worldview that centered on the productive 
capacities of labor and artifice for transforming inert nature into an ever-expanding domain of 
value. Second, modern natural law theory constituted the moral language in which Locke 
articulated the liberal economic premises of liberty, equality, consent, and contract. Third, the 
economic and philosophical valences of Locke’s theory of property were informed by and 
oriented towards the English imperial ambitions in America, mainly because ideas about the 
accumulation of stock and modern natural law theory both took shape in this period against the 
background of European expansion in the New World. 
I place pivotal emphasis on Locke’s peculiar conceptualization of money in his theory of 
property, which I maintain plays a crucial twofold role.  First, Locke’s notion of money is central 
to his articulation of an accumulative worldview imbued with a universal moral force. Second, 
the same notion of money helps Locke navigate the contradiction between the liberal values 
enshrined in his theory of property and the dispossession of Amerindians necessary for English 
colonial capitalism to take hold in the Atlantic. As such, Locke’s theory of property represents a 
momentous intervention in the great seventeenth-century debates on property claims, as it not 
merely justifies European appropriation of the New World but does so by sanctioning a private, 
productive, and accumulative mode of appropriation as the superior and morally exalted basis of 
property. Locke’s arguments about money, its origins, and its implications constitute the linchpin 
of this theoretical configuration, a condensation point where capitalism, liberalism, and 
colonialism intersect, collude, and conflict. Money’s capacity to store value unleashes the 
productive powers of labor in a drive to “increase the common stock of mankind,” while the 
“universal tacit consent” that Locke ascribes to money’s genesis and from which he excludes 
  86 
Amerindians undercuts their entitlement to their ancestral lands. Consequently, Locke’s theory 
of property embodies a vision of “possessive universalism” that matches in scope and ambition 
the global inceptions and the universal logic of capital discussed in Chapter I.213 
I develop this argument in three sections. The first section offers an outline of the 
seventeenth-century “Atlantic system” of colonial capitalism in which England as an aspirant 
imperial power and John Locke as one of its official and intellectual functionaries were deeply 
entangled. Drawing on studies in seventeenth-century economic and intellectual history, I 
explain why questions of property and appropriation occupied the center stage in the political, 
economic, and moral debates in this period. I ground these debates in the world-historical 
significance of the encounter with the New World and its transformative impact on European 
inter-state rivalries and new conceptions of political government and economic organization. 
Against this background, I visit the trails blazed by the colonial reinterpretations of Locke, 
summarizing the implications of Locke’s theory of property, political society, and liberal 
anthropology for the encounters between English colonists and Native Americans.  
As invaluable as the contributions of this literature are, they evince a certain perspectival 
insularity by bracketing off the question of capitalism. In the second and central section of the 
chapter, I address this shortcoming by rekindling several crucial issues raised in the earlier 
debates about the place of accumulation in Locke’s political economy. I contend that Locke’s 
theory of property represents an attempt to formulate a universal and distinctly liberal language 
of progress in which the theological-moral injunctions of natural law would map onto the 
practices and relations characteristic of the English colonial capitalist enterprise. I maintain that 
this theoretical feat hinges on Locke’s idiosyncratic notion of money, which inhabits a 
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conceptual zone of indistinction between the moral absolutes of natural law and the historical 
contingencies of human convention.  
In the last section, I draw out the insights we gain by placing the colonial interpretations 
of Locke in the light of the socioeconomic principles that underpin Locke’s global theory of 
property. Most importantly, I highlight the ways in which money’s conceptual ambiguity enables 
Locke to furnish a liberal self-image for the English capitalism in the face of its structural 
connection to the extralegal appropriation of American land, and its flipside, the colonial 
expropriation of Amerindians. I conclude by drawing out the broader implications of Locke’s 
theory of property for thinking about the tensions that accrue between the liberal self-image of 
capitalism and the systemic deployment of political force that marks its global genealogy. 
Weaving together the axes of capitalism, natural law, and empire is at once a bold and 
modest task, and necessarily syncretic task. It is bold in its scope, as it strives for an integrative 
picture by simultaneously engaging with the socioeconomic, theological, and colonial 
approaches to Locke’s political thought. It is modest in its objective, because it primarily aims to 
send up a few flares that would illuminate the broad contours and the complex structure of 
Locke’s political thought in the cusp of seventeenth-century colonialism and capitalism.  
 
I. Locke and the Atlantic 
Political Economy of the Colonial Atlantic 
 In order to locate Locke’s thought in global socio-historical context with some precision, 
the specifically colonial capitalist configuration of the seventeenth-century Atlantic has to be 
explained. That Locke conceived his theory of property with Atlantic colonies in mind and with 
an eye towards justifying the appropriation of land in America is by now a clearly established 
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argument.214 What needs to be cast in sharper relief is the pivotal role of land as the hinge of the 
networks of people, commodities, and ideas that constituted “the Atlantic” as a social system.215 
The foundations of these networks were laid down by Spanish and Portuguese expeditions of 
conquest and search for gold, accompanied by aspirations to universal sovereignty and self-
appointed missions to convert the New World heathens to Christianity.216 Compared to the 
Iberians, the English were latecomers to the Atlantic, who penetrated the system through “a little 
war of trade and plunder, a continuous exertion of economic and naval pressure by individuals 
acting for private gain.”217 Despite their penchant to think of themselves as peaceful 
agriculturalists in contrast to the vicious Spanish conquistadores, seizure and plunder were never 
far from the minds of Englishmen. In any case, the English themselves had a substantial history 
of conquest in Ireland that would serve as a model and incubator for overseas colonization.218 
                                                
214 The original insight behind this argument comes from Tully’s Approach to Political Philosophy. For the most 
systematic treatment of this argument, see Arneil, “Trade, Plantations, and Property,” and John Locke and America. 
Also see, Ivison, “Locke, Liberalism, and Empire.” 
215 J. H. Elliott describes the Atlantic as a social system consisting in the “creation, destruction, and recreation of 
communities as a result of the movement, across and around the Atlantic basin, of people, commodities, cultural 
practices, and ideas.” J. H. Elliott, “Atlantic History: A Circumnavigation,” in The British Atlantic World, 1500-
1800, ed. David Armitage and Michael Braddick (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), p. 239. Elliott’s 
description follows the recent explosion of interest in conceptualizing “trans-Atlantic history” as a coherent frame of 
reference for social, economic, and political analysis, “especially suited to the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
histories of the Atlantic world, when state-formation went hand-in-hand with empire-building.” David Armitage, 
“Three Concepts of Atlantic History,” in British Atlantic World, ed. Armitage and Braddick, p. 22. The most 
comprehensive recent studies produced in this vein include J. H. Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and 
Spain in America, 1492-1830 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); Thomas Benjamin, The Atlantic World: 
Europeans, Africans, Indians, and Their Shared History, 1400-1900 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2009); Nicholas Canny and Philip Morgan, The Oxford Handbook of the Atlantic World, 1450-1850 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011); Douglas R. Eagerton, Alison Games, Jane G. Landers, Kris Lane, and Donald R. 
Wright (eds.), Atlantic World: A History, 1400-1888 (Wheeling: Harlan Davidson, 2007); Elizabeth Mancke and 
Caroline Shammas (eds.), The Creation of the British Atlantic World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2005). 
216 See Stuart B. Schwartz, “The Iberian Atlantic to 1650,” in Oxford Handbook of the Atlantic World, ed. Canny 
and Morgan; Pagden, Lords of All the World. 
217 Kenneth R. Andrews, “The English in the Caribbean, 1560-1620,” in Westward Enterprise, ed. Andrews, Canny, 
Hair, and Quinn, p. 120 
218 For connections between the colonization of Ireland and the colonization of America, see Nicholas Canny, “The 
Permissive Frontier,” in Westward Enterprise, ed. Andrews, Canny, Hair, and Quinn; Elliott, “Seizure of Overseas 
Territories,” pp. 141-6; Jane Ohlmeyer, “Civilizing of those Rude Partes: Colonization within Britain and Ireland” in 
The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. I, ed. Nicholas Canny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 
[henceforth referred to as OHBE].  
  89 
The turn to colonial plantation agriculture that was to form the backbone of the English Atlantic 
had as much to do with frustrated attempts to find precious metals or tributary vassals in America 
as with the English national character.219 Commercial visions of Hakluyt and other middle-class 
intellectuals notwithstanding, English colonialism was born of conquest and only gradually 
“commercialized.”220 Even then, the forcible appropriation of lands that laid the conditions for 
English commercial plantations remained as a structurally necessary constant, and “the 
convention was gradually developed that right to exclusive possession was to be based on fixed 
and permanent establishment. In this way, the seizure and occupation of territory became the sine 
qua non of the overseas activity of European societies.”221 
 For the English, “plantation” initially signified what it did for the Romans: an alien 
territory “planted” by people from the mother country. In the seventeenth century, the term 
assumed its narrow and singularly modern meaning, that is, “an overseas settlement producing a 
cash crop for export,” worked by indentured or slave labor and ruled by a planter class.222 
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Portuguese sugar plantations in Brazil set the model by combining conquered American land 
with African chattel slavery and reaping immense profits that whetted the appetite of other 
European contenders.223 The English followed suit, replicating this pattern for cultivating sugar 
in St. Kitts, Bermuda and Barbados, and tobacco in Virginia (which incidentally saved the 
struggling mainland colony from otherwise certain collapse).224 Scattered private initiatives in 
the first half of the seventeenth century gained coherence and state backing with Cromwell’s 
Western Design, which boosted English naval capacity in the Atlantic and made Jamaica the 
jewel of English colonial possessions.225  By the last quarter of the century, “the critical 
importance of the plantations in the total scheme of English trade” prompted the English state to 
become actively involved in the Atlantic slave trade.226 The plantation economy was increasingly 
expanded, deepened, and harnessed to the metropole, demographically via colonial migration 
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and institutionally by the Navigation Acts.227 Public-private collaboration in colonization 
thickened through military, diplomatic, and administrative channels presided over by the Council 
of Trade and Plantations, effectively coalescing into a discernible British imperial formation 
spanning the Atlantic.228 
 The importance of the Atlantic “slave-plantation complex” for the global inceptions of 
capital cannot be overstated.229 Plantation colonies stood in the crux of a massive reorganization 
of property, production, and exchange on a planetary scale for the explicit purpose of profit. 
“Often operating at the boundaries of legitimacy,” private colonial agents “absorbed the risks 
that governments could not afford directly, but which needed to be taken if France, England, and 
later the Netherlands were to establish claims to the potential wealth that overseas ventures 
promised.”230 The motive for profit and accumulation that welded together private and state 
interests stimulated the introduction in America of private forms of land tenure much stronger 
than could be found in Europe, absolute commodification of men and women of African origin, 
and large-scale, capital-intensive forms of agricultural production that outstripped in its 
efficiency and exploitative brutality anything known in the Old World – in the words of one 
social historian, “the commercial dynamic that was transforming England … in the new World 
found its most uncompromising form.”231 Global commodity chains that proliferated in and 
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through the socioeconomic transformation of the Atlantic “were directly connected to 
institutional and organizational shifts, including financial trends that conditioned the very 
possibility for the global movement of capital.”232 Each leg of the infamous “triangular trade” 
generated profits much higher than promised by domestic opportunities of investment;233 
manufactured goods from England, slaves from Africa, foodstuffs and timber from the mainland 
colonies converged on the Caribbean, rendering it in the words of an economic historian “the hub 
of empire” and “the primary location of capital accumulation in Americas.”234  
The plantation itself represented the capitalist enterprise par excellence, as it had the 
logic of capital accumulation inscribed in its raison d’etre, design, and operation since its 
genesis.235 The quasi-industrial capitalist nature of these large-scale enterprises often was 
manifested in the conflict of interests between the planter elite on the one hand, and indentured 
servants and smallholding settlers, on the other. This specific species of colonial bourgeoisie 
steadily preyed on the latter for dispossessing and mastering their land and labor.236 The 
imperative to extract maximum labor from the workforce at minimum cost prompted planters to 
commission more efficient labor-saving technologies like sugar-mills, the “most advanced 
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technical installations of the time.” The second strategy for profit maximization was to 
consolidate operations into “large integrated units, with sufficient land and labour to justify their 
own mill and processing plant,” which by the 1680s had replaced “dispersed production with 
large numbers of small-holders.”237 
The slave-plantation complex did not simply spur the proliferation of commercial 
networks and circuits of capital that tied together the distant shores of the Atlantic; it also gave a 
crucial impetus to the development of capitalist social forms and productive capacities in 
England through feedback loops, promoting tendencies towards mass production and 
consumption, economies of scale, innovations in the industrial processing of colonial imports 
and exports, new instruments of finance and trade, and investment in shipping and insurance.238 
After assessing comparative data on European economies in the seventeenth century, a noted 
historian of early-modern England has declared the “conclusive implausibility of the internalist 
history” of English economic success.239 “The key factor in explaining the differences in 
economic development, the key factor in accounting for English and Dutch prosperity in the face 
of crisis elsewhere in Europe, is the growth of long-distance trade and the development of 
overseas colonies … Atlantic trade provides the only plausible explanation for England’s 
divergence from the European pattern.”240 
 The political framework in which Atlantic colonial capitalism germinated was a new 
vision and ensemble of governmental techniques that coalesced into the origins of the “fiscal-
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military state.”241 Commonly referred to as “mercantilism,” this political configuration had as its 
objective establishing networks of production and trade and capturing the greatest amount of 
value produced through these networks for purposes of state- and empire-building: 
England, and above all London, had made a major, and exceptional, investment in planting New World 
lands which shaped economic, social, and political developments from commercial to industrial 
revolution … By the mid-seventeenth century it was apparent that empire would deliver both profit and 
power. England’s political classes united to assert that it ‘was a matter of exact justice’ that any benefits 
of shipping, trade, and entrepot activity should be reserved for the mother country which that provided the 
initial start-up labour and capital needed for colonization and continued to supply defence. England 
should stand like the “sun in the midst of its plantations’ and needed strict laws to prevent the benefits 
being syphoned off by foreigners, above all the Dutch.242 
 
Reducing mercantilism to narrow concerns with the balance of trade misses its real historical 
significance as a political-economic program with momentous historical consequences for 
analyzing, promoting, and systematizing the creation of value, even if the ultimate target of 
obtaining “plenty” remained maximizing “power” in European interstate rivalry.243 As a 
“peculiarly descriptive theory of imperial antagonism,” mercantilism functioned as novel 
language in which “European expansion would be understood primarily in economic terms, as 
theories of imperium gave way to recognizably modern doctrines of imperialism.”244  
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The mercantilist bent of English colonial policy was undeniable from the mid-
seventeenth century onwards, manifesting itself in the proliferation of colonial charters and the 
promulgation of the Navigation Acts. Above all, those at the helm of the state knew that there 
would be no British Empire without the Caribbean and its sugar, slaves, and demand for 
mainland staples and English manufactures.245 The commercial reorientation of the British 
political elite and the colonial-commercial alliance consolidating behind the Whig imperial 
project, itself inspired by a productive ethic of improvement and a programmatic comprehension 
of wealth creation (seminally articulated in the works of William Petty and others), would come 
to fruition in the Glorious Revolution and clinch the symbiosis between the politico-legal power 
of the English state and networks of colonial capitalism in the Atlantic.246 
 Colonial land was the origin, the linchpin, and the highest stake of the Atlantic political 
economic constellation in which European states tried to carve for themselves zones of imperial 
self-sufficiency.247 It should come as no surprise, then, that the legitimate basis of property 
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claims in land, and particularly in the New World, was the major question that occupied some of 
the foremost political intellects of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe.  
The early-modern overseas empires of Spain, Portugal, France, Britain and Holland had to be justified, 
not only to their competitors but also to themselves, and their effects on the metropolitan nations as well 
as the native and later colonial populations had  to be accounted for, understood and explained … 
[P]hilosophers shouldered the ideological task of justifying overseas enterprise, and political theory in 
particular would thereafter bear the marks of early-modern Europe’s expanding world.248 
 
After the swift obsolescence of the Papal Bulls and the Treaty of Tordesillas, principles of 
conquest, first occupation, and settlement, derived from Roman and European international law, 
supplied the terms in which contending European claims to America were contested.249 The 
Classical-Christian legalistic tradition in which disputes over colonial property were embedded 
dictated that land appropriations be legitimated by appeal to some preexisting law, which was 
complicated by the fact that the lands in question were patently inhabited by peoples thought to 
be outside the civic history of the Old World.250 Consequently justifications gravitated towards 
the plane of ius gentium and natural jurisprudence, which hinged on formulating a minimal 
normative core that could apply to Amerindians and Europeans alike and universally adjudicate 
property claims.251 James Tully and David Armitage neatly encapsulate the point: 
The newly discovered lands could not be appropriated on the grounds that they were unoccupied, since 
they patently had a resident population; arguments for the next three hundred years therefore turned as 
much upon dispossessing the native peoples a they did upon asserting positive rights of ownership against 
other European states.252 
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One of the leading problems of political theory from Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes to Adam Smith 
and Immanuel Kant was to justify the establishment of European systems of property in North America in 
the face of the presence of “American Nations.” Almost all the classic theorists advanced a solution to 
this problem justifying what was seen as on the of the most important and pivotal events of modern 
history … to justify European settlement on the one hand, and to justify the dispossession of the 
Aboriginal peoples of their property on the other.253 
 
Theories and ceremonies of possession thus became the means by which European colonists 
could explain and legitimate their acts of appropriation before their European contenders, and 
more crucially, before the bar of their own conscience, as such acts almost invariably entailed the 
expropriation of the New World’s native inhabitants.254 Debates over the universal moral 
foundations of property rights were therefore more than a pastime for European intellectuals; 
they shaped the ideological resources available to public and private agents interested and 
invested in overseas colonization: 
Even if it weakly described actual systems of property-holding, the rhetoric of absolute private property 
was politically important. The idea that absolute private property was the best way incentivize owners and 
maximize productivity was used not only to legitimate the enclosing of commons, but also, as we have 
seen, to legitimate the taking of land from foreign peoples with different systems of property.255 
 
 
Locke in the Atlantic Context 
 
Locke, as the most illustrious intellectual of the post-Restoration Whigs and an official 
functionary of the British Empire, was deeply enmeshed in the administrative webs of colonial 
capitalism and woven into the ideational texture of the new political economic vision that 
fastened on these webs. Patronage of Anthony Ashley Cooper (1st Earl of Shaftesbury) secured 
Locke the position of the Secretary to the Council of Trade and Plantations (1673-4) and later 
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membership to the Board of Trade (1696-1700).256 The massive volume of colonial reports, 
dispatches, and correspondence Locke had to process during his services made him “one of the 
two best-informed observers of the English Atlantic world of the late seventeenth century.”257 
Locke augmented his stock of administrative knowledge on colonial affairs by reading copiously 
in colonial travel literature. “By the time of his death, Locke’s collection of travel literature was 
one of the largest ever assembled in Britain and it comprised 195 books, many maps, and a 
portfolio of ethnographic illustrations.”258 Shaftesbury involved him in his designs to found a 
colony in Carolina, and Locke participated in the drafting of the Fundamental Constitutions of 
Carolina (1669).259 Locke also had economic investments in English colonialism. He held shares 
in the Royal African Company that traded in slaves, was one of the merchant adventurers to the 
Bahamas (1672-1676),260 and through the agency of his cousin and financial manager Peter 
King, engaged in “stock-jobbing” in the East India Company bonds.261 Taken together, these 
involvements have led one scholar to hail Locke as “the wise organic intellectual both of the 
seventeenth-century British elite and of future generations of the British ruling classes” and “a 
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great philosopher of the developing world system which linked the old world with the new with 
ties of domination and subordination.”262 
Locke’s experience in colonial affairs also honed his acumen in the emergent “science” 
of political economy.263 His labor theory of value, clearly inflected by his rumination on the 
colonies, captured the essence of the accumulative political economic vision that triumphed with 
the Glorious Revolution.264 Locke subscribed to a Baconian view of “useful knowledge” that 
fused natural history with induction for generating knowledge that would improve the material 
livelihood of human beings. This orientation was manifested most directly in his unrelenting 
advocacy of boosting agricultural productivity and his scorn for absentee landlords in England, 
which have led one observer to label him a proponent of “agrarian capitalism.”265 Locke’s 
concerns with agricultural “improvement” extended to England’s colonies, as evidenced in his 
“agricultural espionage” in France in late 1670s “on Shaftesbury’s behalf … for a practical 
economic future for Carolina in the business of Mediterranean import substitution.”266 On 
matters of commerce and finance, he figured amongst the champions and first shareholders of 
the Bank of England, which is deemed to be the threshold of modern political economy, and the 
financial pamphlets Locke published during the Great Recoinage debates made an invaluable 
contribution to the revolutionary cause.267 
                                                
262 Lebovics, “Uses of America, pp. 568, 578. 
263 William Letwin observes a great discrepancy of clarity and sophistication between the first (1668) and second 
(1691) drafts of Locke’s economic tract, Some Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest, and 
Raising the Value of Money, and contends that the vast improvement of the second draft over the first “can 
reasonably attributed to his years of practice in the administration of the Carolinas and the Council for Trade and 
plantations.” Letwin, Origins of Scientific Economics, pp. 167-8. 
264 E. J. Hundert, “The Making of Homo Faber: John Locke between Ideology and History,” Journal of the History 
of Ideas, 33 (1972): 3-22. 
265 Wood, John Locke. 
266 Armitage, “John Locke, Carolina,” p. 611. 
267 For the argument that the Bank of England and the English national debt, which are commonly referred to as the 
“Commercial Revolution,” mark the break between the classical and modern notions of property and inaugurate 
modern political economy, see J. G. A. Pocock, “The Mobility of Property and the Emergence of Eighteenth 
Century Sociology,” in Virtue, Commerce, History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the 
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 Locke’s expansive professional, personal, and intellectual investments in British 
colonialism and political economy, or more precisely in Britain as an imperial economy, 
reflected most conspicuously and consequentially in his intervention in the European debates 
over colonial property rights. Building on and confronting an established pedigree of arguments 
from natural jurisprudence (articulated most notably by Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf), 
Locke’s theses on property represented the pinnacle of the seventeenth-century English efforts to 
validate English claims to American territory, pitted simultaneously against rival theories of 
appropriation and presumed Amerindian rights to land268 – to which one should add the 
criticisms of Englishmen, like Robert Gray and Roger Williams, who claimed that colonization 
“violated the rights of the American Indians to their property and territorial integrity.”269 Locke’s 
particular contribution to the global property disputes would reverberate far beyond the 
immediate context of its articulation, as he “gathered together many of the arguments of the early 
seventeenth century and his theory set the terms for many of the later theories that were used to 
justify the establishment of European property in America,” effectively establishing “the 
unexamined conventions of many Western theories of property.”270 
                                                
Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). For Locke’s position in Whig political 
economy, see Pincus, 1688, p. 459. Also see Patrick H. Kelly, “General Introduction: Locke on Money” in Locke on 
Money, ed. Patrick H. Kelly (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991). 
268 Scholarly verdict is unanimous on the colonial ideological agenda of Locke’s theory of property, though 
disagreements abound about the exact coordinates of Locke’s theory vis-à-vis Grotius and Pufendorf as well as the 
Spanish humanists. Compare, Tuck, Rights of War and Peace, Arneil, John Locke and America, Pagden, Lords of 
All the World, and James Tully, “Framework of Natural Rights in Locke’s Theory of Property,” in An Approach to 
Political Philosophy: John Locke in Contexts (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
269 Bhikhu Parekh, “Liberalism and Colonialism: A Critique of Locke and Mill,” in The Decolonization of 
Imagination: Culture, Knowledge and Power, ed. Jan Nederveen Peterse and Bhikhu Parekh (London: Zed Books, 
1995), p. 83. Robert Gray in A Good Speed to Virginia (1609) declaimed English colonialism with the words, “The 
first objection is by what right or warrant we can enter into the land of these savages, take away their rightfull 
inheritance from them, and plant ourselves in their places, being unwronged or unprovoked by them.” Quoted in 
Elliott, “Seizure of Overseas Territories,” p. 148. For a discussion of these and other internal critiques of English 
colonialism, as articulated by Thomas Morton and Pierre Biard, James Tully, “Rediscovering America: The Two 
Treatises and Aboriginal Rights,” in An Approach to Political Philosophy: John Locke in Contexts (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
270 Tully, “Aboriginal Property and Western Theory,” p. 350. 
  101 
Motivated by these intimate colonial liaisons, recent interpretations of Locke have gone a 
long way in wresting Locke’s political philosophy, not only from the “great men” narratives of 
European intellectual history, but also from detailed yet narrow confinement in high politics of 
England.271 Locke’s contractarian defense of individual rights and liberties, often hailed as the 
fountainhead of Anglo-Saxon liberal constitutionalism, was cast in the shadow of The 
Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, which envisioned an essentially feudal hierarchy for the 
colony.272 “Absolute power” over the lives of their slaves that the Fundamental Constitutions 
granted to colonial patricians, compounded by Locke’s shares in the Royal African Company, sat 
uneasily with Locke’s indictment of Filmer’s absolutist argument for reducing Englishmen to the 
“vile and miserable estate” of slavery.273 Above all, the Atlantic focus has brought into sharp 
relief the incubation of Locke’s theory of property in the thick of his enduring investment in 
England’s colonial affairs, and its formulation as a response to the perceived need to provide 
English land appropriations in America with a solid moral and legalistic foundations. Locke’s 
interpreters have compellingly demonstrated how the “pacific,” “sedentary,” and 
“agriculturalist” vision propounded in the fifth chapter of the Second Treatise (a chapter that was 
composed independently of the Two Treatises) carried exclusive agendas against the 
“marauding” Spanish, the “trading” French, and above all, the “wild” Indian. 
Locke’s theoretical assault on aboriginal property rights has received the most sustained 
attention and ramified into manifold analyses of his cultural politics of civilization poised against 
“colonial others.” It has been claimed that the centerpiece of Locke’s theory of property, namely, 
                                                
271 These two interpretive schemes roughly correspond to the Straussian and Cambridge Schools of Locke 
scholarship, with the former searching for the hidden wisdom between the lines of Locke’s manuscripts and the 
latter reducing them to political pamphlets. 
272 Pramod K. Mishra, “‘[A]ll the world was America’: The Transatlantic (Post)coloniality of John Locke, William 
Bartram, and the Declaration of Independence,” CR: The New Centennial Review 2 (2002): 213-258, pp. 232-4. 
273 Farr, “So Vile and Miserable an Estate,” and “Locke, Natural Law.” 
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enclosing and improving the land by “mixing labor,” aims to disqualify Amerindian hunting and 
gathering practices as grounds of entitlement to land.274 Denying Amerindians the graces of the 
“workmanship ideal”275 is compounded by Locke’s assertion that Amerindians do not live under 
institutionalized governments. Absence of “proper” political societies and sovereign authority 
renders America a vacant territory populated by private individuals and households, and 
therefore open to the appropriation of the colonists.276 Some have extended the thrust of these 
insights into more catholic conjectures on Locke’s liberal anthropology and the civilizational 
hierarchies that structure it. The puzzling coexistence in Locke’s philosophy of inclusive liberal 
values side by side with exclusionary impulses against non-Europeans have directed attention to 
his “liberal strategies of exclusion”277 and uncritical universalization of historically specific 
(English and gentlemanly) forms of subjectivity.278 The hidden assumptions of calculating, 
utilitarian, and self-disciplinary rationality built into Locke’s abstract conception of the self, it 
has been claimed, translates social difference into deficit, and infantilizes the colonial other by 
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inscribing her in narratives of historical development and the civilizational tutelage of the 
colonizing power.279 
The issue I would like to take with these accounts of colonial expropriation and 
denigration, and more broadly with the “colonial turn” in Locke scholarship, is a relative lack of 
sensitivity to the specific socioeconomic parameters of Locke’s historical conjuncture. Parallel to 
the shift of focus to the other side of the Atlantic, one can observe a shift away from questions of 
commercialization, accumulation, labor, social rights and obligations, and modern and moral 
economies, which had structured many of the prior debates on Locke’s philosophy. The colonial 
turn to Locke has furnished a great service by critiquing the geographic insularity and myopia of 
these earlier debates. In fact, the very arguments I present here would not be possible without 
this original critique. Yet, I think it has also been too hasty in unhooking his political philosophy, 
especially his relationship to liberalism, from the socioeconomic transformations and economic 
disputes of his time and hitching it to questions of metropolitan identity and colonial difference, 
particularism and universalism, reason and unreason, and civilization and savagery.280 The major 
casualty of the methodological move of displacing Locke’s thought onto global networks has 
                                                
279 The classical formulation of this claim can be found in Mehta’s analysis of the temporal tropes of childhood and 
growth in Locke’s philosophy. See Liberalism and Empire, pp. 30-3, 82, and more broadly Anxiety of Freedom. 
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roots. Jakob de Roover and S. N. Balagangadhara, “John Locke, Christian Liberty, and the Predicament of Liberal 
Toleration,” Political Theory 36 (2008): 523-49. 
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been the dimension of political economy, leaving us with the familiar bifurcation between the 
vantages of national capitalism and cultural colonialism discussed Chapter I. 
 In order to integrate the insights derived from political economic and colonial analyses of 
Locke’s philosophy, we need to first revisit an old and contentious debate over the possibility, 
limits, and morality of capitalist accumulation in Locke’s theory of property. I maintain that 
explicating the economic and moral coordinates of Locke’s theory of property and positioning 
the colonial thrust of Locke’s political philosophy in relation to these coordinates helps 
illuminate the nexus between capitalism, colonialism, and liberalism in the seventeenth century. I 
argue that observing this intersection requires us to zoom out of the conventional preoccupation 
with labor in Locke’s arguments on property, and bring into focus Locke’s notion of money and 
the theoretical work it performs in his overall theory. If examined from the right angle, Locke’s 
arguments on money reveal intriguing peculiarities, and I contend that these peculiarities result 
from Locke’s attempts to contain the contradictions between, on the one hand, liberal principles 
of natural liberty and equality enshrined in his theory of property, and on the other, his agenda of 
justifying the extra-legal appropriation of American lands crucial for the success of the English 
colonial capitalist enterprise. The specific configuration in which Locke relates money to the 
precepts of natural law that govern appropriation, dispossession, and accumulation in the state of 
nature not only morally sanctions the accumulative vector of capitalism, but also wraps its 
expropriatory colonial thrust in liberal myths of universal consent.  
It appears to me that the main reason this point has eluded attention in Locke scholarship 
is the assumption, pervasive in metropolitan and colonial interpretations alike, that money is a 
contingent and second-order theoretical construct in Locke’s theory of property. When it is not 
construed as a strategic scheme to unleash accumulation of capital or dispossession of the 
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Amerindians, money is relegated to irrelevance for understanding the moral parameters of 
Locke’s conception of property. I propose an alternative explanation that has not been considered 
thus far. Money is a structurally necessary if conceptually ambiguous element that sutures the 
composite and contradictory edifice of Locke’s theory of property, which attempts to formulate a 
universal defense of property rights and rule of law against extra-legal absolutist power in 
England, at the very same time it seeks to justify the expropriation of Amerindians through the 
use of extra-legal force. Locke’s notion of money comprises the subtle thread that binds together 
“life, liberty, and property,” the original mantra of political liberalism, and “Thus in the 
beginning all the World was America,” the signal for the primitive accumulation of capital in the 
New World. Perhaps it is no coincidence that remainder of the excerpt above, which is rarely 
quoted in its entirety, reads “and more so than that is now; for no such thing as money was any 
where known” (II. 49). Extrapolating the full significance of this odd conjunction begins with 
returning to the old debate on the morality of accumulation in Locke’s theory of property. 
 
II. Money and Morality of Accumulation 
 A major, if recently dormant, fault line in Locke scholarship runs through two prominent 
interpretive approaches that disagree over the capitalist allegiances and implications of Locke’s 
theory of property. The first of these places the emphasis on the social and economic valences of 
Locke’s theory. Situating his works in the context of the nascent capitalist relations in the 
seventeenth century, this strand of interpretation considers Locke’s understanding of property to 
be emblematic of the emergent bourgeois sensibility with its central tenets of self-interest, 
individualism, utilitarianism, alienable wage-labor, robust private property rights, natural 
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inequality of wealth, and above all, unlimited accumulation of wealth.281 The second strand 
explicates Locke’s theory of property with reference to his moral worldview, grounded in 
Christian theology and the natural law tradition. Emphasis falls here on Locke’s heavy reliance 
on the natural law as a divinely decreed system of morality, which incorporates such premises as 
the inherent purposefulness of God’s design, fundamental equality of men as God’s 
workmanship and the correlate obligation to preserve mankind, sanctity of the person and the 
inalienability of his labor, and the priority of common good and enforceable charity claims over 
absolute private property rights.282 
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 The rift between the two interpretations, heuristically labeled here as “socioeconomic” 
and “theological,” can be formulated in terms of the divergent principles of organization of the 
relations of production, exchange, and distribution that they extrapolate from Locke’s theory of 
property. The socioeconomic perspective perceives in Locke’s theory the foundational principles 
of a commercial-capitalist economy insofar as it locates the center of gravity in the primacy that 
Locke assigns to free and rational pursuit of self-interest and accumulation, accompanied by the 
implied fairness of such negative externalities as dispossession and inequality. In contrast, the 
theological perspective prioritizes the moral odium and restrictions that Locke places on 
acquisitive behavior and hoarding of wealth, which, coupled with Locke’s harnessing of 
production and property to the fulfillment of moral duties towards others, embed his theory of 
property in the domain of classical moral economy. These contending visions appear to be 
irreconcilable within the same theoretical framework, insofar as moral economy circumscribes 
personal acquisition and accumulation by extra-economic social objectives and ethical 
conceptions, while capitalist economy is inherently predicated on the pursuit of profit and 
accumulation of wealth, the dispensation of which devolves to individual proprietors. In other 
words, restrictions on accumulation are parametric under moral economy, whereas under market 
economy they are contingent articles of expediency. Consequently, the dispute over the 
theological underpinnings and capitalist implications of Locke’s theory of property revolve 
around morality and accumulation, or rather, morality of accumulation. 
My main argument in this section is that these conflicting renderings of Locke’s theory of 
property are not as disparate as they first appear, and that a close examination of Locke’s theory 
of money in the Second Treatise provides a different picture, in which theological and capitalist 
premises are not merely reconcilable but necessarily enmeshed. As I discuss in the last section, 
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this relationship of necessity bears momentous implications for the explanation and justification 
of New World land-appropriations within the liberal parameters of freedom, equality, and 
consent. The existing analyses of Locke’s theory evince a lack of perspicacity about he peculiar 
position of money in the narrative structure of the Second Treatise. The theological perspective 
claims that the origins and the function of money are permissible within the dictates of the 
natural law. The socioeconomic approach assumes the exact opposite position, namely that 
money is a theoretical intervention to abrogate the natural law provisions that limit property 
accumulation. The colonial interpretation likewise attributes Locke’s notion of money a strategic 
role but relocates it from the question of accumulation to that of colonial dispossession.  
While acknowledging that all three interpretations grasp a part of the proverbial elephant, 
I maintain that they are limited by their understanding of Locke notion of money as historically 
contingent and hence in an external relationship to the universal tenets of his theological-moral 
framework. I argue, on the contrary, that a critical analysis of the chapter on property shows that 
money is not a historical contingency whose relationship to the natural law is one of passive 
compatibility or strategic intervention, but constitutes an area of indeterminacy, in which the 
theological universals of the natural law and the historical practices of capitalist accumulation 
shade into each other and coalesce into a global theory of property that stakes its claims with 
equal force in the metropole and the colony. More specifically, I identify the major “work” done 
by the notion of money in Locke’s theory of property as resolving an antinomy within the natural 
law itself to the effect of, first, making possible a relationship of necessity between the natural 
law and accumulation, and second, furnishing a liberal image to America’s forcible absorption 
into British networks of colonial capitalism. I demonstrate that the ingenuity of Locke’s theory 
resides in the particular way he sets the terms and the narrative structure of his account, which 
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enables him to depart from God’s command to make use of the earth for the benefit of mankind 
and, passing through money’s zone of indeterminacy, arrive at the necessity of accumulation, 
which renders the seventeenth-century colonial capitalist practices not merely permissible but 
morally commendable.283 
 
Locke’s Theory of Money: An Overview284 
 Instead of providing a detailed reconstruction of Locke’s entire theory of property in the 
state of nature, I will focus on the position of money in the larger problematic which John Yolton 
called “Locke’s dilemma”285, namely, “how Men286 might come to have a property in several 
parts of that which God gave to mankind in common, and that without any express Compact of 
all the Commoners” (II. 25). Locke’s way out of this dilemma is to posit labor as an exclusive 
property in each person, the expenditure of which on the natural common removes a portion of it 
from the common state and inscribes that person’s private property in it (II. 27, 35). However, 
God, who bestows upon man the earth and the means to appropriate it, also places limits on 
appropriation (II. 31). The natural law is breached when appropriation overrides, on the one 
hand, the “sufficiency limitation” which dictates that “enough and as good” should be left in 
common for the others (II. 27, 33), and on the other, the “spoilage limitation,” which prohibits 
one to engross more than one can mix his labor with, and make use of before it perishes (II. 31, 
                                                
283 The methodological implication of this argument is that the peculiar connection between the natural law and 
accumulation can only be grasped by focusing on the structural composition of the chapter on property (and of the 
Second Treatise in general). This approach is paralleled and necessitated by the manner of Locke’s own 
theorization, which manages to derive the necessity of accumulation from a holistic narrative rendering of the 
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(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1960). 
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36, 38). This double circumscription restricts the amount of private property in the state of nature 
“to a very moderate Proportion” (II. 36). The invention of money and men’s mutual consent to 
put a value on it instigate a drastic transformation of this egalitarian state of affairs by enabling 
one to “fairly posses more land than he himself could use the product of, by receiving, in 
exchange for the overplus, Gold and Silver, which may be hoarded up without injury to anyone” 
(II. 50), since “the exceeding of the bounds of just Property” lies not “in the largeness of his 
Possession, but the perishing of anything uselessly in it” (II. 46). By giving men with different 
degrees of industry the opportunity to continue to enlarge their property, money eventually 
introduces scarcity of land (II. 45) and “a disproportionate and unequal Possession of the Earth,” 
yet without encroaching on anyone’s natural rights, for the universal consent conferred on the 
value of money amounts to the universal consent to the inequality that it engenders (II. 50).  
 C. B. Macpherson perceives in this chapter a clear “assertion and justification of a natural 
and individual right to property,” whereby the role of money consists in “remov[ing] the 
limitations inherent in his initial justification of individual appropriation.”287 For Macpherson, 
Locke’s deployment of the notion of money is a strategic one, which, while leaving the moral 
foundations of individual property intact, cleverly opens up the possibility of utilizing “money 
and land as capital,” introduces alienable wage-labor, and paves the way for unlimited capitalist 
appropriation. Perhaps most ingeniously, Locke locates the consent to money along with its 
ramifications in the state of nature and thereby establishes property and contract prior to civil 
society and hence as a realm independent of politics.288 Despite the critical broadsides 
Macpherson’s interpretation has received, the main axis of his analysis has continued to inform a 
number of scholars who adhere, albeit more cautiously and critically, to the premise that Locke’s 
                                                
287 Macpherson, Possessive Individualism, pp. 197, 204. For a detailed account of the removal of limits, see pp. 204-
20. 
288 Macpherson, Possessive Individualism, p. 210. 
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notion of money serves the cause of setting capitalist relations of production on solid theoretical 
grounds. Locke’s intentions have been described as furthering the idea of “natural social laws 
which operated automatically and independently of man-made institutions”289 and a “natural 
market society” beyond the purview of political power, which foreshadowed the “invisible hand” 
models of the eighteenth century.290 A closely related argument has been that his conception of 
money and property is definitively capitalistic291 and promotes “hoarding” as a way of 
accumulation for investment.292 By sanctioning surplus production, Locke’s notion of money 
justifies the dismantling of subsistence economies and the dispossession of the English peasants 
and the American natives, promotes capitalist relations of production on land,293 and expresses 
the capitalist thrust for accumulation on a world scale.294 Success of the strategic introduction of 
money hinges on circumventing the natural law yet leaving it intact, and while some hold that 
Locke accomplishes this maneuver295, others see in it the destruction of “the moral purpose 
associated with God’s gift of the earth”296 and “blatant violations of natural law.”297 
 Macpherson’s explication of Locke’s theory has been criticized, on the one hand, for 
overlooking the latter’s fundamental theological underpinnings and downplaying their moral and 
communitarian implications, and on the other, for anachronistically reading full-blown 
capitalism back into a body of work that was informed by biblical exegesis and the great natural 
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law tradition.298 Accordingly, this strand of interpretation, most clearly articulated by James 
Tully and Richard Ashcraft, focuses on the framework of religion-natural law-morality, in which 
the preservation of mankind, the principle of common good, and the moral injunction to labor on 
the earth as God’s gift override any natural right to private property and unconditional 
accumulation. For Ashcraft, the invention of money and its consequences figure as historical 
contingencies within this framework, which neither directly issue from nor violate the purposes 
of the natural law.299 While admitting that money is pre- or a-political, he refuses to conclude 
that it is “natural.” Rather, money belongs to the domain of the “probable knowledge”; it 
constitutes not a “moral constant” but a “prudential variable,” and all property accruing from its 
use is accordingly conventional.300 Although money enables men to acquire more 
“conveniences” through exchange without breaching the moral limitations on property, it 
introduces inequality and gives rise to the famous “inconveniences of the state of nature” 
(quarrel and contention), which then drives men to enter the civil society for the protection of 
natural rights. The conclusions that Tully draws from Locke’s theory of money are more radical 
as he construes the introduction of money as marking the moment of the man’s “fall” from the 
“golden age.”301 The motive behind the accumulation of money is neither the prospect of 
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capitalist investment nor its utility for exchange, but the miser’s penchant for simple hoarding.302 
By inculcating in men the unnatural and corrupt “desire to have more than one needs,” money 
renders dysfunctional the natural law of appropriation, which it is the commonwealth’s task to 
restitute by redistributing property and bringing it back in line with God’s original command of 
the preservation of mankind.303 
 I believe there are strong grounds to take seriously the theological-moral dimension of 
Locke’s theory of property, and I concur with Peter Laslett that Locke’s reliance on biblical 
exegesis in developing a theory of property cannot be accounted for as “half-conscious 
traditionalism or plain hypocrisy.”304 On the other hand, the depiction of Locke as a Christian 
communitarianist with no stake in seventeenth-century capitalist relations is equally untenable. 
For, in addition to the circumstantial evidence adduced above, Locke was someone who 
“invested in the slave trade, … charged interest on loans to close friends and was always tight-
fisted, recommended a most inhumane – even for his times – reform of the poor laws, and 
bequeathed only a minute proportion of a total cash legacy of over £ 12,000 to charity.”305 The 
question that springs to mind is, if money is a historically contingent phenomenon with a merely 
conventional basis (that is, outside the natural law), why can the inconveniences it engenders 
(quarrel and contention) not be resolved by a simple reversion to the pre-monetary state, instead 
of entailing the formation of commonwealths with their own spate of complications and 
problems? The question could be answered by conjecturing that Locke is simply hell-bent on 
advocating property accumulation, even if it occasions logical inconsistencies in his chain of 
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argumentation; however, such an economic reduction of the problem assumes that Locke is 
ultimately prepared to discard the moral foundations of property. This would be blatantly at odds 
with the main objective of chapter five of the Second Treatise, where Locke tries to demonstrate 
with painstaking effort and intricacy that the moral foundation of private property remains intact 
even at the stage where it is unequally held.  
A possible way of unraveling this conundrum, I propose, is to recast money as an 
ambivalent conceptual ground that allows Locke to establish a necessary relationship between 
the precepts of the natural law and the accumulation of capital. Illustrating the configuration 
between the natural law, accumulation, and money necessitates pinpointing the coordinates of 
money in the broader framework of a teleological imagination of progress that informs Locke’s 
theory of property. 
 
The “Dilemma of the Rational and Industrious” 
 
 A theoretical constant based on “the architectonic importance of theology” in Locke’s 
thought is the idea of the purposefulness of creation.306 In Ashcraft’s words, Locke holds that 
“God has not only put us here; He intends us to do something.”307 Men are created as innately 
equipped with the capacity for reason that is necessary for apprehending God’s purpose or divine 
telos, which manifests itself in the form the obligations under the natural law.308 The first and 
most important moral obligation is the preservation of mankind, which Locke constantly 
reiterates in the Two Treatises of Government: 
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“God having made Man, and planted in him … a strong desire of Self-preservation and furnished the 
world things fit for Food and Rayment and other Necessaries of Life, Subservient to his design, that man 
should live and abide for some time upon the Face of the Earth, and not that so curious and wonderful a 
piece of Workmanship by its own Negligence, or want of Necessaries, should perish again, presently after 
a few moments of continuance” (I. 86, emphasis added).309 
 
God has intended men to “Increase and Multiply” (I. 41) and given them the means for realizing 
this intention, though not without effort. The telos of self-preservation is yoked to the obligation 
to labor on the earth in order to provide for human needs. Locke asserts in the chapter on 
property, “God, when he gave the World in common to all Mankind, commanded man also to 
labour, and the penury of his condition required it of him” (II. 32). “He gave it to the use of the 
Industrious and Rational (and Labour was to be his title to it)” (II. 34). “God commanded, and 
his Wants forced him to labour” (II. 35). Labor’s status as divine injunction renders it a 
fundamentally moral act. “Laboring is not just something we happen to do to resources,” 
remarks Waldron, “it is the appropriate mode of helping oneself to the resources given what 
resources are for.”310 It is the divine authority behind the natural law framework311 that 
underwrites Locke’s theory of property, whereby “mixing one’s labor” entitles the laborer to 
private property not only on practical but also on moral terms.312 
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 Labor at the service of the preservation of mankind is compounded by a third moral 
obligation, which directs it to the subjection and improvement of the earth. Initially contenting 
himself with property rights in the provisions “produced by the spontaneous hand of nature” (II. 
26), Locke later proclaims the “chief matter of Property” to be the earth itself and contends, 
“God and Reason commanded him to subdue the Earth, i.e. improve it for the benefit of Life. As 
much Land as a Man Tills, Plants, Improves, Cultivates, and can use the Product of, so much is 
his property” (II. 32). As with the previous obligations, the improvement of land is not a mere 
technical expediency but the appropriate method for supporting livelihood. God has intended the 
uncultivated land lying in nature to be brought under the improving labor of man. “God gave the 
World to Men in Common; but since he gave it them for their benefit, and the greatest 
Conveniences of Life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed He meant it 
should always remain common and uncultivated” (II. 34). At this juncture in chapter five, the 
terms of discussion change noticeably and the binary of “value” and “waste,” through which 
Locke articulates the telos of improvement, takes the foreground. Although all useful things owe 
the great part of their value to labor, none does more so than land, which is “of so little value, 
without labor” (II. 36). If not enclosed and improved by man, God’s gift lies as “neglected, and 
consequently waste Land” (Ibid). In other words, enclosing and improving the waste of the earth 
is not only a more efficient way of producing the conveniences of life, it is also a moral duty 
because, by rescuing land from waste, it more fully consummates the purpose for which God has 
bestowed the earth upon men.313 This is in marked contrast to hunting and gathering in the first 
stages of the state of nature, exemplified for Locke by Amerindians, which not only renders men 
“needy and wretched” for the want of labor and improvement (II. 37), but also falls short of 
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following God’s purpose by letting waste the resources that could be made use of. As Parekh 
forcefully puts it, “Locke was deeply haunted by the idea of waste and wanted all the material 
potentialities of the earth to be fully realized.”314 
 At this point one begins to discern a progressive imaginary. As men rescue more land 
from waste by enclosing and cultivating it, as they labor and produce more necessities and 
conveniences for the benefit of life, in other words, as they transform greater parts of the world 
into valuable things, they better fulfill the obligations of the natural law, and more fully 
consummate God’s purpose.315 The crucial term Locke devises to substantiate this progressive 
imaginary is “common stock of mankind”: 
To which let me add, that he who appropriates land to himself does not lessen but increase the common 
stock of mankind. For the provisions serving to support humane life, produced by one acre of inclosed and 
cultivated land, are (to speak much within compasse) ten times more, than those, which are yeilded by 
and acre of Land, of equal richnesse, lyeing wast in common. And therefore he, that incloses Land and 
has a greater plenty of the conveniencys of life from ten acres, than he could have from an hundred left to 
Nature, may truly be said, to give ninety acres to Mankind (II. 37, emphasis added). 
 
The increase in the common stock is not restricted to leaving more land available for others to 
enclose and improve, but extends to the products of the earth, as the example of Spain testifies: 
“… the Inhabitants think themselves beholden to him, who, by his Industry on neglected, and 
consequently waste Land, has increased the stock of Corn, which they wanted” (II. 36, emphasis 
added).316 The example of America is most suggestive: 
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An Acre of Land, that bears here Twenty Bushels of Wheat, and another in America, which, with the 
same Husbandry, would do the like, are, without doubt, of the same natural, intrinsick Value. But yet the 
Benefit Mankind receives from the one, in a Year, is worth 5 l. and from the other possible not worth a 
Penny (II. 43, emphasis added). 
 
The notion of the common stock of mankind constitutes the privileged nexus in Locke’s theory 
of property, around which the obligations to preserve, to labor, and to improve are interwoven 
and set in moral, teleological motion. God has furnished the earth with material intended for not 
only the necessities but also the conveniences of life, which allow men to augment their 
livelihood beyond bare subsistence. The capacious and maximalist understanding of production 
in Locke’s vision is evident: “great and primary blessing of God Almighty, Be fruitful, and 
multiply, and replenish the earth … contains in it the improvement too of arts and sciences, and 
the conveniences of life” (I. 33). “Industry and accumulation” therefore are endowed with a 
theological and teleological gravity as the medium in which men “discharge the duty to develop 
earth’s resources and create a prosperous society.”317 The more mankind expands its common 
stock through the improvement of land by labor for the preservation of mankind, the more it 
approximates to fulfilling God’s purpose.  
It should be emphasized that the intimate connection Locke establishes between 
industrious accumulation and theological approbation centers not on the individual and his 
spiritual salvation but on society and its material development. Expressed in words of a historian, 
Locke’s is less a species of “puritan ethic” than of “ethic of productivity.”318 Under the aegis of a 
God’s injunctions and narrated as the unfolding of a divine design through the medium of human 
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activity on the earth, Locke crafts a materialist theory of progress, in effect setting up the 
“background assumption of the ‘stages view’ of historical development.” “Locke’s four sets of 
arguments became conventional figures of the four-stages theories of property in the Scottish and 
French Enlightenments, even when the theorists disagreed with Locke in other respects.”319 
Augmentation of the common stock as well as the dispositions and methods of achieving it 
become the index of at once historical advancement and moral rectitude. 
 The increase in the common stock, however, does not readily assume the form of 
accumulation. The theological precept that the fruits of the earth are intended for the use of 
mankind (spoilage limitation) restricts the extent of the common stock to what can be actually 
utilized by human beings before they perish. The point is obvious in the case of the individual 
producer for whom it is “a foolish thing, as well as dishonest, to hoard up more than he could 
make use of” (II. 46). One solution Locke proposes to spoliation limitation is gift or barter:  
If he gave away a part to anybody else, so that it perished not uselessly in his Possession, these he also 
made use of. And if he also bartered away Plumbs that would have rotten in a Week, for Nuts that would 
last good for his eating a whole Year, he did no injury; he wasted not the common Stock; destroyed no 
part of the portion of Good that belonged to others, so long as nothing perished uselessly in his hands 
(Ibid). 
 
The crucial point to note here is that while gift or barter overcomes the spoilage limitation for the 
individual producer, the same limitation remains in effect for mankind as a whole. Even the most 
durable of goods, such as nuts, are ultimately intended for concrete use and not for accumulation. 
That is to say, while saving the common stock from waste, barter circumscribes it with the 
immediate and concrete needs of mankind at a given moment. Subsistence or “hand-to-mouth 
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existence,” regardless of how much it is enriched by the conveniences, remains the paradigm of 
production and consumption. This might explain why although Locke was cognizant of the 
complex systems of barter and gift-giving amongst Amerindians he nonetheless disqualified 
these forms of exchange as a proper solution to the spoilage limitation.320 The distinction 
between the paradigms of subsistence and accumulation, as I discuss in the next section, is 
central to delineating the precise vector of the expropriatory thrust of Locke’s theory of property 
in the colonial context. 
 With the introduction of moral restrictions on appropriation, Locke’s interpretation of the 
natural law, if one may allow the expression, reaches its limits from within and reveals an 
internal impasse. The industrious and rational, to whom God gave the earth, heed their calling 
and ardently enclose, improve, and increase the common stock only to find themselves to be 
producing more than can actually be used, and thereby violating God’s proscription of spoilage. 
Since the “terrors of natural law no longer strike the covetous, but the waster,”321 the industrious 
and rational face “an ethical dilemma.”322 They can avoid spoilage by limiting their labor to what 
can be used by themselves and others. This would entail enclosing and improving less than they 
could if the spoilage limitation did not exist, and hence leaving most of God’s gift wasting in 
common, which is clearly at odds with God’s intentions, for “it cannot be supposed He meant it 
should always remain common and uncultivated” (II. 34). Alternatively, they can enclose, 
improve and rescue as much land from waste as their capacity to labor permits. This ultimately 
culminates in overproduction and the subsequent wasting of the fruits of labor, which is equally 
against God’s purpose, for “if either the grass on his enclosure rotted on the ground, or the fruit 
of his planting perished without gathering, and laying up, this part of the Earth, notwithstanding 
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his enclosure, was still to be looked on as waste” (II. 38). Put differently, the dilemma is between 
letting waste and making waste, or the loss of potential value and actual value. 
 The contradiction in question is a grim one, for it implies a contradiction within the 
natural law. To acknowledge it as such would amount to imputing an inconsistency to the 
providential design, thereby throwing into question the moral fundament on which Locke erects 
his theory of property. Consequently, there must be something that could show that this apparent 
inconsistency is not an inconsistency at all, and that it is possible to unleash the full force of 
industry and labor in the service of God’s purpose. There must be a way to labor and bring the 
entire waste of the earth under cultivation without violating the spoilage limitation, which means 
that there must be a way to store the value created by labor without letting it decay and return to 
the waste of the common. In other words, there must be a way to accumulate if the dilemma of 
the industrious and rational is to be dispelled. Given this necessary relationship between 
consummating God’s purpose and accumulating value, in turn, there must be a medium in which 
value can be disentangled from the transience of the perishable goods and accumulated in 
abstract form for the satisfaction of anonymous future needs. In short, there must be money. 
 
Money: Deus Ex Machina 
 Even though Locke cannot directly derive the possibility of accumulation from the 
original precepts of the natural law, as we have seen, the way he constructs his theory of property 
culminates in the necessity of accumulation for the consummation of God’s purpose. I argue that 
the introduction of money, as the medium of accumulation par excellence, should be understood 
as Locke’s attempt to navigate this paradox. However, since Locke cannot deduce the existence 
of money from the natural law, he assigns it a conventional position, which renders money an 
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indeterminate phenomenon that is historical and consensual in its origin yet theological and 
teleological in its import. In the remainder of the section, I elaborate this point by explicating, on 
the one hand, the work money performs in Locke’s theory of property, and on the other, the 
peculiarity of the consent from which it is born. 
 The primary function of money is the fulfillment of the spoilage limitation in a way that 
allows for accumulation.323 Unlike the concrete products of labor, money would “keep without 
wasting or decay” (II. 37) and “may be hoarded up without injury to any one” (II. 50). One 
“might heap up as much of these durable things as he pleased; the exceeding of his just Property 
not lying in the largeness of his Possessions, but the perishing of any thing uselessly in it” (II. 
46). However, contrary to what Tully argues, the motive behind the accumulation of money is 
not “miser’s reason,”324 but the possibility of converting the stored abstract value back into use-
value: “And thus came in the use of Money, some lasting thing man might keep without spoiling, 
and that by mutual consent Men would take in exchange for the truly useful, but perishable 
Supports of Life” (II. 47). While remaining within the paradigm of production-for-use, money 
introduces an element of temporal freedom by making it possible in principle to postpone the 
moment of use indefinitely. In so doing, it liberates men from the requirement of immediately 
consuming the products of labor, which characterizes “hand-to-mouth existence,” and enables 
them to rationally orient their productive activities towards some perceived future good.325 
 The new element of temporal freedom harbors momentous implications for the binary of 
waste and value, and it is not coincidental that this binary makes its appearance in the very 
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section (II. 36) where money is mentioned for the first time. Money resolves the dilemma 
between “letting waste” and “making waste” by suspending the latter, and frees men to focus 
their energies on enclosing and cultivating not in accordance with their concrete immediate 
needs, but based on the extent of their capacity to labor. Consequently, insofar as the subjection 
of the earth through labor is amongst God’s intentions for the world (II. 34-5), money proves 
indispensable for the consummation of the theological telos. Given this theological significance, 
it is hard to conceive of money as a mere practical expediency. This point finds support from 
several central passages in chapter five, which suggest that the invention of money ushers a 
whole new way of imagining mankind’s relationship to the world: 
…yet there are great tracts of Grounds to be found, which (the Inhabitants thereof not having joined the 
rest of Mankind, in the consent of the Use of their common money) lie waste, and are more than the 
People, who dwell on it, do, or can make use of, and so still lie in common. Tho’ this can scarce happen 
amongst that part of Mankind, that have consented to the Use of Money (II. 45). 
 
Note that in this passage, enclosure and improvement of land as grounds of entitlement are 
annexed to the logic of money, which is at once the condition and the substantiation of the drive 
to exhaust the earth through its transformation into value. Wherever money is used, the land 
ceases to be waste in principle, without regards to the actual state of land, as attested by the fact 
that Locke does not use the term “waste” to denote the land “left in common by compact” in 
England (II. 35). With this move, Locke equates the presence or absence of a progressive attitude 
that strives to put an end to the waste of the world with the presence or absence of 
monetarization: 
Where there is not something both lasting and scarce, and so valuable to be hoarded up, there Men will 
not be apt to enlarge their Possessions of Land, were it never so rich, never so free for them to take. For I 
ask, What would a Man value Ten Thousand, or an Hundred Thousand Acres of excellent Land, ready 
cultivated, and well stocked too with Cattle, in the middle of the in-land parts of America, where he had 
no hopes of Commerce with other Parts of the World, to draw Money to him by the Sale of the Product? It 
would not be worth inclosing, and we should see him give up again to the wild Common of Nature, 
whatever was more than would supply the Conveniences of Life to be had there for him and his Family 
(II. 48, last emphasis added). 
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 This last point can be more compellingly illustrated by tracing the Locke’s repeated and 
emphatic deployment of the term “waste” after he introduces the notion of money (II. 36 - II. 
50). For an objective empiricist, such as Locke is taken to be, there would be nothing “waste” in 
nature as such. Nature is apprehended as wasting only when looked upon with a progressive and 
acquisitive gaze that perceives the world as a reservoir of potential value to be extracted and 
accumulated. This is not only reflected in Locke’s monetary assessment of the comparative 
benefits mankind would derive from uncultivated American wastes and improved English farms 
(II. 43), but it also grants some clarity on Locke’ famous announcement, “Thus in the beginning 
all the World was America, and more so than that is now; for no such thing as Money was any 
where known” (II. 49). The strange predication of the state of nature on the absence of money 
loses its mystery once we see that money inaugurates a paradigm shift from subsistence to 
accumulation. Whether a plot of land is “worth inclosing” and improving is conditional upon 
whether it is possible to accumulate the value that is derived from it, which, in turn, hinges on 
the use of money. “Find out something that hath the Use and Value of Money amongst his 
Neighbours, you shall see the same Man will begin presently to enlarge his Possessions “ (II. 
49). As a result, money becomes the nexus around which the religious teleology of subduing the 
earth and the practices geared towards the accumulation of value coalesce.326 From this 
perspective, the enlargement of possessions and the subsequent scarcity in land under a monetary 
economy is not to be lamented but rather celebrated as the sign of a closer approximation to 
God’s purpose. Such scarcity entails dispossession and inequality in land, true, but it ameliorates 
                                                
326 From this perspective, such capitalist relations on land as large enclosures and agricultural improvement that 
Locke endorsed in seventeenth-century England are part and parcel of the theological parameters of his theory of 
property. For the agrarian capitalist tenets of Locke’s thought and his historical involvement with the “Baconian 
improvers,” see Wood, Agrarian Capitalism, chaps. 2 and 3; Kelly, “General Introduction,” p. 100. For a more 
textual extrapolation of the Baconian influence in Locke’s thought, see Pangle, Modern Republicanism, p. 166; 
Zuckert, Natural Rights, p. 203. 
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this inequality by a boost in the production of value that feeds into the common stock of 
mankind, which renders a day-laborer in England better fed, lodged and clad than “the king of a 
large and fruitful territory [in America]” (II. 41). Hence money not only leaves intact the moral 
obligation to preserve all mankind, it fulfills it better than the more egalitarian yet more 
penurious pre-monetary system, barter and gift notwithstanding.327 And to bring matters full 
circle, since the expansion of the common stock of mankind is meant by God, money, as the 
precondition of this expansion, evinces a kernel of theological import. 
 In the light of the discussion above, it is unconvincing, if not erroneous, to assert that  
“Money [is] useful in the context of trade, and trade, Locke believes – not ‘unlimited 
appropriation’ – is beneficial to everyone.”328 Criticisms of Macpherson’s “possessive 
individualism” are justified only insofar as “unlimited appropriation” is taken in the narrow 
sense of individual wealth. Whereas I think the stakes in Locke’s theory are far larger than 
“possessive individualism” and accumulation of individual fortune. What is articulated here is 
indeed “unlimited accumulation” but at the global level whose scale is “mankind,” or to cite 
                                                
327 Most importantly, the much-debated right to charity espoused in the First Treatise (I. 42) remains in force, and it 
operates even more efficiently since there is now a larger common stock from which to dispense charity. As Ian 
Shapiro puts it somewhat bluntly, “Locke formulated an early version of the trickle-down justification for unlimited 
private accumulation” (36, fn. 4). Shapiro, “Workmanship Ideal,” p. 36n4. The issue of charity in Locke has been a 
major node of contention, particularly inasmuch as it has been made into a bulwark against unlimited accumulation 
(see, for example, Tully, Discourse on Property, esp. chap. 6). While it is the case that for Locke charity is an 
enforceable right that gives the destitute a minimal entitlement to others’ economic surplus, this right circumscribes 
accumulation only insofar as one conceives of the economy as a “zero-sum-game” whereby one’s gain is another’s 
loss. However, I have consistently argued throughout this section that a “positive-sum-game” qua increased 
common stock is precisely what subtends Locke’s theory of property. Consequently, charity as a right to surplus 
under conditions of extreme want, especially when pre-qualified with work obligations, is quite compatible with 
Locke’s accumulative worldview. This position can be most readily gleaned from Locke’s “An Essay on the Poor 
Law,” in ed. Mark Goldie, Locke: Political Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge, 1997). For a comprehensive articulation 
of the idea of charity as an enforceable right, see John Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1992), especially 307-354. For a similar argument, see Waldron, God, Locke, Equality, 
170-187. For an account of Locke’s vision of political economy as a positive-sum-game based on labor, efficiency, 
and commerce, see Steven Pincus, 1688, chap.12. 
328 Ashcraft, “Politics,” pp. 38-9 
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Goerge Caffentzis’s brilliant coinage, a theory of “possessive universalism.”329 The specific 
mediation that Locke establishes between the “common” and the “common stock of mankind” 
by way of privatization, monetarization, and accumulation amounts to nothing short of a 
magnificent reversal of the conventional terms governing the reception and understanding of 
property relations and social justice. Locke renders “the private” the door opening onto “the 
common good”; particularization of the common becomes the precondition for universal 
prosperity; dispossession paves the road to welfare (as in the case of the day laborer), while 
persistence in holding things in common (as do Amerindians) appears as virtual theft from the 
prospective wealth of mankind. Money functions as the linchpin of a global theory of property, a 
new moral economy, which enlists a theological conception of moral and material progress to the 
service of primitive accumulation qua land enclosures on both shores of the seventeenth-century 
Atlantic. 
III. Back to the Beginning 
 So far I have discussed the effective implications of the notion of money, namely, the 
navigation of a contradiction between two components of Locke’s theory of property, both 
equally crucial for the moral force of private appropriation. The first of these, the spoilage 
proviso, endows original appropriation with a moral force by linking it to the satisfaction of 
human needs and thereby restricting the domain of appropriation. The second, the injunction to 
subdue the earth, sanctions the universal enclosure and improvement of the earth’s waste for 
increasing the common stock of mankind. Money resolves the conflicting implications of these 
moral principles by propelling mankind beyond the material immediacy of hand-to-mouth 
                                                
329 Caffentzis, Clipped Coins, pp. 118-9. Also evocative is Pangle’s expression “dynamic individualism” which 
underlies the “goal of unlimited accumulation of exchangeable value … in a society suffused with the Lockean 
spirit.” Pangle, Modern Republicanism, pp. 168-9. 
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existence, thereby making possible the perpetual development of productive forces and 
accumulation of value. 
 The implications of this argumentation for colonial land appropriations are clear: 
Amerindians would materially benefit if their ancestral lands are enclosed and improved by 
English colonists. “[T]he Aboriginal peoples are better off as a result of the establishment of the 
commercial system of private property,” thanks to “not only finished products but also the 
opportunities to labor”; in short, they are “more than compensated for their loss.”330 The 
justification of appropriation from common stock of mankind is a powerful one, for it stakes its 
claims in universal benefit, that is, in a catholic principle of non-exclusion. By itself, however, it 
does not amount to a liberal justification of appropriation, insofar as the argument from universal 
benefit can be easily coupled with a paternalistic notion of authority that rejects the liberal norms 
of juridical equality and consent, a notion that was forwarded in Locke’s time by Sir Robert 
Filmer. This brings us to the second conundrum in Locke’s theory of property, which stems from 
the uneasy coexistence of two distinct agendas. The first is protecting private property in 
England from the encroachments of extra-legal power propounded by Filmer’s absolutism. The 
second is establishing private property in America precisely through the deployment of extra-
legal power.331 The first of these agendas is advanced through the language of natural rights, 
                                                
330 Tully, “Aboriginal Property,” pp. 352-3. 
331 Extra-legal power in Locke’s political theory is most clearly articulated in II. 159-168 in his discussion of 
“prerogative.” This complex notion in effect refers to a residual power lingering from the state of nature that is 
deployed to respond to the exigencies and emergencies that cannot be foreseen and exhausted by promulgated 
norms. Therefore, executive prerogative, that is, properly extra-legal power is not answerable to positive law. Its 
abuse can only be decided upon by the people, the subject of the social contract and the purported source of 
sovereign power, who determine if and when the executive power has breached the contract that institutionalizes the 
precepts of the law of nature. In other words, the extra-legal constituent power of the people is the counterpart to the 
extra-legal prerogative of the executive. See Ross Corbett, “The Extraconstitutionality of Lockean Prerogative,” 
Review of Politics 68 (2006): 428–81; Iain Hampsher-Monk and K. Zimmerman, “Liberal Constitutionalism and 
Schmitt’s Critique of the Rule of Law,” History of Political Thought 28 (2007): 678-95; Clement Fatovic, Outside 
the Law: Emergency and Executive Power (The John Hopkins University Press, 2009), chap. 2. What is significant 
for our discussion is that insofar as Locke designates the Europeans and Amerindians as interacting in the state of 
nature (II. 14), and insofar as Amerindians are denied the status of commonwealths (which would render the 
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departing from a “state of perfect freedom” and a “state of also equality” in which “all the power 
and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another” (II. 4). The second agenda cuts 
against the grain of this language inasmuch as it endeavors, in matters of appropriation, “to shew, 
how men might come to have a property in several parts of that which God gave to mankind in 
common, and that without any express compact of all the commoners” (II. 25, emphasis added). 
Locke’s explicit intention to base original appropriation on a non-contractual basis targeted a 
more properly liberal stance on property expounded by Samuel Pufendorf, who had followed a 
pivotal precept of the Western law, “what touches all must be agreed to by all.”332 Had Locke 
adhered, as regards American land appropriations, to a strict interpretation of the principle of 
juridical equality and consent he espoused in the Two Treatises, these liberal principles would 
have worked as stumbling blocks to British colonial capitalist enterprise he adamantly defended. 
If Locke had “recognized [indigenous] forms of property, settlement in America without consent 
would have been unjust by his own criteria, for the land would have been owned, rather than 
unowned and common as the original appropriation argument requires.”333 Then the 
reconciliation of Locke’s competing allegiances to liberal principles, themselves rooted in the 
political economy in England, and to English colonial capitalism that violated these principles in 
America hinged on demonstrating that land in America was still natural common, and most 
crucially, that this common status itself was a function of Amerindians’ consent. As I illustrate 
                                                
colonial encounter one between sovereign states), the force that the Englishmen deploy to expropriate Amerindians 
emerges as a species of untrammeled executive prerogative. This power is untrammeled because it is not wielded by 
a sovereign who has derived it from the consent of the governed who would in turn constitute a natural or political 
(as opposed to legal) counterbalance through vigilance and legitimate threat of revolution. If one accepts Matthew 
Connelly’s definition of the “essence of empire” as “the exercise of untrammeled power,” then the relationship that 
Locke envisions between the English and Amerindians, his discourse of natural equality notwithstanding, is an 
inherently imperial relationship. Matthew Connelly, “The New Imperialists,” in Lessons of Empire: Imperial 
Histories and American Power, ed. Craig Calhoun, Frederick Cooper, Kevin Moore (New York: New Press, 2006), 
p. 32. 
332 Tully, “Aboriginal Property,” p. 352. 
333 Ibid, p. 357. 
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below, money not only occupies a structurally necessary position in Locke’s theory of property 
despite its apparent contingency, but it also issues from a paradoxical kind of consent that in 
principle binds mankind. The universal and tacit consent of mankind that Locke ascribes to the 
historical origins of money discloses money to be a theoretical fiction that paints colonial 
capitalism in liberal colors. 
The Paradox of “Natural Consent” 
 “Consent” and “agreement” constantly recur in Locke’s discussion of money in chapter 
five: “the invention of money and the tacit agreement of men to put a value on it, introduced (by 
consent) larger possessions, and a right to them” (II. 36); “had agreed that a little piece of yellow 
metal … should be worth a great piece of flesh, or a whole heap of corn” (II. 37); “in the consent 
of the use of their common money” (II.45); “things that fancy or agreement hath put the value 
on” (II. 46); “money… that by mutual consent men would take in exchange for the truly useful, 
but perishable supports of life” (II. 47); “riches … have but a fantastical imaginary value” (II. 
184). The penultimate section of chapter five is where Locke brings the articulation of land, 
labor, money and property to a close, and thus worth citing in its entirety:  
But since Gold and Silver, being little useful to the Life of Man in proportion to Food, Rayment, and 
Carriage, has its value only from the consent of Men, whereof labour yet makes, in great part, the 
measure; it is plain, that men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal Possession of the Earth; they 
having, by tacit and voluntary consent, found out a way how a man may fairly posses more land than he 
himself could use the product of, by receiving, in exchange for the overplus, gold and silver, which may 
be hoarded up without injury to anyone … This partage of things in an inequality of private possessions, 
men have made practicable out of the bounds of Societie, and without compact; only by putting a value 
on gold and silver, and tacitly agreeing in the use of Money. For in Governments, the Laws regulate the 
right of property, and the possession of land is determined by positive constitutions (II. 50). 
 
The conclusion that some interpreters derive from these passages is that Locke is trying to 
demonstrate that property based on money is conventional and cannot be justified on the grounds 
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of natural rights.334 For others, locating the consent to money outside the bounds of society 
amounts to nothing short of the “naturalization” of money along with the property based on it by 
excluding their foundations from the domain of political human agency.335 Put differently, the 
former interpretation focuses on the presence of consent and concludes with money-as-
convention, whereas the latter emphasize the absence of compact and arrive at money-as-nature. 
Once again, the question is reduced to the choice between nature and convention, and Locke is 
forced to choose sides. 
 I maintain, against this binary, that Locke’s theory of property, insofar as it posits a 
relationship of necessity between theological universals and accumulative practices, cannot 
choose sides regarding the nature of money. For the indeterminacy of the consent without 
compact that underpins money is the very strength of his theory, in that it allows Locke to depart 
from theological injunctions (preserve mankind, labor, and subdue the earth) and arrive at the 
moral necessity of accumulative practices (increasing the common stock of mankind).336 Yet in 
the process, the explicitly consensual language around money saves Locke the trouble of holding 
the difficult position that God directly commanded men to accumulate capital even if this meant 
widespread dispossession and inequality of wealth. In this respect, money remains a peculiar 
beast with historical and contingent origins yet theological and moral impact. It cannot be 
derived from the natural law without committing absurdity; neither can it be reduced to sheer 
convention without impeding the actualization of God’s purpose. Hence the mode of existence 
                                                
334 Ashcraft, Locke’s Two Treatises, p. 139; “Politics,” p. 30; Tully, Discourse on Property, pp. 147-50. Also see 
Parker, Biblical Politics, pp. 136-7; McClure, Judging Rights, p. 171. 
335 Macpherson, Possessive Individualism, p. 210; Appleby, Liberalism and Republicanism, p. 60; Vaughn, 
“Economic Background,” pp. 125, 134. 
336 Caffentzis deserves merit for recognizing the exclusion of money from both the natural law and the social 
contract, however, he concludes by subsuming it under “philosophical law” or “the law of fashion,” which misses 
the theological significance of money by reducing its use to a matter of habit. See Caffentzis, Clipped Coins, pp. 68-
72, 144-150. 
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that money inhabits is paradoxical and can be best expressed by an oxymoronic term such as 
“natural consent” or “necessary consent.” 
 The understanding of Locke’s notion of money as a paradoxical “natural consent” or an 
area of indeterminacy finds support from a careful reading of some of the passages in the Second 
Treatise. The most striking characteristic of the consent given to the use and value of money is 
its universality. Going back to section 50, “men” who “have agreed to a disproportionate and 
unequal possession of the earth” are clearly not a particular group of men but all mankind, the 
protagonist of the Second Treatise.337 A decade later, Locke more clearly reiterates this point in 
his famous economic tract, Some Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of 
Interest, and Raising the Value of Money: “For Mankind, having consented to put an imaginary 
Value upon Gold and Silver … have made them by general consent the common Pledges.”338 
Invocation of “mankind” as the subject of consent to money universalizes the normative reach of 
the implications of monetarization and effectively turns it into an agreement that binds mankind. 
This is nowhere more clearly indicated in perhaps one of the most crucial passages in the Second 
Treatise: 
yet there are great tracts of Grounds to be found, which (the Inhabitants thereof not having joined the rest 
of Mankind, in the consent of the Use of their common money) lie waste, and are more than the People, 
who dwell on it, do, or can make use of, and so still lie in common. Tho’ this can scarce happen amongst 
that part of Mankind, that have consented to the Use of Money (II. 45). 
 
Note in this passage the curious semantics of mankind, which is at once the unanimous consenter 
to money and a subject riven into, on the one hand, those who use money and abide by the 
binding power of the original tacit agreement, and on the other, those who do not use money and 
therefore the subject of a contractual deficit. This social division spatially maps onto the division 
                                                
337 This is paralleled by Locke’s use of the term “earth,” which denotes not a particular geography but the entire 
world. Locke otherwise specifies America, England, Spain, etc. 
338 John Locke, “Some Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest, and Raising the Value of 
Money,” in Kelly, Locke on Money, 233. This also suggests that the assumption of universality espoused earlier in 
the Second Treatise is neither accidental nor temporary.  
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of the earth into non-waste and waste, natural common and property (including common by 
compact), lands that can be appropriated without the consent of their tenants and lands that are 
subject to the consent of their proprietors (including commoners). The penalty (as it were) 
imposed on Amerindians for not abiding by the tacit agreement to which they have, or must 
have, consented in the lost recesses of time is the pronouncement of their territories as natural 
common open to appropriation by the members of a monetarized economy like England. In other 
words, the assumption of universality of the consent to money does not budge in the face of 
factual contradiction. This arrogation can be theoretically explained if and only if one 
presupposes the universality of money as a principle of necessity that binds the entirety of 
mankind.339 If Amerindians have not joined “the rest of mankind” in their common consent to 
money, it is they and not the “rest of mankind” who are at fault. The responsibility for the status 
of their lands as natural common is squarely placed on the shoulders of Amerindians, as the 
legitimacy of appropriating their territories can ultimately be retraced to an act of mutual 
consent. 
 Perhaps even more tellingly for its importance in Locke’s theory of property, 
monetarization is the only phenomenon that rests on universal consent in the Two Treatises. 
Other instances of mutual consent in the state of nature, such as marriage, master-servant 
relations, and exchange of commodities are particularistic contracts that obligate only the parties 
involved,340 whereas the consent to money is singular in its binding force over all mankind.341 
                                                
339 Kelly tries to resolve this conundrum by construing the term “universal” as “analogous to its use in the term 
‘universal truth,’ i.e. everyone on having the advantages of gold and silver as the medium of exchange explained to 
him, necessarily consents to their adoption.” Kelly, “General Introduction,” p. 88. This interpretation fails to explain 
how the status of a consensual practice can be akin to “universal truth” unless it is already inscribed in the natural 
order of human reality, which redirects one to the domain of the natural law. 
340 “The promises and bargains for truck, &c. between the two men in the desert island, mentioned by Garcilasso de 
la Vega, in his history of Peru; or between a Swiss and an Indian, in the woods of America, are binding to them, 
though they are perfectly in a state of nature, in reference to one another: for truth and keeping of faith belongs to 
men, as men, and not as members of society” (II. 14) 
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This point can be more emphatically established through a comparison with the only 
phenomenon whose foundations evince an affinity with those of money. This is the inheritance 
of property, which Locke treats in section 88 of the First Treatise. There, Locke asks the 
question, “how come Children by this right of possessing, before any other, the properties of 
their Parents upon their Decease” and discourses,  
‘Twill perhaps be answered, that common consent hath disposed of it, to the Children. Common Practice, 
we see indeed does so dispose of it but we cannot say, that it is the common consent of Mankind; for that 
hath never been asked, nor actually given: and if common tacit Consent hath establish’d it, it would make 
a positive and not Natural right of Children to Inherit the Goods of their Parents: But where the practice is 
universal, ‘tis reasonable to think the Cause is Natural” (I. 88) 
 
Considering the position of money in the light of the logic presented in this passage further 
underscores its peculiarity. On the one hand, the tacit consent underpinning the use of money 
would clearly position the latter in the domain of positive law, yet this contradicts Locke’s 
contention that America is natural commons because Amerindians have not joined the common 
consent to money. On the other hand, the universality of this consent and its binding validity for 
mankind would lead one to conclude that “where the practice is universal, it is reasonable to 
think the cause it natural”; nevertheless, Locke is incontrovertibly clear about the consensual 
origins of money. To summarize this point, if the use of money is natural because universal, and 
hence binds mankind, then it cannot be based on consent; if, in contrast, it is consensual and 
conventional, then it cannot be natural and hence lacks the power to bind mankind. This leaves 
                                                
341 This discussion also shows that the question of money could provide a fresh avenue of thinking about Locke’s 
theory of consent. For a broad overview of the debates on Locke’s theory of consent, see John Dunn, “Consent in 
the Political Theory of John Locke” in Political Obligation in Its Historical Context (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1980); John Simmons, “‘Denisons’ and ‘Aliens’: Locke’s Problem of Political Consent,” Social 
Theory and Practice 24 (1998): 161-182, and On the Edge of Anarchy: Locke, Consent, and the Limits of Society 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 
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money in an ambiguous, indeterminate position located on the border between positive and 
natural law.342 
To clinch the analysis of the paradoxical position of money, we might consider a 
hypothetical scenario: mankind’s agreement (express or tacit) to cease using money. Let us 
suppose that mankind was discontented with the inequalities and “inconveniences” engendered 
by the use of money in the state of nature, and decided, by universal consent, to cast it into 
desuetude. As a consequence, ceteris paribus, the evaporation of the medium of accumulation 
would entail a massive decline in the common stock of mankind, precipitous fall in trade, 
disappearance of the main motive for enclosure and improvement, shrinkage of possessions due 
to the spoilage limitation, and the return to the common waste all that has been hitherto 
accumulated beyond hand-to-mouth existence. This would not only drastically reduce the 
aggregate conveniences of life (the English laborer would now be fed, lodged, and clad more or 
less like an Indian king), but it would also violate the moral obligations under the natural law by 
letting the value produced by labor to perish uselessly and by wasting the already subdued and 
improved land. In short, the withdrawal of the tacit consent from the use of money amounts to a 
profound moral effrontery, and for this reason it cannot, or rather must not, be withdrawn. Hence, 
whereas all conventional relations established by mutual consent amongst men, including 
marriage, exchange, or even government, can be undone by another act of mutual consent, the 
same freedom cannot be permitted in the case of money. In other words, if it is an act of consent 
that founds money, then it is the only consent that cannot be retracted without violating the 
                                                
342 One could argue that inheritance of property partakes in the same conceptual ambiguity. However, inheritance is 
directly traceable to the “strong desire of propagating their kind … and continuing themselves in posterity” that 
“God planted in men” (which qualifies inheritance as an innate right – II. 56, 88, 190), and can be more broadly 
subsumed under the natural law obligation to preserve mankind (I. 41, I. 86). What renders money peculiar in 
comparison is that it lacks a parallel recourse to a natural framework of rights and obligations while having the 
normative-obligatory efficacy of this framework. 
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natural law. As a result, the inconveniences introduced to the state of nature by money have to be 
regulated by the government founded on a further act of consent. Yet the power of revolution 
vested in “the people” in the case of civil government lacks a counterpart in the case of money, 
which is ultimately the cause for the institution of government.343 Regicide is permitted; 
disaccumulation is not. Governments come and go; historical progress rolls onward. And it 
righteously catapults the rude beginnings of the world rediscovered in America to the present of 
mankind. 
 
Colonial Turn Reconsidered 
 To clarify and summarize this somewhat dense discussion, I have argued that the notion 
of money in Locke’s theory makes possible two intertwined theoretical moves. First, it allows 
Locke to situate his accumulative political economic vision on a universal and inclusive moral 
high ground by suturing the rifts of his divine teleology through the myth of universal consent. 
Secondly, at the same moment it folds all mankind in the universal benefits of this accumulative 
vision, it marks off Amerindians as implied deviants from the foundations of this vision, and 
thereby excludes them from the domain of legitimate proprietorship in land until they have 
                                                
343 Formation of commonwealths, while remedying the “inconveniences” (inequality, contention, and quarrel) 
ushered in by the invention of money, opens to question the universalistic tendencies of accumulation extrapolated 
from Locke’s theory. For instance, Alex Tuckness interrogates the limits of Lockean altruism whereby he concludes 
that governments are empowered to act to preserve mankind only if such actions do not impair their own citizens’ 
interests. Nevertheless, Tuckness distinguishes between the national objectives of specific governments and the 
objectives of government as such, contending “that a government limited to pursuing the preservation of its own 
members was furthering, not hindering, the preservation of all mankind.” Alex Tuckness, “Punishment, Property, 
and the Limits of Altruism: Locke's International Asymmetry,” American Political Science Review 102 (2008): 467-
79, p. 472. From this perspective, it is possible to conceive of Locke’s notion of commonwealth mainly as a 
contrivance devised to make mankind better off, first and foremost by securing the conditions of investment, 
innovation, and accumulation. The degree to which these conditions are maintained and improved becomes the 
universal criterion for judging the performance of specific governments. Therefore, although I concur with 
Tuckness’s observation that the role Locke tailored for government was the promotion of “economic growth,” I 
disagree with his conclusion that economic growth was exclusively geared to buttress national security. As Pincus 
demonstrates, the secular welfare of citizens and subjects was a self-standing concern of the Whig political vision. 
Pincus, 1688, pp. 369, 372, 396-7. 
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joined the “rest of mankind” in the common consent to money. The indeterminacy of money 
between the natural law and human convention modulates the ambiguous status of Amerindians, 
who are simultaneously inside and outside of mankind’s consent to money, that is, bound by a 
universal agreement amongst “mankind” of which they are at once part and yet to join. Layers of 
conceptual ambivalence opened by these theoretical maneuvers enable Locke to configure 
inclusionary and exclusionary provisions in ways that authorizes the dispossession of 
Amerindians at the same time it captures them in myths of natural equality, mutual consent, and 
global prosperity. In other words, Locke’s theory of property subtly co-articulates socio-spatial 
displacement and exclusion, on the one hand, and liberal values and the historical promise of 
development, on the other. It thereby recasts in a liberal mold the fulcrum of seventeenth-century 
Atlantic capitalism, namely, colonial land appropriations effected through extra-legal force. A 
sustained analysis of Locke’s notion of money therefore helps us gain novel insights into the 
ways in which the socioeconomic and theological-moral aspects of Locke’s thought interlock in 
a bid to sanction the transatlantic process of enclosure through a global vision of material 
progress underpinned by a universalist ideology of improvement. These insights have been only 
partially glimpsed by the existing Locke scholarship due to the issues of perspectival insularity 
discussed earlier. Accordingly, I would like to conclude my discussion by reevaluating two sets 
of arguments generated by the colonial turn in the light of the foregoing discussion of the 
morality of accumulation and liberal myths of universal consent.  
The first set of arguments focuses on the exclusionary implications of Locke’s political 
theory of constitutionalism in reducing Amerindians to apolitical tribes dwelling in the state of 
nature. The second set of arguments picks up the question of colonial exclusion and 
disenfranchisement from the perspective of subjectivity, and interrogates the implicit 
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presuppositions of rationality and personhood suffusing Locke’s abstract universalistic claims. I 
suggest that both of these analyses of colonial exclusion can benefit from a materialist 
perspective on the colonial interface between Amerindian and English modes of social 
reproduction. I maintain that with the introduction of the money there arise, first, abstract 
relations of value and the need for their mediation by civil laws, and second, a continuum of 
subjective maturity keyed to the faculty of abstraction in which Amerindians occupy a 
“primitive” stage of human development. While I do not have the space here to fully expound on 
these revisionist claims, I believe they deserve at least a rough sketch. 
One could begin by taking seriously the famous line “[t]hus in the beginning all the 
World was America, and more so than that is now; for no such thing as money was any where 
known” (II. 49), and interpret it through the analytic of money developed in this chapter. By 
“taking seriously,” I mean avoiding the habitual treatment of money here as a metonym for labor 
or agriculture, as an invention that “in Locke’s scheme, only extended the reach of the 
plough.”344 The nature of the paradigmatic distinction that money draws between the beginning 
and the present of the world should be sought in its uniqueness, that is, in its status as the 
medium of representation and accumulation of abstract exchangeable value.345 Considering 
Locke’s repeated emphasis on the “value” that labor creates, and bearing in mind that “value,” 
“waste,” and “money” appear almost always in the same sections of the Second Treatise, I 
suggest that money emblematizes the difference between the principles of subsistence (use-
value) and accumulation (exchange-value) that structure two contrasting modes of social 
reproduction. Money does not simply “facilitate” exchange by resolving the inconvenience of 
barter; it marks in Locke’s theory a radical reorientation of production towards the generation of 
                                                
344 Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, Vol. IV, p. 173. 
345 I have hinted at this earlier with reference to the Locke’s comparison of American and English land in terms of 
their yields assessed in pounds and pennies (II. 43). 
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surplus and profit and thereby a fundamental line of demarcation between properly utilized and 
underutilized land. 
 This distinction between the paradigms of subsistence and accumulation (of “hand-to-
mouth” and “common stock”) can theoretically deepen the constitutionalist ideology of 
dispossession that Tully has brilliantly extrapolated from the Two Treatises.346 Tully argues that 
Locke embedded aboriginal forms of governance in a “Eurocentric narrative of modern 
constitutionalism,” in which they figured as the primitive ancestors of the European peoples 
before the latter set up sovereign states through social contracts.347 The lack of resemblance 
between Amerindian and European governmental institutions, especially the conspicuous 
absence of a bipartite structure of monarchy and parliament amongst Amerindians, prompted 
Locke conclude that the latter inhabited a pre-political state. Locke wrote, 
Thus we see, that the kings of the Indians in America, which is still a pattern of the first ages in Asia and 
Europe, … are little more than generals of their armies; and though they command absolutely in war, yet 
at home and in time of peace they exercise very little dominion, and have but a very moderate 
sovereignty, the resolutions of peace and war being ordinarily either in the people, or in a council (II. 
108). 
 
The absence of an institutionalized power to declare war and peace indicated the absence of 
sovereignty or imperium in America, which, in the tradition of natural jurisprudence and ius 
gentium that Locke followed, meant that America was still in a state of nature. And given that 
original appropriation was possible exclusively in the state of nature, Tully concludes, Locke’s 
denial of imperium to Amerindians effectively translated into opening their lands to property 
claims by Englishmen.348 
                                                
346 For a more recent reiteration of this argument, see Ivison, “Nature of Rights.” 
347 Tully, Strange Multiplicity, p. 77. 
348 Initially formulated by Grotius, the argument that imperium forecloses claims to property or dominium, finds its 
most lucid expression in the contrast Locke draws between commons in America and in England. By Locke’s 
standards, both represented “wastes” that ought to be enclosed and improved. However,  “in land that is common in 
England, or any other country, where there is plenty of people under government, who have money and commerce, 
no one can inclose or appropriate any part, without the consent of all his fellow-commoners; because this is left 
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Locke attributed to the subsistence paradigm of Amerindians the egalitarian simplicity of 
a premonetary natural economy, which also characterized the premonetary “first ages of Asia 
and Europe.” Regulated by the labor and spoilage provisos, natural economy “did confine every 
man’s possession to a very moderate proportion, and such as he might appropriate to himself, 
without injury to any body, in the first ages of the world” (II. 36). The rudimentary and (this is 
crucial) concrete nature of property in game, fruits, or enclosed land, made very clear what 
belonged to whom, by what right, and to what end. The objective immediacy of production and 
consumption rendered property rights legible and relations of exchange uncomplicated. As a 
result, there existed very little reason for “quarrel and contention,” those famous 
“inconveniences” of the law of nature. Locke encapsulates this logic lucidly in the last paragraph 
of chapter five: 
And thus, I think, it is very easy to conceive, without any difficulty, how labour could at first begin a title 
of property in the common things of nature, and how the spending it upon our uses bounded it. So that 
there could then be no reason of quarrelling about title, nor any doubt about the largeness of possession it 
gave. Right and conveniency went together; for as a man had a right to all he could employ his labour 
upon, so he had no temptation to labour for more than he could make use of. This left no room for 
controversy about the title, nor for incroachment on the right of others; what portion a man carved to 
himself, was easily seen; and it was useless, as well as dishonest, to carve himself too much, or take more 
than he needed” (II. 51). 
 
The pivotal expression here is “easily seen” – the tree that is felled, the game that is caught, the 
acorns that are picked, and most importantly, as Pocock reminds us, the land that is tilled by the 
plough, which visibly inscribes on the surface of the earth the property of those who labored on 
it.349 In sum, the paradigm of subsistence, which rests on the satisfaction of concrete needs 
through the production and consumptions of use-values, leaves little room for ambiguity in 
                                                
common by compact, i. e. by the law of the land, which is not to be violated. And though it be common, in respect 
of some men, it is not so to all mankind” (II. 35). In contrast, common land in America was common by nature, 
where “[a]s much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his 
property (II 32). For Grotius’s argument that sovereign power over vacant territory exhausts claims to original 
appropriation by first occupancy, see Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace (New York: M. Walter Dunne: 
1901), pp. 89-92. 
349 Pocock, “Tangata Whenua,” pp. 203-12, and Barbarism and Religion, Vol. IV, pp. 172-3. 
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property relations and consequently no pressing need for promulgated laws to specify these 
rights and institutionalized impartial judges to arbitrate property disputes.  
 What distinguishes the paradigm of accumulation, made possible by the introduction of 
money, is the increasing mediation of production, exchange, and consumption by abstract 
exchangeable values – what is precisely and characteristically missing in the subsistence 
paradigm. Monetarization of the economy, production for profit, and commodification of 
exchange introduce a fundamental element of abstraction into the definition and organization of 
property. This shift brings into focus a vital issue for Locke’s natural jurisprudential thinking, 
which concerns itself primarily with intercourse between property-owning individuals.350 When 
judged by the standard of the legibility of property claims, questions of labor and improvement 
fade in significance in comparison to the monetarization and abstraction of property. For the 
abstraction of property not only opens the way to accumulation and inequality of property by 
allowing one to “fairly possess more land than he himself can use the product of” (II. 50). The 
mediation of progressively complex social relations by intangible and fugitive exchange values 
also multiplies the surfaces of friction between property-owning individuals, thereby sparking 
contentions and quarrels, not because individuals are wicked (recall that natural jurisprudence, 
unlike civic humanism, is not concerned with social personality) but because the modus operandi 
of property relations is compounded by monetary abstraction.351 Against this background of 
                                                
350 “In the early seventeenth century, western European theorists of natural law were turning towards theories of 
natural right, and to that end were constructing the concept of a state of nature, a primeval condition of human 
existence … solitary humans were imagined moving in an environment defined as the earth’s surface as yet 
unappropriated … with the effect that the individual preceded property, and any system of institutionalized values 
must be the effect and consequence of appropriation. From appropriation followed property, from property rights, 
and from rights, government … [T]he more carefully the individual was defined in terms of his property, his rights 
and his appropriation, the more clearly it followed that the individual who had not yet appropriated was not yet fully 
and individual or fully human.” Pocock, “Tangata Whenua,” p. 203. 
351 For the convolution of the experiential grasp of the law of nature, see McClure, Judging Rights, pp. 180-1. For an 
insightful political analysis of the function of the early-modern liberal state in managing “frictions” between 
property-owning individuals, see Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, pp. 342-353. 
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mounting entropy, the intuitively accessible norms of the natural law become inadequate to the 
task of regulating natural liberty and property, and the need arises for “established standing laws, 
promulgated and known to the people,” and “indifferent and upright judges, who are to decide 
controversies by those laws” in order to secure “the peace, safety, and public good of the people” 
(II. 131). 
 The necessary connection between monetarized economy and constitutional government 
in Locke’s narrative therefore constitutes the matrix that modulates the difference between the 
natural common and sovereign territory, between what is still open to free appropriation and 
what requires the consent of its inhabitants, between America and England. Insofar as 
constitutional government with is positive laws represents the end of the state of nature, its 
structural connection to monetarization effectively welds the end of the natural state to the 
origins of money. This connection also sheds light on the shifting center of gravity in chapter 
five from labor to money in Locke’s philosophical adjudication of property claims in land. 
 Social repercussions of monetarization speak to a second prominent interpretation of 
Locke’s justification of colonial exclusion and dispossession, exemplarily articulated by Uday 
Mehta. Adopting a subjectivist lens, Mehta puts pressure on the exclusionary tendencies that are 
“an aspect of [liberalism’s] theoretical underpinnings and not an episodic compromise with the 
practical constraints of implementation,” whereby he concludes, “liberal exclusion can be 
viewed intrinsic to liberalism.”352 Liberal strategies of exclusion operate by governing the 
applicability of liberalism’s universal claims by an “implicit and thicker set of social credentials” 
that constitute the proper subjectivity requisite for political inclusion.353 Mehta skillfully unearths 
the rift between the “universal constituency” of the Two Treatises, which rests on an 
                                                
352 Mehta, “Liberal Strategies of Exclusion,” pp. 61-2. 
353 Ibid. 
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“anthropological minimum” devoid of historical and social specificity, and the “exclusionary 
conventions” of Locke’s Thoughts Concerning Education, which prescribe a “pedagogical 
discipline” for cultivating the sort of reason that “naturally” belongs to the rational, gentlemanly, 
and civilized subjects.354 Ruled by the “cosmopolitanism of reason,” Locke’s liberalism 
negotiates colonial difference by temporally emplotting it as a story of uneven progress and 
authorizes “the imperial power  [as] simply the instrument required to align a deviant and 
recalcitrant history with the appropriate future.” 355 
 I maintain that in order to properly triangulate the colonial implications of subjectivity 
and reason in Locke’s thought, we need to extricate these questions from Mehta’s 
epistemological idealism and ground them in the socioeconomic matrix outlined above. For 
Mehta, the modus operandi of Locke’s liberal hierarchies is to assign differential positions to the 
colonizer and the colonized on a spectrum of reason that is invariably tilted in favor of the 
former. While specifying the semantic content of the binaries that structure this spectrum, Mehta 
never conjectures about the material practices that these binaries might be reflecting. Instead, we 
are told that the source of Locke’s refusal to acknowledge colonial difference as such and his 
inscription of it as a subjective deficit stems from the “uniformity of the Euclidian space” and 
“post-Newtonian algebraic continuity” that governs Locke’s liberalism.356  
I contend, in contrast, that the “teleology of reason” that Mehta posits as the crux of 
colonial disenfranchisement ought to be understood as an index to the teleology of transition 
from subsistence to accumulative patterns of social reproduction. In a crucial passage in Some 
                                                
354 Mehta, Liberalism and Empire, pp. 16, 57; “Liberal Strategies of Exclusion,” pp. 63-70. More generally, see 
Mehta’s Anxiety of Freedom. 
355 Mehta, Liberalism and Empire, pp. 18-25, 30-1, 48, 77 
356 Mehta, Liberalism and Empire, pp. 108, 127. By embedding Locke in a tradition stretching from Newton back to 
Euclid, Mehta partakes in the tendency to treat abstraction “as a kind of “original sin” of the West.” Sartori, “British 
Empire,” p. 625. 
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Thoughts Concerning Education, Locke states that “he that has no master over his Inclinations, 
he that knows not how to resist the importunity of present Pleasure or Pain, for the sake of what 
reason tells him is fit to be done, wants the true Principle of Virtue and Industry; and is in danger 
never to be good for anything.”357 The “true Principle of Virtue of Industry” rests with “higher” 
subjective traits such as instrumental rationality, moderation, sobriety, self-discipline, which are 
in turn rooted in the ability to suspend the urge for immediate gratification in order to achieve an 
anticipated future goal. These traits, I argue, properly belong to the accumulative paradigm, and 
find their medium of expression and development in the realm of abstraction opened up by 
monetarization. Money itself is born out of the human faculty of abstraction, and the 
monetarization of the economy engenders increasingly complex social relations, which in turn 
require the further honing of this faculty.358 The field of temporal freedom opened by the use of 
money is rife with possibilities for exercising future-oriented, calculative, rational behavior, for 
comporting oneself to the present on the basis of a projection of one’s self in a moment that is 
experientially inaccessible because it does not yet exist.359 Producing for anonymous and 
                                                
357 John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, with introduction, notes, and critical apparatus, ed. John W. 
and Jean S. Yolton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), section 45. 
358 Caffentzis deserves credit for being, to my knowledge, the first interpreter to discover this connection. See 
Caffentzis, Clipped Coins, esp. pp. 70-1. 
359 This point also restores Locke’s importance to the debate over virtue and commerce, from which J. G. A. Pocock 
has banished him. Pocock contends that the modern theory of property begins not with the possessive individual or 
even monetarized exchange, but with the novelty of public debt, which constitutes the distinctive feature of the 
commercial society. For Pocock, it is not the commercialization of the economy but the emergence of public debt, 
not the market but the stock market, that forms the fulcrum of the classical-modern debate between landed interests 
and monied interests, and over virtue and corruption. The core of the problem is the mutation of the political relation 
between the state and the citizen into a capitalist relation. “Government stock is a promise to repay at a future date; 
from the inception and development of the National Debt, it is known that this date will in reality never be reached, 
but the tokens of repayment are exchangeable at a market price in the present. The price they command is 
determined by the present state of public confidence in the stability of government, and in its capacity to make 
repayment in the theoretical future. Government is therefore maintained by the investor’s imagination concerning a 
moment which will never exist in reality. … Property – the material foundation of both personality and government 
– has ceased to be real and has become a not merely mobile but imaginary. Specialised, acquisitive and post-civic 
man … does not even live in the present, except as constituted by his fantasies concerning a future.” Pocock, 
“Mobility of Property,” p. 112. As I hope I have now made clear, the epistemological ramifications of the 
socioeconomic sea change engendered by monetarization precede and prefigure the historical shift to modern 
political economy, which Pocock delays until the institution of the National Debt. 
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prospective rather than proximate and immediate human needs cannot therefore be reduced to 
the pecuniary pursuit of self-interest, though it certainly serves that end;360 it is at the same time 
the material process of liberation from the immediacy of quotidian experience and of 
augmentation and refinement of one’s mental capabilities. The “desire for money” goes beyond 
the simple impulse of avarice and extends into “the expression of the distinctly human 
characteristic of foresight.”361 
If one bears in mind that in the Essay on Human Understanding Locke posits the “faculty 
of Abstracting” as the human faculty par excellence, which sets our species apart from lower 
animals, the significance of money and commerce in Locke’s overall philosophy comes into 
sharper relief. It is the “the faculty to enlarge by any kind of Abstraction” that places “a perfect 
distinction betwixt man and brutes.”362 In the Essay, Locke defines human subjectivity as 
consciousness that persists over time and amidst the flux of sense-impressions, consciousness 
that remains aware of its unity and identity at different temporal and experiential instances, 
which has led some commentators to label his depiction of the subject as the “punctual self.”363 
“Abstracting lifts the mind out of the given flow of sensation and allows it to stand in 
semisovereign sway over its own contents,”364 such that the individual “can think of himself, 
abstractly, as a being that endures from moment to moment.”365 This particular temporal 
analytic, the future-orientation of thought and behavior, represents a major philosophical and 
normative thread that binds Locke’s theory of the self to his theory of labor and property. One of 
                                                
360 Karen Vaughn notes that the purpose of “hoarding” that Locke leaves unexplored in the Two Treatises is clarified 
as “productive investment” in Some Considerations. This is why, Locke maintains in that pamphlet, people are 
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361 McClure, Judging Rights, p. 176. 
362 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, with an introduction, critical apparatus and glossary, 
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364 Zuckert, Natural Rights, p. 283. 
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the most forceful critics of innate ideas and a towering philosopher of empiricist epistemology, 
Locke held that selfhood is crafted out of the experience of social practice and convention. 
Emancipation of human beings from production for immediate consumption and their 
reorientation to accumulative plans and practices therefore constitutes the socioeconomic 
crucible where “futural” and more fully human subjectivities are forged. Consequently, as the 
medium of this transition, money functions as the practical grounds for training that mental 
faculty which distinguishes us as humans, as a field of potentialities for the consummation of 
humanity. 
If my interpretation is plausible, then, from a Lockean perspective, the relative 
positioning of various individuals, groups, or classes in relation to monetary economy holds 
normative implications for judging the plenitude of their subjectivities. This is not to contend 
that Locke denies Amerindians the faculty of reason and abstraction. Locke quite clearly parted 
ways with Spanish justifications of dispossession that dehumanized indigenous populations. He 
declared that all men to be born with the same faculty of reason, which enabled them to discern 
the moral obligations of the natural law. “[T]hey have Light enough to lead them to the 
knowledge of their maker … For the visible Marks of extraordinary Wisdom and Power appear 
so plainly in all the Works of the Creation, that a rational Creature, who will but seriously reflect 
on them, cannot miss the discovery of a Deity.”366 By the same token, Locke included 
Amerindians under the protection of religious toleration. “No man whatsoever ought ... to be 
deprived of his Terrestrial Enjoyments, upon account of his Religion. Not even Americans, 
subjected unto a Christian Prince, are to be punished either in Body or Goods, for not imbracing 
our Faith and Worship.”367 The hierarchical implications of Locke’s theory should be sought in 
                                                
366 Locke, Essay, bk. 1, chap. 3, par. 9 and chap. 4, par. 8. 
367 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. James Tully (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), p. 43. Further 
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subtler grounds than imputations of irrationality, more particularly in the gray zone opened up by 
the use of money. In this domain, sandwiched between the natural law and human convention, 
the bounds of rationality as predicated on the faculty of abstraction become fuzzy and contested. 
Viewed within this field, the logical expression that captures the Amerindian’s position takes the 
form of a double negative: the Amerindian is “not irrational.”368 While He does not lack the 
rational capacity with which God has endowed all mankind, he does not partake in the practical 
conditions that enable the consummation of these capacities. I would go further to suggest that 
from a Lockean perspective the absence of monetarization amongst Amerindians instantiate the 
non-exercise of the faculty of abstraction that they surely possess – a non-exercise, the 
responsibility for which belongs to Amerindians themselves. This is also in line with Locke’s 
eschewal of other, equally complex manifestations of social abstraction amongst Amerindians, 
such as symbolic exchange and the use of wampums, as a proper solution to the limits of natural 
economy. 
Locke’s insistence on money over other abstractive social forms as the only way to 
disentangle the transformative powers of labor from the limits of the natural economy, and thus 
pave the way to the full utilization of human faculties, cannot be explained without recourse to 
colonial capitalism that mediated the relationship between Amerindians and the English. For 
Atlantic colonial capitalism consisted of a socioeconomic frontier where the agents of highly 
commercialized economies confronted non-monetarized communities in possession of lands that 
they so avidly sought. Accordingly, it was not the absence of monotheism but of monetarization 
that Locke settled upon for discoursing on property rights in America. If, therefore, we are to 
                                                
corroborating this point, Armitage notes “in 1669 the authors of the Fundamental Constitutions had specified that 
“Idollatry Ignorance or mistake gives us noe right to expell or use [the Natives of Carolina] ill,” and that article 
remained in all later versions of the Fundamental Constitutions.” Armitage, “John Locke, Carolina,” p. 618. 
368 I owe this insightful formulation to Sibylle Fischer’s unpublished essay, “When Things Don't Add Up: The 
Consequences of an Enslaved Enlightenment,” presented at Cornell University in 2008. 
  147 
search for Locke’s liberal strategies of exclusion in the tacit assumptions modulating the 
differential practical efficacy of purportedly universal human capacities or natural rights, we 
should not be looking at well-worn culturalist arguments about the unwarranted universalization 
of European colonizers’ parochial subjective assumptions. For this perspective cannot explain 
why Locke deemed certain forms of abstraction to be binding on property claims while 
relegating certain others to irrelevance, why he claimed that the absence of money rendered 
American lands open to appropriation while disregarding Christianity (no less an abstract 
construct than money) as juridically null in regards to proprietorship. As Chakrabarty remarks, 
“[t]he point is not that Enlightenment rationalism is always unreasonable to itself, but rather a 
matter of documenting how – through what historical process – its “reason,” which was not 
always self-evident to everyone, has been made to look obvious far beyond the ground where it 
originated.”369 I think colonial capitalism of the seventeenth-century Atlantic and its originary 
position in the global inceptions of capital is a good place to start unraveling this historical 
process. 
 
Conclusion 
 The last point  casts into relief several more general issues concerning the imperial turn in 
political theory, and specifically the hermeneutic binary of abstract universals and historical 
difference through which Locke and other members of the pantheon are read into the history of 
colonial empires. In the previous chapter, I sketched some of the shortcoming of this interpretive 
lens, which magnifies the textual enunciation and divides the discursive field into zones of 
disembodied liberal principles and thick cultural particularisms. Here, I would like to conclude 
by drawing out the specific implications of my analysis of Locke for this problematic. 
                                                
369 Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe, p. 43. 
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 First, the foregoing discussion points to the ways in which the putative foundational 
dichotomies such as abstract/concrete and universal/particular, out of which we fashion our 
analytic grids for discerning the colonial inflections of political thought, are themselves woven 
into historically determinate modes of social reproduction. If we are to dissect Locke’s universal 
claims and historical abstractions, perhaps a more accurate scalpel than Euclidian space or post-
Newtonian algebra would be “capital,” which is universal in its conceptual logic and global in its 
geographic horizon, and “commodity” in and through which social relations are mediated 
through abstract exchangeable value.370 If this sounds like crude materialism, one need recall that 
the specific Atlantic context that shaped the orientation of the British towards Amerindians was 
heavily commercialized by the standards of the time. In fact, what constituted the backbone of 
the British Atlantic, what propelled thousands of men and women from the British Isles to 
America and hurled many more from Africa to the Caribbean, what spurred settlements and 
plantations, what regularized transoceanic relations of production and exchange, in short, what 
held the British Atlantic together was a vast network of commodity chains in things and humans, 
driven by the ever-present dreams and plans of profit. One navigated the British Atlantic by the 
compass of commodity and capital much more reliably than one could Britain itself.  
Viewed through this lens, Locke’s universal claims for adjudicating property claims in 
America appear less as arbitrary markers of historical difference, as English parochialism 
usurping the seat of the universal, or as expressions of Locke’s inability to perceive the cultural 
particularity of his own moral values. Under the “universal constituency” of Locke’s theory of 
property, one can discern the vision of a new socioeconomic order lodged in the capitalist 
relations crystallizing in the Atlantic basin, a vision with global aspirations to bring mankind 
within its compass of private property, material productivity, and accumulation of value. That a 
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similar predilection to stake one’s claims in universal grounds characterized the arguments of 
such dissimilar figures as Hugo Grotius (a Dutch jurist) and Josiah Child (a Tory political 
economist) should draw our attention to the colonial capitalist constellation of the seventeenth 
century, in which Locke and his contemporaries were invested to varying degrees and purposes. 
Since this emphasis on the material conditions of the Atlantic context exposes my argument to 
(for some, convenient) dismissals of economic reductionism, I should reiterate that my aim has 
been to embed, rather than reduce, Locke’s theory of property in the field of concrete 
possibilities and relations of the seventeenth-century world-historical conjuncture, which 
structured available political and economic perceptions and priorities. And these perceptions and 
priorities were the province of not only men of power like Shaftesbury and their intellectual 
aides like Locke, but also people of middling sorts who invested in colonial trade or joint-stock 
companies, and even poor masses who indentured their labor in return for their passage to a new 
and hopefully more commodious life. 
Secondly, applying the analytic of colonial political economy to Locke’s theory of 
property helps elaborate in more concrete terms the notion of disavowal that I proposed in the 
previous chapter for interpreting liberal texts. My analysis of Locke’s notion of money as a myth 
for furnishing a consensual fundament for colonial land appropriation moves our focus away 
from what the text enunciates to what it performs in its concrete historical context. It calls for 
reconsidering the tensions and ambiguities we encounter in Locke’s theory of property as more 
than mere examples of the contradictory tendencies of liberal thought, be these inherent in its 
genetic code or induced by the personal involvement of the thinker in the colonial project. 
Rather, the analysis presented here refers Locke’s theory simultaneously beyond the text itself 
and its micro-contextual illocutionary function, and illuminates how it codifies the commodity 
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relations of Atlantic colonial capitalism in natural jurisprudential vocabulary and inscribes 
America as natural commons within a liberal narrative of original consent. In this respect, 
Locke’s theory of property expresses the contradictions of seventeenth-century colonial 
capitalism as a historically determinate transoceanic system of social reproduction, capturing the 
co-articulation of the liberal defense of private and commercial property relations in Britain and 
the illiberal establishment of the same relations in America. At the same time, Locke’s theory 
intervenes for managing these concrete contradictions to the effect of contributing to the 
practical reproduction of Atlantic colonial capitalism. His universally consensual notion of 
money forms the crux of this intervention, insofar as it sutures the rift between the extra-legal 
nature of colonial land appropriations and the Britons’ image of these appropriations as acts of 
peaceful, commercial, and universally beneficial settlement. Bracing in this way the liberal self-
image of the British exploits against the disturbing implications of lawless conquest in the 
Atlantic, Locke’s theory of property instantiates a crucial moment in the liberal misrecognition 
of colonial capitalism and the systemic authorization of colonial land appropriations. 
 When understood as at once an expression and an intervention, it becomes easier to 
discern the dynamic of disavowal in Locke’s theory. Instead of denying and silencing the 
problem of extra-legal appropriation or simply acknowledging it as an inescapable contradiction, 
Locke acknowledges and pronounces the problem eo nomine and proceeds to a verbose 
articulation of narratives and fictions in order to de-problematize it for liberal sensibilities. 
Locke’s interpolation of money in his theory of property caters to a fantastic trove of ideological 
resources for draping capitalism in liberal garbs, including myths of natural consent, oscillating 
spatial exclusion and temporal inclusion, human communities at once inside and outside 
mankind, and gray zones of subjectivity inhabited by “not irrational” individuals. Finally, these 
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conceptual maneuvers and fictions around money operate less as duplicitous strategies Locke 
employs to hoodwink his audience than “myths” in the anthropological sense of the term, that is, 
stories that Locke tells to himself and his British contemporaries for explaining their exploits in a 
vast, vagarious, and contradictory world. If Locke is not trying to blindfold his audience to the 
colonial illiberality of capitalism that is because his own image of it is essentially liberal. 
 Finally, the emphasis on Locke’s notion of money not only helps us discern subtler 
boundaries of exclusion than delineated by the colonial interpretations of Locke, but it also 
suggests hitherto unnoticed connections between England and America that cut across cultural 
lines. Embedding the problematic of exclusion in the distinct modes of social reproduction 
implied by money foregrounds economic complexity, social abstraction, and future orientation as 
criteria of hierarchization. It thereby brings together Amerindians and the British laboring poor 
on the common denominator of hand-to-mouth existence. By connecting English enclosures to 
American land appropriations under the sign of commercial agriculture, it structurally links the 
dispossessed of England with the soon-to-be dispossessed of America. It sets these two groups 
apart from the commercial-colonial entrepreneurs of Britain, whose privileged position in the 
monetary economy of the British Atlantic renders them the proper historical subjects of Locke’s 
accumulative paradigm. The “wild Indian” who subsists on the “spontaneous products of the 
earth” is in this respect akin to the “Labourer” whose “share, being seldom more than a bare 
subsistence, never allows that Body of Men time or opportunity to raise their Thoughts above 
that.”371 When transposed to the register of Locke’s theory of subjectivity, this entrapment in the 
immediacy of subsistence directly contrasts with the workings of the faculty of abstraction, 
which “lifts the mind out of the given flow of sensation and allows it to stand in semisovereign 
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sway over its own contents.”372 Differential access to, and status in, a monetarized economy, 
therefore, conceivably stands indexical to the level of individual and social development in a 
scale ranging from commanding money for investment to merely subsisting in a monetary 
economy to being completely outside of monetarization; from money as capital (M-C-M’) to 
money as medium of exchange (C-M-C) to the total absence of money (C-C); from English 
capitalists to English working class to Native Americans. 
 Insofar as it enables us to perceive this socioeconomic and subjective developmental 
hierarchy, the focus on money can help us reinterpret a conundrum pointed out by Tully, who 
countered Macpherson’s thesis of possessive individualism with the accurate observation that the 
dominant mercantilist view of the English population in Locke’s time was one of “utilizable” 
individuals, not quite possessed of their capacities and pressed from above to the service of the 
state. Recasting these categories along class lines, we can add to the possessive individuals who 
command money as capital, one the one hand, the utilizable individuals who occupy a 
subordinate status in a monetary economy, and on the other, the discardable individuals who, 
until and unless they join the global monetary order, are to be swept aside by the tide of 
historical development. The gradation of socioeconomic status by quantitatively unequal and 
qualitatively different access to money, and the subordinate co-articulation of possessive, 
utilizable, and discardable individuals under the overarching vision of “possessive universalism” 
might offer a fresh perspective on one of the longest-standing debates on Locke’s political and 
economic allegiances. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
372 Zuckert, Natural Rights, 283. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
NOT A PARTNERSHIP IN PEPPER, COFFEE, CALICO OR TOBACCO: 
EDMUND BURKE AND THE VICISSITUDES OF IMPERIAL COMMERCE 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Society is indeed a contract … but the state ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership 
agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, callico or tobacco, or some other such low concern, to be taken 
up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties … it becomes a 
partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, 
and those who are to be born. Each contract of each particular state is but a clause in the great primeval 
contract of eternal society 
 
Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France 
 
 Thus Edmund Burke set the dichotomous terms of his criticism of the natural 
jurisprudential theories of social contract, the extremities of which, he thought, impassioned the 
revolution in France and suffused the radical Lockean sermons of Dr. Richard Price at home. 
The antithesis between the venal, temporary contract in commodities on the one hand, and the 
great primeval contract between generations, on the other, has conventionally been interpreted as 
a classical expression of the conservative, traditionalist, and organicist moorings of Burke’s 
social and political philosophy. Obversely, it has also been construed to mark Burke’s anxieties 
over the disintegration of the inherited social relations under the mercurial pressures of the rising 
commercial-capitalist forces, embodied in the ascendancy of monied men. What has drawn no 
attention, however, is the specificity of the commodities subject to this contract which stands as 
the antithesis of Burke’s “society” as such. Pepper, coffee, callico, and tobacco. The contract 
that, in its lowly status and fleeting duration, represented the mirror opposite and even the 
dissolution of constitutive bonds of society was of a colonial capitalist nature. 
 That “colonial capitalism” was the decisive historical reality that Burke had to grapple 
with during his political and intellectual career constitutes the principal insight behind this 
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chapter. At first sight this framing might seem to tread on familiar ground, given that there is a 
sizeable literature that examines Burke’s forays into political economy, and another, equally 
sizeable, that explores his tarrying with the problems and conundrums of empire.373 These two 
literatures provide us with two “Burke problems,” which serve as useful departure points for this 
chapter. The first “Burke problem” has as its stake the economic soul of the author who once 
proclaimed that he has “made political oeconomy an object of my humble studies, from my very 
early youth to near the end of my service in parliament” (LNL, 159-60).374 In the broad spectrum 
of positions on this issue, Burke’s persona is depicted as an unequivocal capitalist375 and an 
ideologue of the Whig commercial ideal,376 an ardent critic of market society and a defender of 
the precapitalist morality of governance,377 an enemy of the poor378 and their champion,379 a 
                                                
373 These two debates, of course, do not come near exhausting the range of interpretive frames that have competed 
over Burke’s true identity. For a concise and informative overview of this range of perspectives, see O’Neill, Burke-
Wollstonecraft Debate, pp. 51-3. 
374 All of the primary texts cited are in the chapter are from The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke, ed. Paul 
Langford (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981). Abbreviations of the primary texts cited are as follows:  
3rdL: Third Letter on a Regicide Peace 
6thA: Speech on the Sixth Article of Impeachment 
9thR: The Ninth Report of the Select Committee 
AA: Speech on Almas Ali Khan 
AC: Address to the Colonists 
ER: Speech on Economic Reform 
FB:  Speech on Fox’s India Bill 
LNL: Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol 
NAD: Speech on Nabob of Arcot’s Debts 
POH: Speech on the Motion for Papers on Hastings 
R: Reflection on the Revolution in France 
S: Thoughts and Details on Scarcity 
SC: Speech on Conciliation with America 
SEC: Speech on Secret Committee 
SNG: Sketch of a Negro Code 
SOI: Speech on Opening of Impeachment 
SUI: Speech on the Use of Indians 
TPL: Tracts Relating to Popery Laws 
375 Crawford B. Macpherson, Burke (New York: Hill and Wang, 1980); Jerry Z. Muller, “Edmund Burke: 
Commerce, Conservatism, and the Intellectuals,” in The Mind and the Market: Capitalism in Modern European 
Thought (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002). 
376 John G. A. Pocock “Political Economy of Burke's Analysis of the French Revolution,” in Virtue, Commerce, 
History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985); Marshall “Edmund Burke and India”; Whelan, Edmund Burke and India. 
377 Bromwich, “Introduction”; Francis Canavan, The Political Economy of Edmund Burke: The Role of Property in 
His Thought (New York: Fordham University Press, 1995). 
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proponent of free trade380 and the supporter of the mercantilist Navigation Acts.381 These leave 
ample room for “ambivalent” Burkes in between, stretched between the bourgeoisie and the 
aristocracy,382 between paternalism and capitalism,383 or between early economic conservatism 
and late economic liberalism.384 
 The second Burke problem revolves around Burke’s efforts to retain and reform the 
British Empire, both in the Atlantic and especially in India, on which he valued himself “the 
most; most for the importance; most for the labor; most for the judgment; most for constancy and 
perseverance in the pursuit” (LNL, 159). Interpretations launched from as diverse fields as 
literary theory, imperial history, and political philosophy have cut from the cloth of Burke’s 
writings and speeches an entire wardrobe of guises. Some scholars present Burke as a defender 
of empire based on custom and shared culture385 or providence and imperial responsibility,386 
others as a cosmopolitan thinker in the cause of a less exclusionary, more liberal, and culturally 
pluralist empire.387 At times, he appears as an uneasy accomplice in the colonial project and its 
implicit guilt,388 or as a founding figure of British imperialism who absolved the empire of its 
scandal.389 At other times he is a true Whig who glorified empire as the vehicle for commercial 
                                                
378 Himmelfarb, Idea of Poverty. 
379 Pitts, A Turn to Empire. 
380 P. J. Marshall, “Introduction,” to The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke, Vol. 5, ed. P. J. Marshall (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1981); Whelan, Edmund Burke and India; Muller, “Edmund Burke.” 
381 Hampsher-Monk, “Introduction”; Winch, Classical Political Economy, and Riches and Poverty; Kohn and 
O’Neill, “A Tale of Two Indias.” 
382 Isaac Kramnick, The Rage of Edmund Burke: Portrait of an Ambivalent Conservative, (New York: Basic Books, 
1977). 
383 Himmelfarb, Idea of Poverty. 
384 Semmel, Rise of Free Trade Imperialism. 
385 Hampsher-Monk, “Edmund Burke and Empire.”  
386 P. J. Marshall, “Introduction,” in The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke, Vol. 7, ed. Peter J. Marshall 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), and “Burke and Empire,” in Hanoverian Britain and Empire: Essays in Memory of 
Philip Lawson, ed. Richard Connor, Clyve Jones, and Stephen Taylor (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1981). 
387 Mehta, Liberalism and Empire; Pitts, A Turn to Empire. 
388 Suleri, Rhetoric of English India. 
389 Dirks, Scandal of Empire. 
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grandeur and improvement390 as well as for progress understood in terms of the civilizational 
categories of the Scottish Enlightenment.391 Burke’s imperialist dispositions – or lack thereof – 
and their specific character are therefore no less vexing than the question of his economic 
inclinations. 
 Each of these problems in understanding Burke’s conception of political economy and 
the role of empire can be traced to the misconception that capitalism and colonialism are 
separate, aggregative phenomena. It is the contention of this chapter that these problems can be 
properly tackled only if one conceives colonialism and capitalism as constituting a single 
historical process of accumulation that is nonetheless multilayered and fractured, and socially, 
economically, and politically heterogeneous. Therefore, this chapter departs from the major 
premise that the perspective from which to interrogate Burke's thought is neither capitalism nor 
colonialism, but “colonial capitalism” as elaborated in Chapter I. 
To briefly recapitulate, I understand the term colonial capitalism to describe the 
formative impact of colonial expansion on the development of global networks of capital 
accumulation, which are comprised of a heterogeneous array of relations of production and 
social control, most importantly forms of unfree labor and unequal exchange. In a recent essay, 
Jennifer Pitts has included among the “the British Empire’s systemic injuries” “massive resource 
extraction, establishment of catastrophic systems of bonded labor, deindustrialization, 
entrenchment of “traditional” structures of authority, and insertion of subsistence farmers into 
often wildly unstable global market systems.”392 India’s integration to global capital networks 
under the British rule involved the deindustrialization and peasantization of the Indian textile 
sector combined with the commercialization of agriculture, especially after the Permanent 
                                                
390 Whelan, Edmund Burke and India. 
391 Kohn and O’Neill, “A Tale of Two Indias”; O’Neill, The Burke-Wollstonecraft Debate. 
392 Pitts, “Political Theory of Empire.” 
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Settlement of Bengal in 1793.393 While the dominant organization of production remained 
ostensibly non-capitalist, by the end of the eighteenth century peasant-based Indian agriculture 
had been enmeshed in the circuits of British and more broadly European capital. Indian peasants 
and agricultural laborers, working predominantly in the cultivation of cash crops like indigo, 
were bonded by forms of debt-peonage and forced to generate a surplus for the East India 
Company, landlords, financiers and agricultural entrepreneurs, in the form of tax, rent, and 
interest. Systemic exploitation of the peasantry primarily through non-market means, investment 
of agricultural tax revenues in financing exports to Europe and China, and the East India 
Company’s manipulation of regional rivalries to expropriate local princes coalesced into a 
process of “colonial primitive accumulation,” that is, extracting surplus from the subcontinent by 
means of legal and political force and absorbing the region into the global movement of capital, 
the epicenter of which was increasingly shifting to Great Britain.394 Andrew Sartori lucidly 
summarizes the imbrication of coercion and capital in the commercialization of Indian 
agriculture in this period:  
The cultivators were thus already positioned de facto as wage laborers producing surplus out of the capital 
of the planters. Advances functioned as wages foisted upon the cultivator through either the force of 
necessity (want of cash) or direct coercion (the threat of dispossession through rent enhancement or naked 
violence), and forcibly depressed to such a level as to ensure so that the product thus secured would return 
surplus value. 395 
                                                
393 For deindustrialization of Indian textile production, see Hameda Hossain, The Company Weavers of Bengal: The 
East India Company and the Textile Production in Bengal, 1750-1813 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988). For 
the Permanent Settlement, see Ranajit Guha, A Rule of Property for Bengal: An Essay on the Idea of Permanent 
Settlement (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996), and Stokes, English Utilitarians and India. For the 
commercialization of agriculture, see Rajat Datta, Society, Economy, and the Market: Commercialization in Rural 
Bengal, c. 1760-1800 (New Delhi: Manohar, 2000). 
394 India figures as one of the major colonial instances that receives fleeting mention in Marx’s account of the 
history of primitive accumulation: “The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and 
entombment in mines of the aboriginal population of that continent, the beginnings of the conquest and plunder in 
India, and the conversion of Africa into a preserve for commercial hunting of blackskins, are all things which 
characterize the dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief moments of 
primitive accumulation.” Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, p. 915 (emphasis added). For a full discussion of colonial primitive 
accumulation, see Chapter I of this study. 
395 Sartori, Bengal in Global Concept, p. 57. Subjugation of the peasant mode of production in India to the 
imperatives of capital accumulation and the proliferation and intensification of unfree forms of labor are widely 
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The marked illiberality of this process as judged by the bar of contractual freedom and legal 
equality, or put differently, the incompatibility between the colonial manifestations of capitalism 
in India and its liberal self-image embodied in ideals of British commercial society, offers us a 
vantage point for reconsidering Burke’s critique of Warren Hastings, and his effort to reform the 
Indian administration. 
One implication of this perspective is that Burke's writings and speeches on India provide 
us with a glimpse into the broader contradictions that have traversed the history of capitalism and 
its colonial entanglements. In Burke, we find the combination of a pragmatic statesman and a 
metropolitan political economist, who theorized the imperial formation from the epicenter of its 
vast colonial capitalist networks. He was thus cognizant of the centrality of the empire and 
commerce to British survival and power. At the same time, he was wary of the dangers that the 
violent exploitation of the colonies by British capitalism posed to his much-cherished liberal 
image of the British nation and character. 
One major objective of this chapter, then, is to confront the two Burke problems as two 
facets of a larger problem, namely, the contradiction between the violent colonial entanglements 
and the liberal self-image of capitalism in the late eighteenth-century British Empire. When 
viewed from this perspective, the problem ceases to pertain exclusively to Burke, and is revealed 
to be an historical and impersonal conundrum, of which Burke provides a historically specific 
and very perspicacious expression. As I discuss at length, Burke's rhetorical flourish on the 
vicissitudes of the British Empire articulates the broader intellectual aporias that follow from 
attempting to accommodate coercive capital accumulation in the colonies within a liberal cast of 
                                                
investigated in postcolonial Indian historiography. For such two excellent works, see Prakash, Bonded Histories, and 
Banaji, “Fictions of Free Labour. Also see, Kenneth Pomeranz and Steven Topik, The World that Trade Created: 
Society, Culture, and the World Economy, 1400-the Present (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999). 
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contractual freedom, equality, and civilized manners of a commercial society – ironically, a 
commercial society that materially depended on the surplus extraction and transfer from those 
very colonies it viewed with anxiety. Seen in this way, the ambivalences and tensions in Burke's 
thought vanish only to reappear as the products of a coherent attempt to embrace, on the one 
hand, liberal commercial values and constitutional maxims, and on the other, the coercive-
colonial pedestal of British power and glory. 
I develop this argument in four sections. The first section documents the material 
importance that Burke accorded to the Indian dominions for British power and prosperity. Burke 
had grave concerns about the impact of the East India Company’s exploitative policies on the 
moral standing of Britain; however, given his irreducible imperial commitments, he had to deal 
with this problem through reform rather than decolonization. While Burke resorted to the 
classical idiom of “corruption” for expressing the challenge to the British self-image, I argue that 
this language in fact expressed a singularly modern problem, namely, the contradiction between 
the liberal values of Burke’s “commercial ideal” and the universal violation of these values by 
Company policies in India. The second section provides a close analysis of Burke’s “commercial 
ideal.” I reconstruct from Burke’s writings a vision of political and moral economy that endorsed 
the pursuit of material interest, an ethos of productivity, and self-regulating markets. Most 
importantly, Burke prescribed a wall of separation between political power and economic 
transactions, which sustained legal equality and contractual freedom that were indispensable for 
public utility and equity. While Burke endorsed capital accumulation in the liberal, metropolitan 
self-image of commerce as a voluntary and mutually beneficial relation, this image was 
profoundly jeopardized by the colonial expropriation and exploitation in India. The third section 
builds up a detailed inventory the colonial subversions of the commercial ideal. I argue that 
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Burke not only diagnosed this subversion but more importantly realized that the subversion arose 
from the commercial ideal itself. Burke’s attempt to salvage the liberality of commerce hinged 
on the containment of its colonial eruptions, which threatened to reveal the unsettling truth of 
self-interested exchange and the profit motive. In other contexts, Burke passionately defended 
the accumulative urge that motivated capitalism, but he was appalled when that urge was 
amalgamated by political power and turned into outright expropriation and exploitation, both of 
which were offensively visible in India. Burke’s inveterate denunciation of Company rule in 
India can be understood as an attempt to shore up the increasingly blurred distinctions between 
civilized commerce and unabashed plunder, enlightened self-interest and unbridled rapacity, and 
mercantile principle and political rule. In short, Burke was intensely aware of how the liberal 
self-image of the market society in the metropole was endangered by its violent and “primitive” 
buttresses in the colonies. Against this theoretical background, I review Burke’s later work (1780 
onwards) as an attempt to come to grips with colonial capitalism of the late-eighteenth century. 
The final section focuses on Burke’s position on questions of cultural alterity arising from 
colonial encounters, and investigates the civilizational hierarchies that underwrote his defense of 
the Indians under British rule. I contend that Burke’s championing of the rights of Indians was 
subtended by the teleological social categories of the Scottish Enlightenment, and can thus be 
distinguished from his derogatory attitude towards Native Americans and Africans. Burke’s view 
of India as a commercial society afforded that country the protection from the arrogance of 
revolutionary reason which he so vigorously fought in France and Britain. I argue that the 
sublime social complexity of commercial societies, which marked the terminus of mankind’s 
historical progress, was the rampart that ought to stand between India and the rude hand of the 
British. The absence of such complexity in the “primitive societies” of America and Africa, 
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however, made them both normatively and materially vulnerable to the “primitive accumulation” 
of British colonialism and its austere civilizing dominion. 
 
I. British Empire, British Self-Image 
The tensions between the metropolitan theories of commerce and the colonial forms of 
exploitation and accumulation on which metropolitan commerce depends constitute what I call 
the “dialectics of commerce.” Before explicating this contradiction, which preoccupied Burke 
and motivated his thinking about India, it is important to establish that Burke was not an anti-
imperialist, as was the case with certain political economists and Philosophical Radicals of his 
time.396 The major textual support for an anti-imperialist interpretation of Burke comes from his 
speech on Fox’s India Bill, where he stated, “if we are not able to contrive some method of 
governing India well, which will not of necessity become the means of governing Great Britain 
ill, a ground is laid for their eternal separation; but none for sacrificing the people of that country 
to our constitution” (FB, 383). The following sentence (less frequently quoted), however, negates 
the anti-imperialist implications of his passage, as Burke declares that he is “far from being 
persuaded that such incompatibility of interest does at all exist” and that the good government of 
India and the integrity of the British constitution are intimately entwined (FB, 383). P. J. 
Marshall describes this view as “triumphalist” and notes the surprising alacrity with which Burke 
incorporated India into the British Empire at a time when the fear of corruption and decline 
                                                
396 The classical example is Adam Smith’s denunciation of the colonial system in the Wealth of Nations. Adam 
Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner (eds) vol. 
II of the Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1981), 
Book IV. In addition to free traders like Smith, utilitarians like Bentham and Mill, armed with Say’s Law and the 
Ricardian theory of rent, justified their “scientific” misgivings over retaining colonies on the grounds of “economy.” 
A useful overview of the eighteenth-century anti-imperialist arguments from a political economy perspective can be 
found in Winch, Classical Political Economy. For a more detailed and revisionist treatment of the same subject, see 
Semmel, Rise of Free Trade Imperialism. For accounts that emphasize the influence of moral and political 
categories in eighteenth-century critiques of imperialism, see Muthu, “Adam Smith’s Critique; Rothschild, “Global 
Commerce; Pitts, A Turn To Empire, chaps. 2, 4 and 5; Uday Mehta, Liberalism and Empire. 
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inspired by classical interpretations of Roman history instilled his contemporaries with doubt, 
hesitation, and anxiety.397 Burke’s frequent support for the retention of colonial possessions 
reinforces the premise that Burke’s fundamental view of empire was positive. In 1783, Burke 
accused the East India Company and its servants in India not only “of cruelly oppressing and 
tyrannizing over millions of men” but also of “destroying an empire” (FB, 448; italics mine). 
Two years later, Burke warned the House of Commons about “the abuses which are subverting 
the fabric of your empire” and “the shades of eternal night [that] shall veil our eastern dominions 
from our view” (NAD, 491; italics mine). In order to preserve “the British Empire in the east,” 
Burke then invited the British ruling elite to “stretch and expand” their political vision in 
proportion to their imperial project and to formulate “a general, comprehensive, well-connected, 
and well-proportioned view of the whole of our dominions, and a just sense of their true bearings 
and relations” (NA, 492).398 This was compounded by his belief that the House of Commons had 
the means to show the world that “we deserve the superintendence of an empire as large as this 
kingdom ever held” (NA, 488).399 
                                                
397 Burke himself shared these anxieties, as observed by almost every Burke scholar. Nonetheless, he did not 
despair, for he thought it possible to counter the destructive effects of empire through a Ciceronian politics based on 
protection, justice, and parliamentary oversight. See Marshall, “Burke and Empire,” p. 290-1. In an earlier article, 
Marshall provides a broad and very useful account of the general anxiety over the Indian empire that characterized 
the British political culture until the 1790s. See Marshall, “A Free Though Conquering People”. For Marshall’s 
“triumphalist” interpretation of Burke, see Marshall, “Introduction,” esp. pp. 25-7. 
398 Necessity of an imperial political vision was previously asserted by Burke on the American question. See 
Address to the Colonists, p. 285 for Burke’s views on improving the English constitution in order to accommodate 
the increase in dominions and population. 
399 Burke’s agenda to keep the imperial structure intact dates back to his conciliatory position on the conflict with 
the American colonists. His speeches and writings in this period are sprinkled with Whiggish eulogies for the British 
Empire as an instrument of improvement, progress, and civilization. In “Speech on Conciliation,” English colonists 
are praised for turning “a savage wilderness into a glorious empire” and making “the most extensive and the only 
honourable conquests, not by destroying but by promoting the wealth, the number, and the happiness of the human 
race” (SC, 166; italics mine). In the same speech, Burke underscored his steady opposition to the measures that 
“may bring on the destruction of this empire,” and dismissed Josiah Tucker’s call for secession (informed by free 
trade principles) as “childish” (SC, 128). For a recent appraisal of Burke’s defense of the Atlantic Empire, see 
Hampsher-Monk, “Edmund Burke and Empire.” Burke’s writings on the American empire will be revisited in the 
last section of this essay, particularly with respect to the comparative civilizational categories that applied to the 
peoples of America, Africa, and India. 
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Burke’s embrace of empire has been attributed to several reasons. The first is his belief 
that God, for inscrutable reasons, had providentially led the British down the path of dominion 
and conquest in India.400 The second line of interpretation focuses on the constitutional 
connection of the British government to the affairs of India through corporate charters and 
grants.401 Providence and jurisdictional ties mandated a “responsible government” in India, a 
notion that prioritized duty over dominion, protection over administration, and the wellbeing of 
the subjects over the enrichment of the rulers.402 The political economic factors behind Burke’s 
embrace of empire have been relatively ignored, and where mentioned at all, they have been 
                                                
400 The belief that the imperial expansion of Britain was goaded by the hand of God consistently colored Burke’s 
works on empire. “There we are” Burke wrote in the Speech on Fox’s India Bill, “placed by the Sovereign Disposer: 
and we must do the best we can in our situation” (FB, 404). Divine dispensation played a crucial role in the defense 
of the Indian empire due to the historical and cultural difference between the rulers and the ruled. Against such 
alterity, historical ties, cultural kinship, or political consent, which fueled Burke’s advocacy of empire in America, 
became unavailable for the same cause in India. Invoking divine design enabled the British to rule by providence if 
not by consent, and in trust derived from God if not from Indians. The wrath that the breach of this trust would draw 
was equally providential; “we had already lost an empire” said Burke, “perhaps, as a punishment for the cruelties 
authorized in the other” (AA, 477). In the inaugural speech at the impeachment of Warren Hastings, providence 
appears as that divine and natural law which binds every ruler to the moral universal principles of justice and equity 
(SOI, 352). I would hasten to add, against any instrumental interpretation of Burke’s providential arguments, that 
Burke expounded such arguments in the case of American empire as well. Therefore his resort to God’s design in 
the case of India is not a self-conscious strategic act but the reflection of sincere conviction. My emphasis here falls 
on the particular role that the idea of providence performs in navigating the Indian problem. For Burke’s 
providentialist arguments in the American debates, see “Speech on Conciliation,” p. 166, and Letter to the Sheriffs of 
Bristol, p. 316. On Burke and providence, see Marshall, “Burke and Empire,” p. 297, and “Edmund Burke and 
India,” pp. 256-7; Whelan, Edmund Burke and India, pp. 6, 257. 
401 Robert Travers notes that the eighteenth century English political thought was by no means unfamiliar with such 
constitutional entanglements between distant and alien geographies. A complex web of imperial jurisdiction and a 
“coherent imperial constitution” were believed to tie together the distant parts of the empire. P. J. Marshall traces the 
formation of a unitary notion of the British Empire back to the Seven Years War and concludes that such a unitary 
notion informed Burke’s ideas on empire. See Travers, “Contested Despotisms: Problems of Liberty in British 
India,” in Exclusionary Empire: English Liberty Overseas, 1600-1900, ed. Jack P. Greene (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), esp. pp. 200-1; Marshall, “Burke and Empire,” p. 290. My own evidence for the 
constitutional connection comes from Burke’s inaugural speech at the impeachment, where he maintains that the 
quasi-sovereign powers that devolved upon the Company from the crown, and the administrative powers (especially 
the diwani) that was granted to the company by the Mogul emperor created a web of interconnected and overlapping 
jurisdictions in Bengal (SOI, 281-2). For an excellent treatment of the sovereign underpinnings and political 
capacities of English chartered companies, and in particular the East India Company, see Stern, “‘A Politie of Civill 
& Military Power.’” 
402 The classical expression of this position can be found in P. J. Marshall’s essays. Bromwich places a similar 
emphasis on trust and duty as the major link between metropolitan statesmen and their imperial subjects. For 
Whelan the duties of the just and beneficent imperial rule even encompasses the responsibility to reform the bad 
customs of the Indians. See Marshall, “Introduction,” pp. 25-7; “Edmund Burke and India,” pp. 256, 261-3; “Burke 
and Empire,” pp. 290-6; Bromwich, “Introduction,” pp. 13, 16; Whelan, Edmund Burke and India, 236, 271, 278. 
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incidentally appended to the providential and constitutional explanations.403 Underplaying the 
political economic dimension, however, risks overlooking very important material considerations 
that visibly subtended Burke’s imperial attitude and that deserve a much closer attention. 
The contribution of the imperial structure to Britain’s wealth and power entered into 
Burke’s imperial rationale as early as 1775. Discoursing about the strife with the American 
colonies, he reminded his audience of the meteoric rise of the colonial commerce and its 
centrality to British prosperity, as well as how “interwoven” it was into an imperial texture in the 
Atlantic triangle of Britain-North America-West Indies (SC 112-6).404 In Smithian fashion, 
Burke prescribed a light and prudent government for administering the colonial economy, which 
would spur private enterprise and industry, promote prosperity, and thereby secure a solid 
revenue base for the state (SC, 163; AC, 280-1). As regards the Indian dominions, Burke was 
more emphatic about the “interest which this nation [Britain] has in the commerce and revenues 
of that country” (FB, 381). In an impassioned plea to investigate the Company government in 
India and its political connections in the parliament, Burke warned the House that “[t]he greatest 
body of your revenue, your most numerous armies, your most important commerce, the richest 
source of your public credit … are on the point of being converted into a mystery of the state” 
                                                
403 For Marshall, Burke’s conception of empire is clearly “premodern” and evinces a concern with “honor and 
reputation rather than with power and profit, which would be incidental benefits.” Marshall, “Burke and Empire,” p. 
297. Strikingly, analyses of Burke’s political economic thought rarely incorporate the importance he accords to 
imperial commerce. Such analyses predominantly focus on his criticism of the East India Company from a laissez-
faire perspective or on the corrupting effects of imperial revenue on domestic politics. See, among others, 
Hampsher-Monk, “Introduction”; Macpherson, Burke; Winch, Riches and Poverty, chaps. 7 and 8; Pocock, 
“Political Economy of Burke's Analysis”; Muller, “Edmund Burke.” 
404 One should remember that Burke’s advocacy of colonial commerce diverged from Smith’s. While Smith 
contended that the dissolution of the Navigation Laws would benefit, not hamper colonial commerce, Burke’s free 
trade ideal remained within imperial borders. See Canavan, Political Economy of Edmund Burke, p. 122; Winch, 
Riches and Poverty, 210. For instance, in Burke’s “Speech on Conciliation” one finds a jab at the Smithian free 
trade argument that the colonial trade “has drawn the juices from the rest of the body” (SC, 114). Cf. Smith, Wealth 
of Nations, Book 4, chap. 7, esp. pp 27-54. 
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(NA, 491).405 These remarks, especially when read against the eighteenth-century British 
anxieties regarding the imperial ambitions of France, provide plausible evidence that for Burke 
British Empire was a necessary condition for national survival, not to mention power, prosperity, 
and reputation. This meant that decolonization was not an option, and that the moral conundrums 
of the empire had to be addressed and resolved within the imperial framework. It is only in the 
light of such irreducible imperial commitments that it becomes possible to properly grasp the 
moral vexations that colonial capitalism represented for Burke’s political thought. Whatever his 
misgivings might have been, Burke, as a British statesman who was personally and 
professionally invested in the British polity, had to tarry with empire. 
 The major moral problem that constantly erupted around the Indian question regarded the 
image and character of the British nation. Depending on the specific issue that Burke was 
addressing, he imagined the British political integrity to be judged by the people and princes of 
India, other European nations, “all the world,” and even God himself. Sometimes imploring, 
sometimes threatening, but always suffused by a sense of urgency, the tone and the consistency 
of Burke’s pleas leave no doubt he was sincerely agonized by what he perceived to be the 
dissolution of the liberal values that defined the English political tradition. Most importantly, it 
was the Eastern empire, the endowment of providence and a most prolific source of commercial 
wealth for Britain, that was breeding despicable, petty, corrupt, pecuniary behavior amongst the 
Britons, which marred the British name and sapped the moral vitals of the British constitution. 
Below, I explicate the peculiar contradiction that pertains to empire and commerce in three steps. 
First, I explore the nature and the expanse of the threat that Burke perceived in this contradiction. 
Second, I outline the image of the British society that Burke upheld as well as the moral 
                                                
405 Twelve years after this speech, and in an unusually close examination of the political arithmetic of the British 
economy, Burke would note that out of a total of 10,5 million pounds of British balance of trade in 1796, a 
staggering 4 million (near forty per cent) was comprised by the East and West Indies trade (3rdL, p. 384). 
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principles on which this image stood. Finally, I specify how and why British rule in India 
systematically violated these moral principles and jeopardized the British self-image. Having 
thus triangulated the tensions of colonial capitalism, I conclude with a discussion of the extent to 
which Burke was successful in diagnosing, addressing, and navigating these tensions. 
A survey of Burke’s major speeches and writings on empire yields an extensive inventory 
of his deep commitment to an idealized image of the British polity. In his much acclaimed 
“Speech on Conciliation,” England was hailed as a “great, commercial nation,” “a nation, in 
whose veins the blood of freedom circulates” (SC, 114, 130). This familiar coupling of 
commerce and freedom retraced the ideological contours of the seventeenth-century British 
political culture, and intimated the classical conundrum of reconciling freedom and empire. As 
masterfully demonstrated by David Armitage, the seventeenth-century English response to the 
specter of a second Rome was to re-imagine the English empire as “Protestant, commercial, 
maritime, and free,”406 which, galvanized by the agriculturalist ideal of improvement and 
productivity, would form the backbone of Whig imperial ideology and persist well into the 
nineteenth century.407 Reflecting this image and its origins, Burke stated that denying the 
American colonists their liberties would necessarily “subvert the maxims” that kept alive the 
English spirit of liberty (SC, 127). During the war with the colonies, Burke would begrudgingly 
watch his early premonition come true as the British began “ruling half the empire by a 
mercenary sword.” “Liberty is being made unpopular to Englishmen. Contending for an 
imaginary power, we are acquiring the spirit of domination, and to lose the relish of honest 
equality”  (LSB, 328-9). 
                                                
406 Armitage, Ideological Origins, p. 8. 
407 Anthony Pagden emphasizes the centrality of political imaginary to imperial ideologies, and notes that it is “in 
the domain of political and cultural self-imagining that the most enduring link between the first [American] and 
second [Indian] empires is to be found.” Pagden, Lords of All the World, p. 10. 
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 If the free and commercial image of the British Empire and the principles of liberty and 
honest equality were already hard to uphold on the American front, they were even more 
slippery, awkward, and difficult to apply to the Indian dominions. For in India, the British 
presence was no longer maritime and commercial, and the subjects were neither Christian (let 
alone Protestant) nor free. Fortified in territorial possessions acquired by conquest, wielding 
administrative, judicial, and revenue powers over vast and culturally alien populations, and 
thoroughly convinced of India’s perennial tradition of “Asiatic despotism,”408 the Company in 
India resembled the Roman garrisons in Egypt rather than the Athenian colonies in Asia Minor. 
The Greek model of colonization had always been cherished in the English political imaginary as 
natural, voluntary and based on historical ties, whereas the Roman model was invariably 
associated with the “spirit of domination” that Burke dreaded.409 Against this background, it is 
not surprising that he sounded more alarmed when remarking on the British self-image as 
refracted through imperium in India. 
 Burke’s earliest speech linking British conduct in India and the image of the nation 
targeted the Company’s clandestine involvement in the wars between Indian rulers.410 Disturbed 
                                                
408 The British preconceptions of Asiatic despotism and their impact on the practices of imperial governance in India 
are given detailed treatment in two essays by Robert Travers. See, Travers, “Contested Despotism” and “Ideology 
and British Expansion in Bengal, 1757-72,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 33 (2005): 7-27. 
409 Of Burke’s contemporaries, Adam Smith offers an influential contrast between the virtues of the Greek model of 
colonization (independence, settlement, and kinship) and the vices of its Roman counterpart (conquest, domination, 
and inequality), which was gaining traction in the late-eighteenth century. This distinction also prefigures the 
nineteenth-century dichotomy between the “first” and the “second” British Empires, the former comprising the 
republican colonies in the Atlantic, the latter denoting the Asian possessions that began with commercial factories 
and ended in territorial dominion. For a meticulous discussion of this dichotomy, its place in the British political 
imaginary, and its implications for empire-building, see, Armitage, Ideological Origins, and Travers, Ideology and 
Empire. 
410 The East India Company had been resorting to extraordinary means of raising revenue, one of which was to 
engage in “subsidiary alliances” whereby the Company troops would be deployed for “protecting” local rulers in 
return for a fee. In addition to this racketeering scheme, the Company also engaged in mercenary operations by 
lending British troops to its local “allies” for their military campaigns. Not surprisingly, this strategy antagonized 
certain nawabs. Hyder Ali of Mysore was one such prince in Southern India, at whose hands the British suffered a 
severe defeat during the Second Mysore War. The defeat prompted the House of Commons to set up a Secret 
Committee of Investigation to inquire into the issue. Burke made a stand against the Secret Committee, contending 
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by the possibility that such strategy was alienating the local rulers and could drive them to court 
other European powers, Burke resented that Indians considered “the most despotic empires as 
more liberal than Britain” (SEC 136-7). The proper solution would be to completely publicize 
the inquiry into the Company’s Indian dealings, and if the House showed the political integrity of 
chastising its own citizens for their misconduct in distant colonies, “Europe would stand 
astonished and awed by your conduct” (SEC 138). When Burke drafted and defended Fox’s 
India Bill in 1783,411 he demanded administrative reform in India for the vindication of 
“humanity, justice, and every principle of true policy,” on which he predicated the British self-
image. The reform would “turn out a matter of great disgrace or great glory to the whole British 
nation. We are on a conspicuous stage, and the world marks our demeanor” (FB 381). The 
Company’s shady dealings, breaches of contract, and mercenary wars for pecuniary 
aggrandizement constituted a “most atrocious violation of public faith” and “damned our 
reputation in India” (FB 395, 397). Even more perturbing was the collusion between the 
delinquent company servants and the Court of Directors in London, which, by perpetuating the 
abuses in India, brought repugnance upon “the honour and policy of this nation, …great 
calamities on India, and enormous expences on the East India Company” (FB 438; italics in the 
                                                
that a parliamentary Select Committee would be a more proper body to look into the causes of the war and the 
subsequent defeat. Burke’s proposal would eventually be defeated, and a Secret Committee established. 
411 One should note that Burke did not have grave concerns regarding the British exploits in India until the early 
1780s. As of 1781 he still defended the chartered rights of the East India Company against the encroachments of the 
Parliament and the Crown. He became acquainted with Indian affairs during his capacity as a member of the Select 
Committee in 1781-1783. The Committee investigated the conflict of jurisdiction between the Council of Bengal 
and the Supreme Court of Bengal, the latter having been formed by North’s Regulating Act in 1773 in order to 
curtail the abusive practices of the Company servants in India. One can plausibly state that in 1781 Burke’s stance 
on the Indian question was still uncertain. While critical of the Company’s dealings with the local rulers, he 
nonetheless defended its independence from government and from the Supreme Court of Bengal (he also proposed 
the Bengal Judicature Bill that would curtail powers of the Supreme Court). Burke’s position would dramatically 
change by 1783. He would call for the abrogation of the Company charter and begin stressing the “universal laws of 
morality” over and against chartered rights. To observe this shift, compare his “Speech on State of East India 
Company” and “Speech on Bengal Judicature Bill,” both delivered in 1781, to his “Speech on Fox’s India Bill” in 
1783. In the course of his inquiries, Burke was heavily influenced by the information provided by Philip Francis, a 
recalled member of the Council of Bengal, an inveterate enemy of Warren Hastings, and an English physiocrat 
whose plans for India would shape Burke’s drafting of the Fox’s India Bill. 
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original).412 Harnessing together universal moral principles, sound government, and the British 
reputation, Burke called upon the house to vote for “destroying a tyranny that exists to the 
disgrace of this nation, and the destruction of so large a part of the human species” (FB 451).  
Burke’s “Speech on Almas Ali Khan” was likewise satiated by alarm over the 
“disgraceful brand,” “indelible stain,” “ignominy and abhorrence” that stuck to the British 
honour and character (AA 474-5). Burke was convinced that the infamy of the Indian plunder 
and oppression had overflowed the boundaries of India. It had drawn the “scorn and derision of 
the world,” and “interested the curiosity and roused the indignation of all Europe, and … could 
descend to posterity unbroken” (AA 462). The same concern was repeated in “Speech on Nabob 
of Arcot’s Debts,” which asserted the futility of trying to “separate it [India] from our public 
interest and national reputation,” and summoned the “audience formed by the other States of 
Europe … the discerning and critical company before which [the British government] acts” 
(NAD 550, 552). “The estimation of all Europe” as the bar for judging the British image was 
once again raised in a motion for paper on Hastings (PH, 54).  
Burke’s obsession with the test to which the British self-image was put by the imperial 
rule in India, and the global spectatorship to which it was thereby exposed, rose to a crescendo in 
Burke’s inaugural speech at the opening of Hastings Impeachment. It is worth quoting at length: 
My Lords, it is not only the interest of a great Empire which is concerned, which is now a most 
considerable part of the British Empire; but, my Lords, the credit and honour of the British nation will 
itself be decided by this decision. My Lords, they will stand or fall thereby. We are to decide by the case 
of this gentleman whether the crimes of individuals are to be turned into public guilt and national 
ignominy, or whether this nation will convert these offences, which have thrown a transient shade on its 
glory, into a judgment that will reflect on the permanent lustre, honour, justice and humanity of this 
Kingdom (SOI, 271). 
 
                                                
412 Burke’s bundling of the national reputation, Company interests, and the well-being of the natives is an enduring 
theme in his works on India, and reappears almost identically in his “Speech on Pitt’s India Bill” (1784), p. 457. 
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The matters were further complicated, however, as issues of material power and glory 
compounded the universal principles of justice and humanity that distinguished Britain: 
Situated as this Kingdom is – and, thank God, an object of envy to the rest of the world for its greatness 
and its power – its conduct, in that very elevated situation to which it has arisen, will undoubtedly be 
scrutinized (SOI, 277). 
 
Britain’s economic and political rigor, obviously owing in great part to its imperial possessions, 
could raise doubts about the manner in which these were obtained. These passages hint, subtly 
but crucially, at Burke’s concern to ascertain before the British, the European, and the Indian 
public that imperial and commercial grandeur could be made compatible with moral conduct and 
good government. Burke’s efforts to salvage the imperial framework and its material benefits 
while maintaining a morally upright image of Britain as the champion of universal humanity 
would culminate in his decade-long endeavors to impeach Hastings, reform the Company, and 
“restore” the empire to its moral purity.413 
 So much for the extent of the threat that Burke perceived in the Indian dominions. But 
what was the nature of the threat? What was Burke’s idealized image of Britain, and what were 
the particulars of the British conduct in India that made it so offensive to this self-image? The 
conventional answer to this question comes in the form of political “corruption.” The influx of 
plundered “Eastern riches” rekindled the classical fears of Eastern corruption, which burdened 
the once-virtuous Roman republic with the golden chains of the Eastern provinces and dragged it 
in to the abyss of dissolution and collapse.414 The specter of Rome was incarnated in what Burke 
named “Indianism.” The term referred to a political network or a “cabal” formed by the 
                                                
413 Earlier interpretations of the Hastings Impeachment as a spectacular act of exorcism include Suleri, Rhetoric of 
English India, chap. 3; Dirks, Scandal of Empire, chap. 3; Whelan, Edmund Burke and India, p. 101, ff. For the 
impeachment as Burke’s personal exorcism of his bourgeois personality, see Kramnick, Rage of Edmund Burke, pp. 
131-3. 
414 The exemplary formulation of this interpretation can be found in Hampsher-Monk, “Introduction.” Marshall, 
Bromwich, and Whelan pursue the same line of explanation. See Marshall, “Edmund Burke and India,” “Edmund 
Burke and India,” and the introductions to the Writings and Speeches, Volumes 5, 6, and 7; Bromwich, 
“Introduction”; Whelan Edmund Burke and India, especially chap. 2. 
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Company servants in India, the Court of Proprietors and the Court of Directors in London, and 
the most disastrous of all, a growing number of members of parliament who owed their seats to 
the money and influence of the Company and their allegiance to the Company’s interests.415  
The most succinct encapsulation of the corrupt dynamic of Indianism can be found in a 
dreadful image that Burke conjured up in his speech on the Sixth Article of Impeachment: 
“These people pour in upon us everyday. They not only bring with them the wealth they have, 
but they bring with them into our country the vices by which they were acquired,” with many 
more awaiting to “let loose all the corrupt wealth of India acquired by the oppression of that 
country to the corruption of all liberties.” (6thA, 62-3).416 Burke frequently adduced Roman 
precedents as he inveighed against the “guilty riches of the East” (6thA, 61) and the provincial 
corruption that was making “inroads into the vitals of the state” (PH, 63). There are many more 
expressions redolent of the classical fears of political-corruption-via-riches in Burke’s speeches. 
When taken together with his providential rhetoric and his suspicion of monied wealth, these 
remarks make for the argument that Burke’s was a “premodern political conception of 
empire,”417 and his main objective in imperial reform was to salvage the “precapitalist morality 
                                                
415 Burke’s portents were somewhat vindicated as the King used Fox’s India Bill as an excuse to dismiss the Fox-
North coalition, and Pitt’s electoral victory in 1784 was indebted to considerable support by the India interests. Paul 
Benfield, a merchant who made his fortune in Madras, in part by funding local wars through expensive loans, was 
for Burke the incarnation of the corrupt Indian wealth in British politics. 
416 Burke’s anxious diagnosis of the Indian influence goes back to 1783, even before the Indian influence would help 
Pitt strip the Rockinghamites of the governmental seat. In “Speech on Fox’s India Bill,” the returned company 
servants “loaded with odium and with riches” are depicted as a pestilence that infiltrates the body politic of the 
English elite: “they marry into your families; they enter into your senate; they ease your estates by loans; they raise 
their value by their demand” (FB 443, 403). Two years later, back in parliamentary opposition, Burke is more 
explicit in his indictment of Paul Benfield who had “no fewer than eight members in the last parliament,” ministers 
of the Pitt administration, and Henry Dundas, a “prosecutor turned protector” for securing political protection for the 
Indian delinquents (NA, 541-552). In a masterful passage during the impeachment, he cautions the House, “today 
the Commons of Great Britain prosecute the delinquents of India. Tomorrow, the delinquents of India will be the 
Commons of Great Britain” (6thA, 63). The same idea is repeated in Reflections on the Revolution in France, where 
the continual greatness of the House is predicated on keeping “the breakers of law in India from becoming the 
makers of law in England” (R, 96) 
417 Marshall, “Introduction,” pp. 34-5. 
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of governance of England”418 and restore “political moralism” to imperial rule.419 
 While this interpretation of Burke’s anxieties is at first glance plausible, I think it remains 
superficial and incomplete. A closer examination of the normative principles that Indianism 
violated reveals that the classical language of corruption was the medium in which Burke 
expressed a novel problem. I argue that Burke’s discourse on corruption qua amalgamation of 
politics and commerce, that is, the use of political power for material aggrandizement and the 
purchase of political power through wealth, should be read as an index to a uniquely modern 
contradiction. This contradiction is between, on the one hand, the liberal self-image of 
capitalism, which envisions commerce as a voluntary contractual transaction between juridically 
equal individuals in a free market devoid of political power, and on the other, the historical role 
of primitive accumulation in the genealogy of capitalism, which depends on the deployment of 
political power and extra-economic coercion for the maintenance of the conditions of capital 
accumulation.420 The Indian wealth carried off to England and invested as capital significantly 
contributed to the accumulation of capital in the metropole, yet the methods of extracting and 
transferring that surplus appeared reprehensible by the very categories that the British metropole 
imagined itself. Burke was a perceptive observer of this contradiction and tried to articulate and 
navigate it by resorting to a syncretic ideological arsenal comprising physiocratic political 
economy, ancient constitutionalism, Whig history, stadial theory, and classical language.421 
Recasting Burke as an eighteenth-century intellectual wrestling with the tensions of colonial 
                                                
418 Bromwich, “Introduction,” p. 29. 
419 Whelan, Edmund Burke and India, especially pp. 14 and 275-291. 
420 Expressed in terms more readily available Burke, Burke’s image of Britain was that of a commercial society yet 
the colonial extensions and of inflections “commerce” offended the civilized sensibility of the commercial ideal 
itself. 
421 Shifting the lens from the philosophical systematicity of Burke’s rhetoric to the novelty of the challenge he faced 
(a challenge for which no adequate theoretical language had yet been developed) puts in perspective the charges of 
incoherence leveled at Burke. For a classical example of the charge of incoherence, see Pocock’s “Burke and 
Ancient Constitution.” 
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capitalism (tensions that were becoming too palpable to ignore) promises to remove some of the 
apparent incoherencies in his thought that have fueled the “Burke problems.”422 
 Burke conceived of Britain as a “commercial society” that incorporated an agrarian 
capitalist economy based on private property in land, agricultural improvement, and wage labor; 
specialization, technical division of labor, and efficiency in manufactures; a large and highly 
monetarized national market in consumer and capital goods; a complex system of credit and 
national debt; and a legal structure that reproduced these conditions by securing private property 
and enforcing contracts between legally free and equal persons. He not only affirmed this 
economic reality, but in a somewhat un-Burkean fashion elevated its principles to a normative 
theory of political economy.423 A close survey of Burke’s ideas on political economy shows that 
he espoused a physiocratic variant of capitalism, and, true to the nature of eighteenth-century 
political economy as a new moral economy,424 articulated a set of liberal principles of economic 
fairness. These principles, woven into what I call the “commercial ideal,” comprised the free 
                                                
422 This approach also removes some of the awkwardness that pertains to ascribing Burke premodern political 
preconceptions and modern economic ideas, as does Marshall when he writes, “classical antiquity might have 
inspired Burke with a belief that empire should be built upon principles of honour, but he was very much a man of 
his time in his conviction that trade between equals could only be mutually beneficial to both sides.” Marshall, 
“Edmund Burke and India,” pp. 257-8. 
423 On this point, I agree with Macpherson, Muller, and Himmelfarb that by the late-eighteenth century, the 
fundamental features of a capitalist economy were more or less in place in England, and Burke’s defense of the 
existing political economic system was therefore tantamount to a defense of the commercial-capitalist economy. 
However, as David McNally rightly observes, one needs to avoid reading back industrial capitalism into the 
eighteenth-century political economy. Political economy in the eighteenth-century was primarily concerned with 
explaining the dynamics of capitalist relations in what was still predominantly an agrarian economy. See McNally, 
Political Economy. 
424 Whether classical political economy was the death knell of the classical-Christian “moral economy” or the 
codification of a new moral economy has been the subject of intense debate that usually centers on the figure of 
Adam Smith. Himmelfarb rejects the argument that Adam Smith de-moralized man and economy and harkens to 
Schumpeter in asserting that the Wealth of Nations formulated a “new kind of moral economy” with self-interest as 
a core “moral principle.” The invisible hand, too, served a moral function, she argues, by connecting the pursuit of 
self-interest to common good. Himmelfarb Idea of Poverty, pp. 46-54. Sankar Muthu elaborates on Smith’s 
conception of “commerce” as a fundamentally moral category, which harbored utopian impulses of a global network 
of communication that would foster peace, respect for cultural alterity, and universal prosperity. Muthu, “Adam 
Smith’s Critique.” David McNally, follows a similar line of conjecture as regards the eighteenth-century pre-
Ricardian political economists. McNally, Political Economy, pp. xi-xvi. For a classic statement of the “end of moral 
economy” argument, see E. P. Thompson, “Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century, ” Past 
and Present 50 (1971): 76-136. 
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pursuit of material interest, ethos of industry and efficiency, universal benefit through economic 
growth, truth and justice of the market, and contractual freedom and laissez-faire in agricultural 
and labor markets. 
 
II. Burke’s Commercial Ideal 
 The conviction that the free pursuit of material interest, combined with a productive ethic 
of labor,425 would simultaneously improve personal fortunes and contribute to the overall wealth 
of the society was a staple of eighteenth-century political economic thought.426 This premise 
appeared in Burke’s economic remarks as early as 1765 and persisted until 1797. Lambasting the 
restrictive economic policies of anti-Popery Laws in Ireland, Burke extolled the “desire of 
acquisition” as “always a passion of long views.” “Confine a man to a momentary possession  
and you at once cut off that laudable avarice which every wise state cherished as one of its first 
principles” (TPL, 477). Curtailing that laudable avarice by profit ceilings and short tenure terms 
in landed property not only resulted in “famishing the present hour and squandering all upon 
prospect and futurity” (TPL, 477).427 Three decades later, Burke revisited the “desire of 
                                                
425 Himmelfarb, Idea of Poverty, 27-8. 
426 For the genealogy of this particular political economic vision, see Pincus. 1688, esp. chap. 12, “Revolutions in 
Political Economy.” Pincus maintains that by the late-seventeenth century two distinct views of political economy 
confronted each other, mapping imperfectly yet decisively on the two contending camps of what would become the 
Glorious Revolution. The victory of the Whigs sealed the triumph of a political economic vision that viewed labor, 
rather than land, as the principal source of economic value, and thereby prioritized industry and commerce over 
territory and conquest. This was complemented by a positive-sum conception of commerce that further dampened 
the thrust behind mercantilist policies of trade. Burke appears to have shared this economic worldview as he 
criticized mercantilist, zero-sum conceptions of trade in a letter to a friend. “It is in the interest of the commercial 
world that wealth should be found everywhere. I know that it is but too natural for us to see our own certain ruin in 
the possible prosperity of other people. … Trade is not a limited thing; as if the objects of mutual demand and 
consumption could not stretch beyond the bounds of our Jealousies.” Burke, Two Letters from Mr. Burke to 
Gentlemen in the City of Bristol, quoted in Muller, “Edmund Burke,” p. 115. 
427 True to his Whig heritage, Burke hitched improvement in land to the prospect of drawing profit from it. “Every 
law against property is a law against industry,” and such laws in Ireland were tantamount to proclaiming, “Thou 
shalt not improve.” In Ireland, Ascendancy policies culminated in unproductive tenants reluctantly working the land 
of absentee landlords, leaving the realm unenclosed, unimproved, and wasted, and the public miserable and 
discontented (TPL, 476-7). 
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accumulation,” this time to defend monied property that floated the national debt during the 
Anglo-French War. The desire of accumulation was 
a principle without which the means of their service to the state could not exist. The love of lucre, though 
sometimes carried to a ridiculous, sometimes to a vicious excess, is the grand cause of prosperity to all 
states. In this natural, this reasonable, this powerful, this prolifick principle … it is for the statesmen to 
employ it as it finds it … he is to make use of the general energies of nature, to take them as he finds them 
(3rdL, 347-8). 
 
Burke was not endorsing self-interest here simply as a “useful” principle. The analogy between 
the “energies of nature” and the “natural, reasonable, powerful, and prolific” principle indicates 
that self-interest was akin to an elemental force in society, and the desire of accumulation, pace 
the classical interpreters of Burke’s political economy, was stripped of its Aristotelian odium. 
Self-interest posed less a moral than an epistemological issue, a “first principle” in a sort of 
social physics, as the question now became how to use the knowledge of men’s self-interest and 
establish the conditions under which it would augment general prosperity. This question was 
addressed in Burke’s “Speech on Economical Reform,” which betrays a Baconian streak: 
Those things which are not practicable, are not desirable. There is nothing in the world really beneficial, 
that does not lie within the reach of an informed understanding, and a well directed pursuit. There is 
nothing that God has judged good for us, that he has not given us the means to accomplish, both in the 
natural and moral world” (ER, 546). 
 
Burke’s disdain for abstract speculation appears in a different light here, not so much as a ward 
against the dangerous impetuosity of reason (as usually generalized from the Reflections), as 
contempt for its lack of usefulness. He boasted that his economic proposals were rooted not in 
“airy speculation” but “in real life, and in real human nature … in the business and bosoms of 
men” (ER, 534).428 Properly managed, the desire to accumulate lodged in men’s bosoms could 
                                                
428 Comparing Burke’s “Economical Reform” to Locke’s journal entry “Understanding” offers one a striking vista of 
the Baconian tectonics that connected the two political theorists-cum-statesmen. For Locke’s Baconian allegiances, 
see Chapter II of this study. 
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be a universally beneficent force and it was incumbent on the prudent politician to channel it 
towards (to use Smith’s words) “universal opulence.”429 
 It is important to stress that the self-interest that Burke accepted and praised here was not 
the destructive urge derided by the classical-Christian tradition. It was rather akin to Adam 
Smith’s “desire of bettering our condition, a desire which, though generally calm and 
dispassionate, comes with us from the womb, and never leaves us till we go into the grave.”430 
That is to say, Burke’s notion was already inflected by the transformation of destructive passions 
into the constant and predictable motive of accumulation, insightfully theorized by Albert 
Hirschman.431 For Burke (unlike for Smith and other Scottish Enlightenment thinkers), this 
transformation was indebted less to doux commerce than to the civilized manners fostered by 
Christianity and social prescription, which had over time attenuated the conquering spirit of 
arrogant nobility that characterized the ancient Britons.432 Thus rendered calm and dispassionate, 
self-interest implied two conditions that we have already encountered in the analysis of Locke’s 
political economy: first, that the self-interested subject behave in a rational, settled, and most 
importantly, accumulative and a future-oriented manner;433 secondly, following from the first, 
                                                
429 Burke expressed the duty of the politician through an artistic analogy: “People are the masters. They have only to 
express wants at large and in gross. We are the expert artists; we are the skillful workmen, to shape their desires into 
perfect form, and to fit the utensil to the use” (ER, 547). In Letter to a Noble Lord, the good governance of the 
economy, or in Burke’s words, “true oeconomy” or “higher oeconomy … is a distributive virtue, and consists not in 
saving, but in selection.” It has “larger views. It demands a discriminating judgment and a sagacious mind” (LNL, 
162). These words corroborate Pocock’s observation that Burke’s definition of virtue was based on the management 
of public revenue than martial prowess, which made him a defender of the commercial society and the Whig 
aristocratic government that promoted it. See Pocock, “Political Economy of Burke’s Analysis” p. 209. 
430 Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, Book II, Chap. 3, Par. 28. 
431 See Albert Hirschman, The Passions and the Interest (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), esp. pp. 41, 
53-62. 
432 An account of this transformation, which made incidental appearance in Burke’s works and came to its fullest 
and most famous blossom in the Reflections, was seminally articulated in his aborted project, An Abridgment of 
English History. For a recent discussion of this work and its relevance for Burke’s political philosophy, see Richard 
Bourke, “Edmund Burke and the Politics of Conquest,” Modern Intellectual History 4 (2007): 403-32. 
433 This subjective disposition translated into saving, foresight, and investment by the propertied classes (farmers, 
merchants, and the like), and “patience, labor, sobriety, frugality, and religion” for the laboring classes (S, 121, 130-
2). Both classes “augment the common stock … by their industry or their self-denial” (3rdL, 349). 
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labor and consumption be concentrated in productive activities. The first of these conditions had 
its antithesis in the “thoughtless, loitering, and dissipated life” in Ireland (TPL, 477), while the 
second condition was most blatantly contravened in the unproductive consumption that sustained 
the “unprofitable titles” of the royal household targeted by Burke’s economic reform proposals 
(ER, 483).434 In short, the harness that tethered self-interest to public prosperity was woven with 
the strips of a Whig ethos of rational industry and Smithian policy of fostering productive 
consumption. 
 While security of property formed the backbone of the Whig worldview in general, 
Burke’s thoughts on property articulated a particular socioeconomic vision, complete with 
assumptions and prescriptions for maximizing the material and moral benefits of property. One 
can plausibly argue that Burke’s views on private property and wage-labor were of the capitalist 
genus. First, Burke not only favored the private possession of land as a factor of production, but 
he also argued for the concentration of capital as much as possible. In his economic reform 
proposals, Burke justified his advocacy of the sale of crown and forest lands on the grounds that 
such dispersed possessions “are of a nature more proper for private management, than public 
administration”; with the sales, “property is transferred from hands that are not fit for that 
property to those who are. The buyer and seller must mutually profit by such a bargain” (ER, 
506). This call for the privatization of public lands becomes more intelligible if one bears in 
mind that Burke’s political career coincided with the period of parliamentary enclosures that 
                                                
434 Even Burke’s cherished nobility had to compensate for their “luxury and even their ease” by paying “contribution 
to the public; not because they are vicious principles, but because the are unproductive” (3rdL, 349). While he did 
not explicitly refer to Smith, Burke’s ideas on political economy and particularly his assessment of revenue 
management closely followed the Smithian dichotomy between capital and revenue, and its correlate, productive 
and unproductive labor. This principle was brilliantly though subtly expressed in a passage where Burke likened the 
preservation of the old, feudal establishment to “embalm[ing] a carcass not worth an ounce of the gums that are used 
to preserve it” (ER, 510). While this passage has been frequently cited to shore up the “modern” image of Burke, 
surprisingly, it has rarely been interpreted from an economic perspective. In general, compare Burke’s “Speech on 
Economical Reform” to the Wealth of Nations, Book II. 
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spanned roughly the century between 1750 and 1850.435 One can conjecture that Burke had a 
positive attitude to the whole enclosure process, given that he perceived in the enclosure of 
crown lands the same principles “upon which you have acted in private inclosures. I shall never 
quit precedents where I find them applicable” (ER, 506)436 Public lands were not only to be sold, 
but they were to be cheap enough so as to leave the purchasers with adequate “capital” for 
cultivating the land. The principal revenue to be obtained from “these uncultivated wastes” was 
not from the sales but from the “improvement and population of the kingdom,” which required 
that the “unprofitable landed estates of the crown” be disposed of and “thrown into the mass of 
private property” (ER, 507). The capitalist disposition of Burke’s advocacy of private property 
was more clearly expressed in Thoughts and Details on Scarcity, where he openly stated, 
“monopoly of authority … is an evil; but the monopoly of capital is the contrary. It is a great 
benefit, and a benefit particularly to the poor” (S, 132-3; italics mine). The reasoning behind this 
endorsement was the familiar Smithian concatenation of the accumulation of stock, division of 
labor, increased productivity, expedited accumulation, universal opulence, and improved 
condition of the laboring population. 
 Capitalist private property is incomplete without a proletarian labor force, and one finds 
strong assumptions and normative prescriptions of wage-labor in Burke’s later writings. The 
laboring classes of Britain were the dispossessed who had nothing but their labor power to sell: 
“As to the common people, their stock is in their persons and in their earnings” and they were to 
                                                
435 The legal enclosure of common lands consolidated large tracts of private property, which had been in the making 
since the fifteenth century, and entrenched capitalist relations in agriculture. See David McNally, Against the 
Market: Political Economy, Market Socialism, and the Marxist Critique (London: Verso, 1993), chap. 1; Michael 
Perelman, Classical Political Economy: Primitive Accumulation and the Social Division of Labor (London: 
Rowman and Allenhend, 1984), chapters 2-4. 
436 Unfortunately, Burke left no substantial tract or speech on the English enclosures. The only relevant remarks, 
which are mostly in passim, can be found in his unpublished letters entitled ‘Mnemon to the Public Advertiser’ 
(Writings and Speeches, Vol. 2, pp. 75-87). Burke’s position in these letters is not very clear, though it seems 
broadly in line with his economic reform proposals, with additional concerns with the rights of the poor and equity 
of the process. For a brief discussion, see Canavan, Political Economy of Edmund Burke, pp. 118-9. 
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be paid “according to the operation of general capital” (3rdL, 352).437 The labor power of the 
common people is “a commodity, like every other,” “an article of trade … subject to all the laws 
and principles of trade” (S, 122, 126). Burke’s uncompromising view on labor as a commodity 
subject to the dynamics of supply and demand was compounded by the amoral and fatalistic 
acceptance of the precariousness of the laborers’ conditions. Wages were determined not by the 
“necessity of the vender, but [by] the necessity of the purchaser” and whether one could fetch 
subsistence wages on the market was “totally beside the question in this way of viewing it” (S, 
126). Intervening in the wage-contract was a direct and, in government’s hands, an “arbitrary 
tax” that encroached upon property (S, 123, 126).438 Minimum wage or outdoor relief amounted 
to “trifling with the condition of mankind” for it pushed “those who must labour or the world 
cannot exist” to “seek resources … in something else other than their own industry, frugality, 
and sobriety” (3rdL, 355).439 That capital accumulation accrued from the surplus value generated 
by the industrious and sober wage-laborer was similarly unequivocal: “the labour, so far as that 
labour is concerned, shall be sufficient to pay the employer a profit on his capital” (S, 123).440 
This relation of surplus transfer was couched in the language of a “natural and just” chain of 
                                                
437 Burke stated his positive stance on the expansion of wage-labor in his examination of the British economy in the 
first half of the 1790s. “An improved and improving agriculture, which implies a great augmentation of labor, has 
not yet found itself at a stand … An increasing capital calls for labor: and an increasing population answers to the 
call. Our manufactures augmented for both the foreign and domestick consumption … have always found the 
laborious hand ready for the liberal pay” (3rdL, 353). 
438 Burke’s admonition of government intervention was not restricted to agricultural or labor markets. He likewise 
indicted intervention into credit markets as tantamount to “a tax on that particular species [i.e. monied] property. In 
effect, it would be the most unjust and impolitick of all things, unequal taxation. It would throw upon one 
description of persons in the community, that burthen which ought by fair and equitable distribution to rest upon the 
whole” (3rdL, 346-7). 
439 Burke resorted to providential language in explaining this unhappy state: “it is the common doom of man that he 
must eat his bread by the sweat of his brow” (ER, 355). Famine is explained in the same vein, as the decision of the 
benign and wise disposer to “with-hold the necessaries of life” (S, 137). 
440 The natural entitlement of the capital owner to a profit on his capital was restated in Burke’s defense of the 
monied property. “The monied men have a right to look to advantage to in the investment of their property. To 
advance their money, they risk it; and the risk is to be included in the price” (3rdL, 346-7). This is obviously a far cry 
from the condemnation of usury in the classical-Christian conception of moral economy, and opens to question the 
classical-traditionalist image attributed to Burke from another angle. For an image of Burke fearful of modernity as 
defined by money and efficiency, see Bromwich, Introduction, pp. 20, 37. 
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subordination with enterprising capitalist farmers at the top, descending to agricultural laborers, 
beasts of burden, and inanimate instruments (S, 125).441 Regardless of the religious-providential 
language that Burke mobilizes, it is clear that his vision captured and upheld the entrenchment of 
capitalist relations of his time, especially in agriculture, inasmuch as it prescribed concentrated 
private property in factors of production and the employment of legally free wage-labor for the 
accumulation of capital.442  
 If capital accumulation was one major pillar of Burke’s commercial ideal, the other was 
the justice of the free market. For Burke, the foundations of good government and just laws 
resided in equity and “general and publick utility” (TPL, 456). Left to its own operations, the 
market not only maximized public utility but also ensured that the transactions were equitable. 
                                                
441 Burke’s natural chain of subordination in agriculture, while it used the language of natural law and the great 
chain of being, in fact captured the capitalist triad of landlord-tenant-laborer that had by the late-eighteenth century 
dominated the south of England. Burke himself was at the top of the chain with a moderately sized estate which he 
rented out to tenants farmers. 
442 Crucially, Burke represented his proposal as “oeconomizing by principle” that was inspired by the “principles of 
radical oeconomy” (ER, 513), which suggests that he might have had the physiocratic theory in mind. While Donald 
Winch notes Burke’s animosity towards the philosopher-administrator “men of system” like Turgot, there are good 
grounds for connecting Burke’s economic thought to physiocracy. “Radical oeconomy” in the late-eighteenth 
century referred mainly to physiocratic theory, and Burke declared that his studies in political economy began “even 
before it had employed the thoughts of speculative men in other parts of Europe” (LNL, 159-60; italics mine). In 
addition to these contextual intimations, the substance of Burke’s economic thought also points in a physiocratic 
direction. The primacy that he accords to “the agriculture of the kingdom, the first of all it’s (sic) concerns” is one 
case in point (S, 123). His advocacy of unlimited agricultural profits, even if they were acquired by hoarding 
(“turning plenty or scarcity to the best advantage”) is another (S, 130). Equally significant is his moral exoneration 
of the agricultural middlemen, the “factor, jobber, salesman, or speculator, in the markets of grain” who form “a 
natural and most useful link of connection” (132). In addition to his embrace of agricultural laissez-faire, Burke’s 
call for a “simple government” in his speech on economic reform lends indirect support to the conjecture that he had 
physiocratic tendencies (ER, 501). Certainly, Burke would have despised the legal despot condoned by the 
physiocrats; however, his own cause of constitutional balance, it should be remembered, was geared precisely to 
restrain government and thwart its ambitions on property. As he put in the Reflections, “Good order is the 
foundation of all good things. To be enabled to acquire, the people, without being servile, must be tractable and 
obedient … They must respect that property of which they cannot partake” (R, 290). While England’s ancient 
constitution confined political power to its “truly public” duties, such as the protection of property and the 
enforcement of contracts, these duties had to be executed with a simplicity and rigor characteristic of a strong 
government. In other words, limited government did not mean weak government. Burke’s open animosity to the 
physiocrats is very likely to have crystallized after the French Revolution, where the French oeconomists were 
widely believed to have agitated the urban poor against the aristocratic order (which physiocrats sincerely detested). 
Adam Smith, who was presumably one of the “great and learned men [who] deigned to communicate” with Burke 
“on some particulars of their immortal works,” also displayed physiocratic tendencies, which threw a shadow of 
radicalism on his economic writings in the post-Revolutionary period (and put his biographer, Dugald Stewart in a 
difficult position). For Smith’s physiocratic tendencies and his affinity with the French philosophes, see Semmel, 
Rise of Free Trade Imperialism, pp. 24-32; Rotshschild, Economic Sentiments. 
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Burke emphatically asserted in Thoughts and Details on Scarcity that the “market alone can 
settle the price” and does so with an astonishing “truth, correctness, celerity, and general equity” 
(S, 134).443 Burke’s conviction in the natural tendency of the markets to justly convert self-
interested behavior into societal prosperity went beyond Smith’s metaphorical invisible hand and 
bordered on the providential belief that “the benign and wise disposer of all things … obliges 
men, whether they will or not, in pursuing their own selfish interests, to connect the general good 
with their own individual success” (S, 125).  
It has been suggested that Burke’s devout adherence to market principles was a reflection 
of the Whig suspicion of state power and a strategic move to circumscribe it.444 While Burke 
surely eyed royal patronage with disapproval, the reasons behind his embrace of the market also 
evinced impatience with its inefficiency in economic matters. “The principles of trade have so 
pervaded every species of dealing, from the highest to the lowest objects; all transactions are got 
so much into system; that we may, at a moment’s warning, and to a farthing value, be informed 
at what rate any service may be supplied” (ER, 513-4). Compared to such efficiency in the 
exchange of goods and information, the royal practice of “purveyance” (collection of revenue in 
kind) represented an astounding anomaly in “the living [that is, commercial] economy of the 
age” (ER, 510-1). Accordingly, Burke proposed to replace patronage networks with “general 
contract” for supplying goods and services to the crown, and even suggested that the Royal Mint 
“is a manufacture, and it is nothing else; and it ought to be undertaken upon the principles of 
                                                
443 Hence it was only the market that could offer a “fair test of scarcity and plenty” (S, 134). While I do not have the 
space for a proper discussion of the issue, I would like to mention that there awaits a potentially fruitful analysis of 
Burke’s political economy from the theoretical perspective articulated by Michel Foucault in his College de France 
lectures. In these lectures, Foucault constructs a genealogy of liberalism and neoliberalism, in which the dual 
function of the market as a medium of jurisdiction and veridiction occupies a central place. See Foucault, Security, 
Territory, Population and Birth of Biopolitics. 
444 Hampsher-Monk argues that Burke championed free trade mainly to limit the revenue that the crown could 
derive from duties on commerce, which would enable it to circumvent the parliamentary power of the purse. See, 
Hampsher-Monk, “Introduction,” pp. 19-20.  
  182 
manufacture; that is, for the best and cheapest execution, by a contract, upon proper securities” 
(ER, 513, 517). The Board of Trade and Plantations was likewise placed on the chopping block 
of cost and benefit on the grounds that, “commerce, the principal object of that office, flourishes 
most when it is left to itself. Interest, the great guide of commerce, is not a blind one. It is very 
well able to find its own way; and its necessities are its best laws” (ER, 535).  
If public utility was augmented by governmental reform according to market principles 
that minimized unproductive consumption, the equity principle manifested itself in contractual 
freedom based on the “great rule of equality” in commercial transactions (TPL, 456). This 
principle, which constituted the apex of the moral superiority of the free market to all other 
forms of productive organization, was nowhere more unequivocally asserted than in the Scarcity 
essay. There, Burke expressed his preference “to leave all dealing, in which there is no force or 
fraud, collusion or combination, entirely to the persons mutually concerned in the matter 
contracted for” (S, 123). Defending this preference with Smith’s reasoning that the contracting 
parties knew their interests and their particular circumstances better than any third party, Burke 
predicated the equity and thus the validity of the contract exclusively on the volition of the 
contractors. If the parties were not “completely [masters of the intercourse], they are not free, 
and therefore their contracts are void” (S, 124). With each party looking to “all possible profit, 
which, without force or fraud, he can make,” the contract implied compromise and identity of 
interest (S, 130). Most crucially, in labor contracts “it is absolutely impossible that their free 
contracts can be onerous to either party” (S, 124-5). While Burke had his misgivings about the 
theories of social contract, these passages unmistakably point to Burke’s conviction that legal 
freedom and equality, and the categorical exclusion of deception and coercion, rendered 
economic contract the most fair and morally elevated form of organizing material production and 
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distribution.445 The difficulty of interpolating Burke’s philosophical principles notwithstanding, 
the foregoing passages establish that his economic principles were predominantly liberal. 
The providential aura with which Burke consecrated the market became even more 
salient when he later defended the “laws of commerce, which are the laws of nature, and 
consequently the laws of God” against the improvident hands of government (S, 137). Laissez-
faire constituted the final pillar of Burke’s vision of Britain as a commercial society. He 
reprimanded government intervention in the market not only as inefficient in that it distorted the 
“truth and correctness” of prices and wages,446 but also as detrimental to “general equity” insofar 
as it violated contractual freedom. “The moment that government appears at market, all 
principles of market will be subverted,” and a “monopoly of authority” will emerge under the 
“appearance of a monopoly of capital” (S, 135). The idea that “to provide us in our necessities … 
is in the power of government” was merely a “vain presumption” of statesmen (S, 120).447 The 
economic role that Burke reserved for government conformed to a textbook description of 
                                                
445 Freedom of contract and the juridical equality of the contracting parties also held valid for the financial 
transactions between the state and the citizens. In Burke’s view, public debt too should ideally have ideally 
conformed to the principles of a bargain. “Compulsion destroys the freedom of a bargain … the moment that shame, 
or fear, or force, are directly applied to a loan, credit perishes” (LNL, 347). Of course, Burke had in his sights the 
French revolutionary government’s irregular borrowing practices, which bordered on taxation under the rubric of 
“voluntary contributions.” Insofar as it remained purely commercial, Burke did not seem to have a problem with the 
eighteenth-century novelty of public debt, which for Pocock marks the momentous transformation of the state-
citizen relationship, and the distinctive feature of the commercial society. See Pocock, “Mobility of Property,” pp. 
109-112. 
446 Burke discussed the ultimate inefficiency of government intervention by citing, as an example, price controls on 
corn (S, 127). The inability of government regulation to yield favorable results was not a contingent defect that 
could be pragmatically remedied; it was impotent from principle. “Laws of regulation are not fundamental laws,” 
writes Burke, “the public exigencies are masters of such laws. They rule the laws, and are not to be ruled by them” 
(LNL, 161-2). 
447 What is worth attention is the language that Burke used to describe the motives behind government intervention. 
As opposed to the “reasonable” principle of self-interest that animated commercial actors, government intervention 
was driven by the “zealots of the sect of regulation” (S, 126; italics mine). The petulance of this dismissal seems to 
be underwritten by the odium attached to religious “enthusiasm” associated with the dissenting Protestant sects in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. What is equally striking is Burke’s treatment of “pity” (especially for the 
poor) as a kind of enthusiasm: “When we talk of the poor, that moment our reason quits us. Pity is one of the noblest 
of the Passions. So is zeal, but zeal and pity are still passions, and extremely apt to blind good men.” (S, 129, n2). 
These passages lend considerable support to the argument that whatever Burke’s political, cultural, and 
philosophical allegiances might have been, in political economy he was a thoroughly bourgeois subject. 
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laissez-faire. While government could “prevent much evil, it can to very little positive good” (S, 
120); “the office of the judge cannot dictate the contract. It is his business to see that it be 
enforced” (S, 124). There could be “no authority on earth” to “judge what profit and advantage 
ought to be” (S, 125). Instead, the “the truly and properly public” function of the state was to 
maintain public peace, order, and safety: “Let government protect and encourage industry, 
repress violence and discountenance fraud, it is all they have to do. In other respects, the less 
they meddle in these affairs, the better; the rest is in the hands of our Master and theirs” (3rdL, 
355).448 
The most important principle in Burke’s laissez-faire prescriptions, I argue, was to keep 
market devoid of political power. In order for the efficiency and justice of the market to unfold, 
commerce and sovereignty, economy and politics had to remain strictly compartmentalized. This 
is not to suggest that political power was irrelevant to commerce. On the contrary, it fulfilled a 
fundamental role in establishing and maintaining the conditions under which the moral and 
political economy of commerce could survive and flourish.449 It is not coincidental that “force 
and fraud,” the two virulent pathogens of commerce, frequently recurred in Burke’s political 
economic writings, for these were the very stakes in the specific relation of political power to 
                                                
448 One should not misread the “encouragement” of industry to mean the proactive economic presence of 
government. Rather Burke seems to imply here a strategy of giving people incentives for industry. This is supported 
by his view that commercial affairs constituted a “department of things [that] manners alone can regulate. To these, 
great politicians may give a leaning, but they cannot give a law” (S, 144). 
449 On this point I follow Pocock’s seminal argument in “Political Economy of Burke's Analysis,” which is more 
recently restated and expanded by Winch, and O’Neill. Burke shared in the Scottish Enlightenment conception of 
“commercial society” as a socio-historical category that referred to a multiplicity of social, political, economic, and 
moral dimensions, which placed its referent at the terminus of the known historical development of human 
communities. He parted ways with the Scottish philosophers, however, on the direction of the causal chain. Whereas 
Smith, Robertson, Millar, and Ferguson looked first and foremost to the commercial mode of subsistence to 
extrapolate polished manners and civil institutions, Burke prioritized the attenuating impact of organized religion 
and prescriptive hierarchy on manners. Only after a certain level of refinement was achieved could the relations 
characteristic of commerce take hold. Muller refers to Burke’s inversion of the Scottish Enlightenment reasoning as 
the “noncontractual basis of commercial society,” but given that the Scottish philosophers did not credit social 
contract theories, a more apt concept would be the “noncommercial basis of commercial society.” See Pocock, 
“Political Economy of Burke's Analysis” pp. 196-9, 210; Winch, Riches and Poverty, pp. 176-9; O’Neill, The 
Burke-Wollstonecraft Debate, chapters 1 and 2; Muller, “Edmund Burke” p.137-8. 
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commerce. As long as government remained in its proper place, that is, in the margins of the 
economy, political power constrained force and fraud. If it penetrated into the economy, political 
power became the instrument of force and fraud. In other words, political power should form a 
shell that protected and ordered, through property rights and contract enforcement, the field of 
commercial transaction, yet should not bleed into that field. Political power was a 
noncommercial precondition of commerce, and for that precise reason, it had to remain 
noncommercial.450 
In the next section I contend that the distortion, violation, and outright subversion of the 
moral and political economy of the commercial ideal in India spurred Burke’s efforts at reform 
and impeachment. His endeavor can be best understood as an attempt to reinstate the boundaries 
between commerce and political power, economy and sovereignty, public and private, which had 
become extremely porous and at times nonexistent under East India Company rule. 
                                                
450 The principled wall of separation between commerce and politics was also manifest in Burke’s policy proposals. 
His proposal of a general contract for supplying the crown explicitly excluded the members of the parliament from 
such transactions, “by following the course of nature, and not the purposes of politics” (ER, 517). Similarly, he 
proscribed voluntary service in administrative offices on principles of bureaucratic probity: “if men were willing to 
serve in such situations without a salary, they ought not to be permitted to do it. Ordinary service must be secured by 
the motives to ordinary integrity. An honourable and fair profit is the best security against avarice and rapacity … 
For as wealth is power, so all power will infallibly draw wealth to itself by some means or other: and when men are 
left no way of ascertaining their profit but by their means of obtaining them, those means will be encreased to 
infinity” (ER, 531) (astonishingly, Burke thereby repudiated the civic virtue central to classical republicanism). 
Even Burke’s call for the abolition of the anti-Popery Laws evinced a similar indictment of using economic 
regulation to reinforce political supremacy, that is, by impoverishing the Catholic Irish in order to keep them in a 
subservient position (TPL, 478-9). Post-revolutionary France, where “sordid mercenary occupation” was admitted to 
the “title of command” represented the inverted image of the Irish abomination (R, 101). Burke’s defense of the 
landed property can be reevaluated in this light, since landed property, being timid and sluggish, did not display the 
aggressive traits of monied property (R, 159). Monied wealth, by virtue of its mobility and proclivity to 
accumulation by novel means, was more prone to usurping political power for self-augmentation, and it was also 
more easily mobilized by those who aspired to obtain political power through means other than status and merit. 
Over-representing landed wealth in political power thereby functioned as a ward against the corrosion of the 
separation between commerce and sovereignty under the pressure of monied interests, and hence served as  “the 
ballast in the vessel of the commonwealth” (R, 102). This implies that Burke had no problem with monied wealth 
insofar as it remained in its proper sphere, or what Burke would later call “a bottom truly commercial” (9thR). The 
fortune of England had been that “while the landed interest, instead of forming a separate body, as in other 
countries, has, at all times, been in close connexion and union with the other great [i.e. monied] interests of the 
country, it has been spontaneously allowed to lead and direct, and moderate all the rest” (3rdL, 374-5). As a final 
point, the idea of a political rim containing a politically void market would also hold the key to explain Burke’s 
advocacy of free trade within imperial borders. 
  186 
 
III. Dialectics of Commerce 
 A survey of Burke’s reports and speeches on India reveals that each and every one of the 
principles of the commercial ideal, in Burke’s words “every just principle of commerce,” was 
breached by the British rule in the subcontinent (9thR, 306). Given that the commercial ideal was 
the primary prism through which Burke viewed and judged the British image, his fourteen-year 
long labors to reform the Indian administration constituted a desperate attempt to shore up the 
frayed contours of the commercial ideal. A major source of vexation for Burke was that the 
violators of the commercial principles in India had “come from a learned and enlightened part of 
Europe, in the most enlightened period of its time … from the bosom of a free Country” (SOI, 
315). On the colonial frontiers of British capitalism, civilized Britons rapidly jettisoned English 
manners and laws, and turned into barbarous frontiersmen. Equally problematic was the fact that, 
the victim of the British atrocities was another commercial society, which threw into question 
the civilizational categories that governed the historical-geographical coordinates of the British 
self-perception. This section begins with an examination of Burke’s works from a perspective of 
the commercial ideal and its desecration in India. The Company’s merchant-sovereignty that 
Burke came to despise represented the most offensive fusion of political power and commercial 
interest, and inevitably engendered colonial violence and a political economy of plunder. More 
importantly, I contend that Burke indicated that the source of effrontery to the commercial ideal 
was not a precommercial atavistic residue or the moral lapse of a few wayward individuals, but 
the very core of the commercial ideal itself. The natural desire to accumulate that animated the 
whole commercial society and powered the “great wheel of circulation” was the main force 
behind the havoc in India. In the colonies, the truth of commerce showed itself to be piracy, the 
truth of self-interest to be rapacity, the truth of civilization to be barbarity. 
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While the vagaries of British rule over a vast and culturally alien population might have 
remained the classical problem of a “free though conquering people,”451 the issue was 
complicated by the fact that the agent of British rule was a mercantile company whose raison 
d’etre in India was material gain.452 The Company’s newly acquired political power inflected its 
pursuit of commercial interests by opening up non-market opportunities for profit. From 1783 
onwards, Burke systematically declaimed Company policies, and provided his audience with 
detailed accounts of colonial violence and plunder that they supported. The Company’s 
“despotism” in India was not only “oppressive, irregular, capricious, unsteady,” but more 
importantly “rapacious and peculating” (FB, 430).453 Putting power to profit rode roughshod 
over the commercial principles of property, legal equality, contractual freedom, and mutual 
benefit, sapping the foundations of a prosperous and just society in India. 
Burke’s admonition of the economic policies in India in the Ninth Report of the Select 
Committee454 displays his conviction that the political economy of the commercial ideal was a 
                                                
451 Bromwich argues that for Burke the major problem boils down to inconsistency and “self-deception in every act 
of domination.” Bromwich, “Introduction,” p. 33. 
452 By the time the East India Company drew Burke’s attention, and shortly thereafter his wrath, Adam Smith had 
already supplied a catholic critique of chartered trading companies. Although Burke voiced his aversion to 
condemning established institutions on such a priori theories as Smith’s, his inquiries led him to agree with Smith’s 
invective against mercantile sovereignty that characterized the Company. Smith had inveighed against chartered 
companies on two major counts: driven by the necessity for immediate profit, they lacked the broad political vision 
required for good government, such that they impoverished their dominions instead of investing in their long-term 
prosperity; second, they lacked the principle of “authority” that would legitimate their rule and had only brute force 
available as an instrument of rule. Burke’s critique of the Company confirmed these conclusions, but through a more 
elaborate and characteristically Burkean theorization. As Hampsher-Monk correctly observes, for Burke local 
customs, values and institutions comprised the “tools of the politician’s trade,” without which the only resort was to 
violence and force. In their disdain for an alien, “barbarous,” and “despotic” India, the Company officials could 
never acquire such tools and were virtually doomed to be tyrants. Travers offers a good account of the initial efforts 
to discover and reconstruct an Indian “ancient constitution” (ironically, Burke and Hastings were both in this camp), 
which were later abandoned in favor of authoritarian reformism. See Smith, Wealth of Nations, Book IV, Chapter 7, 
Par. 101-8; Burke, “Speech On Fox’s India Bill,” pp. 386-7; Hampsher-Monk, “Introduction,” p. 36; Travers, 
Ideology and British Empire, “Contested Despotism,” and “Ideology and British Expansion in Bengal.” 
453 In Burke’s speech opening Hastings’s impeachment, “avarice” and “rapacity” would be the first two accusations 
leveled at the defendant (SOI, 275). 
454 Ninth Report of the Select Committee was the most comprehensive tract Burke ever wrote on the political 
economy of the Indian dominions. 
  188 
universal normative grid, which ought to have applied not only in Britain but also in India.455 
Commerce in India, however, was an “imperious commerce” as the Company, both 
institutionally through the Council of Bengal and individually through its servants, deployed 
sovereign prerogative for material aggrandizement (9thR, 244).456 The immediate effect was the 
abrogation of juridical equality in commercial transactions between the Company agents and the 
local traders and producers. While the British had always tried to wrest trading privileges and 
avoid duties in Bengal, they had to run commercial transactions under the nominal authority of 
the Mogul emperor and the effectual jurisdiction of the nawab. After a string of military victories 
beginning in 1756 and culminating in de facto rule in Bengal in 1765, the status of the British 
changed. While the Company strategically retained the nominal sovereignty of the Mogul 
emperor and the nawab, it effectively governed the province through its chokehold on the 
revenue system. Burke was not deluded by this strategic façade: “the English are now a people 
who appear in India as a conquering nation” and any commercial dealing with them was a 
“dealing with power” (9thR, 271).457 “The constitution of the company began in commerce and 
ended in Empire” (SOI, 283). One of the first things the Company did with its newfound power 
was to eliminate all native intermediaries between the manufacturers and itself, thereby 
                                                
455 The “Mainspring of the Commercial Machine, the Principles of Profit and Loss” were to govern all economic 
dealings in India (9thR, 241). For instance, when the nawab of Bengal abolished all duties in a move to undercut the 
British abuse of trading privileges, Burke applauded this measure as a “forcible, simple and equitable” retaliation 
against the “oppressions of the monopoly” (9thR, 244-5). Furthermore, Burke extolled the virtues of “rivalship” to 
redeem and reinvigorate the Indian manufactures, a notion that would later reappear as “market of competition” in 
the Scarcity essay (9thR, 268; S, 135). Finally, inveighing against opium and salt monopolies, Burke declared the 
“unerring standard of the public [open, free, competitive] market” as the rule for Bengali economy (9thR, 278). 
These remarks also establish that Burke’s liberal vision of capitalism can be safely dated back to the early 1780s, if 
not earlier.  
456 The Company had been at odds with the nawab of Bengal over trading rights since 1717, when it received a 
farman from the Mogul emperor that exempted it from some of the duties on its Indian exports. Company servants 
printed dastaks based on the farman and used them in their private transactions, undercutting both local traders and 
aggravating the nawab. Post-Plassey ascendancy of the Company finally gave a free rein to its servants, who now 
dealt in the inland trade with exclusive privileges, raking great profits at the expense of local merchants and 
producers. 
457 Burke constructs a more detailed and critical account of this strategy in “Speech on the Nabob of Arcot’s Debts,” 
pp 536-7. 
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rendering its agents “magistrates in the Markets in which they dealt as traders” (FB, 427; 9thR, 
245, 259). The stones of legal asymmetry had paved the road to “forced and exorbitant gains of a 
trade carried on by power” and invariably entailed the dispossession and oppression of the 
natives (9th, 246). 
The natural corollary of the juridical inequality was the evaporation of contractual 
freedom, whereby unilateral coercion and extortion replaced volition, compromise, and mutual 
benefit overseen by an impartial judge.458 Under Company rule, forms of bonded labor 
proliferated, and the system of auctioning off taxes was corrupted by political influence as soon 
as it was introduced. Burke scornfully observed that the elimination of local middlemen and the 
advances system reduced the Indian weavers to “virtual vassalage” and instituted “debt peonage” 
under a “most violent and arbitrary power” (9thR, 259-60). A public and competitive market in 
credit and auctions, which could have freed the Indian producers from “debt bondage,” was 
deliberately thwarted by Company policies (9thR, 268-9). Adding insult to the injury, laborers 
“defrauded” into debt bondage would be “delivered over like Cattle in Succession to different 
Masters, who, under Pretence of buying up the Balances due to their preceding employers, find 
Means of keeping them in perpetual Slavery” (9thR, 290). Those who managed to avoid debt 
bondage found that they had no control over how they invested their stock. The monopoly 
powers of the Company in cash crops, especially opium, were used to force farmers to cultivate 
                                                
458 There was no greater debasement of justice for Burke than allowing one to be a judge in one’s own case. The 
moment that government or its agents became a party to the contracts which they also enforced, the general law of 
equality was irretrievably destroyed. This was the case not only in how the Company ran its operations in India, but 
also how it managed its internal government. Former Company servants involved in delinquencies in India entered 
the Court of Directors that was supposed to inspect the Indian delinquents (9thR, 202-3, 219). “The vote is not to 
protect the stock, but the stock is bought to obtain the vote,” in order to protect corrupt agents, their corrupt 
networks of patronage, and their illegitimate dealings in India (FB, 437). In this respect, the Company embodied the 
“inversion” of all rules and principles of a normal and sound corporation. A more detailed discussion of the principle 
of impartial arbitration in Burke’s moral philosophy can be found in Bromwich, “Introduction.” 
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these crops instead of grain, even after the dearth and high costs of foodstuffs led to the 1769-
1770 famine that decimated the Bengali population (9thR, 270-1, 274). 
Subversion of contractual freedom was compounded by the loss of security of property, 
which manifested itself in confiscation at all levels of social hierarchy. Expropriation of the 
Indian nobility by the British found its most emphatic account in Burke’s “Speech on Almas Ali 
Khan,” where he accused the Company of having invented “the crime of having money … like 
the sin against the Holy Ghost in Christianity” (AA, 464-7). In this scheme, wealthy Indian 
nobles would be first accused of treason on fabricated, vacuous, and purely expedient grounds, 
and then punished by confiscation, sometimes accompanied by death. While the state’s 
confiscation of property was an anathema to Burke’s Whig sensibilities, its conduct under the 
pretext of a legal trial was a macabre travesty of justice, more execrable than the use of open, 
sheer force.459 Instrumentalization of law in the service of plunder brought an indelible disgrace 
upon the British nation, which Burke thought to “have better institutions for the preservations of 
the rights of men than any other Country in the World” (SOI, 352). Predation on property also 
struck Indian farmers and manufacturers, who were first indebted by the arbitrary pricing of the 
Company, and then visited by Company agents who acted in the power of lenders of usurious 
loans, assessors of the accruing debts, and finally bailiffs to seize the debtors’ property (9thR, 
259-60).460 Finally, the lowest strata of Indian society, the ryots who worked the land of 
zamindars, were “ruined and made desperate” by extortionate taxes, not only on land (twice the 
                                                
459 Burke summarizes the perversion of law and justice in India very pithily in his speech opening the impeachment: 
“The great criminal has the law in his hand” (SOI, 290). 
460 Eleventh Report on the Select Committee, while apparently dealing with the conflict between Hastings and 
Francis in the Council of Bengal, is replete with references to the expropriation and humiliation of the Indian 
nobility. This report, drafted mainly by Burke, contains the bulk of the material that would fuel Burke’s later 
speeches on India. The topics of the report include gifts/bribery, personal use of the Company resources, lack of 
transparency and accountability, peculation and embezzlement, corrupt and unfaithful dealings, and the use of 
extraordinary means of revenue and government. 
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rate in England), but also on such necessaries of life like salt under the British monopoly (AA, 
463). The situation is starkly put in the “Speech on the Nabob of Arcot’s Debts” 
Every man of rank and landed fortune being long since extinguished, the remaining miserable last 
cultivator, who grows to the soil, after having his back scored by the farmer, has it again flayed by the 
whip of the assignee, and is thus by a ravenous, because a short-lived succession of claimants, lashed 
from oppressor to oppressor, whilst a single drop of blood is left as the means of extorting a single grain 
of corn (NAD, 532-3). 461 
 
The aggregate effect of these policies was to breach the mutual benefit principle of the 
commercial ideal in India. Commerce, conducted under the rule of a power that was itself a party 
in economic transactions, became a zero-sum game, whereby the enrichment of the British meant 
the impoverishment of Indians.462 In contrast to the Muslim conquerors before them, the British 
did not take responsibility for the dominions they conquered; instead, driven by an “insatiable 
lust for plunder,” they carried away whatever they found available.463 Under the pretext of 
patronage and alliance, the Company devised fraudulent methods of co-opting, indebting, and 
impoverishing local rulers and their dominions (FB, 396, 401-7).464 Indian riches thus obtained 
                                                
461 Burke’s pathos for the Indian ryots reemerges when he asserts that the real defendant in the case of Nabob of 
Arcot’s debts is not Paul Benfield and other British creditors, but the nawab’s subjects. These were the “most 
miserable men,” whose “blood withheld from their veins and whipped out of their backs” provided the “extortion, 
usury and peculation” on which both the creditors and debtors fed (NAD, 496).  
462 The drain of wealth from European dominions in America and Asia was a common theme in the late-eighteenth 
century political economy debates, and it was openly acknowledged by Adam Smith in the Wealth of Nations. 
However, Smith and other free traders did not see this tendency as inherent to European expansion; rather, they 
explained it as an incidental problem issuing from the asymmetries of military power in an essentially benign 
process of exploration and commerce. The problem with this line of thought was, of course, that almost all of the 
explorations had been motivated by the hope of material acquisition. The “otherwise” beneficent free trade was 
simply an imaginary species in the European history of “commerce,” which had always been suffused by political 
force and brute violence. That the underside of positive sum trade within Europe would be a zero-sum game 
between Europe and the rest of the world is insightfully observed in Couze Venn, “Neoliberal Political Economy, 
Biopolitics and Colonialism: A Transcolonial Genealogy,” Theory, Culture & Society 26 (2009): 206-233, and The 
Postcolonial Challenge: Towards Alternative Worlds, (London: Sage, 2006). 
463 “The difference in favor of the first conquerors is this; the Asiatic conquerors very soon abated of their ferocity, 
because they made the conquered country their own. They rose or fell with the rise or fall of the territory they lived 
in. … But under the English government the order is reversed. The Tartar invasion was mischievous, but it is our 
protection that destroys India. It was their enmity, but it is our friendship” (FB, 401-2). 
464 An exemplary account can be found in the “Speech on the Sixth Article of Impeachment,” where Burke 
constructed from the Company’s clandestine political dealings with Mohammed Reza Khan, Nandakumar, and 
Munni Begum a story of opacity, corruption, disobedience, and violation of human trust at every turn (SA, 37-59). 
Against this background, he caustically noted the perverse use into which the “chartered rights of men” had fallen in 
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were siphoned out of the realm, making “the transport of its plunder … the only traffic of the 
country” (FB, 427). After providing a detailed account of the “deep, silent flow of wealth from 
the Carnatic,” which amounted to 20 million pounds between 1760 and 1780, Burke would ask 
rhetorically, “what are the articles of commerce or the branches of manufacture which these 
gentlemen have carried thence to enrich India?” (NAD, 492, 494). These and other surveys of the 
systematic drain of wealth, or “the plunder of the East,” prompted Burke to conclude 
emphatically, “commerce, which enriches every other country in the world, was bringing Bengal 
to total ruin” (SOI, 278, 428). 
The fusion of political power and commerce reached its apex in the “revenue investment” 
system of the Company, which Burke examined in painstaking detail in the Ninth Report. After 
the Company obtained revenue rights (diwani) of Bengal in 1765, it began to finance its Indian 
exports by the taxes it levied in that province. This constituted a “new system of trade, carried on 
through the medium of power and public revenue,” which Burke clearly asserted was “not 
commerce” but “annual plunder,” or “tribute” disguised as “investment” (9thR, 221, 223-6, 
231).465 Insofar as it was driven by narrow and immediate monetary concerns, the revenue 
investment system obscured the principle that the welfare of the natives and thus good 
governance was essential for the investment of capital, sustained profits, and steady revenue 
(9thR, 221). Therefore the “vast extraction of wealth” from India was maintained not, as it ought 
to have been, by the “improvement” of the country but by raising the land rents and by annulling 
the payments due to local powers, backed up in the last instance by the military force of the 
                                                
the hands of the company. The charters that were drafted to protect “sacred rights of men” were now the banner 
under which the Company desolated the Carnatic. 
465 What compounded the disastrous consequences of this policy was Hastings’s tax farming system, which 
extracted the “spoils of revenue” by auctioning the collection of taxes off to the highest bidder in five-year periods. 
Tax farming forced the “ancient proprietors” of land to bid against “every usurer, every temporary adventurer, every 
jobber and schemer,” thus eroding the hierarchical fabric of the Indian society, tearing to pieces “the most ancient 
and most revered institutions, of ages and nations” (FB, 426-7). 
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Company (9thR, 231-2). Even more outrageously, despite its intensive pillage of the Indian 
wealth, the East India Company constantly teetered on the verge of bankruptcy, and had to be 
bailed out by the British government on more than one occasion.466 Mismanagement of 
Company funds and private embezzlement drained the coffers. The system of revenue 
investment had become a vehicle for remitting private fortunes to England at the expense of both 
British and Indian publics, vindicating Burke’s conviction that there could not be public utility 
where there was no equity (FB, 448; 9thR, 235, 242).467 
Perhaps most worrisome of all, violations of the free market, legal equality, free labor, 
and free contract were not occasional; their subversion was “regular, permanent, and 
systematical” (FB, 433) Such violations could not be attributed to the corruption of a few 
servants. Instead they sprung from the degeneracy of the state itself: “the hand of government, 
which ought never to appear but to protect, is felt as the instrument in every act of oppression” 
(9thR, 272). The Indian administration represented a complete inversion of the functions that 
Burke ascribed to government in commercial society: instead of protecting property, it 
confiscated; instead of enforcing contracts, it dictated; instead of promoting the welfare of the 
population, it impoverished and depopulated. Moreover, while the Company was not a 
government in the proper sense, it was neither a proper mercantile body, because, having 
usurped sovereign power, it had abandoned commercial principles. It was indifferent to the 
prices paid on the open market; it engaged in systematic breach of contracts; it had poor and 
fraudulent accounting, bringing upon it insolvency, improvident borrowing, and ruined credit 
                                                
466 The parliament not only came to the financial rescue of the Company, it also granted it exemption from the tea 
tax that its colonial competitors had to pay. 
467 “It is there the public is robbed … in its army, in its civil administration, in its credit, in its investment which 
forms the commercial connection between that country and Europe. There is the robbery” (NAD, 531). The 
theoretical precursor of this argument was Smith’s dictum that chartered companies were deliberately established to 
aggrandize the narrow interests of the merchants at a disadvantage to both the producers and the consumers of the 
commodities they dealt in. 
  194 
(9thR, 242-3). In short, “no trace of equitable government is to be found in their politics; not one 
trace of commercial principle in their mercantile dealings” (FB, 432-3).  
The Company, this sovereign-mercantile manticore, strayed from Burke’s commercial 
ideal not only in its principles of sound policy but also in its moral categories of civilization. It 
might at first glance appear strange to see Burke referring to the British exploits in India as 
“barbarous,” given his high esteem for the standing of Britain as “the most enlightened of the 
enlightened part of Europe” (SOI, 315). Nonetheless, the frequency with which the term 
appeared in Burke’s discourse indicates that its use is not accidental. In his “Speech on Almas 
Ali Khan,” Burke referred to Indians as “millions of our fellow-creatures … whom our 
barbarous policy had ruined” (AA, 463), and poured his scorn on the Company agents’ actions 
as “barbarities” of an “inhuman system” (AA, 471). Two years later, he once again designated 
Hastings’s policies as “crimes of barbarity” (POH, 65). His derogation of the British in India 
reached vitriolic proportions in the Opening Speech: “the Company’s service is made out of the 
very filth and dregs of mankind, the most degenerate public body that has ever existed in the 
world” (SOI 290). Considered in terms of the Scottish Enlightenment categories that influenced 
Burke’s thought,468 British behavior in India represented a civilizational regress from the civility 
of commercial society to the barbarism of nomadic societies. This relapse resonates with Burke’s 
indignation for the youth of the most Company servants, who neither had the chance to grow 
roots in Britain, nor had the intention to do so in India, rendering them “birds of passage and 
prey” that descended in waves upon that hapless country (SOI, 286-90, FB, 402).  
On the frontiers of the empire, British men acted like roving frontiersmen, a term that can 
be applied with theoretical force to the British imperial formation more generally. Burke himself 
                                                
468 The biographical and intellectual connection between Burke and the Scottish Enlightenment is convincingly 
demonstrated in O’Neill, The Burke-Wollstonecraft Debate, chapter 2. 
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had evoked a similar imagery in his discourse on the English colonies in America. Opposing 
proposals for restricting further English settlement in North America, he warned the House that 
the colonists would defy the proscription and settle beyond the Appalachians, but in the process 
“they would change the manners with the habits of their life; would soon forget a government by 
which they were disowned; would become Hordes of English Tartars; and, pouring down upon 
your unfortified frontiers a fierce and irresistible cavalry, become masters of your Governors and 
Counsellors” (SC 129; italics mine).469 Polished manners would leave Englishmen in proportion 
they were cast away from the institutional order and the civilizing influence of Christianity and 
social hierarchy. While in America this civilizational distance would issue from the settlement of 
the outback, in India it was the remoteness of the country from the British metropole, a problem 
that Burke mentioned repeatedly. To continue the analogy, survival in an alien natural 
environment in North America would force the Englishmen to lose the fine appurtenances of 
civilized life, and become the “rugged frontiersmen” of Frederick J. Turner’s thesis. Similarly, 
the alien cultural environment in India would instill anxiety, fear, and revulsion in Englishmen, 
driving them to isolate themselves from Indians, develop harder and sterner attitudes, and lose all 
possibility of sympathy with those people whom they ruled and oppressed.470 
Taken together, these remarks on the American and Indian dominions indicate that for 
Burke the imperial frontier was a dangerous space, where gentlemen turned into frontiersmen, 
civility degenerated into barbarism, polished manners dissipated in the violent grab for land and 
                                                
469 This passage not only attests to the Scottish Enlightenment influence on Burke’s thinking, but also represents a 
fine instance of the colonial inflection of that influence. 
470 The process of isolation, alienation, and aggression in India is discussed in Jon E. Wilson, “Anxieties of 
Distance: Codification in Early Colonial Bengal,” Modern Intellectual History 4 (2007): 7-23, and The Domination 
of Strangers: Modern Governance in Eastern India 1780-1835 (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), chaps. 2 
and 3. 
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riches.471 The catch, however, was that the British Empire that Burke embraced could expand by 
no other means than the exploits of the frontiersmen in America and India. The colonial frontier, 
with its attendant moral abominations from a metropolitan perspective, was not an anomaly but 
the very modus operandi of imperial expansion that underpinned British power and prosperity. It 
was thanks to the primitive accumulation wrought by the colonists in America and the Company 
men in India that the economic surplus poured into Britain which made the “gentlemanly 
capitalism” of the metropole possible. Per Burke’s suggestion, Britain could have re-established 
a “truly commercial” relation to India but only at the cost of a massive negative balance of 
trade,472 as had been the case until the East India Company (as “providence” would have it) 
reversed it by violating the “just principles of commerce” and deploying extra-economic 
violence.  
                                                
471 The moral-civilizational problems posed by the colonial frontier were extensively elaborated upon in the 
eighteenth century French social thought, as Pagden demonstrates. For Raynal and Diderot, abandonment of settled 
community was tantamount to the decay of civility, and the colonists became “dissolute, unlocated, and hence 
uncivilized.” Diderot even argued that the traveler’s identity fell away all together on the frontier. Talleyrand 
described the colonists as “individuals without industry, without leaders, without customs,” and held that the restless 
wanderings turned once-civilized people into barbarians. See Pagden, Lords of All the World, pp. 165-8. Strikingly, 
Pagden notes, the French philosophers believed that only the English were immune to the degenerative tendencies of 
the frontier. This is not surprising given the differential patterns of English and French colonization in North 
America, the former settling in agricultural communities and sequestering itself from Native Americans, the latter 
engaging in fur trade and intermarrying with the indigenous populations. Burke’s studies and efforts about India 
perhaps represent the first critique of the English frontier that matches its French counterpart in empirical expanse 
and theoretical depth.  
472 Drain of wealth qua “export of bullion” from Europe to Asia had been the norm until around the mid-eighteenth 
century and inflamed intense debate amongst political economists since early 1600s. Seventeenth-century classics in 
this debate are Thomas Mun’s A Discourse of Trade from England unto the East Indies (London, 1621) and Sir 
Josiah Child’s A Treatise Concerning the East India Trade (London, 1681). More relevant to Burke’s period is 
William Robertson’s A Historical Disquisition on the Knowledge, and the progress of trade with that country prior 
to the discovery of the passage to it by the Cape of Good Hope (London, 1792), especially section IV, where 
Robertson discusses the colonial excursions to America and Asia from the fifteenth century onwards. The fulcrum of 
Robertson’s argument is the sea change in the historical fortunes of Europe brought about by these excursions. Prior 
to the discovery of silver and gold in America, and the circumnavigation of the Cape of Good Hope, Robertson 
observes, Europe’s trade with Asia had been bleeding the European economy dry. The aforementioned 
“discoveries,” made two years apart, supplied a duty-free trade route and fresh supplies of bullion, which relieved 
European trade balances and enabled Europe to become the epicenter of a global commercial network. The role of 
these discoveries in salvaging European prosperity, religion, letters, in short, European civilization, was so 
momentous in Robertson’s historical vision that he could not but attribute them to “providence.” Given that 
Robertson was the foremost Scottish Enlightenment influence on Burke’s conception of world history, there are 
plausible grounds to assume that their historical visions converged. For Robertson-Burke connection, with a good 
emphasis of the imperial-expansionist implications of their common historical premises, see O’Neill, pp. 42-5, 80-2. 
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Most importantly, the barbarity that Burke perceived in the conduct of the Company was 
neither that of the marauding Tartars or Goths, though this was the only vocabulary of barbarism 
available to him,473 nor that of the rude and warlike ancient citizens as Pocock argues,474 but that 
of the commercial society itself. The barbarism that erupted in India was not a relapse into the 
“conquering spirit of arrogant nobility” which had been tamed into polished manners by religion 
and prescription. It was a new kind of barbarism fueled by the natural “desire of acquisition,” by 
the principle of self-interest that was supposed to be “calm and dispassionate,” by that 
“reasonable, powerful, and prolifick principle” of “laudable avarice” that was the “grand cause 
of prosperity.” In the colonies, these economic and moral principles dialectically turned into their 
opposites: the desire of acquisition turned into “peculation,” calm and dispassionate self-interest 
turned into violent “rapacity,” the laudable avarice turned into “sordid avarice,” and the 
prosperity they ought to have caused turned into “ruination” and “depopulation.” These were the 
very terms in which Burke condemned the East India Company. On the imperial frontier in 
India, the Englishmen did not turn into Tartars; they became banians. 
Banians were the native servants of Englishmen in India, who also acted as commercial 
agents on behalf of their masters. Burke’s opinion on Banians was extremely low and bordered 
on loathing. In his speech on Fox’s India Bill, banians were described as creatures “whose 
fathers they [Indian nobility] would not have set with the dogs of their flock” (FB, 426). During 
the impeachment, the House is warned that if Indianism were suffered to dominate British 
                                                
473 At this point one cannot but remember Burke’s dreadful warning against the returned nabobs’ infection of the 
British body politic, which conjures up an image of barbarian hordes pressing on into the heart of civilization: 
“These people pour in upon us everyday. They not only bring with them the wealth they have, but they bring with 
them into our country the vices by which they were acquired” (6thA, 62-3; italics mine). This is not an accidental 
choice of expression, especially when considered together with Burke’s earlier evocation of the “Hordes of English 
Tartars” in America (SC, 129). These remarks provide an important glimpse into Burke’s social and historical 
imaginary, in which the fluid boundaries of civilizational scale and the fugitive spaces of the colonial frontier 
governed Burke’s imperial anxieties. 
474 Pocock, “Mobility of Property,” pp. 114-5, and “Political Economy of Burke’s Analysis,” pp. 195-6. Indeed, 
Burke was not too fond of the “barbarous, vulgar distinctions” of the “warlike ancestors” of the British (AC, 282). 
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politics, the British nation would “become a Chain of Twisters, prevaricators, dissemblers Liars, 
a nation of Banians” (6thA, 62). Banians were “habituated to misery and subjection, [could] 
submit to any orders, and [were] fit for the basest services. Having been themselves subject to 
oppression … they [were] fit to oppress others” (SOI 292). In the service of Englishmen “the 
Banyan extorts, robs, and murders” (SOI 293). The figure of banian embodied for Burke the 
sacrifice of morality at the altar of self-interest, the reduction of all social relations to the 
temporary collusion for material gain. The dissolution of human sociability as such in the ether 
of vulgar material gain was represented, first, in the collaboration of the Nawab of Arcot with 
Benfield and his “cabal of creditors,” which ended up ruining the inhabitants of the Carnatic. 
Burke denounced this collusion as a “magnificent plan of universal plunder” and labeled the 
creditors “the determined enemies of human intercourse itself” (NAD, 516-8; italics mine). The 
second incarnation of the social dissolution was the “system of banyans” in Bengal in general, 
and Hastings’s relation to his banian in particular. In this system, money was the only interracial 
glue that bound people who otherwise had not, and would never have, an iota of human 
sociability between them. In other words, the banian was the condensation of the dark underside 
of the very principles of self-interest and contractual freedom. These principles reached their 
extreme form in the colonies, whereby turned into their opposites and became the solvents of 
society as such. Hence, as the frontispiece quotation that opens this chapter implies, it was not 
capitalism (men of mobile wealth, monied interest, public credit) but colonial capitalism 
(imperial frontiersmen, unabashed plunder, violence and oppression) that Burke found 
threatening to his image of society and civilization as such. 
 In the colonies, therefore, one encountered the violent non-commercial basis of 
commerce and commercial society. An indirect triangulation of the “dialectics of commerce,” 
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and window onto the vicissitudes of colonial capitalism is thus the heritage that Burke has 
bequeathed to political theory. One could perhaps rephrase the conundrum of a “free though 
conquering people” more accurately as that of a “free though commercial people.” 
 
IV. Burke’s “Peculiar” Universalism 
 The foregoing disquisition leaves one central question unanswered. Why would Burke 
believe that the commercial ideal ought to have governed Britain’s relationship to its imperial 
dominions in India? After all, Britain’s connection to India was imperial, which could potentially 
explain the “imperious commerce” that he reproached.475 Three contending interpretations in 
Burke scholarship respond to this question. The first argues on the basis of Burke’s deep 
conviction in the existence of a natural moral law, which he prescribed as the norm of universal 
conduct.476 All extant human laws, insofar as they were just, were modulations of this natural 
law, or in Burke’s words, “all human laws are, properly speaking, declaratory” (TPL, 456).477 
Diametrically opposed to this explanation is the argument that Burke’s defense of Indians was a 
critique of universality, more specifically, the universality of reason that the late eighteenth- and 
                                                
475 David Hume openly admitted that a liberal corporatist form of metropolitan government would wreak oppression 
and plunder in its colonial domains; in other words, he admitted the connection between commercial society and 
primitive accumulation. Adam Smith hinted at the same connection when he argued that slaves in a free society 
would be much more miserable and oppressed compared to their counterparts in despotic societies. Burke, on the 
other hand, tried to disavow this pessimistic link. Since Hume did not have as strong a stake in “free government” as 
did Burke, he sat more easily with the admission of the metropolitan-colonial nexus of plunder. See, Hume, “That 
Politics May be Reduced to a Science” in Essays, Moral and Political, ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty 
fund, 187); Smith, Wealth of Nations, Book IV, chapter 7, par. 55; also see, Whelan, Edmund Burke and India, p. 
103 ff. 
476 This interpretation is most elaborately advanced by Whelan, who maintains that the universal moral law was the 
standard for judging local customs, as well as the fundament of Burke’s notions of governmental duties, rule of law, 
and law of nations. Whelan, Edmund Burke and India, pp. 275-97). 
477 As another instantiation of this belief one could point to Burke’s painstaking attempts to prove that Muslim and 
Hindu laws were in fact just laws on par with the English common law (SOI, 352-367). In a rhetorical tour de force 
in his speech in the opening of impeachment, Burke proclaimed, “I would as willingly have him [Hastings] tried 
upon the law of Koran, or the Institutes of Temarlane, as upon the Common Law or the Statue Law of this 
Kingdom” (SOI, 365). To similar effect is Burke’s advocacy for ruling India not by the letter but the spirit of 
English law, based on the assumption that the spirit of just laws were everywhere the same, while their form varied 
according to the character of different peoples (SOI 345). 
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early nineteenth-century English liberalism mobilized to infantilize Indians and keep them under 
imperial tutelage.478 In this account, Burke countered the liberal “cosmopolitanism of reason” 
with his “cosmopolitanism of sentiment,” which refuses to map social difference along a 
temporal grid of knowledge, and instead asserts the contemporaneity of different experiences 
lodged in spatial localities. Burke corrected Lockean liberal fantasies of universalism by pointing 
to the constitutive links between land, belonging, intersubjective ties, and political identity, 
which rarely, if at all, take consensual form.479 A third line of interpretation charts a median 
course between moral universalism and radical pluralism, and describes Burke’s attitude as a 
“peculiar universalism” which aimed at expanding British moral sense and aligning it with 
cosmopolitan principles.480 The expansion of the moral horizon required that the British felt 
“sympathy” for the Indians, and Burke’s systematic analogies between India and Europe were 
geared to familiarize his audience with the cultural alterity in India openly and without 
derogation.481 
 The interpretation I adopt here does not so much repudiate these three approaches as 
situates them in Burke’s heterodox appropriation of the Scottish Enlightenment’s stadial theory 
of history, civilization, and moral sense. This theoretical move specifies the conditions under 
which the conclusions of these approaches are operable, and more carefully draws out the 
political stakes of Burke’s Indian endeavors. I contend that the specific moral sensibility and 
course of action that Burke prescribed to govern India was underlain by his conviction that India 
was a commercial society and had to be treated accordingly. The failure to do so amounted to 
                                                
478 The groundbreaking work in this theoretical lane is Uday Mehta’s Liberalism and Empire. 
479 Mehta, Liberalism and Empire, pp. 41-2, 132-44, 175. 
480 This is the position elaborated by Jennifer Pitts in A Turn to Empire, chapter 3. 
481 Indeed, Burke noted in his speech on Fox’s India Bill that the British remained aloof to the oppression and 
sufferings of Indians mostly because they were “so little acquainted with Indian details … that it is very difficult for 
our sympathy to fix upon these objects” (FB, 403-4). 
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injustice by the standards of Burke’s universal moral law, yet this moral law was informed by 
civilizational categories that rendered such non-commercial peoples as Native Americans and 
Africans legitimately vulnerable to the same practices that Burke deemed unjust in India.482 
 For Burke, the problem with the empire in India was not the presence of an imperious 
and violent government per se, in contrast, for instance, to the pacific republican governments of 
the American dominions.483 As has been aptly demonstrated, Burke was comfortable prescribing 
an “iron rod” for Africans on the Atlantic plantations, not for “crushing” but for “ruling” them.484 
While this was in a tract he co-authored in 1757, an early piece that arguably does not represent 
“late Burke’s” cosmopolitan sensibilities, his “Sketch of a Negro Code,” drafted two decades 
later, betrays the same tutelary mission of civilizing Africans. Burke’s attitude towards slavery 
was certainly more emancipatory than that of his counterparts in that he did not attribute to 
Africans any essential incapacity to freedom. True to his Scottish Enlightenment sympathies, 
Africans occupied a savage or barbarous stage in the scale of civilization, and African slaves 
could accordingly be granted freedom provided they internalized the manners characteristic of a 
civilized society. The pivotal premise of the Code is that “the habits of industry and sobriety and 
the means of acquiring and preserving property, are the proper and reasonable preparatives of 
freedom” (SNG, 578-9). Braided around this premise are practical provisions that include the 
education of slaves in schools and churches, crafts training, promotion of monogamous families, 
                                                
482 Burke had a second, and equally important reason to condemn colonial violence in India, which I cannot discuss 
due to limitations of space. Briefly put, grand violence and confiscation imposed on India threatened to tear away 
the veil that covered the illegitimate origins of all property and government, an act of exposure that was especially 
offensive to the sensibilities of a commercial society like Britain. While most scholars concentrate on Burke’s 
hysteria over the divestiture of civilized manners in Revolutionary France, it was first in India that the usurpation at 
the source of all government and the confiscation at the beginning of all property were most outrageously exposed. 
483 Travers is right on mark in repudiating the “settler” and “dependent” distinction that governs the contrast 
between the American and the Indian dominions of the British Empire, with its attendant dichotomy of liberty and 
despotism. India is not an “authoritarian turn” given that the American empire had long been built on slave labor, 
derogation and dispossession of Native Americans as savages, and even the dubiousness of the liberties of domestic 
subjects and colonial settlers. Travers, “Contested Despotism,” pp. 196, 219. 
484 Edmund Burke and William Burke, An Account of the European Settlement in Americas, Vol 2 (London: Printe 
for J. Dodsley, 1757), pp. 127-8. Also see, Kohn and O’Neill, “A Tale of Two Indias,” pp. 199-200. 
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possibility of purchasing one’s freedom or of being emancipated in case of excellence in a 
mechanical art or liberal knowledge (SNG, 574-80). In short, Burke’s scheme of emancipation 
through civilization aimed to forge “proper” subjects by extruding Africans through the grid of 
an improving Whig outlook. Crucially, however, Burke left the civilizational continuum fluid. If 
a “free Negro” was proven to be “incorrigibly idle, dissolute, and vicious, it shall be lawful … to 
sell the said free Negro into Slavery” (SNG, 581). It was ultimately incumbent on the English 
Lord Protector of Negroes and the justices of peace to decide the coordinates any given Negro 
occupied on the civilizational map, which grafted tropes of growth onto stadial theories of 
history. 
 If the “crew of fierce, foreign barbarians and slaves” on the Atlantic plantations at least 
left a door opening to civilization, Native Americans were almost entirely beyond the pale for the 
Burke. Save for a wishful remark for “bringing those unhappy part of mankind into civility, 
order, piety, and virtuous discipline,” Native Americans were relegated to utter abjection in 
Burke’s discourse (AC, 282). They constituted “fierce tribes of Savages and Cannibals, in whom 
the traces of human nature are effaced by ignorance and barbarity” (281). Burke admonished the 
use of Native Americans in the conflict with the colonists, not because of the immorality of such 
recruitment but because of its consequent horrors: 
“… to call from that Wilderness, which is not yet reclaimed [by] the spirited Enterprise of your American 
brethren and which they looked to as the <present> <object> for the growing industry of future 
generations, every Class of savages and Cannibals the most cruel and ferocious ever <known> to lay 
waste with fire hatchet with Murders, and Sanguinary Tortures of the Inhabitants, the most beautiful work 
of Skill and Labour by which the creation and the name of God was ever glorified by his creatures” 
(DPUI, 180). 
 
Clearly, Burke’s “cosmopolitanism of sentiment” or his “peculiar universalism” did not extend 
to Native Americans, who had been watching their population decimated by European incursions 
and diseases, and their lands encroached upon by English settlers. Adding insult to injury, Burke 
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categorically disqualified the remaining Native Americans from claiming any rights to their 
lands, and reduced them to mere vagrants in the British empire: “There is but one single nation in 
America – and that is the English – The Indians are no longer a people in any proper acceptation 
of the Word – but several gangs of Banditti scattered along a wild of a great civilized empire – A 
Banditti of the most cruel and atrocious kind such as infest many such empires” (SUI, 365). 
That Burke lavished on Indians the sympathy which he dramatically denied to other non-
white peoples who were dispossessed, oppressed, and enslaved under the British Empire485 begs 
the question: Why India? What drove Burke to condemn the hypocrisy of attending to the 
Quebecois grievances in the parliament while “universally abandoning the natives of India to 
their fate”? (AA, 463) What distinguished India from Africa or America that bestowed its 
inhabitants such care and passion? What prompted him to refer to Africans as “human bodies” or 
“Negroes” (SNG 563) yet invoke Indians as our “fellow-creatures,” (AA, 463) “fellow subjects 
of the people of England in India” (POH, 62), and even “our distressed fellow citizens in India” 
(NAD, 553)? Why was Indianism was accorded the same contemptible status as Jacobinism? 
What did India, France, and Britain had in common to be the object of the same perceived threat, 
that of “revolution,” broadly conceived?  
My answer to these questions traces Burke’s affinities with the Scottish Enlightenment. 
India merited Burke’s efforts because it was already a commercial society, while Africans and 
Native Americans failed to qualify for the same position by the universal metric of civilization. 
One should not mistake Burke’s usage of the terms “savagery” and “barbarism” for rhetorical 
flourish. In addition to their moral charge, these concepts also served as fundamental 
                                                
485 This is not to say that it was only non-white people that were expropriated and exploited under the British 
Empire. Prior to the entrenchment of African slavery in the West Indies, the labor problem on the plantations was 
temporarily solved by the indentured servitude of predominantly Irish and Scottish immigrants, who were previously 
dispossessed by the English conquests in the British Isles. For a brief and useful account of the Scottish and Irish 
middle passages and “white slavery,” see Canny, “Origins of Empire.” 
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classificatory categories that helped eighteenth-century British thought navigate the “great map 
of mankind” unfurled by the colonial excursions. These categories mediated metropolitan 
thinkers’ encounter with social alterity, but not in a politically neutral way. They implied power 
relations as well as supplied ideological themes and tropes that rationalized them. To conjecture, 
a commercial society could not deal with a savage society in the same fashion it dealt with 
another commercial society, and vice versa. For Burke, it would be inconceivable that the 
English would comport themselves to the “just principles of commerce” in their interaction with 
Native Americans or Africans. Burke’s embrace of a universal moral law did not necessarily 
mean that the provisions of this law were identical in each particular historical situation. The 
inflection of this universal law by civilizational categories explains Burke’s sincere and self-
righteousness advocacy of the Indian cause and his equally candid derogation of Africans and 
Native Americans. While the universal law of morality and justice provided for gradually 
bringing savages and barbarians into the ways of civility, trying to assume a similar tutelary role 
vis-à-vis another commercial society was profoundly haughty, unjust, and scandalous. And it 
was this scandal, the real arrogance of revolutionary reason and its pretensions to remake human 
societies that he denounced in India, cursed in France, and dreaded in Britain. 
Central to this explanation is Burke’s thoughts on the capacity of human reason. There is 
no doubt that he was skeptical of this capacity, especially when it was in “private stock” (R, 
138).486 Statesmen had to resort to the “bank” or the “capital” of ages while confronting the 
economic and political problems of the nation. When placed on the civilizational scale, however, 
there emerges a caveat regarding the prerogatives of human reason. At the interface between 
unequal civilizations, reason cultivated in a commercial society, insofar as it was the apex of the 
                                                
486 This skepticism was not exclusively or even distinctively Burkean. The primacy of psychological moral sense 
over the faculty of abstract reason was an epistemological tenet shared widely by the Scottish Enlightenment 
philosophers. See O’Neill, The Burke-Wollstonecraft Debate, pp. 33-4. 
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moral and material progress of mankind, could assume without arrogance a pedagogical-
civilizational mission over its less civilized counterpart. The crucial feature that simultaneously 
authorized reason over savage or barbarous societies and reined it in commercial societies was 
the dimension of complexity. Social, economic, and moral complexity was the hallmark of 
commercial societies, which had developed out of the simplicity of the savage, barbarous, and 
agrarian modes of life through increased division of labor and civilization. While late eighteenth-
century Europe was considered a mixed geography of agrarian and commercial social modes, 
England, followed by France, was celebrated as the epitome (and no doubt informed the 
conception) of commercial society. Comprising an entrenched capitalist agrarian economy, a 
vast colonial and commercial network, an intricate system of private and public credit, and 
manufactures moving towards what would become the industrial revolution, English society 
constituted a “civilizational pioneer,” a novel social formation that tested the conceptual 
resources of the thinkers of the period.   
The unprecedented socio-economic complexity of commercial society rendered it a 
sublime social totality that denied the possibility of a panoptic and omniscient perspective from 
which it could be grasped. While Smith’s attempt to grapple with the profound inscrutability of 
this social formation yielded the image of an invisible hand governing a secular economy,487 
Burke’s tarrying with this complexity took a turn towards a historical analysis of social 
institutions shot through with providential theology. Hampshire-Monk captures this problem 
well when he argues that for Burke “political society” was a “miraculous” assemblage of 
                                                
487 I owe this insight to Foucault’s lectures, where he places the emphasis on the “invisibility” of the invisible hand, 
indicating the fundamental assumption of inscrutability that pertains to the eighteenth-century liberal vision of the 
market society. In O’Neill’s account, the Scottish Enlightenment rests first and foremost on a causal theory of 
“spontaneously generated social orders.” See, Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, pp. 279-283; O’Neill, The Burke-
Wollstonecraft Debate, pp. 35-6.  
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institutions, rules, moral beliefs, customs, habits, and dispositions.488 Systemic harmony in a 
social formation of such magnitude and intricacy could not possibly be the result of deliberate 
design, save by God, which leads Bromwich to the conclusion that for Burke “society” was a 
“work of art without a maker.”489 Macpherson similarly observes the centrality of the “harmony 
in the natural and political world” to Burke’s social thought.490 These observations are correct 
but partial, insofar as they mistake “political society” or “society” as such for a historically 
specific social formation, that is, commercial society. It was only the presence of a complex 
multitude of contending, or in Burke’s words, “discordant powers” that “the harmony of the 
universe” could spontaneously arise and thwart the “arbitrary power” that characterized simpler 
societies (R, 86). Such complex multiplicity exclusively characterized commercial societies, in 
which the fortuitous interplay of manners and the economic division of labor made possible 
wealth, leisure, arts, letters, and civilization. 
 The impossibility of a sovereign perspective on commercial society was the fundamental 
premise behind Burke’s condemnation of the impetuous attempts to remake a society according 
to an abstract plan. The “diversity of interest, that must exist, and must contend in all complex 
society,” he lamented, was confused and violated by the “categorical tables” or metaphysical 
taxonomies of the legislators in France (R, 231-2). In a commercial society, “interest, habit, and 
the tacit convention that arise from a thousand nameless circumstances, produce a tact that 
regulates without difficulty,” yet the “indiscretion,” “zeal of regulation,” “coercive guidance,” 
and “magistrates exercising stiff, and often inapplicable rules” disrupted the harmonious self-
regulation of the market (S, 126-8). Put succinctly, it was not reason per se that Burke wanted to 
humble; it was reason that made the hubristic claim to regulate or revolutionize commercial 
                                                
488 Hampsher-Monk, “Introduction,” p. 35. 
489 Bromwich, “Introduction,” pp. 36-7. 
490 Macpherson, Burke, p. 50. 
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society. By the same token, however, the simplicity of savage or barbarous societies stripped 
them of the safeguards against the haughtiness of reason.  
Viewed through this theoretical perspective, Burke’s veneration and defense of India 
appears in a light that at once dispels (pace Mehta) the semblance of an unconditional veneration 
for cultural difference, and loads his universal morality with the power relations of civilizational 
asymmetries. It is beyond doubt that what aligned India’s miseries with those of post-
Revolutionary France was India’s status as a commercial society. India 
does not consist of an abject and barbarous populace; much less of gangs of savages, like the Guaranies and 
Chiquitos, who wander on the waste borders of the river of Amazons, or the Plate; but a people for ages civilized 
and cultivated; cultivated by all the arts of polished life, whilst we were yet in the woods. There, have been princes 
once of great dignity, authority, and opulence. There, are to be found the chiefs of tribes and nations. There, is to be 
found an antient and venerable priesthood, the depository of their laws, learning, and history, the guides of the 
people whilst living, and their consolation in death; a nobility of great antiquity and renown; a multitude of cities, 
not exceeded in population and trade by those of the first class in Europe; merchants and bankers, individual houses 
of whom have once vied in capital with the Bank of England; whose credit had often supported a tottering state, and 
preserved their governments in the midst of war and desolation; millions of ingenious manufacturers and 
mechanicks; millions of the most diligent, and not the least intelligent, tillers of the earth. Here are to be found 
almost all the religions professed by men, the Bramincal, the Mussulmen, the Eastern and the Western 
Christians. (FB, 389-90). 
 
If Burke was indeed trying to induce sympathy with the Indians by familiarizing it in a language 
accessible to his audience, then he was trying to induce sympathy for another commercial 
society, for which he did not refrain from denigrating the inhabitants of America. India not only 
boasted agriculture, manufacture, and credit on par with European polities, it also had, 
indispensable to Burke’s social vision of a civilized society, a grand nobility and institutionalized 
religion.491 Five years later, at the opening of the impeachment, Burke complemented the 
socioeconomic analysis of India with a discourse on the Indian government, in which he 
documented in assiduous detail its legal tradition and its conformity to rule of law (SOI, 352-67). 
                                                
491 It is worth noting the parallels between Robertson and Burke’s analysis of India’s civilizational status. Robertson, 
with whom Burke had the most intellectual affinity amongst the Scottish Enlightenment philosophers, had depicted 
India as an ancient and commercial society, though recently languishing under the Mogul rule. See Robertson’s 
appendix to A Historical Disquisition. 
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Contrary to British preconceptions, India was not an “Asiatic despotism” but possessed a 
constitutional government very much like that of Britain. The Indian sovereign 
cannot dispose of the life, of the property, or, of the liberty, of any of his subjects, but by what is called 
the Fetfa, or sentence of the law. He cannot declare peace or war without the same sentence of the law; so 
much is he more than European sovereigns a subject of strict law, that he cannot declare war or peace 
without it. Then if he can neither touch life nor property, if he cannot lay a tax upon his subjects, or 
declare peace or War, I leave it to your Lordships to say whether he can be called, according to the 
principles of that constitution, an arbitrary power (SOI, 354). 
 
In short, India displayed the same social complexity and inscrutability as the English and French 
societies, which entitled it to the same protection against the undiscerning, ignorant, and zealous 
policies of the magistrates. 
Commerce, trade, manufacture had for ages grown in the shade of Indian nobility and 
religion and maintained by a constitutional system that protected life, liberty, and property. 
Under the British imperium, however, “that country suffers, almost every year, the miseries of a 
revolution” and witnessed “the most ancient and most revered institutions, of ages and nations” 
being trampled by the juvenile arrogance and insolent rapacity of the Company agents (FB, 427). 
The same rude hands that would later destroy French nobility and religion, which formed the 
“protecting principles” of “commerce, trade, and manufacture,” had already begun their work in 
India (R, 130). Through massive confiscation of landed property, they had reduced men of rank 
and status to a “state of indigence, depression and contempt” (R, 155). Animated not by a 
“barbarous philosophy” but by an urge for material gain no less barbarous, they had torn apart 
the “system of manners,” beyond which their dominion in India, like the laws of French 
Revolutionary government, was “supported only by their own terrors” (R, 128-9). Having 
drowned equity and public utility, justice and prosperity, they remained a pack of “gross, stupid, 
ferocious, and at the same time, poor and sordid barbarians, destitute of religion, honour or 
manly pride” (R, 131). The destructive effects of the simplicity of radical reason on commercial 
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society was foreshadowed by the simplicity of self-interest that ripped through the complex 
texture of institutions, customs and values, and left behind naked human existence, shivering 
under the violence of primitive accumulation. 
 
Conclusion 
 At the historical level, Burke’s objective was to distill commerce as a purely social and 
economic transaction which could nonetheless be accommodated in an imperial framework. At 
the theoretical level, this desire to have an “imperial” but not an “imperious” commerce was a 
specific mode of expressing the dynamic tension between the liberal self-image of capitalism and 
its material dependence on coercive methods of accumulation that appeared primitive and 
uncivilized when viewed through this self-image. Primitive accumulation as the “constitutive 
outside” of liberalism had been going on in the Atlantic and nourishing British capitalism for 
some time, but it became a problem for Burke for the first time when it cut against the grain of 
his civilizational categories by despoiling another commercial society. The civilizational parity 
and common imperial constitution required that the economic dealings between Britain and India 
be governed by the commercial principles of equality and freedom. However, these legal and 
moral principles were utterly inapplicable in India. Economic relations in the British colonies 
were thoroughly enforced by political force, because the imperial relation is unavoidably and 
transparently a political relation involving subordination, inequality, and unfreedom. Insofar as 
the imperial relation was the historically specific political shell in which primitive accumulation 
in India was carried out, and insofar as Burke could not relinquish the British Empire, the only 
recourse available to him was to openly castigate the agents of primitive accumulation 
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(Company agents as primitive accumulation incarnate) and try to oust the “odium of primitive 
despoliation” from the way the British polity was perceived and imagined. 492 
 Placing Burke in a historical materialist perspective sensitive to the dynamics of colonial 
capitalism thus offers an analytical framework that integrates the political economic, imperial, 
and moral dimensions of his thought and promises a systematic solution to the “Burke problems” 
that have occupied the historians of political thought. But more importantly, it turns Burke’s 
thought into a window that looks over the plateau of the history of capital, a plateau riven by 
dynamic contradictions between the material conditions necessary for the reproduction of capital, 
and the inventory of images and narratives that capital has of itself. The self-image of capitalism 
as an exclusively market phenomenon, self-righteously resting on the principles of juridical 
equality and contractual freedom, has been the keystone of its legitimacy. The elevation of these 
principles to self-evident universal axioms has secured capitalism the moral high ground in its 
past and present struggles against alternative forms of social and economic organization. In other 
words, the conflation of capitalism and the market has played, and continues to play, the greatest 
part in various hegemonic projects of capital. The interrogation of Burke’s work from a historical 
materialist perspective reveals, however, that the identification of capitalism and the market has 
not always been spontaneous and self-sustaining. It has rather involved constant ideological 
boundary maintenance whereby the profoundly illiberal supports of capital accumulation had to 
be disavowed, contained, and explained away, especially when their powerful eruptions in the 
face of hegemonic capitalism rendered concealment and denial unavailable as ideological 
                                                
492 From the perspective of political economy, Burke’s grand proclamation that “Without subordination, it would not 
be one empire; without freedom, it would not be the British Empire” amounts to fantastic expression of the desire to 
reconcile the inexorable contradiction between his commercial and imperial ideals. The political economic 
dimension thereby draws out the actual dynamics of the contradiction, which Bromwich perceives in purely 
political, and my opinion inadequate, terms of the “contradictory aims and methods of the imperial rule,” that is, 
“governing heterogeneity of interests within a rule of law framework” Bromwich, “Introduction,” pp. 15, 38. 
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options. Burke’s frantic efforts to shore up a civilized, liberal, commercial self-image for the 
British Empire against colonial primitive accumulation in India constitutes one momentous and 
formative chapter in the history of guarding the liberal boundaries of capital. Therefore, students 
of the history of capital have as much to learn from an analysis of Burke’s works as do Burke 
scholars. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
LETTERS FROM SYDNEY: 
EDWARD G. WAKEFIELD AND THE QUESTION OF COLONIAL LABOR 
 
Imperialism was born when the ruling class in capitalist production came up against national limitations 
to its economic expansion. The bourgeoisie turned to politics out of necessity; for if it did not want to 
give up the capitalist system whose inherent law is constant economic growth, it had to impose this law 
upon its home governments and to proclaim expansion to be an ultimate political goal of foreign policy. 
 
Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism. 
 
 
Introduction 
 The second quarter of the nineteenth century was a critical juncture for the fortunes of 
empire in British social, political and economic thought. Dominant intellectual opinion was 
leaving its turn-of-the-century hostility for a more favorable disposition towards colonial 
possessions at the same time the inertia of public indifference to empire was lifting. The first of 
these shifts stemmed from a growing awareness about the peculiar condition of English 
capitalism in this period and its potential political ramifications.493 The second shift was owed to 
a group of policy entrepreneurs’ sustained efforts to convert public opinion to the cause of 
colonization.494 A major figure at the intersection of these two currents was Edward Gibbon 
Wakefield, who devoted his life to establishing in political economic theory as well as in popular 
                                                
493 Alan Shaw provides a useful overview of the shifting sands of official and intellectual opinion on colonization. 
After 1825, Shaw contends, the economic case for colonization gained the upper hand, not on older mercantilist 
grounds, but on the basis of political economy. By 1830, “no prominent political economist ventured to attack 
colonization in principle,” with the exception of John McCulloch. A. G. L. Shaw, “Introduction” in Great Britain 
and the Colonies, 1815-1855 ed. A. G. L. Shaw (London: Methuen & Co, 1970), especially pp. 16-17. 
494 For a concise treatment of the popularization of the ideas and visions of settler colonialism in nineteenth-century 
England, see James Belich, “The Rise of the Angloworld: Settlement in North America and Australasia, 1784-1918’, 
in Rediscovering the British World, ed. P. Buckner & R. D. Francis (Calgary: University of Calgary, 2005); Belich, 
“Settler Utopianism? English Ideologies of Emigration, 1815-1850” in Liberty, Authority, Formality: Political Ideas 
and Culture, 1600-1900, ed. John Morrow and Jonathan Scott (Charlottesville, VA: Imprint Academic, 2008). For a 
more topical treatment of the promotional literature, see Marian Minson “Promotional Shots: the New Zealand 
Company’s Paintings, Drawings and Prints in the 1840s and Their Use in Selling a Colony” in Edward Gibbon 
Wakefield and the Colonial Dream: A Reconsideration, ed. Philip Temple (Wellington: Friends of the Turnbull 
Library, 1997). 
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consciousness the necessity and desirability of the British Empire’s colonial expansion. On the 
one hand, Wakefield posed a formidable challenge to orthodox political economy by exposing its 
limits from a colonial perspective and compelled his contemporaries to regard questions of 
colonization and empire as questions of political economy proper.495 On the other hand, his 
indefatigable labors in organizing colonization societies, lobbying the Colonial Office, 
generating a promotional literature for colonization, and his quasi-family business of settling 
New Zealand, would pave the way for the rapid colonization of the antipodes.496 
This chapter focuses on the first of these efforts by analyzing Wakefield’s intervention 
into the field of early-Victorian classical political economy. Wakefield’s thought deserves more 
attention than has been conventionally bestowed upon it, because it presents a rare condensation 
point of the major controversies raging over the economic and political prospects of the British 
society at a time when the global industrial supremacy of England had borne the bitter fruit of 
domestic social antagonism. More specifically, I argue that Wakefield’s political-economic 
thought bore powerful and original insights into the problem of “overaccumulation of capital”497 
                                                
495 For elaboration on the theoretical bridges Wakefield built between classical political economy and theories of 
colonization, see Winch, Classical Political Economy, especially part 2, and “Classical Economics and the Case for 
Colonization” in Great Britain and the Colonies, 1815-1855, ed. A. G. L. Shaw (London: Methuen & Co, 1970); 
Semmel, Rise of Free Trade Imperialism: Political Economy, the Empire of Free Trade and Imperialism, 1750-1850 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), especially chapters 4 and 5, and “The Philosophic Radicals and 
Colonialism” in Great Britain and the Colonies, 1815-1855, ed. A. G. L. Shaw (London: Methuen & Co, 1970). 
496 For the direct involvement of the Wakefields in the enterprise of colonizing New Zealand, see among others, 
Patricia Burns, The Fatal Success: A History of the New Zealand Company (Auckland: H. Reed, 1989); Philip 
Temple, “New Zealand: A Family Business” in Edward Gibbon Wakefield and the Colonial Dream: A 
Reconsideration, ed. Philip Temple (Wellington: Friends of the Turnbull Library, 1997), and A Sort of Conscience. 
For the contribution of Wakefield’s colonization efforts to the settlement of Australia and New Zealand, see James 
Belich, Making Peoples: a History of the New Zealanders, from Polynesian Settlement to the End of the Nineteenth 
Century (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996), especially pp 180-9; John Martin, “A Small Nation on the 
Move: Wakefield's Theory of Colonisation and the Relationship between State and Labour in the Mid-Nineteenth 
Century,” and Eric Richards, “Wakefield and Australia,” both in Edward Gibbon Wakefield and the Colonial 
Dream: A Reconsideration, ed. Philip Temple (Wellington: Friends of the Turnbull Library, 1997). 
497 The term “overaccumulation of capital” as used in this chapter draws on Karl Marx’s theory of the crisis of 
capital, articulated in Karl Marx, Capital Vol. 3 (London: Penguin, 1991), especially chapter 15. The problem of 
overaccumulation, which has been variously conceptualized as a problem of “overproduction” and 
“underconsumption” remains the subject of a long and unresolved debate amongst Marxists scholars. Amongst the 
most prominent touchstones of this genealogy, one could cite Rosa Luxemburg’s Accumulation of Capital and 
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that troubled nineteenth-century capitalism, precisely because he placed (to paraphrase Stoler 
and Cooper) the metropole and the colony in a single analytic frame.498 Wakefield’s proposed 
solutions to the overaccumulation problem mobilized this global frame and pointed to colonial 
expansion not as an incidental safety valve (as was suggested by some of his contemporaries) but 
as a structural remedy to be applied by systematic political means, thereby forging a metabolic 
link between capitalism and imperialism. Perhaps most striking was Wakefield’s blending of this 
political-economic analysis with, on the one hand, an unwavering commitment to free trade and 
free labor that epitomized middle-class liberalism of his time, and on the other, a theory of 
progress built of the hardened categories of civilization and savagery inherited from the Scottish 
Enlightenment. The outcome was a grandiose plan of a liberal capitalist empire that heralded a 
global vision peace, prosperity, and liberty. 
 More importantly for the central concerns of this chapter, Wakefield’s glorious vision 
was fractured by profound tensions, aporias, and impasses that arose from commitment to 
economic and political imperatives that could not be immediately reconciled. The first of these 
commitments attached to the liberal values of contractual freedom and juridical equality that 
underpinned the ideal of free market devoid of political power, while the second was to the 
imperatives of capitalist expansion, which involved irreducible processes of dispossession and 
social displacement subtended by legal and political coercion, which I have discussed in Chapter 
1 under the rubric of primitive accumulation. The contradictions between these imperatives came 
to a head in the early nineteenth century around the “labor problem” and its manifold yet closely 
                                                
David Harvey’s Limits to Capital. A recent reconsideration of the overaccumulation phenomenon with in the 
context of the current economic crisis is David McNally’s Global Slump. 
498 Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, “Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda” in 
Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World, ed. Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1997), p. 4. 
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connected metropolitan and colonial repercussions.499 This chapter deploys Wakefield’s analytic 
and prescriptive engagement with the labor problem as an entry point into the conundrums that 
confronted the development of capitalism in the early-nineteenth century. Wakefield’s Whig 
affiliations, spliced with Benthamite utilitarianism and neo-Smithian political economy and 
combined with his championing of colonialism as essential to the survival of capitalism, renders 
his thought fecund grounds for reconstructing the tensions between the illiberality of capitalist 
expansion in the colonies and the avowedly liberal banner under which capitalism trotted the 
globe.  
The claims of this chapter proceed along two interlocking axes. The first of these relates 
to the problem of capitalist reproduction in the early nineteenth century and the status of wage 
labor therein. I argue that the navigation of the aforementioned tensions was essential to the 
settlement of the ideological contours of “free labor” in a manner that would render it abundant 
yet manageable, productive yet docile, in short, compatible with the imperatives of capital 
accumulation. For Wakefield, English capitalism suffered from a glut of capital and labor, which 
drove down profits and wages, accelerated proletarianization and pauperization, and stoked labor 
militancy that threatened social upheaval and confiscation of private property. In the colonies, by 
contrast, the scarcity of wage labor leveraged the bargaining power of laborers to the point where 
capital owners shunned investment due to expensive and unstable labor supply. At home, labor 
was abundant but politically intractable, in the colonies, it was politically inert yet woefully 
scarce. The ingenuity of Wakefield’s solution was his mobilization of political and legal 
instruments, imperial in nature and utilitarian in principle, for ensuring a supply of dispossessed 
                                                
499 I borrow the term “labor problem” from Eric Williams’s trailblazing work Capitalism and Slavery, which is 
prefaced by a discussion of Wakefield’s analysis of the colonial political economy. I use theoretical license to 
deploy this notion beyond the historical object of Williams’s analysis, while aware of the possible complications 
attendant to such capacious deployment. 
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and tractable labor force both in the metropole and in the colonies. The active role assigned to 
government in producing and reproducing a class of dispossessed laborers pitted Wakefield’s 
theory and policy proposals against the laissez-faire orthodoxy of his contemporaries; at the 
same time, the subtlety of legal and institutional instruments and minimal direct coercion 
envisioned in this process of primitive accumulation distinguished his vision from earlier 
mercantilist labor policies. I contend that the peculiarity of Wakefield’s proposals, insofar as 
they rested on the utilization of political force that did not directly impinge upon individual 
choice, represented the makings of a neoclassical paradigm, in which the institutional conditions 
of economic growth were understood in terms of their impact on individual incentives. 
The second axis examines Wakefield’s conjectures on morals and manners, which were 
informed by the Enlightenment categories of civilization and savagery and which implicated the 
early-Victorian Britons’ image of themselves. Here the focus is on Wakefield’s criticism of the 
“frontier pathology” that he maintained plagued all settler colonies. The changes he observed in 
the manners, morals, and tastes of settlers at colonial frontiers represented nothing less than a 
civilizational regression from “polished” life that represented the extant terminus of human 
development to “rude” life that characterized the vagrant barbarian or semi-savage peoples.500 
Such deterioration could not be dismissed simply as decay in the moral fabric, however, just as 
the rise of crime, prostitution, and popular dissent in England was not to be condemned as the 
triumph of vice. Adducing the Scottish Enlightenment premise that civilization was closely 
                                                
500 The term “frontier pathology” is Erik Olssen’s, who coins it in situating Wakefield’s writings in the post-
Enlightenment intellectual tradition. Pat Moloney expands on Olssen’s thesis, by bringing into sharper relief the 
civilization-savagery tropes in Wakefield’s thought. I follow Olssen’s and Moloney’s insights in developing my 
arguments on the moral-civilizational dimension of Wakefield’s works on political economy and colonization. I am 
heavily indebted to J. G. A. Pocock’s expert treatment of the nineteenth-century Enlightenment thought for 
explicating the broader social imaginary in which Wakefield’s understanding of civilization and savagery was 
embedded. See Olssen, “Wakefield and the Scottish Enlightenment,” and “Mr. Wakefield and New Zealand”; 
Moloney, “Savagery and Civilization”; Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, especially Vol. 4, Barbarians, Savages, 
and Empires; and The Discovery of Islands: Essays in British History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005). 
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tethered to economic development, Wakefield argued that metropolitan and colonial pathologies 
had their roots in their respective political-economic and sociological conditions, the correct 
scientific analysis of which could inform ameliorative policies. The over-concentration of capital 
and population in the metropole caused social degradation and depravity, whereas their under-
concentration in the colonies resulted in a vulgar and repugnant livelihood. These interconnected 
problems had to be addressed in a political economic framework that centered as much on the 
colonies as on the metropole. The daunting task at hand was to salvage at once capitalism and the 
civilized self-image of the British, or more precisely “capitalist civilization,” and Wakefield rose 
up to this challenge with his theory of systematic colonization. 
I develop these arguments in three sections. The first two sections analyze Wakefield’s 
diagnosis and explication of the labor problem in its metropolitan and colonial moments, which 
roughly map onto the problems of overaccumulation and the inadequacies of spontaneous 
colonization. I contextualize the first moment in the debate on falling profits and economic 
stagnation that preoccupied British political economy in the first half of the nineteenth 
century.501 The second moment is situated in relation to the broader controversy on the legal and 
moral status of labor that flared in the wake of the abolition of slavery in Britain’s colonies.502 
Both debates were animated, I maintain, not merely by political and economic concerns for the 
stable reproduction of capitalist relations, but laden with deeper anxieties about moral and 
                                                
501 These debates are most meticulously examined in Semmel, Rise of Free Trade Imperialism, and Winch, 
Classical Political Economy. Also see, Edward Kittrell, “Development of the Theory of Colonization in English 
Classical Political Economy,” The Southern Economic Journal 31 (1965): 189-206; G. S. L. Tucker, “The 
Application and Significance of Economic Theories of the Effect of Economic Progress on the Rate of Profit, 1800-
1850” in Great Britain and the Colonies, 1815-1855, ed. A. G. L. Shaw  (London: Methuen & Co, 1970). 
502 While Wakefield’s immediate plans concerned South Australia and New Zealand, the West Indies constituted the 
flashpoint for the metropolitan and controversies over the legal and moral status of labor. Furthermore, while 
Wakefield did not formulate specific plans for the Caribbean colonies, he definitely brought them, along with 
Ireland and African colonies, within the scope of his colonization theory. In substantiating these controversies 
against I which investigate Wakefield’s position on labor, I draw upon the historiographical scholarship that has 
critically built upon Eric Williams’s work, most importantly, Davis, Problem of Slavery; Holt, Problem of Freedom; 
Kale, Fragments of Empire. 
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civilizational values that implicated British self-conceptions. The last section examines 
Wakefield’s theory of systematic colonization, which went beyond simply funneling the excess 
of the metropole to the colonies (what he criticized as “pauper relocation”) and called for 
orchestrating colonial emigration and settlement with an eye towards maintaining the optimum 
level of social and economic pressure – overseeing the boiler of the capitalist engine, as it were. 
The linchpin of the entire theory was the idea of selling colonial lands at a “sufficient price” that 
would ensure the existence of a class of dispossessed laborers and reasonable wages. Such 
imperial instruments as pre-emptive crown rights in colonial lands and royal charters for 
colonization companies were to be mobilized for establishing colonial land and labor markets 
that would conform to the laws of the commodity and capital accumulation, thereby supplying 
the institutional conditions of the commercial-capitalist society.  
Wakefield’s ultimate objective was to extend the civilization of capitalism to the colonies 
by leaping over or bracketing the precapitalist stages of barbarism. The transplantation of 
capitalist civilization necessitated an element of social engineering to be achieved through 
political means, which traversed a number of contradictions between capitalism and democracy, 
colonization and civility, and laissez-faire and utility. These contradictions forced Wakefield to 
weave contractual fantasies of dispossession, class harmony, and summum bonum for 
circumnavigating them. Such contradictions have eluded attention in the extant scholarship on 
Wakefield, mainly due to the striking disconnect between political economic and cultural 
analyses of systematic colonization.503 This chapter attempts to remedy this disjuncture by 
                                                
503 Scholarly literature on Wakefield is somewhat sparse and far between, at least compared to some of the political 
economists and political figures of his time. Wakefield’s fortunes in British imperial history, especially as written by 
New Zealand historians, display a certain resonance with the course that British imperial history has taken through 
the twentieth century. Early twentieth-century Whiggish depictions of Wakefield, such as by A. J. Harrop, Irma 
O’Connor, and Paul Bloomfield, which hailed the man as the “builder of the British Commonwealth” were eroded 
by the steady pressure of the revisionist historiography after the 1960s. Michael Turnbull disclosed the questionable 
pecuniary motives behind Wakefield’s colonization efforts; John Miller underscored his mercurial adventurism; 
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underscoring the intimate connection between the “dismal science” of political economy and 
civilizational anxieties in Wakefield’s thought. More importantly, I conclude that these 
contradictions and their negotiation deserve attention because they were formative of the 
realignment of civilizational tropes around political economic theories of colonization in the 
early nineteenth century, which can be considered as the moral-epistemological ur-form of the 
contemporary discourses of development and good governance. 
 
 
 
                                                
Patricia Burns’s scathing critique targeted the impact of Wakefield enterprise on the European-Maori relations; Peter 
Stuart’s account drew attention to the unbridled political ambitions that stamped his career in New Zealand and 
overrode the very policy proposals he had formulated in England (the same shift in position would later be 
interpreted more favorably by Lloyd Prichard, who perceived in it the virtue of non-doctrinaire flexibility). 
Australian historians Peter Howell and Douglass Pike wrote the most acerbic criticisms that labeled him a 
“charlatan” who had not even built a colony, let alone an empire. During the same period, Wakefield fared better 
under the pen of the British historians of economic thought, who contextualized his thought in the British rather than 
the antipodean isles. Donald Winch drew attention to Wakefield’s political economy as a doctrine of liberal empire, 
while Bernard Semmel cast Wakefield and the Colonial Reform movement as the consummate proponents of the 
imperialism of free trade. Edward Kittrell and G. S. L. Tucker likewise followed Wakefield into the economic 
orthodoxy-heterodoxy debate, though they honed their focus on more specific issues on profits and rents. After the 
cultural and colonial “turns” in history, the bicentennial of Wakefield’s birth brought about a resurgence of interest 
that displayed a predilection for cultural analysis, as attested by recent essays by Erik Olssen and Pat Moloney. 
Given my focus on the thought rather than the deeds of Wakefield, this chapter draws more heavily on the 
contributions of the British political economy school and the insights of the cultural analyses than on New Zealand 
historiographies, incorporated at specific junctures. See A. J. Harrop, The Amazing Career of Edward Gibbon 
Wakefield (London: Allen & Unwin, 1928); Irma O’Connor, Edward Gibbon Wakefield: The Man Himself (London: 
Selwyn & Blount, 1928) Paul Bloomfield, Edward Gibbon Wakefield: Builder of the British Commonwealth 
(London: Longman, 1961); Michael Turnbull, New Zealand Bubble: Wakefield Theory in Practice (Wellington: 
Price Milburn, 1959); John Miller, Early Victorian New Zealand: A Study of Racial Tension and Social Attitudes, 
1839-1852 (London: Oxford University Press, 1958); Peter Stuart, Edward Gibbon Wakefield in New Zealand: His 
Political Career, 1853-4 (Wellington: Price Milburn, 1971); M. F. Lloyd Prichard, “Introduction,” in The Collected 
Works of Edward Gibbon Wakefield, ed. M. F. Lloyd Prichard (London: Collins, 1968); Douglass Pike, Paradise of 
Dissent (London: Longmans, 1957); Semmel, Rise of Free Trade Imperialism, and “Philosophic Radicals;” Winch, 
Classical Political Economy, and “Classical Economics;” Edward R. Kittrell, “Wakefield and Classical Rent 
Theory,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 25 (1966): 141-52, and “Wakefield’s Scheme of 
Systematic Colonization and Classical Economics,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 32 (1973): 87-
111; Tucker, “Application and Significance;” Olssen, “Wakefield and the Scottish Enlightenment,” and “Wakefield 
and New Zealand;” Moloney, “Savagery and Civilization.” For an overview of the shifting scholarly perspectives in 
British imperial history see Buckner and Francis, “Introduction.” in Buckner and Francis (ed) Rediscovering the 
British World (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2005). For a methodological appeal for redefining the 
parameters of British history as an essentially imperial history by integrating Britain and the colonies in a single 
framework, see J. G. A. Pocock, “Neo-Britains and the Three Empires” in The Discovery of Islands: Essays in 
British History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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I. Political Labor Problem: The Metropole 
Metropolitan Debates 
 Since the middle of the eighteenth century, a major source of befuddlement for British 
intellectuals had been the simultaneous appearance of unprecedented wealth and poverty within 
the national borders, a counterintuitive unity that proved to be permanent and fueled debate over 
its economic causes as well as political and moral consequences.504 By the first decades of the 
nineteenth century, the disquietude reached a new pitch as the age of English industrial 
supremacy also entailed the dramatic pauperization of the English laboring classes, which left its 
political mark on the 1832 Parliamentary Reform Act and its economic imprint on the 1834 
Amendment of the Poor Laws.  
In the field of political economy, the nineteenth-century social science par excellence, the 
social convulsions of the period made a palpable dent in the belief that the economy tended 
towards competitive equilibrium. By the 1820s this belief had morphed into the orthodox 
position underwritten by Say’s Law, which denied the possibility of economic crisis due to 
systemic overproduction even though it allowed for short-term sectoral gluts. The challenge to 
the orthodoxy was spearheaded by Thomas Malthus’s view of industrial capitalism as an 
inherently disharmonious totality ridden with systemic imbalances.505 The ensuing controversy 
whirled around the problem of falling profits, which posed “a problem of primary importance in 
British political economy” insofar as it threw into sharp relief the question of stability and 
sustainability of industrial capitalism.506 
                                                
504 See, above all, the essays in Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff (eds), Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political 
Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Winch, Riches and 
Poverty; Himmelfarb, Idea of Poverty. One should also mention the great political-economic ethnography of 
nineteenth-century Britain, Marx’s, Capital Vol. 1. 
505 Winch, Riches and Poverty, pp. 246-7; Semmel, Rise of Free Trade Imperialism, pp. 51-4. 
506 Shaw, “Introduction,” pp. 11-13. For a brief exposition of the problem of falling profits and its pertinence to 
colonization debates, see Tucker, “Application and Significance,” p. 132; Semmel, Rise of Free Trade Imperialism, 
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The orthodox school, with Ricardo at the helm and the Utilitarian philosophers in tow, 
admitted of falling profits but did not perceive a fatal danger in them. They maintained that 
profits tended to decline because of the expansion of investment to less fertile marginal lands, 
and wages followed a similar pattern due to the scissors between the laboring population and the 
agricultural output. However, countervailing tendencies such as technological innovation and 
most importantly free trade in food could stave off a systemic crisis for an indefinite future. As 
long as profits were reinvested (as it was assumed that they would be, no matter how low the 
profit margin), it would create demand for labor and sustain wages above the subsistence 
level.507 The heterodox Malthusian camp, including Thomas Chalmers, Robert Torrens, and 
Edward Gibbon Wakefield, was less sanguine. Ascribing falling profits to the existence of 
abundant capital lacking profitable investment opportunities in Britain, they contended that 
overproduction or “glut” could occur in all sectors of the economy simultaneously. System-wide 
low returns on capital would encourage hoarding over investment. The growing rift between 
economic and demographic expansion would translate into a glut in the labor market, pushing up 
unemployment and depressing wages. In other words, the source of economic stagnation and 
social distress was not the insufficient accumulation of capital (as Ricardians would hold) but its 
“superabundance,” or overaccumulation. Capital in excess of that which could be invested in 
employing labor and realize a reasonable profit by the sale of the product was left idle (thus 
ceasing to be capital), thrown into speculation or driven to bankruptcy, thereby undergoing 
massive devaluation. The grand outcome was the paradoxical situation of an economy soaked 
                                                
chapter 4, and “Philosophic Radicals and Colonialism,” pp. 79-80; Winch, Classical Political Economy pp. 79-81, 
and “Classical Economics,” pp. 97-9. 
507 Ricardian orthodoxy rested on two basic assumptions that rendered it theoretically elegant yet empirically weak. 
First of these was the assumption of full employment, wherein the productive capacity of a country (which for 
Ricardo synonymous with its capital) would be fully employed. The second assumption was full internal factor 
mobility, which signified the possibility of diverting capital with relative ease from those spheres of production 
suffering from low profits to other sectors with high returns. 
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with capital and labor, yet suffering from stagnation, unemployment, low wages, and low 
profits.508 
 Wakefield’s view of the socioeconomic conditions in England broadly followed 
heterodox lights. His theoretical eclecticism in incorporating Smithian and Utilitarian tenets, the 
comparative and global scope of his analysis, and his prognosis about the political consequences 
of England’s economic ills led him to peculiar insights and policy prescriptions. Malthus had 
advised to relegate the problem of social distress to natural solutions and wait until the edifying 
effects of poverty (such as watching one’s family starve) instilled moral habits of abstention in 
the poor and brought the population back in line with what could be gainfully employed. For 
Wakefield, such passive fatalism was rendered unviable by the increasing political organization 
of the working class, undesirable by his middle-class philanthropy, and unnecessary by the 
possible solution he perceived in capitalist colonization. 
 
Accumulation of Capital and the Myth of Voluntary Dispossession 
Wakefield’s England and America (1833)509 opens with an impressionistic survey of 
wealth, comfort and conveniences in England. The diffusion of wealth manifests itself in the 
                                                
508 For a useful overview of the orthodox-heterodox debate about overproduction, its sources, and possible remedies, 
see Bernard Semmel, Liberal Ideal and the Demons of Empire: Theories of Imperialism from Adam Smith to Lenin 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), chapter 2. 
509 All references are to Prichard (ed) Collected Works of Edward Gibbon Wakefield. A brief overview of the major 
works of Wakefield examined here would be in order. Wakefield composed his A Letter From Sydney (1829) in the 
Newgate Gaol where he was serving for abducting a wealthy heiress and beguiling her to marry him (the marriage 
was later annulled by an Act of Parliament). His prison term would mar his name with notoriety and dispose him to 
pursue his political ambitions behind the scenes, mostly through members of the Parliament whom he converted to 
the cause of systematic colonization. Wakefield’s term in prison has informed disparate perspectives on Wakefield. 
For sympathetic authors, the time in Newgate represented the moment of moral awakening that channeled 
Wakefield’s ambition into philanthropic and reformist paths (Prichard, “Introduction,” pp. 12-13) (Wakefield indeed 
condemned the death penalty and transportation in an essay entitled Facts Relating to the Punishment of Death in 
the Metropolis [1831]). For less sympathetic historians, Wakefield’s philanthropy was a sham. Ged Martin, for 
example, contends that social ostracism and imprisonment pushed Wakefield into a world of fantasy dominated by a 
pathological, haughty egocentrism. Ged Martin, “Wakefield’s Past and Futures,” in Edward Gibbon Wakefield and 
the Colonial Dream: A Reconsideration ed. Philip Temple (Wellington: Friends of the Turnbull Library, 1997). 
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wide array of popularly available consumer items, a large professional class, and relatively 
comfortable servants. These markers of wealth, however, pale in comparison to the “facility with 
which in any part of England, funds are raised for any undertaking that offers the least chance of 
profit” (EA, 324). Wakefield’s explanation of the plenty in consumer and capital goods at first 
sight followed the familiar Smithian tenets of division of labor and specialization, with the 
concomitant effects of productivity, innovation, and frugality. In England, the farmer was 
                                                
Whatever the impact, during his three years of service, Wakefield interacted with other inmates, and those sentenced 
to transportation to Australia incited an interest in him in matters of colonization. In his own words, “whilst in 
Newgate, I had the occasion to read with care every book concerning New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land, as 
well as a long series of newspapers published in these colonies. Becoming thus pretty well acquainted with the true 
prospect of a convict about to be transported, and being in the habit of conversing on the subject with such prisoners 
gave me a perfect opportunity of ascertaining the state of their feelings” (Facts Relating to the Punishment of Death 
in the Metropolis, p. 266). The result of these studies was his Letters from Sydney published in the Morning 
Chronicle as a series, and later republished as A Letter from Sydney. This work had a peculiar style in that, although 
Wakefield had never been to Australia, it contained an economic and sociological account narrated by an imaginary 
entrepreneur in New South Wales, who served as the mouthpiece of Wakefield’s analysis of the colonial labor 
problem. Ideas propounded in A Letter from Sydney found more systematized reiteration in Wakefield’s Plan of 
Company to be Established for the Purpose of Founding a Colony in Southern Australia, Purchasing Land Therein, 
and Preparing the Land so Purchased for the Reception of Immigrants (1830). This plan would serve as the 
repository of principles and policy proposals for the string of Colonization Societies founded by Wakefield and 
Colonial Reformers, from South Australian Land Company to New Zealand Land Company. In 1833, England and 
America was published, the most comprehensive political economy tract Wakefield wrote. Wakefield’s analysis of 
the social and economic problems troubling England made its debut in England and America, which was laid out 
together with a systematic investigation of the colonial labor problem and a full articulation of the theory of 
systematic colonization. Between this work and A View of the Art of Colonization (1849), Wakefield published 
numerous pamphlets and articles, the latter appearing mostly in the Philosophic Radical journal The Spectator. He 
also co-authored with John Ward a promotional book, suggestively entitled The British Colonization of New 
Zealand (1837) and published under the name of his son, Edward Jerningham Wakefield. Furthermore, he 
participated in the Durham Mission to Canada and drafted those parts of the Durham Report (1839) as pertained to 
the management of public lands, and served as witness before Parliamentary committees regarding waste lands 
(1836), New Zealand (1840), and Australia (1841). A View of the Art of Colonization bore the sediments of his 
efforts to promote colonization with half-heartedly celebrated partial victories and bitterly resented larger 
disappointments. While Wakefield dictated the entire book, the exposition of the arguments were organized in the 
form of a series of letters between Wakefield and an anonymous member of the Parliament, the latter acting in the 
function of a “statesman” willing to promote colonization yet ill-informed and hesitant, consulting Wakefield’s 
expertise on the matter. The semblance of letter-exchange not only endowed the book with a more dialogical quality, 
it also enabled Wakefield to put the objections to this systematic colonization (accruing in the last twenty years) in 
the mouth of a high-ranking Colonial Office acquaintance of the statesman. In other words, the letters from the 
statesman operated as the discursive medium in which Wakefield consistently unfolded the counterarguments and 
rebuttals to his theory of systematic colonization and responded to them. A View of the Art of Colonization found 
lukewarm reception, mainly because its theses overlapped to a great extent with those in England and America. 
Nonetheless, Wakefield more clearly elaborated in this book some of his major arguments, and introduced some 
apparently minor yet theoretically significant contentions, especially regarding the nature and role of government 
and law in colonization. In the remainder of the chapter the primary texts are referred to by the following 
abbreviations in brackets: A Letter from Sydney (LS); Plan of Company to be Established for the Purpose of 
Founding a Colony in Southern Australia (PC); England and America (EA); A View of the Art of Colonization (AC). 
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nothing but a farmer and the agricultural laborer worked only in agriculture. English farmers’ 
exemplary industry and foresight shone forth in their employment of scientific knowledge for 
experimenting with and improving agricultural methods, which, combined with sufficiently large 
and secure tenure, enabled them to benefit from economies of scale and “wait for distant returns” 
(Ibid, 328, 330-1). Thanks to the immense agricultural productivity, “more than two-thirds [of 
the rural population] are set free, to follow other pursuits” and flocked into the manufacturing 
and industrial sector (Ibid, 332). English industry mirrored the concentrated, specialized and 
capital-intensive form of the countryside, whereby the “congregation in one place vast numbers,” 
“steam power,” and “large factories” honed the competitive edge of the English manufactures in 
foreign markets, and rendered “improvement” and “rapid material progress” the signature of “the 
greatest commercial nation in the world” (Ibid, 332-6). 
 Wakefield’s explanation of England’s productive powers diverged from Smith’s in one 
apparently formal but actually momentous conceptual reformulation. Smith had identified 
“division of labor” as the root cause of productivity. Wakefield objected by arguing that the term 
concealed two distinct processes. The first of these was the “combination of labor” among 
separate individuals performing joint tasks, and the second comprised the “division of 
employments” between different individuals or groups and technical specialization (Ibid, 327). 
Crucially, the second could not arise in the absence of the first, that is, before individuals were 
placed in a social situation where they would be willing to cooperate for producing social 
necessaries, rather than each working for satisfying the entire battery of his own individual 
needs.510 In other words, the social division of labor preceded and conditioned the technical 
                                                
510 I retain Wakefield’s gender denominations throughout the chapter. 
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division of labor in production.511 England represented a sterling case of the social and technical 
division of labor, as combined labor set in work in agriculture in turn released more labor which 
could then be combined in large scale manufactures, feeding not only into social specialization 
between agriculture and manufacture, but also technical specialization within each sector.  In 
contrast, the “cottier system” in Ireland, France, and America was characterized by the dispersal 
of the factors of production amongst a large number of small producers who had to allocate their 
labor time amongst various tasks, or in other words, by the division of individual labor and 
consolidation of employments. The consequent lack of specialization and absence of economic 
scale resulted in the production of fewer commodities of poorer quality, and posed a formidable 
obstacle to the accumulation of capital (Ibid, 331). 
 The crux of Wakefield’s reformulation of Smith’s “division of labor” lay in the 
preconditions of combined labor, an insight, as we shall see, he derived from his study of 
colonial economies. Smith had assumed the social division of labor to be always already present 
in all human societies, from the earliest recesses of time.512 According to Wakefield, this 
assumption flowed from the confusion of the state of the British society for the state of all human 
societies. Great Britain represented an exceptional case in human history insofar as it was the 
first society where the “laborers for hire constitute the bulk of the people” (AC, 793). “One 
                                                
511 The specific form of cooperative production whereby individuals performing different activities would satisfy 
mutual needs was the commodity economy. Marx would later develop this point in his discussion of cooperation and 
the centrality of social division of labor to commodity production. Marx, Capital Vol. 1, chaps. 13 and 14. A 
focused theorization of the difference and relation between social division of labor and technical division of labor 
can be found in Perelman, Invention of Capitalism, especially chap. 4. 
512 Smith wrote, “As it is by treaty, by barter, and by purchase, that we obtain from one another the greater part of 
those mutual good offices which we stand in need of, so it is this same trucking disposition which originally gives 
occasion to the division of labour. In a tribe of hunters or shepherds a particular person makes bows and arrows, for 
example, with more readiness and dexterity than any other. He frequently exchanges them for cattle or for venison 
with his companions; and he finds at last that he can in this manner get more cattle and venison, than if he himself 
went to the field to catch them. From a regard to his own interest, therefore, the making of bows and arrows grows 
to be his chief business, and he becomes a sort of armourer.” Smith, Wealth of Nations, bk. I, chap. II, par. 3. He 
made the same point with hunters and bowmakers, almost ad verbatim, in Lectures on Jurisprudence, where he 
concluded, “This bartering and trucking spirit is the cause of the separation of trades and the improvements in arts.” 
Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), chap. VI, par. 46. 
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cannot use capital merely by wishing to use it,” Wakefield contended; “the use of capital and 
division of labor result from some anterior improvement” (EA, 325-6), and the formation of a 
workforce for hire, or a class of wage-laborers, comprised this “anterior improvement.” Thanks 
to the availability of a large dispossessed labor force in England, labor could be combined in 
various forms, in different degrees, and for a multiplicity of tasks, because laborers lacked 
independent access to means of labor and social reproduction and therefore deferred to the 
managerial authority of the employer. The existence of “the laboring class; that is, a class whose 
only property is their labor, and who live by the sale of that property to the other classes” 
ensured that laborers would voluntarily submit, via contractual agreements, to function as part of 
combined labor and characterized those “modern states, which deserve to be called civilized” 
(EA, 337). In less “civilized” countries such as Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and France, the 
predominance of small proprietorship turned people into “something between capitalists and 
workmen,” whereas in England, “a complete separation has taken place between capitalists and 
workmen, the labouring class compose the vast majority of the people” (Ibid, 338).513 
 This “complete separation” lauded by Wakefield would later be theorized by Marx under 
the rubric of “primitive accumulation,” “the process which divorces the worker from the 
ownership of the conditions of his own labor.”514 Marx zeroed in on the centrality of this 
                                                
513 The connection between the presence of a dispossessed workforce and civilization traced the Scottish 
Enlightenment predication of the civilized ways of life on property relations, economic division of labor, social 
complexity, and the generation of material surplus that could sustain leisure necessary for cultivating arts, letters, 
sciences, polished manners and refined morals – a connection we will revisit in length below. Secondly, the 
association of wage labor with civilization stemmed from the absence of direct coercion that contrasted starkly with 
serfdom, corvee, slavery and other forms of bonded labor braided with open extra-economic force. Marx himself 
observed this moral valence of wage labor when he remarked that wage labor under capitalist social division of 
labor “appears as a more refined and civilized means of exploitation.” Marx, Capital Vol. 1, p. 486. For the Scottish 
Enlightenment parameters of civilization and their connection to social, economic, and legal conditions, see Berry, 
Social Theory of the Scottish Enlightenment, especially chaps. 5 and 6. 
514 Marx, Capital Vol. 1, p. 874. A superb treatment of primitive accumulation as an essentially theoretical, rather 
than historicist, notion is provided by Massimo de Angelis’s works. The great merit of de Angelis’s argument is to 
theorize this notion as originary in the constitutive sense of being present whenever capital-relation is produced and 
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separation to Wakefield’s analysis and considered him as the theorist of primitive accumulation 
par excellence.515 Marx maintained that the expropriation of the immediate producer constituted 
the “prehistory of capital” and the precondition of the “capital-relation” that hinged on the 
extraction of surplus labor from the dispossessed worker for the self-valorization of capital. 
Equally significantly in this case, the capital-relation proceeded through the fair exchange of 
labor-power for wages freely contracted on the labor market. The majority of the population in 
England who were “set free, to follow other pursuits” were thus free in the double sense of the 
term: free to sell their labor to whomever they pleased, and free (that is, cut off) from the means 
of production, first and foremost, the soil. This double freedom that Wakefield celebrated as a 
liberal political economist had its concrete genealogy in the English Enclosures and Highland 
Clearances, which marked the makings of the modern English working class through the legal 
and political violence of the “bloody legislation” and “parliamentary enclosures.”516  
The historical process of primitive accumulation was omitted in Wakefield’s works,517 
and its place filled by what I call a “myth of voluntary dispossession.” As will be discussed 
                                                
reproduced. See, de Angelis, “Separating the Doing and the Deed,” and Beginning of History, especially chapters 10 
and 11. 
515 Marx, Capital Vol. 1, chap. 33. 
516 On English enclosures in general and the place of Parliamentary Enclosures therein, see Marx, Capital Vol. 1, 
chapters 26-27; Gregory Clark and Anthony Clark, “The Enclosure of English Common Lands, 1475-1839,” 
Economic History Review 61 (2001): 1009-1036; G. E. Mingay, Parliamentary Enclosure in England: An 
Introduction to its Causes, Incidence, and Impact, 1750-1850 (London: Longman, 1997); J. M. Neeson, 
Commoners: Common Right, Enclosure, and Social Change in Common-Field England, 1700-1820 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993); Joan Thirsk, Tudor Enclosures (London: Routledge and Paul, 1959); Michael E. 
Turner, English Parliamentary Enclosure: Its Historical Geography and Economic History (Folkstone: W. Dawson, 
1980); J. A. Yelling, Common Field and Enclosure in England: 1450-1850 (Hamden, Archon Books: 1977). For a 
brief overview of the “bloody legislation,” see Marx, Capital Vol. 1, chapter 28. A fascinating study of the 
repressive legislation that worked to consolidate wage relations is provided by Peter Linebaugh’s London Hanged: 
Crime and Civil Society in the Eighteenth Century (New York: Verso, 2003). A similar history, with an Atlantic 
scope and an emphasis of the resistance of laborers to such legislation, can be found in Linebaugh and Rediker, 
Many-Headed Hydra. 
517 One exception was an early-nineteenth century pamphlet reproduced in England and America (pp. 340-2), 
mainly to the effect, however, of emphasizing the pauperization of the English agricultural laborers rather than 
criticizing enclosures per se. The same pamphlet also criticized the Poor Rates instated by the Speenhamland Laws 
for not only driving wages down but also impairing motives to industry, providence, and good conduct. John 
Martin’s mistaken attribution of this pamphlet to Wakefield himself has disposed him to think of Wakefield as at 
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below, while Wakefield evinced a keen perspicacity in explaining the causes of colonial slavery 
with reference to the historical absence of “wage-labor” in colonies,518 he spared the origins of 
wage labor from the same historical-analytic probe. Instead, he assigned it, much like Adam 
Smith, to the fictional recesses of time. By claiming that “the accumulation of stock must, in the 
nature of things, be previous to the division of labor,” Smith had endowed political economy 
with the theological element of “original sin.”519 Marx argued that Smith’s position partook in a 
“childish insipidness” in that it envisioned a spontaneous emergence of wage labor through 
initial acts of parsimony and profligacy, whereby a “diligent, intelligent, and frugal elite” 
accumulated wealth and a great many “lazy rascals … finally had nothing to sell but their 
skins.”520 While Wakefield did not share Smith’s assumptions of spontaneity in the birth of 
social division of labor, he spun a fable no less conjectural. Prior to the separation between 
workers and capitalists, all individuals worked on their own “capital” only as necessary to ensure 
their own subsistence – not unlike, Wakefield added, the contemporary state of American 
settlers, Irish cottagers, or French peasants. Far from triggering an unequal “accumulation of 
stock,” the natural unfolding of the production process reached a plateau where “all members of 
the society are supposed to possess equal portions of capital” (Ibid, 326, emphasis added). Such 
egalitarianism, however, “would not admit of much further improvement in the productive 
powers of industry” (Ibid).  Under these conditions, “no man would have a motive for 
accumulating more capital than he could use with his own hands,” making it impossible to 
undertake any work, such as infrastructural projects, that required the “employment of many 
hands and fixed capital” (Ibid, 326). An economically stationary stage ensued and locked society 
                                                
heart sympathetic to workers’ cause and their desire to have access to land. As will be shown below, nothing could 
be farther than the truth. John Martin, “Small Nation,” pp. 108-9. 
518 See William, Capitalism and Slavery, chapter 1. 
519 Smith, Wealth of Nations, Book II, Introduction; Marx, Capital Vol. 1, p. 873 
520 Marx, Capital Vol. 1, 873. 
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in a paradigm of mere subsistence by confining it to at best a primitive economy of petty 
commodity production. With this conjecture, Wakefield gestured towards at least an implicit 
antagonism of interest between the individual left to his own devices to pursue his ends and 
society whose common good lay in a configuration of economic behavior beyond what could be 
spontaneously expected from individuals. 
Instead of confronting this problem in historical terms, however, Wakefield took refuge 
in the convenient proposition that  
Mankind have adopted a  … contrivance for promoting the accumulation of capital, and the use of capital 
when required, both in large masses and fixed shape: they have divided themselves into owners of capital 
and owners of labour. But this division was, in fact, the result of concert or combination of labour. The 
capitals of all being equal, one man saves because he expects to find others to work for him; other men 
spend because they expect to find some men ready to employ them; and if it were not for this readiness to 
cooperate, to act in concert or combination, the division of the industrious classes into capitalists and 
labourers could not be maintained (Ibid, 326-7). 
 
That individuals could “concert” to their own dispossession and therefore to their dependence on 
others for their subsistence in order to promote capital accumulation has struck some as absurd, 
to say the least.521 Indeed the fable in question posits rational and self-possessed individuals 
inhabiting a sort of natural state with equal freedoms to make use of their labor and stock. It then 
places these individuals in a quasi-tacit social contract of dispossession to which they accede in 
full knowledge of the ends to be achieved (capital accumulation) and the means to achieve them 
(separation of labor from the instruments of labor). Rather than dismissing such ideas as absurd, 
it might be more helpful to consider Wakefield’s conjecture as a fantasy for accommodating the 
imperative of primitive accumulation within a liberal cast by removing any and all possibility of 
constitutive coercion, unfreedom, and inequality from the process by which “free labor” comes 
                                                
521 Marx’s withering disdain for classical political economists is well known, and he did not spare Wakefield. Marx, 
Capital Vol. 1, p. 934. Perelman likewise dismisses Wakefield’s conjecture as outrageous and absurd. Perelman, 
Invention of Capitalism, chapter 10. Such summary dismissals are unfortunate, for they miss the significance of such 
hypothetical conjectures in suturing the rifts in the theoretical fabric, navigating tensions and aporias, and effacing 
the limitations of a system of argumentation. 
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into being. Equally importantly, this liberal cast betrays a utilitarian bent, since proletarianization 
is not the unintended consequence of fortuitous profligacy or frugality, but a socially conceived 
necessity and an object of cognition that impacts how individuals choose to behave. “Saving” or 
“spending” based on one’s expectations of others’ economic behavior presents itself as an option 
only insofar as a patterned social reality underpinned by particular institutional arrangements 
(such as private property and a market in free labor) is in place or in the making. Shifting the 
angle from individual behavior to social totality, given the ends of capital accumulation, the 
maintenance of the institutional arrangements that reproduce a specific social pattern represents 
the means by which individual incentives governing economic behavior are keyed to capital 
accumulation. While, pace J. B. Brebner, I would not stretch Wakefield’s utilitarianism to the 
borders of “bureaucratic collectivism,”522 the notion of a quantifiable common good (however 
rudimentary), instrumental causality, and legal positivism that flow from this philosophy 
constituted crucial theoretical resources for Wakefield’s peculiar negotiation of the historical 
necessity of primitive accumulation. For while Wakefield put a contractual lid on the problem of 
primitive accumulation for the time being, the conundrum of the illiberal origins of capitalism 
would return to haunt his analysis, especially when his plans for establishing capitalism de novo 
in the colonies forced him to revisit these origins, trailing in their wake similar myths of 
contractual dispossession. 
 
Overaccumulation and Crisis of Social Reproduction 
Before Wakefield could turn to the colonies, however, he had to face a more pressing 
problem at home. The blessed fruit of a large proletarian workforce that had been growing on the 
                                                
522 J. B. Brebner, “Laissez-Faire and State Intervention in Nineteenth Century Britain,” The Journal of Economic 
History 8 (1948): 59-73. 
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soil of primitive accumulation was turning bitter in the 1820s and 1830s. The immediate cause of 
the problem was the overaccumulation of capital in England. The end of the Napoleonic Wars 
sealed a major well into which the English agriculture and industry had been pouring the output 
of their expanding capacity, causing a glut in the commodity markets and prompting the 
imposition of the Corn Laws to prevent the total collapse of agricultural prices in England. 
Consequently, diminishing returns on capital investment discouraged the investment of savings, 
culminating in an “abundance of CAPITAL” (Ibid, 324). “Capital creates capital,” declared 
Wakefield, and in England “by reason of the vast masses of capital already invested, there seems 
but little room for the profitable investment of more, millions accumulate so rapidly, that funds 
are never wanted for even the most hazardous undertakings” (Ibid). Wakefield was in effect 
assailing Say’s Law by contending that post-war England had been suffering from systemic 
overproduction. Since 1815, woefully low profits struck not one or two but all of the major 
sectors of the English economy (farming, manufacture, commerce, and retail). “Each distress has 
lasted fifteen years, and all the distresses together make a permanent general distress … [a] 
steady national distress” (Ibid, 355, emphases added). Since the end of the war, rapidly 
accumulating capital could find no space for investment and realization in England, regularly 
flowing out to unproductive speculative ventures, “glutting distant markets,” and inflating short-
lived bubbles (such as in South American mines or foreign securities) only to be subject to 
“occasional destruction on the grandest scale” (AC, 798).523 
                                                
523 Examining the conditions leading up to the economic crisis of 1825-6, Boyd Hilton remarks, “The reduction of 
interest on government debt, and a shortage of opportunities for domestic investment in the period between the canal 
and railway building eras, fortuitously deflected all this extra capital into foreign loans and joint-stock ventures 
overseas.” Hildon, Corn, Cash, Commerce, pp. 204-5. For a broad historical perspective on financialization, 
speculation, and economic crises, see Charles Kindleberger, Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial 
Crises (New York: Basic Books, 1978). 
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 If the problem remained confined to the cyclical destruction of excess capital, there 
would be no cause for alarm. However, absence of new investment also meant growing 
unemployment and the approximation of wages to the “minimum” level. While the immediate 
cause of the fall in wages was greater competition for jobs in an “overstocked labor market,” the 
influx into England of “barbarous and easily satisfied Irishmen” and the factory system that 
rendered “the work performed by man’s labor more simple and easy” combined to depress wages 
below what used to be an acceptable pay for the English workman (Ibid, 343-4). The latter was 
no longer a freeman, nor was he a slave; he was a “pauper” (Ibid, 339). Acute pauperization was 
compounded by chronic proletarianization due to capitalist competition at narrow profit margins. 
Large enterprises could weather the low profit rate by virtue of their scale, whereas small 
capitalists, whether in agriculture, manufactures or commerce, frequently sunk into bankruptcy, 
leaving behind “hundreds and thousands of people who lost their capital” and joined the ranks of 
the laboring class (Ibid, 356).524 Pauperization and proletarianization prepared the conditions for 
the ruthless exploitation and deplorable working conditions of the poor masses, especially 
women and children who were particularly vulnerable. Wakefield’s middle-class philanthropy 
blossomed in his sympathetic account of children recruited through parish apprenticeship system 
who perished while being overworked in millineries or sweeping chimneys, women who found 
no avenue of livelihood available but “prostitution for bread,” many who dove into the pit of 
crime and ended up in “fine jails,” and those who sought consolation in the gin-shops 
                                                
524 In her reconstruction of the genealogy of totalitarianism, Arendt remarked that the imperialist expansion in the 
last third of the nineteenth century “had been touched off by a curious kind of economic crisis, the overproduction of 
capital and the emergence of superfluous money … which could no longer find productive investment within the 
national borders,” which was accompanied by “another by-product of capitalist production: the human debris that 
every crisis, following invariable upon each period of industrial growth, eliminated permanently from producing 
society.” The insight of Arendt’s observation is acute; however, its historical claim is off the mark by several 
decades. Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, pp. 135, 150. 
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mushrooming in poor neighborhoods (Ibid, 347-351).525 Rebuking the haughty moralism of his 
time, Wakefield declared, “not vice and misery, Mr. Malthus, but misery and vice is the order of 
checks to population … In England, those who compose the bulk of the people are too cheap to 
be happy” (Ibid, 353).526 If Malthus stripped political economy of morality, then Wakefield 
rendered morality dependent on political economy.527 
 At the heart of the problem lay the separation of labor from the instruments of 
production, the very fount of England’s economic superiority. In times of economic growth, this 
separation formed the precondition of capitalist productivity insofar as it enabled combined 
employment and technical division of labor under the efficient direction of capital. However, the 
absence of sufficiently high rates of profit vitiated the structural conditions and subjective 
incentives necessary for investment (combination of labor and capital in production), thereby 
generating glut in capital (low interest rate and speculation) and labor (unemployment and 
underemployment). Wakefield attempted to explain this paradox by introducing a third variable 
to capital-labor binary, namely, the “field of employment,”528 which broadly denoted the field of 
                                                
525 Deteriorating conditions of the urban poor would prompt an investigation in 1840 by Royal Commission of 
Inquiry into Children's Employment. Karl Marx provides a striking account of the hyper-exploitation of children in 
manufacturing and domestic industries, which would prompt a most devoutly capitalist and callous political 
economists like Nassau Senior to declaim “the most frightful picture of avarice, selfishness and cruelty on the part of 
masters and parents, and of juvenile and infantile misery, and destruction ever presented.” Nassau Senior, Social 
Science Congress, pp. 55-8, quoted in Marx, Capital Vol. 1, pp. 623-4. 
526 Susan Thorne offers an original account of the shift in English middle-class philanthropy from socioeconomic to 
moral explanations for the plight of the poor, mainly in response to the aristocratic backlash against what the upper 
classes perceived to be a subversive collusion between the middle and lower orders. As I illustrate below, Wakefield 
was quite aware of this collusion and its potential consequences, which occupied a significant place in his analysis 
of the political crisis he believed awaited Britain. See Susan Thorne, “The Conversion of Englishmen and the 
Conversion of the World Inseparable: Missionary Imperialism and the Language of Class in Early Industrial 
Britain,” in Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World, ed. Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura 
Stoler (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1997). 
527 Malthus’s exclusion of moral questions, especially as regards the condition of the poor, from the management of 
the economy is a point agreed upon by a diverse scholarship. See, for example, McNally, Against the Market, chap. 
3; Himmelfarb, Idea of Poverty, chaps. 4 and 5. 
528 Wakefield used the terms, “field of employment,” “field of production” and “field of investment” 
interchangeably. I will be referring to this notion simply as “the field” in the rest of the paper. Wakefield’s theory 
brought together the Ricardian theory of diminishing agricultural returns and Smithian theory of competition of 
capitals to explain the saturation of the field of employment and falling profits. While he most frequently identified 
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profitable opportunities for investment. Wakefield pilloried the orthodox for their “worship of 
capital,” which had rendered “Bentham, Ricardo, Mill, M’Culloch, and others” blind to a 
fundamental tenet of political economy: “capital” was not synonymous with “production” (EA, 
371) and “it does not follow that, because labour is employed by capital, capital always finds a 
field in which to employ labour” (Ibid, 517).529 
The proportion between the amount of capital and the field of employment in any 
country, by impacting profits and wages, constituted the variable of economic expansion or 
stagnation.530 Readily available fertile land comprised an abundant source of foodstuffs and raw 
material, reducing the costs of reproducing labor and of industrial inputs, thereby maintaining 
high profits and high real wages, creating further incentives for investment and employment. The 
best illustration of a large field-to-capital ratio was America, where capital, no matter how fast it 
accumulated, found profits from improvement and agriculture in the fresh lands opened up by 
the westward expansion.531 By contrast, the dearth of uncultivated fertile land in England, 
combined with the Corn Laws that reduced access to the produce of fertile lands elsewhere, 
constricted the field in which capital could circulate. “War ceasing, great masses of capital were 
                                                
the field of employment with fertile land (Ibid, 375), he deployed the term more capaciously to refer, on the one 
hand, to productivity, specialization, and comparative advantage in the use of land, and on the other, to the expanse 
of the markets in which surplus produce could be realized (AC, 804). 
529 In explaining the relationship between capital and field of employment, Wakefield resorted to a strange literary 
strategy by arguing to have discovered this insight in a dream. In his dream, Wakefield found himself on Robinson 
Crusoe’s island. After a long night’s chat about Crusoe’s rich stock and cozy comforts, he woke up to rising sea 
levels that flooded most of Crusoe’s arable land and rendered most of his “capital” superfluous (EA, 366-70). The 
dream, one has to admit, was very poorly and awkwardly constructed, yet its significance can be interpreted to 
emphasize the pervasiveness of economic orthodoxy Wakefield was combating, such that only the insights of a 
dream could break through its encrustation. 
530 Wakefield constructed a broad taxonomic system based on the relative ratios of capital, labor, and field, for 
explaining the average the level of profits and wages in different countries. His approach was fundamentally 
comparative and underlain with ideas of uneven development. Differential capital-labor-field ratios yielded high 
profits and high wages in America, high profits and low wages in Bengal, high wages and low profits in postwar 
France, and low profits and low wages in postwar England (EA, 375). 
531 Marx made a similar remark regarding the US expansion to Native American lands. Marx argued that thanks to 
the expanding arable fields, the application of machinery to agriculture did not yet expel any agricultural workers in 
America, in direct contrast to English agriculture. Marx, Capital Vol. 1, p. 637.  
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no longer wasted every year but were accumulated in England … Both the capital and the people 
increased faster than the field of production was enlarged” (EA, 376).532  
Wakefield utilized hydraulic imagery to express the dynamic between capital and the 
field. The trope of “want of room,” that is, too narrow a field of employment, dotted his analysis 
and pertained first and foremost to capital. The “competition of capital with capital” for limited 
profitable opportunities was “the immediate cause of all other competitions” (AC, 798). Limited 
investment curtailed employment and left “less room for the subordinate classes,” spurring 
competition not only amongst laborers but also amongst “professional classes” (doctors, lawyers, 
tutors, and the like) who were virtually “snatching the bread out of each other’s mouths” (Ibid, 
360-2). The aggregate impact of the cyclical economic crises, or “alternations of hoarding, 
wasting, and panic,” on England amounted to no less than a potential crisis of social 
reproduction at all levels of society: laboring classes drifted into pauperization and moral 
degradation; sons of the lesser gentry found respectable career opportunities foreclosed to them, 
which in turn undercut the prospects of marriage for the daughters of the same class (EA, 363-5); 
small capitalists joined the ranks of workers, while wealthy manufacturing and commercial 
classes slowly abandoned the “old-fashioned” habits of rationality and industry for financial 
speculation, and cultivated the “spirit of the gambler” (AC, 799).533  
                                                
532 A simple yet illuminative expression of the field of employment is “demand for capital” as reflected in the 
interest rate, and interest rates were unusually low in mid-1820s. Hilton, Corn, Cash, Commerce, chapter 8.  Too 
narrow a field of employment, that is, low to no demand for capital portended its immanent devaluation. Winch, 
“Classical Economics,” p. 97. 
533 Perhaps most strikingly, Wakefield situated England’s shift to overseas financial speculation in a broader pattern 
of economic collapse that he observed in Genoa, Venice, and Holland (EA, 375, 411). By correlating 
financialization and the dissolution of imperial economic formations and tracing this connection through Italy, 
Holland, and Britain, Wakefield presaged Arrighi’s conclusions in The Long Twentieth Century by a century-and-a-
half. Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times (New York: 
Verso, 1994). What Wakefield perceived to be speculation, however, in fact belonged to a broader trend in the 
composition of economic growth in England with commerce and finance claiming an increasing share. While 
England retained competitive advantage in manufactures for the most of the nineteenth century, European and 
American tariffs in 1830s forced a threefold change in the direction of English economic activity. First, British 
industrialists turned to India as a significant market. Secondly, Britain’s “failure to dominate her chief competitors, 
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One ingenious theoretical feat Wakefield accomplished throughout this exposition was to 
depict an “industrial and commercial system operating most inharmoniously and requiring a 
constant expansion of the fields of production and employment”534 while managing to steer the 
problem of political economic disharmony away from the waters of class conflict. In Wakefield’s 
narrative, capitalist and working classes rode the same boat (the former at the helm, of course), 
and they swam or sank together. “The agricultural laborer is a miserable wretch, no doubt,” 
Wakefield wrote, “because he obtains but a very small share of the produce of his labor; but this 
is a question, not of distribution, but of production” (EA, 329). Not the avarice of the employers 
but the extremely low profit margins graded wages down, since no employer would hire workers 
unless the latter’s labor yielded a profit. Put differently, the pie to be divided between the 
capitalist and the worker was too small, and Wakefield singled out the insufficient field of 
investment as the culprit. That in England “both classes, capitalists and laborers are fighting for 
room” offered support to the conjecture that “masters and servants have one and the same 
interest,” in stark contrast to the confused contentions about the distribution of surplus, which 
served nothing but introducing “bad blood” between the two classes (Ibid, 372-4). Therefore, by 
displacing the contradiction between labor and capital onto the contradiction between capital and 
the field of employment, Wakefield demoted a fundamentally political economic contradiction 
                                                
and especially to prevent their industrialization” spurred the formal expansion of her colonial dominions. Thirdly, it 
diverted capital into financial activities and “invisible earnings” from credit and capital exports. Expansion of white 
settler colonies in America and Australasia absorbed most of the British financial capital. P. J. Cain, “Economics 
and Empire: The Metropolitan Context” in  The Oxford History of the British Empire Vol. 3, ed. Roger Louis 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 34-5; P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, “The Political Economy of British 
Expansion Overseas, 1750-1914,” The Economic History Review 33 (1980): 463-90, p. 466. Since 1822, Britain had 
been running a visible trade deficit, which had reached £23 million per annum in 1840s; however, the country was in 
£5 million in credit per annum during the same period, thanks to “invisibles” that reached the £28 million notch, 
“more than a quarter of which came from earnings in overseas investments.” Boyd Hilton, Mad, Bad, and 
Dangerous, pp. 12-13.  The ascendancy of commercial and finance capital in Britain has been theorized by Cain and 
Hopkins as the rise of “gentlemanly capitalism.” See P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation 
and Expansion, 1688-1914 (New York: Longman, 1993). For a useful essay that situates these arguments in the 
broader landscape of theories on empire and economics, see A. R. Dilley, “The Economics of Empire,” in The 
British Empire: Themes and Perspectives, ed. Sarah Stockwell (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008). 
534 Semmel, “Philosophic Radicals,” p. 87. 
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(the separation of labor from the instruments of production) to a technical economic 
contradiction (the rational reluctance of capital to employ labor under low profits). The natural 
convergence of interest between capital and labor constituted a major utilitarian cornerstone in 
Wakefield’s thought, one that was chiseled from the idea of aggregate economic growth as 
summum bonum. Wakefield would lean on this cornerstone more than once in his attempts to 
reconcile, on the one hand, his proposed policies of primitive accumulation necessary for 
capitalist reproduction in the colonies, and on the other, the liberal premises of free labor and 
laissez-faire hegemonic in his time. 
 
Dilemma of Democracy and Civilization 
A possible solution, conceivable within the parameters of Wakefield’s analysis and also 
conformant to the laissez-faire sensibility of the time, was to wait until excess capital and labor 
were destroyed and “the quantity for use is brought to a level with the field of investment” (Ibid, 
798), though this would mean widespread poverty, famine, disease, and death. Such a solution 
might have seemed acceptable, necessary, or even inevitable for Reverend Malthus, but for 
Wakefield, passivity threatened more than just the misery and decimation of the laboring poor. 
His ominous remark, “if their condition be such that it must be worse before it can be better, the 
crisis is coming” gave expression to a growing anxiety of his time (EA, 353). The laboring poor 
did not share Malthus’s fatalism; instead, they embarked on the path of political organization for 
social change. Socialism and Chartism were riding the wave of popular radicalization that had 
sprouted in the early nineteenth century, and despite such repressive reactions as the Peterloo 
Massacre and Six Acts, the laboring classes were continuing to agitate for universal suffrage.535 
Adding to these sources of political distress and most immediate for Wakefield’s context, the 
                                                
535 Richard Brown, Chartism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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Swing Riots erupted in 1830 in the south and east of the English countryside, destroying 
agricultural machinery, setting fire to ricks, and destroying tithe barns.536 
Wakefield wove a fascinating narrative of popular dissent and mobilization in England 
that revolved around class relations with the middle order as the pivot of the story. The French 
Revolution of 1789 had roused the English middle classes from their “slothful and slavish” 
immersion in mundane economic affairs and sparked “political excitement” for reforming a 
corrupt and inefficient constitutional order (Ibid, 387). This impulse gained a new direction with 
the Haitian Revolution that alerted the middle classes to the plight of the “slaves” at home, and 
kindled the philanthropic mission to “improve the physical and moral state of their inferiors” 
(Ibid, 389). The pressure of the aristocratic-clerical backlash notwithstanding, the political 
pedagogy of the middle class taught the English working class “to be thoroughly discontented 
with their lot,” and instilled the belief that “their misery was owing to bad government” (Ibid, 
391).537 The most important development that turned the recently acquired political 
consciousness into a combustible political force was the July Revolution of 1830 in France, 
where the poor urban masses made “the very important discovery” of the “barricades,” which in 
turn “led to this great political discovery in England; that the nation had outgrown its laws” (Ibid, 
394-5). Haunted by the specter of urban revolt and pounded by public pressure, the Parliament 
finally passed the Reform Act of 1832. The subsequent electoral reform appeased the middle 
classes; however, persistent property qualifications for the franchise frustrated the laboring 
                                                
536 Eric Hobsbawm and George Rudé, Captain Swing (New York: Norton, 1975). 
537 “It seems well to observe here,” wrote Wakefield insightfully, “that ever since the poor of England were taught to 
read, the English have found a standing army absolutely necessary” (EA, 391). 
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masses, instigating the dissolution of the alliance between the two classes and the birth of 
Chartism.538 
“The new constitution of England was obtained by physical force,” Wakefield contended, 
and “those who compose the physical force know this, are proud of it, and will never forget it. 
Universal suffrage was, is, and will be the object of the working classes” (Ibid, 399-400). This 
left the newly empowered middle classes facing a grim dilemma, and a properly political 
economic one at that. One the one hand, they could not honestly and credibly deny the vote to 
the laboring class to whom “they owed they charter” and with whom they could not risk an open 
confrontation. Class conflict was not an option because of the peculiar political economy of 
England, which harbored a preponderantly urban proletariat and a very complex social and 
technical division of labor (AC, 793-4). Under these conditions, “the regular course of industry 
depends so much on confidence and credit” that “any social convulsion, if it should last but a 
week, must produce a series of convulsions, one more violent than the other” (EA, 400; also see 
AC, 795). Unlike America, Ireland, or other states of Europe (except Holland), where the 
persistence of peasant economies would dampen the ramifications of social unrest, English 
economy and social structure was rendered very fragile by the very separation of labor from the 
means of production. 
On the other hand, the middle classes could not immediately give in to the demand for 
wider democracy, for the wretched and degraded state of the laboring poor sheared them of the 
reason and foresight necessary for exercising political power. The whole matter ultimately boiled 
                                                
538 “Chartism and socialism,” Wakefield observed wryly, represented the “fruits of popular education in this 
country” (AC, 793). There is a conspicuous resemblance between Wakefield’s and Marx’s accounts of the political 
education of the middle and working classes, and the role that the former played in drawing out the latter to the 
political arena in its struggle against aristocracy, inadvertently supplying the working class with the preconditions of 
its own political education. The tendency Wakefield observed pointed to “many a struggle for the mastery over a 
restricted franchise and private property: and in these struggles, I perceive immense danger for everybody” (Ibid, 
794). 
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down to the problem of property. Laws promulgated by the representatives and in the interest of 
a “poor, discontent and ignorant” multitude would invariably target private wealth and ultimately 
culminate in a “revolution in property” – a point overlooked by the philanthropists, Wakefield 
observed condescendingly, who were not tutored in political economy (Ibid, 404). Even though 
Wakefield admitted that the pre-1832 economic legislation expropriated the lower orders through 
policies on interest and the national debt, a counter-expropriation through inflationary measures 
would open the flood-gates to repairing “one great robbery [by] another great robbery” (Ibid). 
Under “a legislature moved by the wretched,” therefore, “there would be no end to confiscation” 
(Ibid, 405). Insecurity of property would decimate investor confidence, freeze credit markets, 
ignite capital flight, terminate in economic depression that would exacerbate the condition of all 
classes, worker and capitalist alike (AC, 794-5). Hence, from a utilitarian perspective 
confiscation would not only “injure the majority,” but for England (unlike for France’s more 
rudimentary economy) was “synonymous with destruction” (EA, 405).539 
At stake, then, was nothing less than survival of “civilization” under the inevitable advent 
of “democracy,” a question that had preoccupied prominent European intellects since the French 
Revolution.540 As Thomas Holt correctly observes, the British “defined civilization in their own 
terms and according to their own value system, a system honed over the past century as Britons 
shaped and were shaped by a capitalist political economy.”541 The compatibility of this 
civilization with democracy could no longer be confined to speculation and had to be confronted 
                                                
539 Wakefield saw “inestimable value” in “a distinct and full account of the political economy of the French 
Revolution,” mainly to inform an estimation of the economic costs of property confiscation in Britain (AC, 795). 
Similar concerns had been raised by Edmund Burke at the height of the Revolution. The important point to 
emphasize is that when it came to the question of property, Wakefield’s utilitarianism and Burke’s conservatism put 
aside their differences and converged on the primacy and indispensability of a “political order” as such, in 
comparison to which the nature of that order ranked as secondary. See. Pocock, “Political Economy of Burke's 
Analysis.” 
540 See, for example, John Stuart Mill, “Spirit of the Age,” and “Civilization” in Essays in Politics and Culture, ed. 
Gertrude Himmelfarb (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1973). Also see, O’Neill, Burke-Wollstonecraft Debate. 
541 Holt, Problem of Freedom, p. 76. 
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by the English at the policy level.542 If the “misery and ignorance” of the English laboring 
population disposed it to abuse the extended suffrage, Wakefield argued, then the concrete 
solution had to tackle the political economic roots of such misery and ignorance.543 “Nature 
herself forbids that you should make a wise and virtuous people out of a starving one,” and only 
by providing the working class with “high wages, leisure, peace of mind, and instruction” that 
one could cultivate “prudence and wisdom” necessary for self-rule (Ibid, 410). And the wages 
could be raised only by solving the problem of overaccumulation, by expanding the field in 
which redundant English capital could productively employ English labor. The temporal horizon 
of Wakefield’s solution displayed a humble realism, though one shot through with urgency. 
While he reckoned that maintaining high wages “for twenty years or so” and bestowing “comfort 
and knowledge upon one generation of the poorer class might be a step to the permanent cure of 
misery and vice,” he emphatically asserted, “there is not a year to lose” (Ibid, 407-10).544 On this 
depended not only the “great experiment” of reconciling democracy and civilization, but the very 
“existence [of the English] as a wealthy and civilized nation” (Ibid, 410). 
 The grand implication of this long exposition can be summarized as follows. For 
Wakefield, the separation of labor from capital constituted both the necessary precondition of 
capitalist civilization, inasmuch as it underpinned social and technical division of labor, and the 
principal source of its crisis, insofar as it made the combination of labor and capital tenuously 
dependent on profitability. When profitability declined, the outcome was misery amongst plenty, 
                                                
542 The situation was delicate and pregnant with momentous, if opposing, possibilities. Whigs saw themselves, Holt 
argues, standing between a new liberal order and the chaos of the mob. Holt, Problem of Freedom, p. 51. 
543 Dangerous political dispositions extended beyond the “wretches” and inflected those whose initial fortunes had 
fallen prey to the destructive vicissitudes of overaccumulation. “A ruined man is a dangerous citizen; and I suspect 
that there are at all times in this country more people who have been ruined than in any other country” (AC, 799). 
544 When it came to the question whether population pressure on the means of subsistence could be resolved 
permanently, the general opinion was pessimistic. Nonetheless, ensuring prosperity and comfort for a single 
generation, some believed, would grant the British policy makers the “breathing room” necessary for the political 
education of the working classes. See, Winch, Classical Political Economy, chapter 6; Semmel, Rise of Free Trade 
Imperialism, chapters 3 and 4; Kittrell, “Development of the Theory of Colonization.” 
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which stoked the fires of labor militancy. In the metropole, the labor problem was a political 
problem. Each economic bust added to the numbers of the pauperized, aggrieved, and barbarized 
proletarians. By cramping them ever more ruthlessly in the already-congested labor market, it 
built up the systemic pressure that threatened to explode in social upheaval that would be 
tantamount to a civilizational bust. For Wakefield, the stakes of the upheaval were the 
destruction of the capital-relation through the forcible abridgment of the separation between 
labor and the instruments of production. This would mean peasantization, a return to the rude 
lifestyle that characterized “less civilized” countries such as Ireland, Portugal, and America.545 
This meant the end of civilization as the early Victorians knew it. As Bernard Semmel accurately 
points out, most of what has been considered the exclusive province of Marxist analysis, such the 
internal contradictions and crisis of capitalism, overaccumulation, socioeconomic polarization, 
and class conflict, was anticipated by Wakefield and some other Philosophic Radicals “over a 
decade before Marx came to England.”546 
 For keeping the capital-relation operational (ensuring at once the dispossession and the 
employment of labor), Wakefield offered two solutions. The first was the Repeal of the Corn 
Laws in order to access an enlarged field of production by way of commerce. As long as Britain 
could buy cheap corn cultivated on American lands, she would effectively expand her field, 
reduce the costs of reproducing British labor, and raise real wages and profits at once. While 
Wakefield’s argument was a commonplace of the free trade position, he went beyond this 
commonplace by arguing that the Repeal catered to the interests of all social classes in Britain. 
                                                
545 Wakefield broke tectonic economic cycles to four main stages. The “progressive” stage was characterized by the 
accumulation and relatively even distribution of capital. The “stationary” stage (an obvious citation of Ricardo) 
witnessed the slowing down of accumulation and falling profits. If continued unabated, stagnation culminated in 
economic crisis, which in turn led to the fourth, “retrograde” stage in which capital dissipated, means of production 
scattered, and productivity vanished (EA, 376). 
546 Semmel, Liberal Ideal, p. 31. 
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Ricardo had proclaimed an inverse proportion between the interests of the landed classes and the 
interests of the rest of the society, and the promise of the “big loaf” had become in early 
nineteenth century a discursive nodal point around which working class discontent coalesced 
with the industrialists’ assault on the Corn Laws. Wakefield reversed this position by laying out 
in detail how the landlords could also materially benefit from the Repeal, through factor and 
product diversification under an expanded domestic market (thanks to rising real wages) and 
consequently enjoy higher rents (Ibid, 420-3).547 
 The assertion of class harmony paled in comparison to Wakefield’s other divergence 
from Ricardian free traders, namely, his view that the Repeal itself would not suffice to resolve 
England’s problems. Relying on free trade alone would not only expose England to the vagaries 
of the world market in food (a point also emphasized by Malthus and Torrens) but also introduce 
complications into financing food imports. By the 1830s, English manufactures were beginning 
to feel the sting of the American and European tariffs,548 which led Wakefield to propose the 
establishment of a free trade emporium off the coast of China, where English manufactures (and 
opium) could be exchanged for silver, which in turn could finance food imports from America 
and the Continent (Ibid, 431-60).549 Yet the complexity of this scheme encumbered it with high 
transaction costs and vulnerabilities in comparison to the more politically protected and 
economically predictable plan of turning imperial possessions into agricultural hinterlands, loyal 
to England, without tariffs, employing English labor, and hungry for the manufactures of the 
                                                
547 For a focused treatment of Wakefield’s rent theory and the Corn Laws, see Kittrell, “Wakefield and Classical 
Rent Theory.” 
548 Cain, “Economics and Empire,” p. 34. 
549 This proposal actually presaged the establishment of Hong Kong. Wakefield remarked, “if there be any foreign 
restriction on the foreign demand for English manufactured goods, restrictions which it is in the power of the 
English government to remove, interference for that purpose is a proper office, a bounden duty, of government” 
(EA, 430). It might come as a surprise that such proponents of free trade as the Colonial Reformers should later 
support the Opium War (which they did), but as we can see, the theoretical premises for endorsing the establishment 
of free trade by the military-diplomatic arm of the state were already in place in the early 1830s. 
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mother country.550 Crucially, this metropole-colony nexus depended not on monopoly but on the 
similarity of cultural tastes, which distinguished Wakefield’s vision of an “empire of free trade” 
from the mercantilism of the “old colonial system.”551 Wakefield’s consequent proclamation of a 
“new colonial system” was grandiose and visionary: 
The whole world is before you. Open new channels for the most productive employment of English 
capital.  Let the English buy bread from every people that has bread to sell cheap. Make England, for all 
that is produced by steam, the work-shop of the world. If, after this, there be capital and people to spare, 
imitate the ancient Greeks; take a lesson from the Americans, who, as their capital and population 
increase, find room for both by means of colonization. You have abundance, superabundance of capital; 
provide profitable employment for it, and you will improve the condition of all classes at once. … Invest 
it in colonization; so that, as it flies off, it may take with it, and employ a corresponding amount of labor, 
if there be any … May the explanation assist to point out a way, by which the English shall escape from 
that corrupting and irritating state of political economy, which seems fit to precede the dissolution of 
empires! (EA, 411). 
 
Ricardians had accomplished most of the theoretical work in favor of the Repeal, which was not 
yet to come for another decade-and-a-half. In contrast, colonization, though in existence, was at 
best scattered and spontaneous, and lacked a theoretical godfather. A major task was to recruit 
political economy to the cause of colonization while countering the orthodox indictments of 
colonies as “outdoor relief for the aristocracy.” This would involve demonstrating that all classes 
in England would gain by colonization, if properly conceived and executed. Wakefield stepped 
up for this role. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
550 However, Wakefield dissented from Torrens’s idea of an imperial Zollverein, the mercantilist residues of which 
did not square with Wakefield’s free trade principles. Plan of a Company (1830), for instance, stipulated free trade 
for the prospective Australian colony, not only with the mother country but also with the rest of the world. For 
Torrens’s vision of an imperial Zollverein and Wakefield’s response, see Lionel Robbins, Robert Torrens and the 
Evolution of Classical Economics (London: MacMillan & Co, 1958), chapters 6 and 7. 
551 Semmel, Liberal Ideal, p. 32. 
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II. Economic Labor Problem: The Colony 
Spontaneous Colonization and Its Shortcomings 
 Whether or not Britain actually teetered on the verge of a terminal economic crisis and 
political upheaval, its perception by the British political elite proved credible enough to incite 
action. One obvious remedy that presented itself to Wakefield’s contemporaries was to defuse 
the pressure of poverty and social unrest by shipping the poor, and especially the Irish, off to 
British colonies, initially to Canada and later to the antipodes.552 As Karen O’Brien puts it 
poignantly, the white settler in the early nineteenth century appeared “not so much as a standard-
bearer of Britain’s civilizing mission, but as a casualty of industrialization, war, and poverty, and 
as an economic migrant.”553 The main figure behind emigration schemes in the 1820s was Sir 
Robert Wilmot-Horton, the Tory Under-Secretary of State for War and the Colonies. Wilmot-
Horton justified his emigration proposals on economic and moral grounds. Economically, 
assisting the colonial emigration of the indigent by mortgaging the poor rates would have lower 
long-term costs than sustaining them at home.554 Culturally, Wilmot-Horton appealed to 
ascendant Tory Romanticism that condemned the morally corrosive impact of urbanization and 
industrialization and envisioned “return to the land” (in this case, colonial settlement) as a path to 
moral regeneration.555 Wilmot-Horton’s plans sparked a major political economic controversy. 
Ricardo, James Mill, Bentham, and McCulloch, joined by Malthus, displayed at best a lukewarm 
                                                
552 Emigration as a solution to the metropolitan population problem did not conquer policymaking minds easily and 
spontaneously, however. In 1815, emigration of skilled artisans and mechanics still constituted a crime under 
English law. By the end of the Napoleonic Wars, however, such mercantilist restrictions gave ground before the 
opinion that “emigration would help resolve the menacing spectre of overpopulation and act as a safety valve for 
popular discontent that was beginning to sweep the country in the aftermath of a severe economic depression and 
chronic post-war employment.” Kent Fedorowich, “The British Empire on the Move, 1760-1914,” in The British 
Empire: Themes and Perspectives, ed. Sarah Stockwell (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), p. 70. 
553 Karen O’Brien, “Colonial Emigration, Public Policy, and Tory Romanticism, 1783-1830,” in Exclusionary 
Empire: English Liberty Overseas, 1600-1900, ed. Jack P. Greene (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
p. 161. 
554 Fedorowich, “British Empire on the Move,” p. 72-3. 
555 O’Brien, “Colonial Emigration,” pp. 161-2. 
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attitude to colonization as an economic remedy, and perceived it desirable only if the burden of 
the poor rates exceeded those of assisting emigration; even then, emigration was to be deployed 
as a temporary measure.556 Robert Torrens and Nassau Senior by contrast were strong 
proponents of state-assisted emigration, although they disagreed with Wilmot-Horton’s specific 
proposals for funding the project. 
 Wakefield’s entry to this debate “may be compared to the descent of some gorgeous 
tropical bird among the sober denizens of a respectable farmyard.”557 Born to a Quaker middle-
class family of philanthropic ideas and deeds,558 son of a land agent who wrote a widely 
acclaimed survey of Ireland, and brimming with political ambitions that drove him to found a 
number of colonization societies and land companies,559 Wakefield did not conform to the 
average image of the political economist of his time. While Wakefield’s strong embrace of 
utilitarian principles situated him with the Philosophic Radicals, what distinguished him there 
were his efforts to convert, with some success, his fellow utilitarians to the cause of 
colonization.560 The inflection of Philosophic Radicalism with colonial concerns would result in 
the Colonial Reform Movement, and “the novelty and inner unity” of Wakefield’s doctrine 
                                                
556 Winch, Classical Political Economy, pp. 51-7; Shaw, “Introduction,” pp. 5-7. For the orthodox, the long-run 
tendency was still towards equilibrium. Colonization represented a matter of cost-benefit analysis and a better 
redistribution of internal factors of production. For Malthus and his “vacuum theory,” which contended that the 
demographic space opened up by emigration would be filled up by accelerated procreation, the real and permanent 
solution resided in the moral education of the poor in the ways of abstention. 
557 Robbins, Robert Torrens, p. 154.  
558 For the influence of Quaker heritage on Wakefield’s thought, see Graham Butterworth “Wakefield and the 
Quaker Tradition,” in Edward Gibbon Wakefield and the Colonial Dream: A Reconsideration, ed. Philip Temple 
(Wellington: Friends of the Turnbull Library, 1997). This influence is significant insofar as Quakerism in the late-
eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries proved to have the gift to “assimilate utility and rational self-interest to a 
humanitarian ethic,” deploring visible cruelty while “creating a moral climate in which highly ethical purpose could 
disguise the effects of power.” Davis, Problem of Slavery, p. 253. As I discuss below, Wakefield’s sufficient price 
theory sought to exert a subtle form of power over laborers while claiming it to be a liberal alternative to slavery. 
559 For the series of colonization societies and colonial land companies founded by Wakefield, see Prichard, 
“Introduction,” pp. 29-43. The direct and indirect policy impact of these organizational efforts lies beyond the scope 
of this chapter. 
560 The most prominent Philosophic Radicals, in addition to the obvious Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, and John 
Stuart Mill, were George Grote (MP), William Molesworth (MP), Francis Place, and John Roebuck (MP). For an 
authoritative study of the Philosophic Radicals, see Elie Halévy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism (London: 
Faber & Faber, 1952). 
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would associate the Radicals with “positive programmes of empire based on the new economic 
science.”561 Moreover, Wakefield would claim convincing Bentham in the benefits of systematic 
colonization as his greatest intellectual achievement and leave an indubitable mark on the 
political economy of John Stuart Mill. 
 As we have seen, Wakefield deemed it imperative that excess labor and capital be 
exported. However, he declared Wilmot-Horton’s proposals for colonial emigration to be poorly 
conceived and impracticable for achieving this end. First, these proposals lacked an overarching 
logic or “system” in the utilitarian sense of a totalizing calculation of ends and means. Instead, in 
the words of Charles Buller, they desperately aimed at “shovelling out paupers to where they 
may die without shocking their betters with the sight or sound of their last agony.”562 This 
drawback glared in Wilmot-Horton’s plans for financing colonial passage and settlements by 
mortgaging the poor rates. Relocated paupers were to be transformed into small landowners 
supplied with a year’s provisions and agricultural implements, and after a year, they were 
expected to start repaying their mortgages by selling their agricultural produce. The utter 
inexperience of emigrants in agricultural techniques aside, the real problem for Wakefield 
resided in the subsistence-orientation of small proprietorship and the absence of properly 
integrated commodity markets in the colonies. Even if the emigrants managed to produce a 
surplus, the chances for monetarizing the surplus were nil. Consequently the financial burden of 
assisted-emigration would remain perpetually on the shoulders of the English taxpayer. 
Secondly, the tone and provisions of Wilmot-Horton’s plans appealed only to the most wretched 
                                                
561 Semmel, “Philosophic Radicals,” pp. 77-8. Amongst the more outstanding of Wakefield’s disciples in matters of 
colonization were William Hutt, Charles Tennant, Charles Buller (MP) and Robert Torrens (MP). A longer list of 
subscribers to Wakefield’s principles of colonization can be found on the member list of the Provisional Committee 
of the South Australian Land Company (13 of the 23 members being MPs), in “Appendix III” to England and 
America, in Collected Works, ed. Prichard, p. 615. 
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and desperate, “the scum of the mother country” (PC, 282), and laced the name “colony” with 
the odium of destitution, vice, and social degradation. Such associations hardly helped to induce 
self-respecting English laborers, let alone higher classes, to emigrate, as it also hampered the 
motives to invest in colonial lands. In other words, Wilmot-Horton’s schemes could make only 
the most miniscule dent in the problem of excess capital and labor. Finally, the mode of land 
disposal laid out by Wilmot-Horton consisted of land grants by the crown in vast tracts, opening 
the door to patronage, speculation, corruption, and pecuniary aggrandizement, providing grist for 
the mill of the orthodox and utilitarian critiques of the colonies as a racket for supporting the old, 
unproductive, parasitic aristocracy.563 
 
Pathology of the Frontier 
The absence of a preconceived system afflicted the schemes of spontaneous colonization 
in yet another important way. Wilmot-Horton provided no stipulation for reforming the loose, 
unregulated, and sporadic manner in which colonial lands had been hitherto settled. Against this, 
Wakefield forwarded his signature argument in the colonization debate, namely that uncontrolled 
“dispersal” over vast and fertile land constituted the root cause of all the economic and moral ills 
that plagued all known colonies in human history. The colonial problem diagnosed by 
Wakefield, and which Erik Olssen calls “pathology of the frontier,”564 consisted in the 
civilizational relapse of colonial settlers along the scale of social development. This perception 
of social pathology was conditioned by a particular normative lens crafted from categories of 
savagery and civilization, which refracted social difference as civilizational deficit. While the 
secular trope of civilization and savagery was broadly though loosely shared by the eighteenth- 
                                                
563 For a comparison of the Wilmot-Horton’s and Wakefield’s colonization plans, see Ghosh “Colonization 
Controversy.” 
564 Olssen, “Wakefield and New Zealand,” p. 205. 
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and nineteenth-century Enlightenment thought, its maturation into a coherent theoretical 
framework belonged to the province of the Scottish Enlightenment. Of this philosophical 
tradition, Adam Smith represented the major influence on Wakefield both in political economy 
and moral philosophy.565  
As briefly discussed in the previous chapter, the stadial theory of the Scottish 
Enlightenment comprised a materialist sociology of human history, which envisioned 
interlocking stages of social development predicated on the dominant mode of subsistence, 
property system, and division of labor. The density and complexity of these institutional pillars 
of social reproduction in turn heavily influenced the development of the “moral sense” that the 
Scottish philosophers held to be a universally constant human feature. The stadial theory 
betrayed a clearly progressive, if not teleological, grammar as it graduated human societies on a 
scale bracketed on one extreme by the most primitive “savage” races, and on the other, by the 
most advanced “commercial” peoples, with the nomadic “barbarians” and sedentary 
“agriculturalists” occupying the intermediary stages. The developmental journey departed from 
the coarse and simple lifestyle characterized by vagrancy, rude manners, warlike tendencies, and 
natural freedoms of an elemental kind, and moved towards complex forms of social interaction 
that cultivated pacific dispositions, polished and refined manners, and civil society in which one 
could remain free under voluntarily submission to authority.566  
By the early nineteenth century, these civilizational categories had become, albeit in 
simplified and even vulgar forms, the basic furniture of social and political thought in Britain, 
especially as Britons tried to locate themselves in the “great map of mankind” that was unrolling 
                                                
565 Olssen, “Wakefield and the Scottish Enlightenment,” pp. 54-8. 
566 Pocock, “Mobility of Property,” and Barbarism and Religion Vol. 4, chapters 9 and 10; Berry, Social Theory of 
the Scottish Enlightenment, chapters 5 and 6. Berry and Pocock’s analyses supply enough evidence to regard the 
notion of “commercial society,” as conceived by the Scottish Enlightenment and their disciples, as roughly 
synonymous with the term “capitalist civilization” used here. 
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in an ever-expanding colonial world of social alterity.567 The discourse of civilization and 
savagery operated as an “anthropological, legal, and moral framework with which early 
Victorian categorized non-European peoples.”568 However, the implication is not that the Britons 
crafted this discourse as a cynical ideology of colonial dispossession and exploitation.569 For the 
same discourse of savagery and civilization also shaped the Britons’ image of themselves as 
reflected on the mirror of colonial encounters. This is particularly significant, because the main 
preoccupation that suffused Wakefield’s perception of the colonies did not stem from the 
encounter with the indigenous savage, whom he almost insisted looking past. The real colonial 
encounter was with the barbarian lying dormant in the commercial self, which rose from its 
slumber in the colonies.570 
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European peoples carries a tempting simplicity (and also overlooks expropriation and exploitation at home). This 
argument suffers, however, from a stunting facility insofar as it presumes a neat compartmentalization between 
unambiguous interests transparent to their bearers and fabricated symbolic systems whose instrumentality is likewise 
clear to those who deploy them to conceal their true interests. What such an understanding of ideology occludes is 
the constitutive role played by ideology in the way people perceive and conceive their interests. Similarly occluded 
is the greater efficacy of expropriation and exploitation when their perpetrators are sincere believers in the morality 
and propriety of their actions and that deeply staked in the controversy over the meaning of these actions is the very 
self-conception of the perpetrators. Pocock neatly encapsulates this logic in his investigation of the European 
encroachment upon Maori lands in New Zealand: “[T]hough the ideology of agriculture and savagery was formed to 
justify this expropriation, it also articulated things which the Pakeha [European settlers] very deeply believed about 
themselves … They were not only expropriators, and this made it easier for them to deny that expropriation was 
what they were doing … Even when they debate their actions in expropriating tangata whenua, they are more often 
than not debating what they have been doing to themselves, rather than to tangata whenua.” Pocock, “Tangata 
Whenua,” pp. 214-5. 
570 In Moloney’s words, the threat lurking in the colonial frontier was “reverse conversion,” whereby, instead of 
converting natives to the ways of civilization, the colonists would jump the civilizational ship and sink into 
barbarism. Moloney, “Savagery and Civilization,” p. 171. Indeed, the danger that Europeans have perceived in the 
“nativization” of European colonists at “permissive frontiers” is almost coeval with the history of colonial 
encounters themselves. For a seminal work plumbing this question, see Canny, “Permissive Frontier.” However, an 
important distinction should be underscored between, on the one hand, relapse into barbarism through contact with 
the natives as examined by the extant scholarship, and on the other, a similar civilizational relapse that issues from 
socioeconomic conditions. The crux of the matter is that such conditions were believed to be at once the cause of the 
barbarism of the natives and the barbarization of the Europeans, operative even in the absence of any sustained 
interaction between the two groups. It is the latter kind of “reverse conversion” that was at stake in Wakefield’s 
theory. 
  251 
Refracted through these lenses, what appeared on Wakefield’s canvas was nothing short 
of an “unnatural” regression from commercial society to semi-nomadic barbarism.571 He 
encapsulated the stakes of the colonial problem in a forceful passage about American colonists: 
the people of America may, in this respect be likened to the Tartar conquerors of China, who, being 
themselves barbarous, consider all but themselves barbarians … This narrowness of mind, arising from 
ignorance, seems proper to the barbarous conquerors of China; but in colonies planted by the most 
civilized nations, it is a degenerate sentiment, a step backwards from civilization to barbarism, and out of 
the course of nature, which seems favorable, stoppages reckoned, to the improvement of mankind (EA, 
466-7). 
 
While the problem was most acute in America, it was by no means its peculiarity. Wakefield 
adduced “the rudeness, the semi-barbarism of what are called back-settlements in Canada and 
New Brunswick” (AC, 871) and the “semi-barbarous, Tartarian, ill-cultivated, poverty-stricken 
wilderness” of the Australian bush (EA, 112) to support his hypothesis that every colonist 
“gradually learns to like the baser order of things, takes a pleasure in the coarse licence [sic.] and 
physical excitement of less civilized life” (AC, 873). Amidst massive differentiation in natural 
environment (climate, soil, flora, fauna), what remained strikingly constant was the social 
degeneration of colonists into a rude, parochial, narrow-minded, superstitious, cantankerous 
people, beset by relative material and absolute cultural poverty, with little surplus and no leisure, 
arts, or letters, and consequently no refinement (LS, 119). This constancy led Wakefield to turn 
to sociological and more specifically institutional causes for explaining civilizational regress, 
which he deemed to be the “natural and inevitable [outcome] of a faulty mode of colonization” 
(EA, 464).572  
                                                
571 See, Olssen, “Wakefield and New Zealand,” pp. 205-11, and “Wakefield and the Scottish Enlightenment,” p. 52, 
58; Moloney, “Savagery and Civilization,” pp. 171-2. 
572 Wakefield can perhaps be considered the first theorist to conceive of the method of “natural experiment” in 
explaining economic development. Comparing the US to Canada, he observed the “striking difference in the 
prosperity of two sets of people, cultivating the same soil, under the same climate, with the same degree of 
knowledge, and divided only by an imaginary line” (EA, 531), expressing a methodological approach that 
anticipated Daniel Posner’s “natural experiment” in ethnic conflict by one-and-a-half centuries. Daniel N. Posner, 
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In all his political economic monographs, Wakefield singled out the system of royal land 
grants as nurturing the germ of the colonial labor problem, from which sprouted all colonial 
evils. The abundance of cheap and fertile land that could be obtained for a trifle not only goaded 
investors (not to mention speculators) to engross more than could be viably cultivated, but more 
importantly, made land accessible to laborers.573 As soon as the worker saved enough to buy 
land, he ceased working for a wage and became a landowner himself, not only reducing colonial 
wage-labor supply and pushing wages up, but in doing so, also expediting the process whereby 
other laborers became landowners (Ibid, 110-2). The expensive and unreliable labor supply 
precluded any possibility of large-scale economic undertaking that required combined labor and 
fixed capital, thereby discouraging investment and reinforcing the tendency towards subsistence 
economy on smallholdings. Importing more laborers, “five thousand starving peasants” from 
England or even “twenty thousand industrious and skillful Chinese,” was to no avail; they, too, 
would disperse and become freeholders as soon as they could (LS, 108-9).574 
The tendency of colonial laborers to become smallholders struck at the heart of 
Wakefield’s economic theory by undoing the separation between labor and capital on which the 
entire edifice of capitalist civilization rested. The precariousness of social division of labor 
                                                
“The Political Salience of Cultural Difference: Why Chewas and. Tumbukas Are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries 
in Malawi,” American Political Science Review 58 (2004): 529-45. 
573 Wakefield’s observation was accurate regarding the vastness of the grants (Thomas Peel, the tragic colonist of the 
Swan River settlement in South Australia, was initially granted a staggering 500,000 acres, which were then revised 
down to a still massive 250,000 acres). Yet Wakefield overstated the ease with which land could be purchased, 
cleared, and settled by workers without substantial means. Eric Richards notes, “laborers generally did not obtain 
land quickly; access to land was constrained much more by the economies of scale and the capital requirements of 
pastoralism.” Richards, “Wakefield and Australia,” p. 95. Also see, John M. Ward, James Macarthur: Colonial 
Conservative, 1798-1867 (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1981), p. 48. 
574 Nonetheless, in the postscript to A Letter from Sydney, Wakefield seriously considered and argued for Chinese 
indentured labor to work in the colonization of South Australia and New Zealand, reflecting the broader tendency to 
view the Pacific as “a labor reserve for indentured servitude.” Donald Denoon and Marivic Wyndham, “Australia 
and the Western Pacific,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire Vol. 3, ed. Roger Louis (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), p. 553. When his predictions based on systematic colonization theory failed to materialize 
in New Zealand in 1850s, Wakefield would not hesitate to push for promoting the immigration of Chinese 
indentured workers. Prichard, “Introduction,” p. 67. 
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stunted the technical division of labor, thereby restricting the scale of production and surplus 
generation to a very modest level. Even when surplus was generated, the lack of communication 
between dispersed producers and towns made it extremely difficult to market it (Ibid, 103-4).575 
This further reinforced subsistence farming geared towards producing “a sufficiency of mere 
necessaries of life” (PC, 295).576 For example, “many a New South Wales farmer grows no more 
corn than will supply his family, because he could be unable to remove a surplus quantity from 
his own barn” (LS, 132). Consequently, “there is little division of labor, and you might roll in 
plenty, without possessing anything of exchangeable value. You must do everything yourself; 
and flocks in the wilderness are not worth much more than the wilderness itself” (Ibid, 107). An 
economy characterized by production for immediate needs resulted in  
a barbarous condition, like that of every people scattered over a territory immense in proportion to their 
numbers; every man is obliged to occupy himself with questions of daily bread; there is neither leisure 
nor reward for the investigation of abstract truth; money-getting is the universal object; taste, science, 
morals, manners, abstract politics are subjects of little interest (LS, 119) 
 
Wakefield’s disdain with colonial subsistence economies was clear enough. Yet this still 
fails to explain why he associated it with “barbarism” that the Scottish philosophers reserved for 
pastoralist nomads (with Central Asian “Tartars” representing the emblematic case). Cultivation 
of land in most of the colonies was the dominant mode of subsistence, and squatters aside, even 
the pastoralist occupations such as sheep raising were not “nomadic” in the proper sense. The 
key to this puzzle resides in Wakefield’s term “earth-scratchers” (EA, 493). “Earth-scratchers” 
denoted those who lived by horticulture (American backwoodsmen and the indigenous 
populations alike) at the same time it excluded horticulture from the category of cultivation 
                                                
575 The problem of markets and communication was so urgent for Wakefield that he even fantasized, during his 
refutation of Ricardo’s theory of rent, about a global commodities market and airfreight. “If nature had provided 
markets in waste countries, or if mankind could fly, easily carrying great weights through the air then indeed the 
value of land used in producing food for the market would depend on superior natural fertility” (EA, 414-5). 
576 Again, in characteristically comparative fashion, Wakefield identified the same subsistence tendencies in more 
“backward” economies of Continent Europe and Ireland (EA, 327). 
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proper. If Wakefield’s remark “the Americans have only scratched instead of cultivating” (LS, 
157) supplies us with the first part of the puzzle, then the second part is offerdd by Pocock’s 
comment that the Enlightenment thinkers perceived of horticulturalists as “scratching the ground 
for a while before moving on. They had not escaped from the vagrant condition, and were no 
further from savagery.”577 Instead of “improving” the soil with plough and manure, the settlers 
opted for “moving from one piece of land to another as the natural fertility of each piece is 
exhausted” (EA, 488n). Under such conditions of quasi-vagrancy, prerequisites of civilization 
such as intensive agriculture, monetary economy, and literacy (at once the signs and the 
conditions of durable, continuous social intercourse) led only the most incipient and rudimentary 
existence in the colonies.578  
Wakefield’s examination of colonial afflictions once again resorted to hydraulic imagery, 
with “dispersal” and “spreading” inverting the “want of room” in the metropole. “Concentration” 
constituted the operative analytic term: 
But rudeness and civilization are effects as well as causes. By going further back, by substituting 
dispersed for rude, and concentrated for civilized, we get nearer, at least, to the truth. In the history of the 
world, there is no example of a society at once dispersed and highly civilized; while there are instances 
without end, in the history of colonization, of societies which, being civilized, became barbarous as soon 
as they were dispersed over an extensive territory (EA, 468). 
 
                                                
577 Pocock, “Tangata Whenua,” pp. 211-2. Surely, Wakefield was neither the only nor even the first to observe the 
barbarizing tendencies of the colonial frontier. Pocock has compellingly demonstrated the sway the binary of 
sedentarism and vagrancy held over the eighteenth-century Enlightenment thought, to the extent that “the step into 
humanity was taken with the acquisition of capacity for exchange, commerce, specialization and diversification” 
(and commerce and agriculture were often telescoped) while “a wandering condition dehumanize[d] or precede[d] 
humanization.” Edmund Burke had voiced his concerns about North American colonists turning into “English 
Tartars” more than half a century earlier, and Anthony Pagden shows that Diderot, Raynal, and Talleyrand had 
already associated the decay of civility, loss of identity, and dissolution of morals with the vagrancy of the frontier. 
Pocock, “Tanagata Whenua” pp. 208-9, 215; Edmund Burke, Address to the Colonists, in The Writings and 
Speeches of Edmund Burke, ed. Paul Langford (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981); Pagden, Lords of All the World, pp. 
165-8. As with many other colonial pathologies, for Wakefield, Americans represented the epitomic case of 
barbarization by vagrancy. The American colonists were “a people without monuments, without history, without 
local attachments, … without any love of birthplace, without patriotism” (LS, 124, 134). Equally strikingly, 
Wakefield’s unfavorable opinion of slavery in the West Indies and North America issued partly from the constant 
relocation of plantations due to soil exhaustion. 
578 Pocock, “Tangata Whenua,” pp. 201-2. 
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The division of labor and socioeconomic complexity that characterized commercial society 
depended on a certain level of social density, dynamism, and pressure,579 which diffused under 
the centrifugal pull of cheap land in the colonies. “[S]uperabundance of good land belong[s] to 
many savage nations,” Wakefield declared, and “men’s minds [are] as narrow as their territory is 
extensive, preventing the native growth of liberal feeling and polished manners” (EA, 483, LS, 
122). The inverse proportion between abundant land and civilizational integrity manifested itself 
universally. For example, in South Australia, “the power to spread at will” stretched the social 
texture ever thinner, culminating in the “present Tartar state” of the colonists (LS, 152). In North 
America, Elizabethan land grants, Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase, and Jackson’s land policies, 
by making immense amounts of land popularly available, had paved the way for an “uncouth, 
ignorant, and violent … mass of North Americans,” and spawned the “white savages of 
Kentucky” (LS, 114, 124). To the South, the same logic manifested itself in post-independence 
Argentina, whose inhabitants eventually dispersed over the Pampas and degenerated into 
nomadic gauchos who “subsist … on the flesh of wild cattle, … and have lost most of the arts of 
civilized life; not a few of them are in a state of deplorable misery” (EA, 483). “The savage 
descendant of Spaniards” were mirrored by the farmers of South Africa, the “most ignorant and 
brutal race of men” as well as by the “hordes of savages” of the French Louisiana (Ibid, 528, 
532). Regardless of their cultural and political status, people who dispersed over large colonial 
lands constituted a “new people,” who “whether new or old, dependent or independent, have a 
capacity for greatness, and yet remain insignificant, solely in consequence of their excessive 
territory” (LS, 158). They were those who 
                                                
579 Ironically, this argument was also wielded by contemporary opponents of emigration, who saw in the social 
density of Britain a potential for further division of labor, increased productivity, and solution to poverty. See 
Kittrell, “Wakefield’s Scheme” pp. 97-8. 
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though they continually increase in number, make no progress in the art of living; who, in respect to 
wealth, knowledge, skill, taste, and whatever belongs to civilization, have degenerated from their 
ancestors; … who, ever on the move, are unable to bring anything to perfection; whose opinions are only 
violent and false prejudices, the necessary fruit of ignorance; whose character is a compound of vanity, 
bigotry, obstinacy … we mean, in two words, a people who become rotten before they are ripe” (Ibid, 
151-2) 
 
Hence, the “new people” signified a civilizational rather than a temporal status: not young, but 
degenerate.580 
Put summarily, in the colonies, civilization decomposed due to too much room, as 
Wakefield’s almost obsessive use of the words “dispersal” and “spreading” attests. Social rarity 
due to sparse population and inadequate communications581 vitiated the material conditions of 
civilization (productivity, surplus, accumulation, social complexity) and undermined its cultural 
corollaries (leisure, arts, letters, sciences, and polished manners). In the metropole, civilization 
threatened to implode under the ever-increasing pressure of capital and labor pressing against the 
claustrophobic walls of the narrow field of employment. In the colonies, labor and capital 
                                                
580 The unnatural degeneracy of civilization was also instantiated in the subversion of the social order in the colonies 
in the form of extremely fluid class boundaries. Wakefield’s fictional Australian colonist expressed his revulsion 
toward his former servant, who, having become “an Australian aristocrat,” “has grown enormously fat, feeds upon 
greasy dainties, drinks oceans of bottled porter and port wine” (LS, 105). As a result of labor scarcity, the colonist 
continued, “I became a slave of my slaves. Can you think of a more hateful existence?” (Ibid, 106). The same 
subversion extended to women in the colonial society. “Fancy [a vulgar body in England] converted, by sudden 
elevation to the first place anywhere into a vulgar fine lady” (Ibid, 120). Wakefield’s anxieties about the subversive 
impact on social order of letting colonists choose to do as they wish (including loitering, squatting, and idling), 
however, had a much older genealogy. Early modern mercantilist debates were suffused by preoccupations over the 
pursuit of self-interest by masterless men and the potential “abuse” of liberties, as the social fabric of the English 
countryside frayed under the onslaught of the enclosures. For a solid scholarly examination of these debates, see 
Joyce O. Appleby, “Ideology and Theory: The Tension between Political and Economic Liberalism in Seventeenth-
Century England,” American Historical Review 81 (1976): 499-515. Such tendencies of social subversion, 
Wakefield argued, could be best remedied by the immigration of the English gentry to the colonies. The gentry, “the 
most valuable class of emigrants” in Wakefield’s mind, would become “landowners in the colony, or the owners of 
capital lent at interest or farmers of their own land.” Their presence in the colony would “most beneficially affect the 
standard of morals and manners” by holding up an exemplary combination of “honour, virtue, intelligence, and 
property” (AC, 829-30). “The self-restraints which belong to civilization would be substituted for the barbarous 
licence of colonial life; for the sense of honour may be transplanted like the habit of crime” (Ibid, 925). Dalziel 
remarks that Wakefield’s vision of the ideal colonial society replicated the English class structure, minus “the unfit, 
the unstable, and the idle.” Raewyn Dalziel “Southern Islands: New Zealand and Polynesia,” in The Oxford History 
of the British Empire Vol. 3, ed. Roger Louis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 583.  
581 Marx noted that “social density is more or less relative. A relatively thinly populated country, with well-
developed means of communication, has a denser population than a more numerously populated country with badly 
developed means of communication. In this sense, the northern states of the U.S.A. for instance are more thickly 
populated than India.” Marx, Capital Vol. 1, p 473. 
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dissipated in the agoraphobic immensities of the same field, and as the social reproduction of 
commercial society came to a grinding halt, its civilization slowly languished in a state of fatal 
torpor. 
 
Colonial Critique of Political Economy 
 Wakefield conceptualized the social pressure that sustained the commercial society in the 
term “the degree of concentration,” a “category of political economy,” which encapsulated “that 
which will lead to the combination of labor necessary to obtain the greatest quantity of produce 
from a given number of hours’ work and a given quantity of capital” (PC, 304). This abstract, 
utilitarian economic calculus in effect boiled down to the following question: how to secure the 
social pressure necessary to retain the capital-relation. One had to maintain the level of social 
compulsion necessary to keep the laborers working for the capitalists, thereby making possible 
social and technical division of labor, however, without squeezing laborers to the point of 
pauperization and discontent, beyond which they turned against the capitalist property system. 
Wakefield’s colonial framework of analysis had rewarded him with a crucial political economic 
discovery: people worked for a wage only if they had to, and only to the extent that they had to. 
This was in fact an old mercantilist insight that had been lost to classical political economy,582 
                                                
582 The predominant controversy about labor in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was how to get laborers 
(many the victims of English enclosures) to work for a wage beyond the satisfaction of their subsistence needs. Not 
yet infused with a “productive ethic,” let alone with a “puritan work ethic,” the laboring poor were not quite 
“laboring.” One seventeenth century commentator complained that the idle and lazy English workers would not 
work unless “two days pay will keep them a week”; another reproached them for being “too proud to beg, too lazy 
to work, when ‘tis either too hot or too cold, an will choose their own time and wages, or you may do the work 
yourself.” Appleby, Economic Thought, p. 146. The completion of primitive accumulation in England, the 
consequent dependence of workers on the labor market, manufactures, factories, and the prolongation of the 
working day can be considered as some of the sources behind classical political economy’s amnesia about the 
mercantilist debates, and the impression that labor had always been employed by and for capital. Appleby’s account 
of the seventeenth-century mercantilist debates on labor, in chapter 6 of Economic Thought, is masterly. For the role 
of puritan work ethic in the consolidation of capitalism in England, or what is also known as the “Tawney thesis,” 
see Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism. For the “productive ethic” thesis that qualifies and complements 
Tawney’s position, see Himmelfarb, Idea of Poverty. 
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and Wakefield had to retrieve it from the colonies, where he repeatedly observed a “passion to 
own land” that was coupled with a tendency to engage subsistence farming. “The desire of 
becoming a land proprietor, for the gratification of which [the laborer] is willing to make great 
sacrifices” constituted the most trenchant obstacle to generating surplus, because “by a small 
quantity of labor on new soil, he produces a sufficiency of the mere necessaries of life … and 
contents himself with producing little more” ” (PC, 297-8). While “the desire of becoming a 
landed proprietor is so great in all Colonies” (Ibid, 305), the sterling case was once again 
American settlements “where a passion for owning land prevents the existence of a class of 
laborers for hire; and where, consequently, half of the crop is sometimes left to rot upon the 
ground” (EA, 326).” Wakefield would later elevate these initial observations to the status of a 
universal principle, and proclaim that “the passion for owning land … belongs to human nature,” 
and “property in land is the object of one of the strongest and most general of human desires” 
(AC, 929, 937). It was this desire for direct access to land, coupled with the latter’s abundance in 
the colonies, which gave rise to scarcity of labor, or the colonial labor problem.583 
 The desire or passion to own land has a momentous, twofold implication for our analysis. 
First, insofar as it permeates the very tissue of human nature, one can hardly discipline (let alone 
dislodge) it, which leaves one with the option of controlling its effects by manipulating the 
                                                
583 One enduring theoretical merit of Wakefield has been to posit the problem from which Marx could extrapolate 
the crucial antithesis between individual private property and capitalist private property. The former accrued from 
the labor of its owner and served as a pedestal for relative economic independence, whereas the latter emerged from 
the destruction of individual private property and the subjection of the dispossessed to the imperatives of capital 
accumulation. Marx, Capital Vol. 1, pp. 927-31. This is a simple yet momentous theoretical point that ought to be 
borne in mind in engaging with libertarian arguments, such as articulated by Robert Nozick, which mistakenly treat 
all private property under capitalism as if it were individual private property, thereby reaching the fallacious 
conclusion that taxation is “on a par with forced labor.” Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: 
Basic Books, 1974), p. 169. The antithesis between individual and capitalist private property helps us see that if 
Nozick’s principles of entitlement were to be strictly applied to the chain of possessions culminating in 
contemporary capitalism, very few, if any, holdings would be legitimate. 
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conditions in and through which this desire translates into behavior.584 I return to this point 
below in discussing Wakefield’s systematic colonization scheme as a utilitarian calculus and 
institutional blueprint that aims to harness this desire for inducing the emigration of labor and 
capital to the colonies. Secondly, Wakefield’s choice of “desire” and “passion” has a mystifying 
effect. “Passion” or “desire” to own land is mystifying in that it misrepresents a basic social 
propensity, one that has been the practical norm in the most of known human history, namely 
that human beings have organized social production primarily around the security of livelihood 
and not for the accumulation of surplus on the part of private individuals585 – a point that finds 
support, among others, in Karl Polanyi’s ethnological studies, as well as E.P Thompson and 
Peter Linebaugh’s historical research into the commons and commoning.586 This propensity 
appears as a “passion” or “desire” only when inflected by the viewpoint of capital, here borne by 
                                                
584 The obvious theoretical precursor of this principle was Bentham’s utilitarianism, but the monument to its 
practical implementation was the US Constitution that embodied the strategy to manage factions by “controlling its 
effects” rather than by “removing its causes” (Federalist Papers, No. 10). It is perhaps not surprising that despite all 
his contempt for the colonial pathology of American settlements, Wakefield harbored great admiration for the 
utilitarian outlook that Americans had cultivated, from the lowest orders to the highest-ranking politicians. 
“American ministers” were lauded for being “active men of business,” and the “American fashion” of performing a 
task was to perform it “with a view to utility” (EA, 453, 456). 
585 For instance, Holt remarks, “life’s goals for most humans who have walked this earth are better described in 
terms of the relative absence of scarcity and peril than in the full achievement of satisfaction and security.” Holt 
illustrates this point through an analysis of the paths chosen by the former slaves in the West Indies, who shunned 
wage labor even if it meant higher income, and opted for small proprietorship and petty commodity production 
organized in autonomous villages. Holt, Problem of Freedom, p. 5. Likewise, Davis cautions against reducing the 
socioeconomic transformations wrought by the Parliamentary Enclosures, above all the “dehumanization of labor,” 
to the question of “real wages,” instead emphasizing the laceration in the social fabric wrought by the displacement 
from land. Davis, Problem of Slavery, pp. 402-3, 464-8. It is not coincidental that both authors focus on processes of 
primitive accumulation (enclosure and enslavement), which constitute the capital-relation by destroying or 
subordinating forms of social reproduction that are not immediately compatible with the accumulative logic of 
capital. 
586 Karl Polanyi, The Livelihood of Man, ed. Harry W. Pearson (New York: Academic Press, 1977) and Great 
Transformation, chapter 2; Peter Linebaugh, Magna Carta Manifesto: Liberties and Commons for All (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2008); E. P. Thompson, Customs in Common (London: Merlin Press, 1991). John 
Weaver explains the widespread penchant for landed property in the British colonies with reference to the 
peculiarity of Anglo-Saxon culture in highly valuing freehold landownership. While this cultural interpretation is 
disputable, what is more certain is that small property in the colonies did not translate into patterns of isolated 
settlements. As Charles Sellers illustrates, even the American settlements that Wakefield held in such disdain 
comprised less a scattered string of insular households dotting the frontier wilderness than tightly organized 
communities, the social reproduction of which neither depended on, nor was oriented towards, the generation of 
surplus and its realization in the market. Weaver, Great Land Rush; Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: 
Jacksonian America, 1815-1846 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
  260 
Wakefield, a viewpoint for which the accumulation of value is so doxically entrenched that no 
one can “reasonably” dissent from its desirability, unless one is misled or blinded by “passions” 
or “desires.”587 
 In England, such passions and desires remained effectively under check, because 
primitive accumulation qua enclosure of land had advanced to a degree where the laboring 
classes had no choice but to work on somebody else’s land, on the condition, of course, that the 
latter reaped a profit. The “social pressure” necessary to keep laborers working (and capital 
owners investing) was sustained by strong private property rights in factors of production and by 
the compulsion of market mechanism. The capital-relation that “naturally” obtained between 
factors of production in the metropole dissolved in the colony like a “clump of earth thrown into 
a river.”588 Land and labor defied the laws of supply and demand. As the laborers brought from 
England abandoned their would-be employers to set up their own freeholds, the initial stock fell 
prey to “unproductive consumption” (PC, 289).589 Capital, which self-evidently referred to 
“stock” and “money” in metropolitan political economy, was revealed to be a social relationship 
the moment it crumbled into its constituent elements (labor and means of production) in the 
colony. Land and instruments of production ceased to be “capital” because “capital which cannot 
                                                
587 This line of reasoning was resonant with Wakefield’s remarks elsewhere that equated civilization with the 
socially acquired capacity to resist the urge to immediately gratify passions and desires (AC, 925). The same 
disposition would later surface in Wakefield’s anthropological discourse on man as a conscious, planning, futural 
homo faber, which unfolded in all its transparency in the geographical and social terra nullius of the colonies (Ibid, 
827). 
588 I borrow this brilliant metaphor from Eric Hobsbawm’s Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1994), p. 175. 
589 Wakefield was most likely following the distinction that Smith drew in the Wealth of Nations between the 
expenditure of income as “revenue” as opposed to “capital.” Only the latter form of expenditure employed labor in 
productive activities, which generated value and augmented the wealth of the nation. This specific formulation 
resonates with Wakefield’s designation of the aristocracy as the “spending class” (EA, 364), a term he chooses 
deliberately to denote the unproductive consumption of surplus as “revenue.” See, Smith, Wealth of Nations, book 
II, chapter III; cf. Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, Part II. 
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be employed, which lies idle for want of employment, is as if it did not exist” (EA, 373),590 and 
the scarcity of “labor” as a political economic category made sure that this happened. “What the 
capitalist brings to the colony in the shape of labor, ceases to be labor the moment it reaches the 
colony” (Ibid, 553). The colonial conditions disclosed the heavily social and historical conditions 
that primed large-scale cooperation and division of labor, which “seems in old countries like a 
natural property of labour” itself” (AC, 846).591 As with labor, so was with land rent. Extremely 
limited conditions of transforming “plenty” into “value” (i.e. commodification) severed the 
Ricardian cord between rents and “natural fertility of the soil” and instead predicated land values 
on the proximity to social factors of production (labor, manure, and other inputs) and social 
infrastructure (roads, towns, ports, markets) (LS, 161-2; EA, 413-6).592 In short, as Wakefield’s 
final verdict on classical political economy stated, “their economists, in treating of colonies, have 
worked with no other tools than those which they were accustomed to use in explaining the 
phenomena of and old country, to facts that never existed in the colony” (EA, 525).  
Unveiling the analytic limits of political economy from a colonial perspective, however, 
is only half of the story. More importantly, Wakefield’s own account of England’s economic 
conditions was indebted to the global expanse of his analytic frame that pivoted on the 
                                                
590 Regarding stock, Wakefield wrote, “I could fill pages with an account of the number of things, which would be 
of great value in England, which would be considered capital in any densely peopled country, but which we throw 
away as rubbish” (LS 112). 
591 Marx argued that classical political economy was born in the age of manufacture and therefore conceived of 
cooperation only through the lens of the division of labor in manufacture. This did not imply, however, that classical 
political economy’s view of division of labor was simply false. For the capacity of human labor to enter cooperative 
production processes had been ostensibly crystallized under the managerial direction of the manufacturing system. 
Consequently, productive powers of cooperation had always appeared under the sign of the entrepreneurial genius of 
the capitalist. Marx, Capital Vol. 1, chapters 13 and 14. 
592 Insertion of land into relations of production primarily as a commodity rather than an instrument for satisfying 
subsistence needs comprised the precondition of moving on to the stage of commercial society. “There is no fourth 
stage until land becomes purely a commodity.” Pocock, Barbarism and Religion Vol. 4, p. 173n. Similarly, 
commodification of land is the sine qua non of a self-regulating market society for Polanyi. Polanyi, Great 
Transformation, chapter 6. One should add in passing that in his critique of the naturalist assumptions of 
metropolitan economists, Wakefield crossed paths with Marx, who later disparaged Ricardo for seeking “refuge in 
organic chemistry” for explaining the falling rate of profit (Marx would find Wakefield’s explanation based on 
“competition” similarly inadequate). Marx, Grundrisse, p. 754. 
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metropole-colony nexus. “The passion to own land” represents Wakefield’s mode of 
apprehending the tendency of laborers to seek relatively direct access to the means of social 
reproduction without the mediation of the capital-relation and the concomitant compulsion to 
generate surplus in order to make a living. The colonial tendency towards subsistence economy 
on smallholdings threw into sharp relief the narrow preconditions of “labor” as a category of 
political economy, that is, as capital-positing labor, as labor that contributes to the self-
valorization of capital.593 Similarly, Wakefield groped at the relational nature of capital in his 
observations on the breakdown of the capital logic, in the form of hoarding and devaluation in 
the metropole and unproductive consumption in the colony. The colony was Wakefield’s 
window opening onto the metropole.594 This movement from the colony to the metropole was 
reflected in the sequence of his works. A Letter from Sydney (1829) and Plan of a Company 
(1830) focused exclusively on the colonial labor problem. After roughly triangulating the nature 
of capital as a social relationship in these early works, Wakefield devoted roughly half of 
England and America (1833) to the analysis of the metropolitan economy, before further 
expounding on the colonial labor problem.595 Wakefield’s intellectual pendulum then swung 
back to the colonies, this time with an eye towards possible policy designations drawn from the 
theoretical insights, which made their embryonic appearance as early as A Letter from Sydney 
                                                
593 Classical political economy’s conflation of labor with capital-positing labor has been observed by British colonial 
officials as well. For example, Lord Sydney Olivier, once the Governor of Jamaica and Secretary of State for India, 
noted that labor in the language of political economy “always means occupation for the for an employer at wages,” 
the reason behind the Victorian perceptions of the freed people as inveterate enemies of industry. Quoted in Holt, 
Problem of Freedom, p. 148. 
594 Marx was perhaps the first to discern the broader theoretical implications of Wakefield’s study of the colonies. 
“It is the great merit of E. G. Wakefield to have discovered, not something new about the colonies, but, in the 
colonies, the truth about capitalist relations in the mother country.” And this discovery was “that capital is not a 
thing, but a social relation between persons which is mediated through things.” Marx, Capital Vol. 1, p. 931. 
Unfortunately, Marx’s condescending and dismissive (to say the least) prevents him from appreciating the larger 
stakes embedded in this discovery, and not just for Wakefield but for early Victorians in general, stakes that are 
tethered to the fortunes of capitalism and civilization in England. 
595 Wakefield continued to articulate the same line of critique in the annotations to his edition of Smith’s Wealth of 
Nations. I have refrained from bringing these annotations into the fold of this analysis since they basically replicate 
the theoretical points made in England and America. 
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and came to full maturation in England and America and A View of the Art of Colonization 
(1849). Wakefield’s swing back to the colonies comprises the third and last part of this chapter. 
To underscore how closely the metropole and the colony were yoked together in 
Wakefield’s social imaginary, I would like to risk one last conjecture. The intensity of 
Wakefield’s abhorrence of the colonial life could perhaps be explained by the latter’s uncanny 
premonitions about the predicaments of England. In a perverse way, the colonial mode of 
subsistence and the attendant civilizational forms provided a disturbing glimpse into what 
England would look like if its socioeconomic ailments were not immediately mitigated, and the 
danger of social revolution were to be let run its spontaneous course. A post-revolutionary 
England would not be a post-capitalist society (as Marx sanguinely presaged) but would revert to 
a precapitalist society, the living embodiment of which was the colonies. Class conflict in 
England “must end in England’s ruin; which might make England a hunting field, or a place fit 
to receive convicts from America” (EA, 405-6, emphases mine). The allusion to the wilderness of 
the colonial frontier and the penal colonies of South Australia is incontrovertible. The economic 
regress and civilizational degeneration that accompanied the movement from the metropole to 
the colony provided the imagery in which Wakefield gazed at the barbarizing consequences of a 
possible economic and civilizational bust in England. Of course, a peasant society ought to have 
nothing inherently “uncivilized.” Nonetheless, the collusion of political economy with 
Enlightenment tropes of civilization and savagery under the sign of “progress” constituted the 
grammar on the basis of which the “difference” of peasant societies would be translated into a 
“deficit” in civilizational terms.596  
                                                
596 While a critic of political economy, Marx himself was not exempt from such acts of translation, as attested by his 
well-known deprecations of the “idiocy of rural life.” 
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Given that the early Victorian Britons viewed themselves through the stadial model of 
civilization and savagery, Wakefield’s invocation of “regress” should not be overlooked as a 
colloquial matter, but taken as expressing a fundamental idea of social development that was 
linear yet not inexorable, and therefore reversible and precarious.597 What Wakefield believed he 
observed was once-civilized Englishmen sliding on the slippery civilizational slope towards the 
lower rungs of barbarism and savagery. The problem not only implicated the aforementioned 
imperative of exporting surplus English labor and capital en masse to the colonies. As Pat 
Moloney reminds, “Victorians had more than their capital invested in such schemes. Civilization 
and savagery defined who they were.”598 Consequently, Wakefield’s scheme of colonization 
would not be worth trying if salvaging civilization in England could only be obtained at the cost 
of barbarizing Englishmen abroad. 
 
Slave Labor and Competing Barbarisms 
Wakefield admitted that not all colonies in human history had fallen prey to the 
barbarizing tendencies of an open frontier. Coastal towns of North America and the West Indies 
had long been centers of prosperity and could hardly be called barbarous in the sense described 
above. In such colonial settlements, the colonial labor problem was resolved through the 
employment of bonded labor, of which slavery represented the most controversial type. 
Wakefield wrote A Letter from Sydney and England and America in the heat of the public and 
official debates over the emancipation of slaves in the British West Indies, and his analysis bore 
the marks of, as well as intervened in, these debates.  
                                                
597 Moloney remarks that the early Victorian perceptions of the Maori analogized the latter to the Scottish 
Highlanders of 1700 as well as to the ancient Britons who had begun their journey to civilization with the Roman 
contact. “Like a photograph album of one’s juvenile years, it could excite nostalgia and romanticism, but also 
embarrassment and rejection.” Moloney, “Savagery and Civilization,” pp. 157-8. 
598 Ibid, p. 153. 
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Wakefield’s view of slavery evinced the same political economic perspective he applied 
to pauperism in England. Parting ways with contemporary philanthropy, he traced the causes of 
slavery to “not moral but economic circumstances: they relate not to vice and virtue, but to 
production” (AC, 928). The “permanent” and “original cause of slavery” could be firmly traced 
to the “superabundance of land in proportion to people” that generated the colonial labor 
problem (EA, 479).599 Enslavement of American Indians, African chattel slavery, and a host of 
other kinds of “virtual slavery,” including redemptioning, indenture, convict labor, pauper 
migration, and apprenticeship, had served as historical remedies to the colonial labor problem, 
ensuring the combination of labor in large-scale agriculture, most importantly in such export 
staples as sugar, tobacco, and cotton (EA, 470-80, AC 849-53).600 Wakefield was effectively 
challenging, though not completely rejecting, the argument that free labor yielded a productive 
performance superior to slave labor, an argument that comprised the heavy “capitalist” artillery 
of the liberal “humanitarian armoury.”601 Wakefield rested his challenge on the theoretical 
                                                
599 “I can conceive that slavery was revived for something else than the gratification of man’s worst propensities,” 
wrote Wakefield, and “it will never be abolished by appeals to the hearts of the slave-owners … What was the sole 
cause of the revival of slavery by Christians, but the discovery of waste countries and the disproportion which has 
ever since existed in those countries between the demand and the supply of labor?” (LS, 113). 
600 In Southern Australia, for instance, which never had chattel slavery, meager progress was indebted to the system 
of convict transportation. Even then, the unreliability of the transportation system in meeting the demand for a 
constant labor supply (combined with the moral decrepitude of convicts) would make many an Australian capitalist 
long for “African slaves,” which they would indeed obtain “if public opinion in England did not forbid it”  (LS, 135-
6; EA, 485). Accordingly, “if Australasia should become independent to-morrow, these people would find some 
means of establishing slavery in spite of all the saints” (LS,114). Prior to the onset of the African slave trade, convict 
transportation and indenture offered the principal means for populating the West Indian plantations with white (and 
during Cromwell’s reign, predominantly Irish) bonded laborers. See Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, pp. 9-16. For 
excellent scholarship on forced migration and bonded labor, see Marcus Rediker, Cassandra Pybus, and Emma 
Christopher (eds) Many Middle Passages: Forced Migration and the Making of the Modern World (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2007). On convict labor in Australia, see Hamish Maxwell-Stewart, Closing Hell's 
Gates: The Life and Death of a Convict Station (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2008); Lucy Frost and Hamish 
Maxwell-Stewart, Chain Letters: Narrating Convict Lives (Carlton South: Melbourne University Press, 2002). 
601Andrew Porter, “Trusteeship, Anti-Slavery and Humanism,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire Vol. 3, 
ed. Roger Louis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 204. This is not to say, however, that Wakefield did not 
find slavery reprehensible. He was an Enlightenment thinker through and through. His convictions sat squarely atop 
the late eighteenth-century intellectual bloc against slavery, in which secular theories of moral sense, sympathy, and 
ethics of benevolence combined with liberal political economy to transform the attitudes toward labor, property, and 
individual responsibility. Davis, Problem of Slavery, pp. 45-6, 82. 
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premise that economic productivity was first and foremost a function of social cooperation and 
division of labor, and only secondarily a creature of individual skill or willingness to work. If 
social cooperation and division of labor were in place, free laborers would be preferable to 
bondsmen, since they did not carry the motivational blight that afflicted slaves. In the colonies, 
however, free labor, qua its tendency to disperse, was the very solvent of the conditions of 
economic productivity, and slavery represented the only viable instrument for securing a labor 
force large, pliable, and constant enough to undertake specialized production and economies of 
scale.602 This had dawned upon Wakefield’s fictional Australian capitalist, who “had not bound 
[his workers] by indentures, for [he] was weak enough to think that free agents would prove 
better servants than bondsmen” (LS, 106). Indeed, as Henry Taylor, one of the architects of the 
emancipation in the West Indies remarked, “free agents” proved more advantageous to slaves on 
all counts except “in the continuity and the certainty of [the] supply of labor.”603 However, as 
Thomas Holt underscores, considerations of “continuity and certainty” (or in Wakefield’s words, 
“constancy”) overwhelmingly governed colonial capitalist classes’ policy of labor recruitment.604  
During and after the emancipation, the planters set their eyes on the East Indian labor 
reserves and mobilized their connections in the Colonial Office for the organized migration of 
indentured laborers to the West Indies. Madhavi Kale’s excellent analysis of the indenture 
debates reveals the acuity of the colonial labor problem driving these schemes, as well as the 
conundrums faced by the British humanitarians and policy makers as they tried to reconcile the 
                                                
602 “Slavery is a question of labour, the original purchase of all things … Slave labour is on the whole much more 
costly than the labour of hired freemen … Slavery, therefore is not preferred to the method of hiring: the method of 
hiring would be preferred if there were a choice: but when slavery is adopted, there is no choice: it is adopted 
because at the time and under the circumstances here is no other way of getting the labourers to work with constancy 
and in combination” (AC, 927-8). David Brion Davis historically traces the continued and “immense profitability of 
slave labor” through the surge of slave populations in the Western Hemisphere in the half century before the 
emancipation, concomitant with the “comforting illusion that slave labor was inefficient, unprofitable, and an 
impediment to economic growth.” Davis, Problem of Slavery, p. 61. 
603 Quoted in Holt, Problem of Freedom, p. 123. 
604 Ibid. 
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ideology of “free labor” that increasingly defined the British self-image and the material 
necessity to provide a viable solution to the colonial labor shortage.605 Initially denounced by the 
abolitionists as yet another form of slavery, Indian indentured servitude ultimately comprised the 
ground for a “liberal compromise” between colonial entrepreneurs and the proponents of free 
labor.606 Given Wakefield’s efforts to popularize his theory, it should not come as a surprise that 
he was explicitly invoked as an authority by at least one West Indian planter, William Burnley, 
who adduced his theory lock, stock and barrel in his advocacy of labor importation to the British 
Caribbean.607 
Ironically, slavery, execrated in Britain as a most barbaric form of domination, formed 
the central pillar of civilization in the colonies. “Had slavery never existed,” Wakefield 
contended, a Jamaican planter “would, in the natural course of things, have been a little West 
Indian farmer, perhaps scarcely be able to read – certainly not fit to be a member of civilized 
society” (LS, 113). Thanks to the “riches, leisure, and instruction” afforded by the surplus 
generated by slaves and realized in the European and American markets, planter societies could 
cultivate the civilized features characteristic of commercial peoples. The perceived link between 
colonial slave economies and capitalist civilization, while most systematically treated by 
Wakefield, generally suffused the abolition debates and stamped not only planters’ but also 
policymakers’ anxieties surrounding the emancipation and apprenticeship. “The worst fears of 
                                                
605 See Kale, Fragments of Empire, especially chapter 2. For the increasing centrality of the ideology of “free labor” 
to the hegemony of the British middle classes after 1832, as well as its dialectical relationship to the abolitionist 
discourse, see Davis, Problem of Slavery, especially pp 349-60. 
606 Kale writes, “the peculiarity of indentured migration was the ambiguous space it occupied and opened in the 
dichotomizing discourse on slavery and freedom. On the one hand, [it] was represented as a new system of slavery 
… On the other hand, it was defended as a form of free labor especially suited to distinctively imperial conditions, 
where natural resources and labor were not always coincident.” Indentured labor “qualified as free labor, not only 
because men and women chose to enter into them, but also, and more important, because the guarantor of their 
freedom of choice was the imperial government and its agents.” Kale, Fragments of Empire, pp. 173-4. 
607 Ibid, 44-8. While Wakefield noted the West India planters’ pleas to the imperial government to organize the mass 
migration of free labor from Africa to the West Indies, he was not a principled proponent of indenture (AC, 931). 
This did not mean, however, that he excluded it as a practical option, as evidenced both in his writings (LS, 170-7) 
as well as in his official policy proposals after he settled in New Zealand. Prichard, “Introduction,” pp. 66-70. 
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the men who had fashioned British policy,” writes Holt, was the perceived tendency of the freed 
people “to establish independent freeholds,” as expressed in a planter’s warning “our present 
apprentices will answer to our necessities only in proportion to the facilities of their becoming 
petty settlers being withheld from them.”608 The danger of peasantization registered itself in a 
civilizational as well as economic key, wherein subsistence farming, market gardening, and petty 
commodity production outside the wage relation conjured up visions of “savage indolence” and 
“cultural regression.”609 The “Malthusian and Wakefieldian dicta” that “ex-slaves be prevented 
from obtaining land” became the official policy of the day, in an effort to counter, in Lord 
Glenelg’s words “the natural tendency of the population to spread over the surface of the 
country, each man settling where he may, or roving from place to place in pursuit of virgin 
soil.”610 
The absence of colonial slavery meant the stall of civilization, while its abolition meant 
civilizational decay. However, slavery itself did not stand free of moral complications. The moral 
considerations that Wakefield exorcised from the causes of slavery returned in its effects on the 
character of the slaveholders. While a partial “economic remedy,” slavery constituted a “political 
and social malady” that offended the liberal-Whig sensibilities on which the English character 
was predicated (AC, 853). The origins of these sensibilities were rooted in the transvaluation of 
                                                
608 Holt, The Problem of Freedom, pp. 143, 146. 
609 Ibid. For a good overview of the colonial labor problem in the Caribbean and the dilemmas of emancipation, see 
Gad Heumann, “The British West Indies” in The Oxford History of the British Empire Vol. 3, ed. Roger Louis 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). Heumann similarly emphasizes the intimate connection conceived by the 
policy makers between the quest for abolishing slavery without “casting the West Indies in barbarism” and retaining 
plantation economy without slaves. A great work on the anxieties and conundrums of “civilizing” the Caribbean 
freedmen is Catherine Hall’s Civilising Subjects. 
610 Lord Glenelg’s dispatch to West Indian governors, quoted in Holt, The Problem of Freedom, p. 74. Wakefield 
did not believe the West Indies to be immanently susceptible to barbarization because he perceived in the 
apprenticeship system the practical continuation of slavery (EA, 486). In fact, until and unless another method of 
procuring an abundant and reliable labor supply was devised, he saw the chances of top-down abolition to be next to 
zero.  If abolition would at all come to pass, it would follow the resistance and struggle by the apprentices or the 
political secession of the colonies. In the latter case, barbarization of the Argentines after independence and 
abolition portended the fate of the British colonies (EA, 483). 
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social values during the consolidation of capitalism in eighteenth-century England where the 
polished individual of commercial society was increasingly juxtaposed to the slave-owning, rude 
and even barbarous figure of the ancient citizen.611 “In the pre-commercial society … the 
exchange of goods and services is so underdeveloped that the normal human relationship is that 
between master and slave, lord and serf. Only as commerce develops do social relations become 
capable of generating civil authority.”612 Seen in this light, colonial slave economies resembled 
less the commercial society from which they spun off than the pre-commercial stage the British 
had supposedly left behind. Slavery, and especially African chattel slavery, represented a 
condition as “artificially distanced from civil society as that of savagery was naturally 
remote.”613 
Once again, the civilizational tropes outlined above could offer the guiding thread into 
Wakefield’s statement, “slavery is full of moral and political evils from which the method of 
hired labor is exempt” (AC, 928). Colonial slavery as a mode of labor control stood outside civil 
society and planted one foot of the slave-owner firmly in the soil of unprincipled, brute might. It 
resolved the labor problem through immediate coercion, which placed it squarely outside the 
liberal principles of consent and contract that increasingly demarcated the British political and 
moral character under the ascendant leadership of the commercial classes. As David Brion Davis 
compellingly demonstrates, at once constitutive of and pitted against the idea of “free labor,” 
slavery became a “unique moral aberration” no longer compatible with the changing “attitudes 
toward labor, property, and individual responsibility,” and “the needs and values of the emerging 
                                                
611 Pocock, “Mobility of Property,” pp. 107-9, 114-5, and “Tangata Whenua” p. 206. 
612 Pocock, “Mobility of Property,” p. 121. 
613 Pocock, Barbarism and Religion Vol. 4, p. 6. 
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capitalist order.”614 The forcible expropriation and exploitation inherent in enslavement glared 
too disturbingly in the face of the relatively subtle, flexible, and institutionally relayed forms of 
labor control and social discipline that were being developed and disseminated in England in this 
period.615  
Against this ideological background, the passages below (written twenty years apart) 
pinpoint the civilizational coordinates of slavery in Wakefield’s thought: 
Convict labor being a kind of slavery, the employer of convicts is a species of slave-driver, and his 
children are little slave drivers. As his slaves have more rights and more reason than the black slaves of 
Virginia, his position is more injurious to his character than that of the Virginian slave-owner … One can 
imagine a kind of master of downright slaves; but to drive men, half slaves and half freemen, must make 
the driver a brute … the injury done to the character of the master by our slave system is quite perfect. Is 
this not a great evil? (LS, 136) 
 
Negro slavery is detestable for the master who was not bred, born, and educated within hearing of the 
driving-whip. If I could find a stronger word than detestable, I would apply it to the life of a decent 
Englishman who has become a driver of convicts in Tasmania. … [The] political danger and social plague 
[of a degraded slave population] is tolerable, indeed, for those who are used to it, and to whom it is, 
moreover, a convenience in other respects; but the British capitalist is not used to it (AC, 852-3)  
 
Arresting the barbarizing expansion of the frontier by means of coerced labor gave rise to 
another form of civilizational relapse, namely, turning the slave-owner into a cruel despot and 
compromising the liberal English character.616 Here was another conundrum for spontaneous 
                                                
614 Davis, Problem of Slavery, pp. 82, 254, 349. However, the cause of antislavery did not imply sympathy for the 
laboring class on the part of the abolitionists. If antislavery played an indisputable role in “making a sincere 
humanitarianism an integral part of class ideology,” it also shaped the discursive plain on which disciplining the 
British working class according to the dictates of industrial capitalism could be undertaken and understood in a 
liberal language by fusing utilitarianism with an ethic of benevolence. The crucial point underscored by Davis is that 
antislavery ideology to which Wakefield subscribed represented a “highly selective response to the exploitation of 
labor,” “isolating specific forms of human misery, allowing issues of freedom and discipline to be faced in a 
relatively simplified model.” Davis, Problem of Slavery, pp. 402-3, 455-8, 464-8. 
615 The abolition of slavery belonged to a broader genus of institutional reforms that targeted prisons, police, and 
poor relief in the 1830s and 1840s, which built on the modern techniques of disciplinary power chronicled by 
Michel Foucault, and which constituted the essential institutional conditions of the consolidation of capitalist 
relations, or what Polanyi labeled “the great transformation.” See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth 
of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), Birth of Biopolitics, and Security, Territory, Population. 
616 In this observation, Wakefield was not alone. Catherine Hall points out the uneasy coexistence of material 
symbiosis and cultural revulsion that marked the relationship between the West Indies and England. For the English, 
“the wealthy planters represented forms of vulgarity, backwardness, and degeneracy that inverted the standards of 
English civility and culture.”  The West Indies represented “a kind of outpost of the metropolis, an extension or 
perhaps an excrescence of the British self rather than a place entirely separate.” Davis similarly emphasizes the 
notoriety of the “white population” of Barbados “for its vulgarity, alcoholism, and general improvidence.” Catherine 
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colonization: free labor in the colonies culminated in vagrant savagery, while bonded labor bred 
barbarous despotism. The inhabitants of free colonies were free but not civilized (like the 
savages of the American wilderness), while those of the slave colonies were relatively civilized 
but not free (like the subjects of Asiatic despotisms). Whether they set sail for becoming 
homesteaders or planters, “something happened to Britons when they left the island shores.”617 
 
III. Systematic Colonization: the Metropole and the Colony in Full Circle 
Shoring Up Capitalism and Freedom 
If capitalist civilization and its liberal image of itself were both to be upheld in the 
colonies, “free labor” had to be consummated as a notion. It had to remain “free,” that is, the 
exclusive private property of the laborer who could alienate it through contracts. At the same 
time, it had to remain “labor,” that is, a commodity the purchase and employment of which 
yielded a surplus.618 We have reconstructed Wakefield’s analysis of the antithesis between these 
two imperatives. In this third and last section, I turn to his proposed methods to mitigate this 
antithesis and bring the imperatives of accumulation in the metropole and imperatives of 
civilization in the colony together in a harmonious resolution. Wakefield’s scheme of systematic 
colonization sought to connect the two loci through streams of labor, capital, commodities, and 
culture, which could relieve the pressure in the metropole by channeling excess labor and capital 
to the colonies without, however, letting them to disperse over the wild. In hydraulic terms, the 
steam had to be let out of the over-pressurized boiler, not into open air where it dissipated and 
                                                
Hall, “What did a British World Mean to the British?” in Rediscovering the British World, ed. P. Buckner & R. D. 
Francis (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2005), p. 26, 28. Davis, Problem of Slavery, p. 52. 
617 Hall, “What did a British World Mean to the British?” p. 27 
618 As Kale aptly remarks, what was lacking in the post-emancipation Caribbean was not labor, but labor that yielded 
a surplus. Kale, Fragments of Empire, pp. 55-60. 
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vanished, but into artificially constructed chambers in order to obtain optimum pressure on both 
ends of the transfer and to secure a free, reliable, and contented labor supply. 
 We have seen that in Wakefield’s view labor was either free or not; all hybrid forms of 
labor control (indenture, apprenticeship) qualified as “virtual slavery.” His policy proposals 
reflected such dichotomous bearings, as it only provided for the emigration of legally free labor. 
Wakefield’s ingenious solution to the colonial labor problem wove together a laissez-faire stance 
on the labor contract, which by the early nineteenth century had calcified into the decisive mark 
of free labor,619 and a strategy for indirectly coercing free labor into remaining capital-positing 
wage labor. Both capitalist relations and freedom could be achieved in the colonies, Wakefield 
argued, by placing an artificially inflated price on public lands in order to prolong the period for 
which emigrants had to work as wage laborers to save enough for becoming landowners. The 
compulsion to work would remain; however, it would issue not from the sound of master’s lash 
or the sight of the gallows but from the Malthusian fear of destitution and the Smithian desire to 
improve one’s condition.  
                                                
619 By the end of the eighteenth century, the laborer’s consent to enter into a wage contract with the employer had 
been the juridical sign of freedom, regardless of whether or not the laborer was in practical bondage. The debates 
over free labor in Britain came to a head around the status of Scottish colliers and salters (broached during the case 
of Knight v. Wedderburn) who had been bound to mines for life and some of whom wore collars with the names of 
their employers. The conclusion of the case, conjoined by such illustrious names as John Millar, was that the 
lifetime bondage of colliers, viewed in the light of “high wages,” represented not legal slavery but “commercial 
regulation” based on expediency. The decision demonstrated “the importance of wages as a symbol of exchange and 
voluntarism even in a situation of nearly absolute subordination.” Davis, Problem of Slavery, pp. 489-92. The 
similar argument would resurge in Lord Grey’s criticism of Henry Taylor’s gradual abolition plans, which granted 
one day of the week to slaves to work on their own account, save, and purchase their freedom (what was also known 
as contracion in Spanish colonies). Grey drew an impervious line between slavery and freedom and squarely 
predicated the latter on the idea of “wage contract,” struck by the mutual consent of fully free and equal parties. 
Holt, Problem of Freedom, p. 47. The notion of “freedom” that the British policymakers to explicitly formulate after 
the emancipation turned out to be the freedoms of the “possessive individual” theorized in C. B. Macpherson’s 
Political Theory of Possessive Individualism. A concise overview of the transvaluation of the wage relation, during 
which it morphed from an indicator of dependency to the hallmark of independency can be found in Nancy Fraser 
and Lisa Gordon, “Dependency Demystified: Inscriptions of Power in Keyword of the Welfare State,” Social 
Politics 1 (1994): 4-31. 
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Obviously, for these “voluntary” and “economic” motives of labor to be more than a 
good idea in the colonies, one needed employers to invest capital and laborers to employ. Given 
that one could not force either to immigrate to the colonies, the means of convincing them had to 
be devised. Wakefield’s theory of systematic colonization offered an elaborate solution to this 
problem, yet one that depended on the highly demanding condition that all of its prescriptions be 
implemented simultaneously and uniformly. Behind this reasoning lay the Benthamite theory of 
human motivation, especially as it related to property. “Expectation is a chain that unites our 
present existence to our future existence,” wrote Bentham, and “the idea of property consists in 
an established expectation.”620 If capitalists and workers were to sink their property (stock and 
labor) in colonial land, they had to be assured that they would obtain reasonable returns, since 
“he who has no hope that he shall reap will not take the trouble to sow,” a dictum of Bentham’s 
that applied quite literally in this case.621 Following Bentham’s legal positivism that decreed the 
birth and death of law and property in unison, Wakefield advocated and actively lobbied for an 
Act of Parliament to underwrite his systematic colonization plans. Additionally, he worked for 
the publicization of the anticipated results of systematic colonization, which, especially when 
sanctioned by prominent political economists of the time, could instill in policymakers and 
prospective emigrants a favorable set of expectations regarding colonization. 622 In one respect, 
the whole plan was a leap of faith, yet one subtended by the “science” of political economy. This 
                                                
620 Jeremy Bentham, The Theory of Legislation (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1931), pp. 110-1. 
621 Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Reward (London: John and H. L. Hunt, 1825), p. 318. Wakefield’s advocacy of 
wage labor found another source of theoretical sanction in Bentham’s utilitarian endorsement: “substitute alluring 
for coercive motives: reward for punishment. With suitable precautions, abolish all services in kind, all forced 
labour and slavery. A country peopled with serfs will be always poor. Pay for labour in money, and the reward, 
mingling drop after drop with the labour, will sweeten its bitterness.” Ibid, p. 307. 
622 In the modern microeconomic lexicon, the “set of expectations” invoked here roughly translate into “incentive 
structures,” especially if specific expectations and their behavioral effects are preconceived, anticipated, and hoped 
for, as was the case for Wakefield. Hence, although it sounds anachronistic for the early nineteenth century, I will be 
using the term “incentives” and “incentivizing” to refer to Wakefield’s preferred mechanism for implementing his 
colonization schemes. 
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myth of profitability and prosperity would prove to be more successfully self-actualizing than 
one would expect. As one New Zealand historian put it, “the image was marketed before the 
reality existed, and helped create it.”623 
 
Commodity Fictions, Colonial Fabrications 
The cornerstone of Wakefield’s policy measures was the mode of land disposal in the 
colonies. The manner in which individuals appropriated colonial land heavily influenced the 
predominant forms of property, the organization of labor, and consequently the prospects of 
socioeconomic development. The “grants system” hitherto adopted by European governments 
represented a “faulty mode of colonization” inasmuch as it made land accessible to people who 
would otherwise be wage laborers and thereby spawned the colonial labor problem with 
deplorable consequences detailed above. Now, Wakefield admitted that governments could not 
control the amount of fertile land available to settlers. They could control, however, the disposal 
of secure titles, or in other words, legal property in land. Assuming that no person would settle 
on land without a solid title to it, Wakefield suggested that the British government adopt two 
principal measures for restricting the expanse of private property in the colonies in order to 
prevent dispersal and ensure social concentration. Social concentration meant wage labor, which 
could be combined and directed by employers; capital accumulation, leisure, and civilization 
would follow. “Government might, by restricting the amount of grants, establish and maintain 
the most desirable proportion between people and territory,” Wakefield wrote, and added, “every 
government, therefore, possesses the power to civilize its subjects” (LS, 158-9). 
As the first measure, the grants system ought to be replaced by the sale of colonial lands, 
which would give the government a much more precise instrument of disposal.624 This policy 
                                                
623 Belich, Making Peoples, p. 358. 
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envisioned much stronger and exclusive preemptive crown rights over, and stricter government 
management of, colonial lands than had been the case under the grants system.625 Unchecked 
private property in land had been a curse. For colonization to proceed along civilized lines, land 
“must not only be waste, but it must be public property, liable to be converted into private 
property for the end in view” (EA, 527, emphasis added). And the “end in view” being the 
enlargement of the field of production for capital and labor, the “power of government over 
waste land must be exerted actively” in bestowing land titles, while at the same time, to prevent 
dispersion, “that power must be exerted negatively, in refusing titles to waste land” (Ibid, 538). 
The tandem deployment of the powers to grant and withhold secure titles would enable the 
system to operate like an “elastic belt” (Ibid, 541), tightly enclosed around the field of 
production and exerting the necessary amount of pressure to sustain the accumulation of capital, 
expanding outward when the pressure of accumulation pressed against the field of production.626 
Wakefield’s proposal had to vie with two established approaches to the economics of 
colonization. One of these was the orthodox position, summarized by James Mill’s contention 
that the British economy could employ all its capital and labor at home even if Britain were 
                                                
624 This was one field in which Wakefield’s efforts bore fruit in the form of Ripon Land Regulations adopted in 
1831, after which the sale of colonial lands replaced the land grant system in Canada, the West Indies, and 
Australasia. 
625 English chartered companies in the seventeenth century were granted not only land in America but also the 
exclusive discretion over its disposal. Similarly, the British East India Company as a semi-autonomous 
governmental body handled the regulation of property in the territories under its government. See Stern, ““A Politie 
of Civill & Military Power.”” Neither was this tradition restricted to the English. The Dutch East India Company 
(VOC) went so far as to claim its dominions as its exclusive sovereign property, asserting against the United 
Provinces that such possessions “could be sold for profit to the Spanish or to any other enemy of the state.” Julia 
Adams, The Familial State: Ruling Families and Merchant Capitalism in Early Modern Europe (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2005), p. 61. 
626 The “elastic belt” principle would play the crucial role of orchestrating the conditions underpinning Ricardian 
rent theory by gradually expanding agriculture out to marginal lands, thereby protecting rents from the collapse that 
typically followed from dispersion. These outcomes would be obtained by the administrative feat of the local 
government, which would ensure that “the capital and labor possessed by the Colony at any given time, will be 
employed on those portions of land, which from quality or situation, can be most advantageously cultivated, and 
such concentration of population aimed at, as shall produce that degree of combination of labour which is most 
favorable to production” (PC, 303). 
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surrounded by “Friar Bacon’s Wall of Brass,” at which Wakefield’s “elastic belt” took an open 
jab. We have seen Wakefield’s response to this position in Section 1, and need not retrace it here. 
The other and more important position was Smith’s dictum that abundant fertile land in the 
colonies guaranteed productivity and prosperity. This line of thought was seminally articulated in 
John Locke’s labor theory of property a century earlier. Locke had claimed America to belong to 
the natural common (much like Europe had been ages ago), open by divine design to private 
appropriation by anyone who would subdue and improve it by his labor. Everything of material 
value to human existence flowed from the mixing of labor with land; therefore, the prosperity 
and happiness of mankind increased in proportion to the enclosure and improvement of the 
earth’s common.627 As discussed in detail in Chapter 2 of this study, Locke formulated his theory 
with the English colonies in America in mind. Smith likewise celebrated the combination of 
English agricultural skill with fertile American soil, unburdened by heavy taxes and government 
interference characteristic of the old country, which paved the stones to opulence in America. 
From this perspective, Wakefield’s proposal of government-created scarcity of land would lay 
the ax to the root of colonial prosperity. 
I have described Wakefield’s objection to Smith as regards the subversive impact of 
abundant land on the colonial labor market; however, there existed another problem with such 
abundance that directly pertained to land itself. Wakefield agreed that the superabundance of 
land in the colonies rendered it a species of natural commons, “supplied, like air or water, in 
unlimited qualities”; however, this was precisely the problem from a political economic point of 
view, since this supply was “not in any proportion to the market demand for land, but so as to 
                                                
627  Locke, Two Treatises of Government, pp. 301-10. 
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prevent such a demand” (AC, 933).628 Strictly speaking, “common” as a category is outside the 
frame of supply and demand, and from the perspective of the colonizers all colonial land was 
practically in the natural common. By invoking the peculiarity of colonial conditions, Wakefield 
attempted to undercut the laissez-faire offshoots of the Smithian lineage, which invoked the 
natural value of land arising from the dynamics of supply and demand. It was not natural 
fertility, Wakefield argued, but competition for land that created land rents (the vital sign of a 
thriving land market) and such competition issued from scarcity in land (EA, 423). The facility 
with which land could be obtained, however, translated into the absence of scarcity, the central 
dynamic that gave life to the interplay of supply and demand. Consequently, no scarcity, no 
competition, no market.629 In the colonies, the “tragedy” of the commons issued not from the 
absence of private property, pace Garret Hardin, but from its ubiquity. Against this background, 
Wakefield’s “elastic belt,” constructed from strong preemptive crown rights and public property 
claims, represented the boundaries of the colonial territory to be cordoned off, negated as 
commons, and reconstituted as “property” of a specific type – mutable property, property that 
had an exchange value, or in short, commodified property.630 Wakefield thereby countered both 
                                                
628 Wakefield’s denial of any value to the commons was in line with the labor theory of value to which he 
subscribed. “The accumulated produce of labor is wealth,” wrote Wakefield (LS, 133), and declared labor to be “the 
original purchase-money of all things” (EA, 523). Another theorist of the labor theory of value, Karl Marx made the 
crucial distinction between “nature” and “raw material,” wherein he distinguished the latter by virtue of human labor 
that went into its production. Nature neither embodied nor could be expressed in terms of abstract human labor. 
Marx, Capital Vol. 1, p. 287. 
629 Wakefield analogized the profusion of private property in the colonies to inflationary monetary policy, which 
reduced the value of land and money, respectively. Liberally granting colonial lands to private persons, he held, was 
akin to mining a gold deposit to depletion and flooding the economy with currency coined from it irrespective of the 
demand for money (EA, 427). 
630 While it would have been absurd to say that land had no value for colonial small proprietors (their socioeconomic 
independence and survival hinged on it), it would still have made sense to speak of colonial land having no 
exchange value, insofar as commodity form had not become the main social form in which land was conceived and 
transacted. Moloney provides a very pertinent overview of the debates on the status of land and property in New 
Zealand and the competing theories of appropriation (labor, first occupancy, sovereignty). In the confrontation 
between Lockean, Scottish, and Utilitarian theories of colonial land, the association of property with exchangeable 
value was a strikingly constant tenet (again, to recall Pocock, without commodity in land, commercial stage, or 
capitalist civilization, could not be attained). Moloney, “Savagery and Civilization,” pp. 163-6. 
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Locke’s philosophical argument (labor) and Smith’s economic reasoning (opulence) as adequate 
grounds for the free appropriation of land. He rebutted the former by substituting, in Benthamite 
fashion, positive law for natural law as the foundation of property, and the latter by 
demonstrating the need for government intervention to create land as a commodity and an object 
of investment.631 This theoretical confrontation crucially highlighted the political, legal, and 
essentially non-market preconditions of the market in land.632  
                                                
631 For Wakefield, the line that divided “waste” from “property” was drawn neither by labor nor by use or 
settlement, but by law. He defined “waste land” that constituted the object of colonization as “land that is not yet the 
property of individuals, but liable to becoming so through the intervention of government” (EA, 504). The familiar 
trope that faces us here is terra nullius, lands that are “empty” from the perspective of legal entitlement, not 
necessarily because they are unoccupied (for the term applied to inhabited land) but because they are occupied 
“improperly.” This question is a continent of its own, and a proper treatment of it lies beyond the scope of this 
chapter. Instead, I consider terra nullius here as it structures the labor problem. On that basis, I would like to briefly 
point to some of the stakes in, and disputes around, the status of colonial lands as it relates to Wakefield’s 
colonization plans. The distinctive debate in Western political and legal thought over the status of colonial lands is 
coeval with the contact with the New World and has involved such illustrious names as Francisco de Vitoria, 
Francisco Suarez, Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, John Locke, and Emerich de Vattel, among others. Amongst 
these figures, John Locke occupies a privileged place inasmuch as he systematized earlier natural law arguments on 
the issue, and formulated an original theory of appropriation based on labor, productivity, and material-cultural 
civilization which provided the ideological script for deciding on whether a given tract of land was terra nullius (see 
Chapter 2). Pat Moloney and Patricia Burns have sufficiently established that Wakefield and Colonial Reformers’ 
viewed Australia and New Zealand (the immediate object of their colonial designs) as essentially terra nullius. The 
proclamation of the antipodean geography as empty land issued, on the one hand, from the civilizational perceptions 
of “proper” occupation of land by intensive agriculture, monetarization, and a system of letters, explored extensively 
by Pocock. On the other hand, it mobilized a constitutional discourse of sovereignty, which assessed the strength of 
the indigenous peoples’ claims to land and often found them wanting. These lines of legitimization worked with 
much more facility in Australia, thanks to the hunter-gatherer mode of subsistence and the feeble military 
organization of its inhabitants, whereas it ran into substantial difficulties in New Zealand, where the Maori not only 
had sedentary horticulture but also an extensive political organization recognizable by the British gaze. Matters were 
further complicated when the presumed threat of French claims on New Zealand prompted James Busby to engineer 
the declaration of independence of New Zealand (1835) by a convention of the prominent tribal chiefs and then the 
voluntary annexation of New Zealand to the British Crown with the Treaty of Waitangi (1840). The initial 
recognition of Maori sovereignty, only for the express purpose of its transfer to the crown, positioned them much 
more strongly vis-à-vis the colonists when it came to the question of land, as the myths of terra nullius foundered on 
the express necessity to purchase land from the Maori who were now rightful subjects of the British Crown. The 
transfer of sovereignty constituted the crucial political basis for two developments regarding land. First, it laid the 
groundwork for preemptive crown rights over “unoccupied” land (itself an object of tug-of-war between the Maori 
and the settlers), which was precisely what the Maori thought they were not ceding by the Treaty of Waitangi (a 
source of ongoing ire among the Maori today). As Pocock puts it, “What was at issue was not merely the creation of 
a Lockean sovereignty with authority to regulate the transfer of lands, but that of a pre-emptive sovereignty with 
authority to make itself the source of legal title to land … What looked like a guarantee of possession to the iwi has 
in practice meant to them the imposition of a greater capacity for alienation than they desired … it is the question of 
crown title which has in the end become crucial.” J. G. A. Pocock, “Law, Sovereignty, and History in a Divided 
Culture” in The Discovery of Islands: Essays in British History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
Secondly, it extended British jurisdiction to land disputes between the Maori and the colonists, paving the road to 
the Native Land Court (1865), which accelerated the dispossession of the Maori through legal means. One should 
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Ironically, therefore, while Wakefield’s privileging of government chokehold on landed 
property raised liberal eyebrows and laissez-faire indignations (discussed below), his scheme 
intended nothing less than the enclosure and nurturing of a sphere in which the movement of 
land could conform to the metropolitan laws of commodity and capital. Wakefield consummated 
this argument in a hypothetical scenario, wherein he fantasized about the physical production of 
land for the market:  
Suppose then, that Liebig633 should discover a process by which the water of the sea might be converted 
into fertile land, at a cost of, let us say forty shillings an acre. Suppose, further, that the state did not 
monopolize the exercise of this art, and allowed a free trade in it. Immense capitals would be invested in 
this trade. The quantity of sea converted into land would be as much as there was a prospect of being able 
to sell for the cost of production and a profit besides (AC, 937).634 
                                                
keep in mind, of course, that the practical enforceability of these measures owed to the drastic weakening of Maori 
resistance after the Maori Wars (1845-1872). In other words, might and right worked in tandem for folding New 
Zealand into the imperial embrace, a scheme that Wakefield openly endorsed and criticized only for its moderation 
and circumspection. Wakefield blamed the slow pace of colonization in New Zealand on the failure of the British 
government to extinguish native rights in land and poured his indignation at the Colonial Office and the Church 
Missionary Society for attempting to “protect” the Maori from the colonists by bridling the latter’s aggressive 
expansion into Maori land. To recapitulate, while subtended by strong beliefs in the civilizational superiority of the 
British over the Maori, Wakefield’s views on colonial expansion in New Zealand did not follow Lockean labor 
theory of property in which improvement of land entitled individuals to it. Rather, it bore affinities to Grotius’s 
arguments that sovereign claims to unoccupied land, regardless of labor or improvement, preempted and 
extinguished individual claims. The political and legal power of the British state represented, analogous to 
Parliamentary Enclosures, the wedge that was to be driven between the Maori and their lands. A useful overview of 
the Western European debates over the legal status of colonial lands can be found in Pagden’s, Lords of All the 
World and Seed’s Ceremonies of Possession. For the constitutionalist arguments deployed in deeming colonial lands 
as terra nullius, see Tully, Strange Multiplicity. For the exploration of Locke’s impact on terra nullius arguments 
and his colonial entanglements, see Tully, “Rediscovering America,” and Arneil, John Locke and America. For the 
implications of early Victorian civilizational discourse and conceptions of sovereignty for British forays with the 
Maori, see Burns, Fatal Success; Moloney, “Savagery and Civilization;” Dalziel, “Southern Islands;” Pocock 
“Tangata Whenua,” and “Law, Sovereignty and History.” A brief overview of the transfer of Maori lands to 
European settlers through litigation in the Native Land Court, see M. P. K. Sorrenson, “The Politics on Land” in The 
Maori and New Zealand Politics, ed. J. G. A. Pocock (Auckland: Blackwood & Janet Paul, 1965). For a more 
extensive discussion of the development of Maori-colonist relations along social and economic axes and of the place 
of land disputes and political conflict therein, see Belich, Making Peoples, chapters 5-11. 
632 An interesting comparison can be drawn here between Wakefield and Locke’s methods of preventing the 
dispersal of the colonists. Locke’s involvement in the Carolina colony is well known, and his correspondence about 
the colony reveals anxieties about the dispersal of the settlers and the disintegration of the settlement. This colonial 
administrative preoccupation can provide a new angle of interpretation on Locke’s famous limitation of engrossing 
land by the natural law injunctions to labor, to use the fruits of land, and to leave as good and enough for others. 
John Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 306-13. When viewed through the colonial lens, these natural law precepts can be 
recast as moral barriers against dispersion the same way Wakefield’s sufficient price comprises a legal barrier. 
633 Justus von Liebig was a scientist who specialized in, and significantly contributed to, biological and agricultural 
chemistry. 
634 One should note that such fantasies were not the sole province of eccentrics like Wakefield. Ricardo had argued 
earlier, “If with every accumulation of capital we could tack a piece of fresh fertile land to our Island, profits would 
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Costs that attended the production of land for sale at a profit (i.e. capitalist production) would be 
sufficient to align land relations with the market logic. “In the colonies” however, “there is no 
such cost of production. There, the whole good effect must be produced by a price imposed by 
the government, or not produced at all” (Ibid, 938). This price would help demarcate a capitalist 
enclave, sequestered from the unruly waste surrounding it, within which labor and land could 
find their market price. In the waste of the colonies, the production of land-as-commodity 
through the exercise of political power unfolded openly and without entanglement in English 
customary and common law – a point that forces Karl Polanyi’s account of the fictitious 
commodity in land and of the “great transformation” in general beyond its archipelagic confines. 
The powers to grant and withhold property in land could be simultaneously exerted by 
the indirect, economic, and productive instrument of an artificial price on public lands. This 
constituted the core of Wakefield’s famous “sufficient price” theory. The price had to be 
“sufficient” to fulfill several social utility functions at once. First and foremost, it ought to be 
sufficiently high to make land financially accessible and appealing only to a certain type of 
purchasers, namely, those with the economic means (capital) and intention to invest in and 
improve land.635 The obverse side of this objective was barring people with meager resources 
(the majority of the settlers) from obtaining landed property, and by denying them the ownership 
of land (the principal means of production in the colonies), compel them to work on others’ 
property. As early as A Letter from Sydney, Wakefield advocated the imposition of “some 
considerable price on land” for the purpose of maintaining “a constant supply of the demand for 
well-paid labor,” such that a colony could obtain the economic fruits of “the more divided labor 
                                                
never fall.” David Ricardo, “Essay on Profits,” in The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo Vol. 4, ed. 
Pierro Sraffa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), p. 18. 
635 The artificially inflated prices, Wakefield argued, would also discourage another form of unproductive 
investment in land, namely, speculative engrossment. 
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of its less scattered people” and “the greatest increase of wealth and civilization” (LS, 159-60). 
This argument he would constantly refine and reiterate, in policy form in The Plan of a Company 
(PC, 276-8) and in the political economic discourse of England and America (540-7) and Art of 
Colonization (935-50).  
Throughout the twenty years that separated the first and last of these works, Wakefield 
confronted persistent criticisms that assailed the possibility of setting a sufficient price.636 To 
such criticisms he responded by asserting the status of sufficient price as the outcome of a 
multivariate calculus that had to factor in circumstantial data. His earlier remarks displayed some 
hesitancy on the subject. “Still, how is the proper price to be ascertained? I frankly confess that I 
do not know. I believe that it could be determined only by experience” (LS, 159). By the time he 
consummated his theory in Art of Colonization, he sounded confident and scientific: 
There is no price that would be suitable for the colonies generally: the price must needs vary according to 
peculiar natural and other circumstances in each colony: and in order to determine the price for each 
colony, practical proceedings of a tentative or experimental nature are indispensable … That it is so 
becomes very plain, when one considers what are the elements of a calculation made with a view of 
determining the sufficient price for any colony (AC, 939) 
 
The scientific-experimental conception of sufficient price also glimmered in Wakefield’s 
designation of it as a “variable force, completely under the control of government” (Ibid, 935), 
through which the proportion between land and labor could be calibrated to achieve the desired 
results. True to this spirit, Wakefield did not entrust such a technically sophisticated manner to 
colonial governors, who were “always a sailor or a soldier” and “as fit to manage a great work of 
public economy as Adam Smith was fit to navigate a ship or command a regiment” (EA, 534). 
Wakefield’s suggestion that the British government commission a political economist for each 
colony (LS, 165) might sound ludicrous, but it was consonant with the scientific-utilitarian 
                                                
636 Prichard, “Introduction,” pp. 23-4. 
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underpinnings of his project; it also foreshadowed, if not “rule by experts,” then certainly “rule 
with experts” that distinguished the government of economy, or economic governmentality.637 
 Whether one could pinpoint a sufficient price for all colonies was an incidental question 
compared to the golden rule to which it served, namely, “so limiting the quantity of land, as to 
give the cheapest land a market value that would have the effect of compelling labourers to work 
for some considerable time for wages before they could become landowners” (AC, 935). “There 
is but one object of a price; and about that there can be no mistake. The sole purpose of a price is 
to prevent labourers from turning into landowners too soon” (Ibid, 939-40).638 In this capacity, 
sufficient price theory formulated the legal and political means of reproducing in the colonies the 
class of dispossessed laborers that the Parliamentary Enclosures (itself a massive politico-legal 
instrument) had been producing in the metropole. British political sovereignty that drove a 
wedge between labor and land in Britain was summoned reappear in the colonies as a barrier that 
prevented their reunion. Wakefield celebrated the sufficient price theory as the path to 
“extending” the civilization of the old society to the colonies, “planting perfect offshoots” of 
Britain and its energetic Anglo-Saxon race, creating “Better Britains” exempt from the 
metropolitan and colonial pathologies.639 What the sufficient price theory also extended as the 
                                                
637 Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, p. 286.  
638 What price was “sufficient,” how soon was “too soon,” these questions were subject to the aforementioned 
“elements of calculation” that included, among others, the rate of population increase, volume of immigration to the 
colony, rate of wages and the cost of living that determined workers’ average rate of saving, and the nature of the 
soil and climate, which impacted how large a tract of land would be an economically viable unit for self-cultivation. 
In the face of a dynamic multiplicity of variables, Wakefield proclaimed, “to name a price for all the colonies, would 
be as absurd as to fix the size of a coat for mankind” (AC, 940). 
639 The ultimate achievement of systematic colonization was to be “the extension to new places of all that is good in 
an old society” (civilization, experience in the arts of production, mutual assistance, skilful application of capital and 
labor, ready markets to dispose of surplus, high profits and wages), or in other words, precluding the emergence of 
“new people.” If successfully executed, the colonists would be “enjoying all the advantages of an old society 
without its evils; without any call for slavery, or restrictions on foreign trade; an old society in every thing save the 
uneasiness of capitalists and the misery of the bulk of the people” (EA, 549). The contours of Wakefield’s vision of 
colonization could perhaps be discerned more clearly by considering whom it excluded. The urban 
Lumpenproletariat and the parasitic aristocracy, who shared the traits of unproductivity and moral dissipation, had 
no place in Wakefield’s colonies (accordingly, the agents of New Zealand Company concentrated their recruitment 
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precondition of all these glorious visions was the process of primitive accumulation. Once again, 
the production of “fictitious commodity,” this time in labor, found its undisguised and 
premeditated execution in the colony. 
Inversely to land, however, labor could be made to conform to the laws of supply and 
demand only when it existed abundantly relative to the amount of capital in a given field of 
employment, or to borrow from Marx, when capital had at its disposal a reserve army of labor.640 
Wakefield lamented the absence of such a reserve army in the colonies where labor that could be 
hired tended to be so expensive as to render it impossible to realize a profit. This practically 
meant that “labor” in the classical political economic sense, that is, wage labor employed for 
profit did not exist. The elegance of Wakefield’s scheme resided in its production of relative 
scarcity of land and relative superfluity of labor, and therefore a capitalist market in both, in one 
stroke of the sufficient price. For accomplishing this double feat, Wakefield drew upon political 
and legal instruments of imperial nature, to an examination of which we now turn. 
                                                
efforts in the English countryside). Similarly, the Irish and the Highland Scots were emphatically excluded, since 
their indolent and barbaric condition ill-fitted them to be the pioneers of civilization in new lands, in stark contrast to 
the “energetic, accumulating, prideful, domineering Anglo-Saxon race” (AC, 850) (“Lowland Scottish” managed to 
obtain a place on a par with “purely English” when it came to colonization. AC, 802). The transplantation of 
metropolitan relations was not restricted to the economic realm. The colonial political system would also mirror that 
of the mother country, though only after the colony achieved the social and economic maturity for self-government. 
The latter would be modeled on the English Ancient constitution and “harmonious government,” where franchise 
would be restricted by landed property qualification. Such qualification would have the effect of politically 
authorizing the gentry and the middle classes, and equally importantly, those members of the working class whose 
industry and moral integrity had raised them to the level of landowners. Landowners would have higher stakes in, 
and a stronger commitment to, the wellbeing of the colony. Raised to the higher degree, a more strenuous 
qualification in landed property and hereditary titles ensconced in a higher chamber (equivalent of the House of 
Lords) could encourage the gentry to emigrate (AC, 918-9). “The British Constitution [has] grown up by slow 
degrees … In order to give a colony the immediate benefit of it, we cannot wait to let it grow from the seed as it has 
grown here, but we must transplant a perfect offshoot” (Ibid, 919). Although the connection between sound political 
institutions and the prosperity of a people had proven itself an incontrovertible universal maxim, once again, it 
unfolded fully in English exceptionalism. “Whilst colonial prosperity is always dependent on good government, it 
only attains the maximum in colonies peopled by the energetic Anglo-Saxon race” (Ibid, 799-800). For a discussion 
of Wakefield’s idea of extending the old society without its social pathologies and the popular colonial visions of 
“Better Britains” with which conversed, see Olssen “Wakefield and New Zealand,” and Belich, Making Peoples, pp. 
298-305. For the significance of “neo-Britains” and “Better Britains” for reconceptualizing British social and 
political history, see Buckner and Francis, “Introduction,” and J. G. A. Pocock, “Neo-Britains and the Three 
Empires.” 
640 For the relationship between the reserve army of labor and the market in labor, see Marx, Capital Vol. 1, p. 792. 
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Imperial Governmentality 
What distinguished Wakefield’s scheme from more glaring processes of primitive 
accumulation was its embeddedness in what I would like to call, following Couze Venn, 
“imperial governmentality.” Venn uses the term to denote the amalgamation of three modalities 
of power, namely, biopolitics, economic rationality, and militarism, exercised through techniques 
of subjection/subjectification that are developed, emulated, and refined within networks of 
colonial rule.641 In expounding on this “hybrid form of power,” Venn’s emphasis falls upon the 
combination of “the right to kill of sovereignty … with elements of the disciplinary and 
normalizing strategies of biopolitical power.”642 While fully agreeing with Venn on the 
irreducible and persistent presence of “originary violence” in the genealogy of capitalist relations 
and attendant forms of subjectification,643 the moment of primitive accumulation I highlight here 
partook of more indirect and discrete methods of exerting power. Put bluntly, one could not 
brandish the lash for promoting colonization while championing the cause of free labor (convicts 
were the exception, but they were not free anyway). Accordingly, Wakefield’s colonization 
schemes display a stronger affinity with the logic of “imperial labor allocation” that Kale 
outlines in her account of Indian indentured migration to the Caribbean.644 Wakefield’s strategy 
pursued even more invisible and circumspect routes, since unlike the “brown men” who were 
                                                
641 For a full explanation of the concept, see Venn, Postcolonial Challenge, especially pp. 62-74. For the treatment 
of imperial governmentality in relation to Foucault’s theoretical paradigm, see Venn, “Neoliberal Political 
Economy.” 
642 Venn, “Neoliberal Political Economy,” p. 212. 
643 Venn, Postcolonial Challenge, p. 164. One great merit of Venn’s engagement with Foucault is the stress he 
places on the constitutive role played by violence, and in particular colonial violence, in the development and 
application of techniques through which the subject of enterprise, or what Foucault calls homo oeconomicus, comes 
into being. As crucial as this point is, it lies beyond the scope of this chapter, not least because Wakefield considered 
those segments of the population he targeted for emigration as already to be homines economici capable of 
responding to opportunities for maximizing economic gain (higher profits and wages). 
644 Kale, Fragments of Empire, pp. 5-6. Like Venn, Kale draws attention to the range of imperial legal, financial, and 
military technologies through which “empire made labor accessible to suitably situated employers.” Ibid, p. 159.  
  285 
ignorant and thus vulnerable to deceit and fraud by their prospective employers, Wakefield’s 
prospective emigrants represented “properly free” laborers: English, male, white, civilized, and 
in control of their own labor.645 Therefore, their economic freedom could not be abridged.  
Political freedoms, however, were another story. In the early nineteenth century, the 
institutional arsenal of the British Empire contained a variety of politico-legal instruments of 
rule, the most important of which was the status of “crown colony.” This status bound a colony 
to the Colonial Office through a colonial governor with powers that bordered on the plenary.646 
Though a source of much ire, especially amongst the colonial elite, and a purported anathema to 
“English liberties,” the crown colony status constituted an indispensable conduit of colonial 
reform in the nineteenth century.647 Although Wakefield consistently advocated for colonial self-
government over crown colonies,648 the “uniform” and “permanent” implementation of the 
                                                
645 Ibid, 111-3. As I discuss below, emigration of women comprised an indispensable component of Wakefield’s 
schemes, yet he did not considered women to be independent laborers. Rather, the vision he had for women was one 
of domestic labor (which did not qualify as “productive” labor) and financial dependency on the husband. 
646 Peter Burroughs provides a helpful overview of the institutional government of the British Empire in the 
nineteenth century, in which he emphasizes the institutional innovation, variation, and adaptability that typified 
British rule over distant colonies and dependencies. In a noteworthy passage, he identifies the impact of Wakefield’s 
scheme on imperial conventions. “Most ambitiously, the Colonial Office adopted in 1831 as part of Imperial 
practice the leading principles of Edward Gibbon Wakefield’s theory of systematic colonization with respect to 
restrictive land sales [aforementioned Ripon Regulations] and assisted immigration to Australia, in a bid to shape the 
colonies’ land use, landownership, and economic development according to a doctrinaire blueprint. Colonial slavery 
and the transportation of convicts were discontinued in favour of both free and indentured labour.” Peter Burroughs, 
“Imperial Institutions and the Government of Empire,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire Vol. 3, ed. 
Roger Louis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 172. 
647 The contrast drawn between “despotic crown rule” and “English liberties” in the colonies was more apparent than 
real. British imperial tradition of governance had always operated through a variegated hierarchy of subjecthood. In 
this spectrum between freedom and subjection, persons were differentially positioned according to class, race, 
gender, corporation, nationality, and locality. Rana’s Two Faces of American Freedom provides an incisive account 
of the British hierarchy of subjecthood and traces its continuity in the post-Revolutionary US. As Stoler puts it, 
imperial governmentality has always rested on “gradated variations and degrees of sovereignty and 
disenfranchisement — on multiplex criteria for inclusions and sliding scales of basic rights. Each generated imperial 
conditions that required constant judicial and political reassessments of who was outside and who within at any 
particular time.” Ann Laura Stoler, “Degrees of Imperial Sovereignty,” p. 139. 
648 Such virtues as knowledge and interest in local affairs, enterprise, bonds of fraternity and common ancestry 
distinguished colonial self-government from the vices and mischief arising from governing from a distance, 
including the administration by strangers, jobs and monopolies of trade, and the diversion of resources into less 
productive fields (EA, 579-83, 586-7; AC, 859-64, 880-1, 892). The dichotomous terms of this comparison mirrored 
the familiar language of contrasting Roman “garrisons” to Ancient Greek “colonies,” a point iterated in Adam 
Smith’s critique of the old colonial system in the Wealth of Nations. “Municipal government was a main cause of 
  286 
policy of land sales at a sufficient price hinged on preemptive crown rights over colonial land 
and the undisputed authority lodged in colonial governors.649 Obtaining the anticipated results 
while retaining the formal freedom of labor unimpaired required the dexterous utilization of this 
politico-legal tool. 
Wakefield acknowledged this point by lamenting the “paucity of government” that 
afflicted British colonies, and lambasted crown colonies not so much for “too much government” 
as for “misgovernment.” Especially in his later works, he made the crucial distinction between 
the founding of a new society and its reproduction, to each of which he assigned a different 
governmental logic. “Intervention of government is more, and more constantly needed in the 
multifarious business of constructing society, than that of preserving it.” The cardinal role 
government played in such social construction was “opening the public waste to settlers by 
extensive surveys, and in converting it into private property according to law” (AC, 868).650 
After surveying the secondary, infrastructural undertakings such as drainage, fencing, roads, and 
bridges that would lie within the province of the state, Wakefield emphatically concluded, 
                                                
the greatness of the greatest empires,” Wakefield argued, and the English had thus far managed to offset the 
drawbacks of the Roman precedent by sending out their own people for colonizing, rather than colonizing by 
subordinating other people (AC, 876). 
649 Lord Glenelg’s (Secretary of State for War and the Colonies) 1836 dispatch to all West Indian colonial 
governors, which virtually stipulated that Wakefield’s theory be implemented to maintain capitalist civilization in 
the post-emancipation West Indies is a case in point. Glenelg wrote in his dispatch, “In new countries, where the 
whole unoccupied territory belongs to the Crown, and settlers are continually moving in, it is possible, by fixing the 
price of fresh land so high as to place it above the reach of the poorest class of settlers, to keep the labour market in 
its most prosperous state from the beginning.” Glenelg continued, “The minimum price of land, therefore, should be 
high enough to leave a considerable portion of the population unable to buy it until they have saved some capital out 
of the wages of their industry, and at the same time low enough to encourage such savings by making the possession 
of land a reasonable object of ambition to all.” Quoted in Holt, Problem of Freedom, pp. 74-5. 
650 This task needed not be performed by the Colonial Office. Wakefield thought chartered colonization companies 
to be equally, if not more, competent agents of colonial settlement and government, invoking the “colonizing 
wisdom of our ancestors” with reference to the seventeenth-century corporate charters (AC, 921). However, 
Wakefield’s position on chartered companies was unconventionally flexible, as he had no qualms in considering 
them to be appendages to the Colonial Office. Such subordination of corporate bodies to the imperial state went 
against the Whig tradition of upholding the rights of chartered companies against the encroachments of the crown 
(Edmund Burke’s earlier position on the East India Company being a classical case). Wakefield concluded A View 
of the Art of Colonization by gesturing at “some suggestions, the aim of which is, to make colonizing companies 
seated in the mother-country, very effective instruments of the state in promoting the emigration of capital and 
labour, because properly-empowered and properly-restrained instruments” (AC, 991). 
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“Without plenty of government, the settlement of a waste country is barbarous and miserable 
work … It is difficult, as impossible, to colonize well without plenty of government … The 
quality of government, I repeat, is of less moment to colonists than the amount” (Ibid).651  
Wakefield reiterated this premise in another register that offered a glimpse into the 
political underpinnings of imperial governmentality, that is, the nexus between imperial 
sovereignty and the rule of law: 
The grand point for the colonies, as to government, is that they should always know what they might 
lawfully do, and what they might not. What the law permitted or forbade them to do would be of 
comparatively small importance. … I ask that the colonies should be governed, as a trespasser or vagrant 
is prosecuted in this country, that is to say, “according to law;” that they should be ruled even according 
to the law-martial of a man-of-war rather than left to the lawlessness of a pirate ship; that they should be 
governed by the imperial power instead of being the sport of the chapter of accidents” (AC, 902) 
 
A surface-level analysis of this passage highlights the violation of property rights as the shared 
ground of vagrancy, trespass, and piracy. However, reconsidered in the light of Wakefield’s 
preference of “imperial power” over “accidents” and “law-martial” over “lawlessness,” 
vagrancy, trespass, and piracy indicate the absence of any settled and fixed framework of rules, 
norms, or even conventions. In symbolically marking this absence, these three evils give 
palpability to a more profound political problem that Wakefield discerned in the colonies. When 
left alone, the colonies lacked “order as such,” or to borrow from Carl Schmitt, a nomos that 
provided the conditions on which norms could be applicable. Without the ballast of the imperial 
government, the colonies would be as chaotic (or anomic) as a pirate ship, and as Schmitt 
famously remarked, there existed no norm (most importantly, respect for life, liberty, and 
                                                
651 In this vein, Wakefield’s proposed plan for colonizing South Australia stipulated that the colony would be a 
crown colony until its adult male population reached 10000 (PC, 277). In part, this stipulation reflected a widespread 
opinion amongst contemporary colonial policy makers, which held self-government to be viable only in 
economically mature colonies. A 10000-strong adult male population was taken to indicate an adequate level of 
economic development. 
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property) applicable to chaos.652 In short, empire provided the politico-legal preconditions of the 
governmental techniques through which capitalist civilization could be established in the 
colonies under the aegis of political economic liberalism. 
That its political preconditions were imperial does not detract from the distinctively 
governmental logic of Wakefield’s theory of systematic colonization. With “imperial 
governmentality,” we bring Michel Foucault’s analysis of power under liberalism within the fold 
of political economy inflected by colonial considerations, which can lend strong theoretical 
purchase on the specific modus operandi of primitive accumulation implied in Wakefield’s 
vision.653 Expressed in Foucauldian terms, the sufficient price theory represented a scientific 
discourse, which referred to the controversial yet authoritative field of political economy, and 
through which the political-legal power of the state could be relayed to produce in the colonies 
the social effect of dispossession that was constitutive of capital-relation. One distinctive 
character of this theory was the subtlety and discretion of the power it authorized in molding 
labor relations, which set it apart from its mercantilist predecessors. Unlike such blunt measures 
as maximum wage legislation that early-modern mercantilism prescribed, Wakefield’s theory 
upheld the inviolability of the labor contract and the principle of voluntarism. The hoped-for 
effects were to be produced by targeting, not the individual behavior itself, but the social and 
economic environment that surrounded him.654 The scientific knowledge of human motivation 
would inform policy plans for configuring the set of interventions that would direct individuals 
                                                
652 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, ed. George Schwab (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1985), p. 13. Wakefield hinted at the chaotic propensity of spontaneous colonization in 
his conjecture on the South Australian colonists in a manner that disclosed the civilizational metrics of his 
conception of order. “Our grandchildren will be a race of unmixed barbarians, more ungovernable than the white 
savages of Kentucky” (LS, 124). 
653 While there are plausible grounds for considering Foucault’s works on discipline, sexuality, and punishment as 
forming a constellation around the question of power exercised by liberal precepts, the main and incontrovertible 
grounding of this argument invoked here can be found in Security, Territory, Population, and Birth of Biopolitics.  
654 For the explication of the insightful formulation, “minimum economic and maximum legal intervention,” see 
Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, pp. 89, 118-120, 131-3, 137-8, 145-6, 167. 
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to act, of their own volition, in a manner to that would realize the socioeconomic objectives of 
systematic colonization. 
The government “cannot force either capital or people to emigrate,” Wakefield remarked 
emphatically, “the principal [sic.] of laissez-faire must be strictly observed in this case” (AC, 
824). However, the government possessed “control over the disposition of people and capital” 
and could manipulate these dispositions into “inducements to emigration for various classes of 
people,” which Wakefield termed “the charms of colonization” (AC, 824-5, emphases mine). 
After a comparative economic survey of Britain’s colonies, Wakefield concluded, “in all these 
cases, people are attracted from a worse to a better proportion between land and people; from 
lower to higher profits and wages. That it should be so is consistent with the principles of human 
nature and political economy” (EA, 551).655 In order to relocate excess capital and labor from 
England to the colonies, then, one ought to create the conditions of high profits and wages in the 
colonies. Prospective colonial capitalists had to be assured of an abundant and pliable labor 
force, adequate economic infrastructure, and steady rents. Since such labor supply did not 
naturally present itself in the colonies, it had to be “regulated” by administrative means, and 
sufficient price was the price paid for such regulation, order, certainty, and “system” (Ibid, 556-
7). “The sufficient price alone” however, provided “only for civilized, not for rapid colonization” 
(AC, 952). For expediting the process, Wakefield complemented the policy of sufficient price 
with that of the “emigration fund,” whereby the revenues from the sale of colonial lands would 
be spent on defraying the costs of emigration of workers, thus further increasing the labor-land 
ratio in the colonies (AC, 952-7; EA, 555). Taxes would be laid, not on land but on rents, and the 
                                                
655 Wakefield observed the same “natural” inclinations in the Chinese, who displayed their penchant for higher 
profits in the pervasive activities of smuggling with the British. His call for founding a free trade emporium on an 
island off the coast of China similarly aimed at manipulating these inclinations to the benefit of British economic 
interests (EA, 453-8). 
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rent revenue would be ploughed back into productive activities by supplementing the emigration 
fund and financing infrastructural improvements (roads, ports, towns) that would further raise 
land values (LS 162).656 Social status and “right to a liberal popular Government” would 
constitute the social and political incentives compounding the economic ones (PC, 301).  
Encouraging labor emigration would similarly rely on the promise of liberal wages, and 
more importantly, the prospects of ultimately becoming a landowner. This would rely in part on 
publicity efforts to remove the stigma attached to colonial emigration in the early nineteenth 
century due to pauper shoveling and convict transportation, and Wakefield promoted the 
publication of celebratory letters from poor emigrants to their friends in England (EA, 568-71; 
AC, 828-9). The other dimension of the effort was political economic. The sufficient price in 
each colony had to straddle a fine line, in that it ought to be sufficiently high for delaying most 
settlers’ plans for establishing independent property, yet sufficiently low for keeping these plans 
within the range of viable ambition so as to motivate settlers to work and save as wage 
laborers.657 Put differently, the sufficient price was artificial but not arbitrary. It did not 
crystallize at the intersection of supply and demand, but it served as the linchpin of a utilitarian 
calculus that neither indulged nor frustrated but harnessed the “passion to own land” and turned 
it into a motivation to work for a wage. 
The ultimate promise of landownership has led some historians like John Martin to paint 
Wakefield as a friend and advocate of the laboring class.658 This interpretation confuses strategy 
                                                
656 On Wakefield and colonial rents, see Kittrell, “Wakefield and Classical Rent Theory.” What stands out in a broad 
view of the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century debates on land rent is their consistent inflection by 
divergent colonial contexts. For instance, for the detours that Malthusian and Ricardian rent theories have taken 
through colonial India, see Guha, Rule of Property and Stokes, English Utilitarians. 
657 “No pains should be spared to teach the laboring classes to regard the colonies as the land of promise, which it 
should be their highest ambition to be able to reach. Nor does this matter concerns the poorer orders among us 
alone: in the colonies a large proportion of the children and grandchildren of the highest families in this land must 
be contented to fix their abode, unless they resolve to drag on a life of dependence and indigence here” (LS, 100). 
658 Martin, “Small Nation.” 
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and objective. The imperative of maintaining a dispossessed working class that guided the theory 
and proposals of systematic colonization belies the image of Wakefield as a sincere believer in 
landownership for all laborers, since this would categorically annihilate the working class. Yet, 
for inducing the emigration of labor the prospects of landownership had to be more than simply a 
myth, and it had to be possible for some laborers to rise to the rank of proprietors. The dialectic 
between the myth of social mobility and the imperative of labor supply is captured by James 
Belich’s treatment of the recruitment efforts of the New Zealand Company founded by 
Wakefield and his entourage. The latter preferred, Belich argues, “social sojourners” who 
immigrated to the colonies for the purpose of “bettering themselves.” Such aspirations of social 
mobility formed the most formidable bulwark against worker dissent and rebellion. The dreadful 
scenario for the colonial entrepreneurs was the hardening of the colonial laborers into “social 
settlers,” that is, not only remaining contented with their working class position but also 
becoming aware of its structural permanence, which made for tight social organization and class 
conflict.659 “It was not classlessness,” concludes Belich, “but class harmony that was the 
imperative”660 – or put differently, an abundant and docile labor force. The formation of a 
laboring class in the colonies through voluntary emigration required individual laborers to 
become landowners while impeding the same for laborers as a class. The prospects of 
landownership for all, realized for few and hampered for many, was to be mobilized, ironically, 
for undercutting the pervasive landownership that Wakefield perceived to be the source of all 
colonial pathologies. 
                                                
659 One anticipated benefit of the emigration fund was to shorten the average duration of wage labor workers had to 
perform before they could become landowners, thereby dampening their resistance to sufficient price and 
reinforcing the sense of social sojourning (AC, 956-7). 
660 Belich, Making Peoples, pp. 300-2. In the ideal case, laborers would constitute an economic yet not a political 
class, which would mean resolving the economic labor problem without letting it tip over into the political labor 
problem. 
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Liberal governmental techniques of systematic colonization incorporated a further, and 
distinctively biopolitical dimension. This should not come as surprise, given that the 
metropolitan and colonial pathologies diagnosed by Wakefield were fundamentally problems of 
social reproduction. The twin objectives of relieving England of its excess population and 
populating the colonies would be most efficiently achieved by promoting the emigration of 
young couples, thereby transferring not only bodies but also their fertility (LS, 164). Wakefield’s 
blueprint for the colonization for South Australia stipulated that the people assisted by the 
emigration fund “consist entirely of young married or marriageable persons of both sexes in 
equal numbers” (PC, 276). In the long run, the population growth spurred by this demographic 
policy would obviate the colonial labor problem. “If all the people who have removed from 
Europe to America had been young couples, just arrived at the age of puberty, slavery in north 
America must have long since died a natural death” (AC, 971)661 Gender balance in colonization 
targeted more than simply demographic effects. One of the crucial anticipated outcomes of such 
balance was the sexual division of labor. “Two men, each of whom should be obliged so to 
divide his labour between household cares and the work of production, would produce less than 
one man giving the whole of his time, attention, and labour, to the work of production” (EA, 
562). Raewyn Dalziel keenly observes that Wakefield’s “combination of labor” implicitly 
included women’s labor as a condition of productivity while denying such labor itself any 
productive quality.662 The second crucial outcome would be the civilizing impact on women and 
                                                
661 Intense utilitarian preoccupation with “greatest happiness” also impressed its mark on the biopolitics of 
emigration. “As the greatest quantity of relief from excessive numbers would be comprised in the least number of 
people, the maximum of good from emigration would be obtained, not only with minimum cost, but, what is far 
more important, with the minimum of painful feelings” (EA, 573) 
662 Raewyn Dalziel, “Men, Women, and Wakefield” in Edward Gibbon Wakefield and the Colonial Dream: A 
Reconsideration, ed. Philip Temple (Wellington: Friends of the Turnbull Library, 1997), pp. 81-3. 
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domesticity in their capacity to “sop up, civilize and anchor chaotic surplus males.”663 Colonies 
had been characterized by an unruly preponderance of single men believed to be prone to 
debauchery, coarseness, and a dissipated life, against which “women were perceived as the sub-
heroic mediators of complex and civilized society, constantly softening and refining the passions 
of man.”664 “The moral advantages” accruing from gender proportion would be manifold, argued 
Wakefield. “No man would have any excuse for dissolute habits … Every pair of immigrants 
would have the strongest motives for industry, steadiness, and thrift … The colony would be an 
immense nursery” (EA, 567). In short, “without women, colonization could not succeed” (AC, 
979). The key to inducing women to emigrate would be the promises of a bright future haloed by 
the middle-class ideals of womanhood and conjugality, prospects of marriage, domesticity, and 
respectability.665 This strategy would complement the more direct method of regulating the 
gender ratio by offering passage funds to married couples while denying them to single men 
(EA, 574). 
Finally, in order for all these promises to be credible and powerful enough to induce 
emigration, the whole plan needed to be implemented with a “complete uniformity” and 
“permanency,” and as mentioned above, underwriting it with an Act of Parliament would offer 
the best possible solution (Ibid, 540, 578). This, in turn, required inducing the Colonial Office 
and the members of the Parliament to support the plan and converting prominent political 
economists to the theory of systematic colonization in order to exert indirect pressure on the 
policymakers. Those with the power of policy were attracted to the self-financing provisions of 
Wakefield’s scheme, which stipulated that the emigration fund should accrue “not from 
                                                
663 Belich, Making Peoples, p. 334. To this end, colonial entrepreneurs followed the Tory myths about the moral 
integrity of rural population into the English countryside, which they combed for single women who could be 
convinced to emigrate. Ibid, pp. 334-6. Also see Fedorowich, “British Empire on the Move,” p. 78. 
664 Pocock, “Tangata Whenua,” p. 213. 
665 Dalziel, “Men, Women, and Wakefield,” pp. 83-4. 
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government, but from the capitalists of the mother country” (EA, 574). Early Victorian 
policymakers viewed the empire with an economic eye, comparing its costs and benefits. At the 
height of this debate between 1830s and 1850,666 a blueprint for relieving population pressures 
through emigration funded by private capitalists had its “charms.”667 The same provisions also 
appealed to political economists, especially in Wakefield’s depiction of systematic colonization 
as a spontaneously synchronized machine with a self-adjusting land/labor ratio, which imbued it 
with the “imprimatur of economic science.”668 Wakefield boasted his correspondence with, and 
conversion of, Bentham and noted, “the form of the present treatise [England and America] was 
suggested by one of the wisest and best of mankind” (Ibid, 517).669 While Bentham had been a 
late-life convert, John Stuart Mill was a disciple from the beginning.670 If Wakefield’s strength 
                                                
666 Porter, Andrew, “Introduction,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire Vol. 3, ed. Roger Louis (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 26. 
667 The credit for the active propagation of Wakefield’s ideas in the British Parliament and the Colonial Office 
circles belonged to such Colonial Reformer MPs as Charles Buller and William Molesworth. 
668 Richards, “Wakefield and Australia,” p. 96-7. Initial drafts of the theory of systematic colonization contended 
that the land/labor proportions in the colonies and the flow of emigration would be spontaneously adjusted by the 
interplay of land sales and the emigration fund. Later, Wakefield explicitly renounced such claims of self-regulation, 
declaring (inconsistently) “nobody has ever attributed to it that magical property of being able to work itself without 
legislative or administrative care” (AC, 942). In this respect, Wakefield’s political economy resembles much less 
that of Adam Smith’s than that of James Steuart’s, who analogized a commercial economy to a very complex and 
delicate watch that required fine-tuning by the trained hands of an economic expert. In a similar tone, Wakefield 
contended, “in colonization, as in watch-making or navigation, the doing has certain results in view” (AC, 790). For 
the parallels between Wakefield and Steuart, see Perelman, Invention of Capitalism. 
669 This claim is corroborated by a paper amongst Bentham’s unpublished manuscripts, entitled, true to Bentham’s 
peculiarity, “Colonization Society Proposal, being a proposal for the formation of a Joint Stock Company by the 
name of the Colonization Company on an entirely new principle intitled (sic.) the Vicinity-Maximizing or 
Dispersion-Preventing principle.” Bentham not only detailed the rules of settlement to be followed in the founding 
of a colony, he also meticulously described the physical exercises that the emigrants were to perform during their 
oceanic passage. Semmel, Rise of Free Trade Imperialism, p. 94. 
670 Mill’s adherence to Wakefield’s principles is well known amongst the scholars of the history of economic 
thought. See Semmel, “Philosophic Radicals.” The following excerpt from The Principles of Political Economy 
(published the same year as Wakefield’s Art of Colonization) lends illustrative support to this connection. “To 
appreciate the benefits of colonization, it should be considered in its relation, not to a single country, but to the 
collective economical interest of the human race … It is a question of production, and of the most efficient 
employment of the productive resources of the world … There needs be no hesitation in affirming that Colonization, 
in the present state of the world, is the very best affair of business, in which the capital of an old and wealthy 
country can possibly engage.” 
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lied not in his comprehension of political economy671 or the practical success of his theory of 
colonization,672 then he was certainly adept in “inducing” a diverse audience into thinking that 
systematic colonization offered a platform that harmonized the interests of capitalists and 
laborers, metropolitans and provincials.673 
Wakefield’s reliance on voluntarism, however, did not exclude other, more repressive 
instruments of imperial governmentality. On the contrary, in good utilitarian fashion, he had 
already factored in how the bonded labor of the convicts, certainly more tightly tethered to the 
imperial-sovereign rather than governmental power, could be integrated into his liberal schemes 
of colonization. The sharp end of imperial governmentality showed its uncompromising face in 
Wakefield’s proposals regarding the use of transported convicts. “The Transports would act as 
pioneers to a future army of emigrants,” Wakefield conjectures, “and when they had paved the 
way for a settlement, not penal, they might be removed to other desert places. In this case, their 
labor would, of course, be confined to preparing the settlement for the habitation of better men” 
(LS, 166). The government “would be a capitalist, employing its money with a view to 
remunerating profit” (Ibid, 167). In other words, convicts, thanks to their legally degraded status, 
would function as colonial frontiersmen, preparing the way for, yet not belonging to civilization. 
                                                
671 Tucker, for instance, criticizes Wakefield for simply not understanding the theories he opposed. Tucker, 
“Application and Significance,” pp. 139-40. 
672 In the opening pages of A View of the Art of Colonization (1849) Wakefield admitted the tarnished record of 
systematic colonization in yielding the anticipated results, yet blamed it on the impediments thrown in its way by the 
Colonial Office. Even though systematic colonization “has never had a fair trial anywhere,” and its success in South 
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada were at best relative, it had the favorable impact, Wakefield argued, of 
changing the public opinion both at home and in the colonies (AC, 784-9). 
673 O’Brien underlines the remarkable convergence of Tories and Whigs around Wakefield’s colonial vision, by 
virtue of the its weaving together economic viability and moral regeneration via government intervention. The 
theory of systematic colonization “exerted a disproportionate influence upon the reconceptualization, in the first half 
of the nineteenth century, of Britain’s relationship with its colonies, of their nature, economic purpose, and the kinds 
of imperial future they might bring.” Likewise, Belich notes the remarkable array of allures that laced the colonies in 
the discourse of Wakefieldian colonizers: a bride’s paradise for middle class women, an investor’s paradise for 
capitalists, a haven for uneasy professional classes with promises of gentility, and a heaven for skilled agricultural 
and urban workers who would find respectability and independency. O’Brien, “Colonial Emigration,” p. 164; 
Belich, Making Peoples, pp. 306-8, 324-7.  
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They would serve as the imperial shock troopers of settler capitalism, establishing bridgeheads 
for the reserve army of labor directed by the prospective colonial captains of industry.674 
 
Conundrums of a Liberal Panacea: Voluntary Dispossession Revisited 
 Extending the old society to the colonies through webs of systematic colonization 
conjured up a panacean vision for Wakefield. If it were to be properly institutionalized and 
underwritten by the imperial state, and if all of its provisions were to be set in motion 
simultaneously, systematic colonization would prompt the free and voluntary emigration of 
capital and labor with no fiscal burden to the public.675 It would thereby provide the mother 
country the urgently needed relief from surplus population, opening up the “breathing room” in 
which a solution to the metropolitan labor problem could be devised.676 By concentrating 
workers around capital owners in the colonies, it would ensure social density, combined labor, 
and the division of employments, obviating the necessity of slavery. It would subject all colonial 
workers to the moral edification of labor, and offer the chance of landownership to the 
industrious among them.677 It would make possible the surplus and leisure for the cultivation of 
                                                
674 And the state, thanks to its impersonal and bureaucratic probity, could presumably operate as a slave driver of 
convicts without being subject to the corrupting effect of such a position. This latter implication was curiously 
reminiscent of the contrast drawn between the private-mercenary government of Warren Hastings and the public-
bureaucratic government of Lord Cornwallis in British India. 
675 And capital and labor did immigrate to the colonies in explosive waves, beginning in the 1820s. See Belich, 
“Rise of the Angloworld,” and Fedorowich, “British Empire on the Move.”  
676 The spatio-temporal limits to this remedy arose at the interface between, on the one hand, the inexorable 
tendency of capital to expand or else to fall into crisis, and on the other, the geographic finitude of fresh land in the 
world. Yet Wakefield did not despair. “This stupendous good must have a limit as to its duration. Of course it must; 
because the world is of limited extent. But even if a system of free migration were adopted in all new countries, so 
as to permit the population of the world exert its utmost capacity of increase, still half a century must elapse before 
the pressure of population upon territory would be felt, at the same moment, all over the world; and perhaps in the 
course of fifty years we might discover a way to “new countries” in the moon, or, what appears quite as difficult, a 
means of checking population otherwise than by sin and sorrow” (LS, 164).  
677 The significance of laboring flowed beyond the bounds of morality and spilled over into the domain of 
anthropology. Wakefield’s anthropology conceived of the human being as an essentially futural and possessive 
homo faber. The “principle of human nature is a love of planning for oneself, executing one’s own plan, and 
beholding the results of one’s own handiwork. In colonizing, individuals and communities are always planning, 
executing, and watching the progress, or contemplating the results of their own labours … If you had been a 
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letters, arts, and polished manners.678 It would transform immense colonial wastes into 
agricultural hinterlands for the investment of metropolitan capital. It would establish a free and 
symbiotic exchange relation between industrial centers hungry for cheap food and raw materials 
and colonies in need of manufactured goods.679 With restored wages and profits on both ends of 
the exchange, the working class would be rendered comfortable, receptive to political education, 
and most importantly made to understand the virtues of the system of private property.680 The 
empire of Britain would expand and consolidate her great power status, not by the force of arms 
but through the pacific process of capitalist expansion.681 Strings binding the colonies to the 
                                                
colonist, or architect of society, you would feel, as well as Bacon knew by means of his profound insight into the 
human nature, that colonization is a heroic work” (AC, 827). Human beings derived almost an existential 
satisfaction “from the perpetual and visible sequence of cause and effect, designed and watched by the operator,” 
and accordingly, “the life of a settler, when colonization prospers, is a perpetual feast of anticipated and realized 
satisfaction” (Ibid, 828). This principle of human nature could find only stunted and distorted expression in the 
asphyxiating economic conditions of the metropole. Its full, unadulterated unfolding in the empty lands of the 
colonies transformed the latter into more than an economic field of investment and into a laboratory for conscious 
human activity. 
678 “Wealth will bestow leisure; and leisure will bestow knowledge. Wealth, leisure, and knowledge mean 
civilization. Schools and colleges will be established. The arts and sciences will flourish … A nation will be born 
free, under a clear sky, and will be highly instructed” (LS, 133). 
679 Wakefield was in effect vindicating Smith’s theory on the impact of markets on economic growth.  “In order to 
sell merchandise in a colony, it is necessary that the colony should exist,” wrote Wakefield  (EA, 505). Criticism of 
mercantilist monopolies on colonial markets was justified, but one ought not throw the baby out with the bathwater, 
for “the uses and abuses of colonization are very different things”  (Ibid, 508). The government ought to bring 
colonies into existence yet allow them to trade freely, which would create a natural mutualism between the 
metropole and the colony. “[The emigrants] would be growers of food and raw materials of manufacture for this 
country: we should buy their surplus food and raw materials with the manufactured goods. … Thus employment of 
capital and labor would be increased in two places and in two ways at the same time; abroad, in the colonies, by the 
removal of people and capital to fresh fields of production; at home, by the extension of markets, or the importation 
of good and raw materials” (AC, 806). The outcome would be the augmentation of “population, wealth and 
greatness of the empire … imperial wealth and greatness” (AC, 954-7). 
680 “The colonists, being an instructed and civilized people, would be as well qualified to govern themselves as the 
people of Britain, and being a wealthy people, they would be able, without going to war, to assert the birth-right of 
all British subjects … Qualified, entitled, and powerful to govern themselves, they might either take a share in 
framing the general laws of empire, by means of their representatives in the British Parliament; or if a means 
jealousy on the part of Englishmen should prevent such an arrangement, they might frame their own laws, in a 
Colonial Assembly, under the eye of a viceroy” (LS, 169). The education of the colonists would include “a 
foundation of moral, political, and general knowledge, as may fit the colonists for the exercise of their political 
rights” (PC, 278). 
681 Preparing the conditions for the consolidation of capitalist relations would function as the modus operandi of 
empire building. “Certainty of obtaining labor in the new colony would be the strongest inducement to the migration 
of capitalists, ambitious to take part in laying the foundation of an empire” (EA, 577).  The benefits that would 
accrue therefrom were not limited to economic-fiscal ones but catered to the political advantages of Pax Britannica. 
The “extent and glory of an empire are solid advantages for all its inhabitants, and especially those who inhabit the 
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metropole would be woven of mutual economic interest and fortified by a common cultural 
heritage and liberality of spirit.682  Civilization and democracy would lock arms under the aegis 
of an empire of liberty. A mighty experiment indeed. 
 A major conundrum remained, however, without accounting for which the theory of 
systematic colonization rested more on stilts than on posts. As Eric Richards notes, Wakefield’s 
proposals for government intervention were formulated “in the teeth of the laissez-faire doctrines 
of the times.”683 The Smithian precept that private individuals were the best judges of the 
decisions affecting their interests, and what is more, that free pursuit of individual interest was 
the best route to furthering social utility, had become a doxa of political economy by the early 
nineteenth century that one did not challenge lightly. Malthus, Ricardo, and especially 
McCulloch rebuked systematic colonization as an offense against the laissez-faire doctrine, 
insofar as it laid the heavy hand of the government in the most important business of a colonist, 
namely, choosing the location and the amount of land he purchased as he ought to see fit. While 
this offense also implicated laborers, it pertained more immediately to wealthier colonists, whose 
private decisions to buy land would be subject to such extraneous and suspiciously vague 
considerations as “land-labor ratio” and “degree of concentration.”  
To these challenges, Wakefield responded by invoking the social irrationality of 
spontaneous colonization, an argument that hinged on the juxtaposition of short-term and long-
term considerations and apparent and actual interests. The former of these binaries was 
                                                
centre.” “The possession [of an empire] is worth more in money than its money cost,” insofar as “it enables to keep 
the peace of the world.” “This immense empire causes the mere name of England a real and a might power” (AC, 
809). Expressed in utilitarian-economic terms, establishing a perceived preponderance of imperial power would 
offset the costs of preempting aggression and maintaining peace through actual military might, thereby serving as an 
informal institution that reduces the transaction costs of peace. 
682 “Mutual dependence would prevent oppression on the one part, and on the other a wish for independence; 
reciprocity of interest would occasion mutual good will; there would no longer be injurious distinctions, or 
malignant jealousies, or vulgar hatred between British subjects, wherever born; and Britain would be come the 
centre of the most extensive, the most civilized, and above all, the happiest empire in the world” (LS, 169). 
683 Richards, “Wakefield and Australia,” p. 97. 
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encapsulated in the passion to own land, while the latter issued from the imprimatur of economic 
science that Wakefield purported to represent on the questions of colonization. “There is no 
business more entirely a man’s own business than that of a settler picking new land for his own 
purpose,” admitted Wakefield; “I would if possible open the whole of the waste land of a colony 
to intending purchasers” (AC, 982, emphasis mine). However, “the truism of our time, that in 
matters of private business the parties interested are sure to judge better than any government can 
judge for them, is an error, if the best of governments could determine as well as the settler 
himself the quality and position of land the most suitable to his objects” (Ibid). If there were “a 
perfect liberty of choice” (a nineteenth century cognate of “free market”), 
the settlers would disperse themselves too much … wander about the waste portions of the colony … 
where, being distant from a market, and from all that pertains to civilization, they would fall into a state of 
barbarism: instead of acquiring wealth as all colonists ought to do, the settlers would only raise enough 
produce for their own rude subsistence; and the colony, instead of exporting and importing largely, would 
be poor and stagnant (Ibid) 
 
“In a word, there would be mischievous dispersion” concluded Wakefield, and continued, “But 
mischievous to whom? Mischievous, if at all, to the settlers themselves. The supposition then is, 
that the settlers would injure themselves in consequence of not knowing what was for their own 
advantage” (Ibid, 983). 
In broader terms, the disagreement between Wakefield and the laissez-faire proponents 
turned on the question whether “economic sovereignty,” that is, the possibility of a totalizing 
viewpoint to which economic processes are transparent, was possible.684 Wakefield broached the 
possibility of such a viewpoint. The baffling complexity of the economy in England might have 
obscured the fundamental principles governing the movement of labor, capital, and land, and 
correspondingly of wages, profits, and rents. In the colonies, however, such complexity 
dissolved and laid bare the extra-economic conditions on which these economic principles 
                                                
684 I borrow the term “economic sovereignty” from Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, pp. 282-3. 
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depended. Social and technical division of labor had not and could not have arisen spontaneously 
from the propensity to truck, barter and exchange, and the desire to better one’s condition. 
Without the separation of labor from the means of production, which in turn was imposed by 
political and institutionalized by legal means, “capital,” “labor,” and “land” as classical political 
economy understood them would not exist. For Wakefield, then, the primacy of the politico-legal 
in establishing the capital-relation and consequently the commercial economy constituted the 
window through which the entire landscape of economic relations could be surveyed. In the 
colonies government intervention proved not only necessary but also inevitable for entitling 
people to land, which made it possible to implement Wakefield’s dictum “it is for the good of all 
that no individual should be allowed to injure other individuals by taking more than the right 
quantity of waste land” (EA, 537, emphases added).685 The “right” quantity of wasteland clearly 
implied an overarching calculus in which it functioned as a manipulable variable for maximizing 
social utility.  
With the exception of the small proportion of the people who in the case supposed would be labourers for 
hire, every man would be palpably interested in making land dearer, even the labourers would have the 
same interest, though it would be a little more remote and therefore, perhaps, much less obvious. In all 
probability, therefore, we should pass a law for making land dearer (AC, 938). 
 
The same grounds of social utility, which made it an “injury” to engross more land than was in 
the greatest good of all, also authorized the politically-instigated and maintained dispossession of 
laborers. The latter would catch up with the wisdom of the scheme later. 
However, while the capital-relation certainly represented the condition of highest social 
utility, a self-referential invocation of social utility for justifying primitive accumulation would 
not simply be totalizing but, insofar as it came at the expense of individual liberty, profoundly 
illiberal. Abridging the gap between the natural desire to own land and the imperative of 
                                                
685 Once again, one can hear Lockean echoes of injuring others by engrossing more land than one morally can under 
the natural law, though stripped of its natural law “stilts,” as Bentham would put it. 
  301 
reproducing a class of wage laborers by way of state power, while leaving this power 
ideologically naked, would hardly appeal to prospective colonial laborers or the political 
economists of the time. Nor could it withstand the charges of despotism and designs of reducing 
laborers to a state of perpetual servitude. To navigate this problem, Wakefield revisited the 
contractual fantasy of dispossession discussed earlier, which he had forwarded for explaining the 
origins of wage labor in the world. The preemptive crown rights, restrictive land titles, and 
sufficient price represented  “nothing but the enforcement of a compact among all who are 
interested in the disposal of waste land; and agreement that none shall be allowed to injure 
others, that the greatest good of all should be consulted” (537, emphases added). By conjuring 
up a colonial contract of dispossession amongst “all who are interested,” which obviously 
included landowners, middle classes and laborers, Wakefield not only reintroduced the principle 
of consent and therefore liberty and volition, but he once again appealed to the harmony of class 
interests, this time in the colony. The voluntary self-division of mankind into capitalists and 
workers in the dawn of time repeated itself in the colonies. In both cases, the decision of the 
contractors was supposedly informed by a notion of common good keyed to the telos of 
productivity and capitalist civilization – a paradoxical notion that was at once accessible only to 
the political economist yet transparent to all, in conflict with the natural and universal passion to 
own land yet powerful enough to override this passion through reasoned agreement. State 
intervention resolved this paradox in practice, while opening a rift in the fabric of liberal 
politicaleconomy. Wakefield’s fantasy of contractual dispossession, not unlike Edmund Burke’s 
“well wrought veil” to be thrown on the ignominious beginnings of all property, covered over 
this rift. If, as John Locke famously proclaimed, “in the beginning, all the world was America,” 
then in the colony one witnessed those beginnings. 
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Conclusion 
The foregoing analysis of Wakefield’s works in relation to their specific historical 
context opens onto three major avenues of inquiry and helps one rethink them in a colonial 
capitalist framework. The first of these concerns the history of liberalism’s troubled relationship 
with capitalism, a trouble that has received relatively little scholarly attention, partly due to the 
tendency to conflate capitalist relations with market relations.686 At this point, one should note 
that Wakefield’s observations comprised less an accurate description of the capitalist relations in 
the metropole and the colonies than a theoretical attempt to grapple with the tendencies inherent 
in these contexts. Wakefield erred in declaring the economic crisis in England to be terminal, yet 
his diagnosis of the tendency of industrial capitalism toward glut, finacialization, and crisis was 
on the mark. In the colonies, it proved much harder for laborers to become self-sufficient farmers 
than Wakefield surmised, but colonial labor scarcity did present an endemic problem (as attested 
by English indenture, African slavery, and then Indian indenture). Likewise, small property 
owners turned out to be far from the autistic subsistence farmers Wakefield imagined them to be, 
instead engaging in petty commodity production, participating in export and import chains, and 
settling in organized communities.687 Accurate, however, was his observation that economic 
                                                
686 It is perfectly conceivable to have market relations that are not capitalist, as demonstrated by excellent 
scholarship, including Arrighi’s Adam Smith in Beijing, Braudel’s Civilization and Capitalism, and Abu-Lughod’s 
Before European Hegemony. Chakrabarty makes the emphatically Marxian case against seeing money and 
commodity as inherently capitalist and draws attention to the use of state violence to destroy these “independent 
forms” and rearticulate them in accordance with the capital logic. Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe, p. 64. For 
Marx’s elaboration of this point, see Marx, Theories of Surplus Value Part III, pp. 468-91. Inversely, it is perfectly 
conceivable to have formally non-capitalist relations that are articulated to circuits of capital accumulation, 
plantation slavery being a prime, but only one, example. On this point, see, among others, Banaji, “Fictions of Free 
Labor” and Bhandari, “Disguises of Wage Labor.” 
687 Australian colonists, for instance, eagerly enmeshed themselves in the evolving global market, “exporting and 
importing everything that could be shipped.” Denoon and Wyndham, “Australia and the Western Pacific,” p. 550. 
Similar concerns over the freedmen were misguided, as demonstrated by the rise of new villages and markets and by 
and mixed economies of petty commodity production and selective wage labor. Holt, Problem of Freedom, pp. xxii, 
156. 
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enterprise in the colonies did not follow the logic of large-scale undertakings with concentrated 
capital and wage labor, or in other words, that formal capital-relation had not yet obtained. 
Settlers avoided working for wages, and when they did work for wages, they leveraged labor 
scarcity to negotiate for employment on terms detrimental to capital accumulation.  
For Marx, a historical study of capitalism revealed that “before he [the laborer] spends 
his leisure time in surplus labor for others, compulsion is necessary,” and Wakefield’s analysis 
and policy proposals belong to this historical study.688 Without the accumulation of surplus 
labor, civilization of capitalism collapsed like a house of cards, and the barbarism that Wakefield 
observed at the frontier symptomatially captured this collapse. The evanescence of “labor” as 
soon as the prospective laborer disembarked the ship and the concomitant disintegration of 
commercial society disclosed the element of extra-economic force requisite for extracting 
“labor” from bodies by keeping them separate from the means of production, most importantly, 
land.689 Plantation slavery represented the logical extreme of this separation, human life reduced 
to brute homo laborans for the sake of capital. The centrality to the emerging middle-class 
hegemony of the transvaluation of the wage contract into the hallmark of freedom, however, had 
rendered such forms of forced labor an impossible alternative to the barbarism of the frontier. 
The fantasies of contractual dispossession conjured up by Wakefield, both in genetic and 
colonial versions, attempted to navigate, and in those very attempts underscored, the tensions 
between the imperatives of capital accumulation and liberal precepts of contractual freedom and 
legal equality, tensions that came to a head most saliently in the colonial labor relations and were 
inscribed in Wakefield’s theoretical explorations. 
                                                
688 Marx, Capital Vol. 1, p. 651. 
689 For a fascinating elaboration of the relationship between body and labor-power from a Marxist-feminist 
perspective, see Silvia Federici, Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body, and Primitive Accumulation (New York: 
Autonomedia, 2004), pp. 133-55. 
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 Secondly, the foregoing discussion makes fresh inroads into relationship between 
sovereign and governmental modalities of power. Venn contends that colonial rule was 
characterized by the “absence of pastoral power,” indicating the sovereign power over life as the 
only governmental modality.690 Wakefield’s theory of systematic colonization requires a severe 
amendment to this and other contentions that are disposed to map sovereign and governmental 
techniques too easily on the colony and the metropole, respectively. On the one hand, 
Wakefield’s proposals problematize the identification of the colony exclusively with sovereign 
power, insofar as they envision the extension to the colonies of the conditions under which 
pastoral power could be the predominant form of governing colonial populations, in contrast 
both to the lawlessness of the frontier and to the whip of the master or the military officer. On the 
other hand, by highlighting the irreducible element of sovereign power as the core of a nomos 
and the condition of possibility for governmentality, they unseat the assumption that sovereign 
power in the West has been permanently supplanted by liberal forms of governmental power. 
Making a detour through the history of capital (a history on which Foucault makes only 
incidental claims), it critically probes the Foucauldian inclinations to equate sovereignty with 
archaic, premodern politics, and gestures towards the need to re-center on the nexus between 
colonial politics and the idea of modern sovereignty.691 
 A third strand of analysis underlined by a critical interrogation of Wakefield’s works 
pertains to the erasure of legal coercion and political violence deployed in the establishment of 
economic institutions that are today celebrated for promoting capital accumulation. Colonial 
genealogies of differential economic performance as mediated by economic institutions have 
                                                
690 Venn, Postcolonial Challenge, p. 67. 
691 Carl Schmitt’s Nomos of the Earth remains a touchstone in any inquiry into this nexus. Also see, Tuck, Rights of 
War and Peace; Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty; Gerrit W. Gong, Standard of “Civilization” in International 
Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); Eve Darian-Smith and Peter Fitzpatrick (eds) Laws of the Postcolonial 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999). 
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increasingly been the object of scholarly attention at the crossroads of political science and 
economics.692 Wakefield’s adoption of a comparative institutional analysis in explaining 
differential levels of capital accumulation across a wide range of colonies, with a focus on such 
variables as the degree of concentration of labor and capital, forms of land tenure, labor regimes, 
land-labor-capital ratios, and complexity of social and technical division of labor,693 positions 
him as a forgotten forerunner of the acclaimed “new institutionalist” perspective of economic 
growth.694 The latter shares with Wakefield’s paradigm the utilitarian-marginalist assumptions 
about human behavior and its manipulability through institutional arrangements that shape 
incentive structures. The convergence is not only methodological. There exists a baffling 
coincidence between what Wakefield technically defined as “colony” and what goes under the 
name “neo-Europe” in the new institutionalist literature. “Americans, Canadians, South Africans, 
and Australasians” (LS, 152), which Wakefield identified as “new peoples,” are the exact set of 
populations that are singled out by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson for their growth-
enhancing institutions.695  
                                                
692 The seminal work in this strain is North and Thomas, Rise of the Western World, matched in influence perhaps 
only by Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson “The Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development.” American Economic Review 91 (2000): 1369-1401. More recent exemplars of such scholarship can 
be found in Jared Diamond and James A. Robinson (eds) Natural Experiments of History (Cambridge:  Harvard 
University Press, 2010). Some scholars have decided to extend the microeconomic analysis of institutional 
determinants of economic growth beyond the colonial encounters and into the dawn of history; Barry Weingast, 
Douglass C. North, and John J. Wallis, Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework For Interpreting 
Recorded Human History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), and Carles Boix “A Theory of State 
Formation and the Origins of Inequality” (unpublished manuscript presented at Cornell, February 2011) are cases in 
point. 
693 See England and America, pp. 318-338, 372-5, 531, and A View of the Art of Colonization, pp. 878-9, 889. 
694 The theoretical and methodological affinities between Wakefield and Douglass North, the pioneer of the 
neoclassical school of new institutionalist economics, have been noted at least by one scholar. See Winch, Classical 
Economics, p. 99. 
695 Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, “Colonial Origins.” For a similar yet non-economistic conceptualization of “neo-
Europes” and “tropical peripheries,” see B. R. Tomlinson, “Economics and Empire: The Periphery and the Imperial 
Economy,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire Vol. 3, ed. Roger Louis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999). 
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The point, however, is not simply to return to an obscure historical figure the honors he 
has been denied. Rather, the potential merit of revisiting Wakefield with an eye towards 
contemporary institutional analysis is to unearth the element of extra-economic coercion, legal or 
political, that lies to varying degrees in the pedigree of most, if not all, stories of economic 
success predicated on the accumulation of capital. The insights gained from the foregoing 
analysis can pry open the technical, antiseptic language of the neoclassical approach to colonial 
trajectories of economic performance, and help us peer into the forcible obliteration or abortion 
of alternative ways of being, alternative modes of apprehending the world, and alternative modes 
of social reproduction not completely yoked to the imperatives of capital accumulation. It can 
enable one to reappraise what Schumpeter called “creative destruction” and what Marx had 
labeled “real subsumption,” firmly rooted in neo-Europes, as a process predicated on the 
complete extirpation or displacement of indigenous populations, invalidation and annihilation of 
their ways of life, and the establishment of tight linkages to the extant flows of capital, labor, and 
technology.696 Viewed through these historico-theoretical lenses, terra nullius reappears as a 
trope of social imagination that encompasses not only geographic but also social surfaces, which 
can be experimented on, ploughed, landscaped, and improved for the cultivation of capitalist 
relations. Deployment of politico-legal coercion through the sharp edge of state sovereignty, 
which has often accompanied colonial proclamations of terra nullius, glimmers in less obvious 
though no less momentous declarations of social terra nullius, ranging from Walter Eucken’s 
schemes for restructuring German (and more broadly European) agriculture strictly in 
accordance with market logic697 to brutal experiments with “authoritarian liberalism” under the 
                                                
696 Similarly, it recasts the “failed” modernization of peripheral economies as differential articulations to global 
circuits of capital, or in Marxian lexicon, as processes of formal subsumption, which, from the perspective of capital 
accumulation, need not be “failures” at all. 
697 Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, pp. 140-2. 
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confluence of Augusto Pinochet and Friedrich von Hayek.698 Naomi Klein has written 
persuasively about the “blank slate” created by the shocks of natural and social disasters and 
their central role in blazing capitalist inroads into the capillaries of the social tissue. 699 The “rise 
of disaster capitalism” she explores, however, has been sprouted originally in soil of colonialism. 
A critical tarrying with Wakefield and the conundrums he waded through can help us discern the 
ur-language or the grammar of primitive accumulation, in which we find articulations of the 
destruction of lifeworlds and their reconstitution in the image of capital. Wakefield and his 
contemporaries’ view of Australia could perhaps provide us with the primordial image of a 
wilderness to be conquered and a waste to be tamed, which continues to pulsate in the World 
Bank’s discourses on economic reform.700 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
698 For an important yet unduly neglected study of the intellectual and biographical connections between Schmitt and 
ordoliberals, and of the interaction between Pinochet and Hayek, see Renato Cristi, Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian 
Liberalism: Strong State, Free Economy (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1998).  
699 Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007). 
700 Paul Cammack’s work offers theoretically insightful, if strictly presentist, efforts in this direction. See, Paul 
Cammack, “What the World Bank Means by Poverty Reduction and Why It Matters,” New Political Economy 9 
(2004): 189-211. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The historical relationship between liberalism and capitalism has been one of uneasy 
union, a relationship of mutual constitution fraught with tensions and dependent on ideological 
balancing acts for its continuation. Interlocked by the hinges of property, exchange, and labor, 
liberalism as a philosophico-discursive field and capitalism as a global social formation comprise 
a contradictory whole. As the foregoing chapters illustrate, the global processes of primitive 
accumulation have not only instituted the socio-material basis of capitalism but also given rise to 
antithetical social forms that introduced a deep rift into the formation of liberalism. The colonial 
genealogy of capitalism constitutes the terrain on which one finds such foundational liberal 
concepts as private property, commodity exchange, and free labor to be genetically tied to their 
disowned cousins, namely, extrajudicial land grabs, systematic plunder, and chattel slavery. The 
active disavowal of these ties in liberal thought, exemplified in the works of Locke, Burke, and 
Wakefield, provides us with an analytic thread into the complex relationship between 
colonialism, capitalism, and liberalism.  
As I hope to have demonstrated, the analytic of colonial capitalism can offer a more 
precise triangulation of the coordinates of liberalism vis-à-vis European colonialism than offered 
by overwhelmingly culturalist approaches. Currently, there exists an impressive inventory of 
historical instances in which the confrontation between liberal universals and colonial 
particularisms gave rise to diverse and even discordant narratives such as inexorable universal 
human progress,701 cosmopolitan pluralism,702 and insurmountable cultural difference.703 What 
                                                
701 Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe; Chatterje, Nation and Its Fragments; Mehta, Liberalism and Empire. It 
should be noted that even the most trenchant critiques of imperial liberalism acknowledge its internal variability, 
discerning a redeeming potential in the “cosmopolitanism of sentiment” that marks “this other liberalism.” Mehta, 
Liberalism and Empire, pp. 20, 43. 
  309 
remains wanting is a theoretical axis around which these instances can be sutured and their 
specificity explicated with reference to common dynamics unfolding in the uneven topography 
of colonial expansion. Jennifer Pitts describes liberalism as a “set of characteristic dispositions 
[that have] always been articulated in universal terms” yet have always already been inflected by 
“various circumstances.”704 This formulation confronts us with the task of constructing an 
explanation of how historical circumstances shaped and colored the “universal ambitions” of 
liberalism across specific imperial sites, and why liberal politics of universalism revolved around 
certain social practices and not others. As a corollary, we need an account of how markers of 
colonial difference varied over historical periods, or in other words, a systematic elaboration of 
the link “between historical and conceptual transformation, between the external and internal 
sources of intellectual change.”705 
Colonial capitalism offers one such analytic that casts into relief the political and 
economic conditions that shaped the field of colonial transformations and the concomitant liberal 
ideologies of rule. More specifically, I believe the extent to which colonial primitive 
accumulation assimilated (destroyed and reconstructed) or articulated (subordinated and 
managed) non-capitalist relations of social reproduction in the colonies can serve as a useful 
heuristic. Settler capitalism of the “neo-Europes,” which was invariably conditional upon the 
extirpation or dramatic marginalization of local populations (as in America and Australasia), 
arguably gave palpability and plausibility to the triumphalist narratives of universal progress qua 
the expansion of the market, civil society, life, liberty and property.706 In contrast, confronted by 
                                                
702 Pitts, A Turn to Empire, and “Empire, Progress”; Muthu, Enlightenment Against Empire, “Adam Smith’s 
Critique,” and “Diderot’s Theory.” 
703 Hall, Civilising Subjects; Mantena, Alibis of Empire. 
704 Pitts, “Free for All.” 
705 Mantena, “Fragile Universals,” p. 551. 
706 For an encompassing account, see James Belich, Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of 
the Anglo-World, 1783-1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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the resilience of non-capitalist social relations and the risk of social upheaval attendant to 
capitalist reconstruction (as in South Asia and Africa), colonizers opted for intensifying these 
relations for surplus creation, becoming convinced in the process that these “traditional” ways of 
life were hopelessly ingrained in the social genetics of the natives.707 The displacement of Native 
Americans who refused to be “Red Lockeans” was inscribed in the inexorable progress of human 
history,708 while the failure of the Permanent Settlement in Bengal to create capitalist farmers 
and virtuous yeomen was attributed to the insurmountable singularity of the Indian society, their 
village communities, their “castes of mind.”709 Conceived thus, the uneven and heterogeneous 
development of global capitalism in imperial networks can provide a systematizing matrix for 
the dilemmas of liberalism, which arose from its encounters with concretely situated 
socioeconomic relations. Through this lens, we could glimpse into the global dynamics that 
connected the various context-specific articulations of liberalism with other, non-liberal social 
philosophies and imperial ideologies, as liberal thinkers grappled with the vicissitudes of 
colonial capitalism. 
The perspective of colonial capitalism further complicates the interplay of liberal 
universals and colonial difference by disclosing the civilizational hierarchies that cut across the 
colonizer-colonized divide and the ostensible lines of race and culture on which this divide is 
conventionally predicated. As the previous chapters on India and New Zealand illustrate, British 
settlers, planters, and company agents occupied an ambivalent position in British social 
imaginary. On the one hand, they were an integral and indispensable part of the imperial polity 
                                                
707 See, among others, Washbrook, “Law, State”; Frederick Cooper, Decolonization and African Society: The Labor 
Question in French and British Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Ann Laura Stoler, 
Capitalism and Confrontation in Sumatra’s Plantation Belt, 1870-1979 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1995). 
708 Ronald Takaki, Iron Cages: Race and Culture in Nineteenth-Century America (New York: Knopf, 1979). 
709 Dirks, Castes of Mind. 
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as British subjects under a “coherent imperial constitution,”710 and as the pioneers of the British 
Empire who established the networks through which British capital could expand, penetrate, and 
transform the colonies through settler capitalism and extractive ventures.711 On the other hand, 
the same colonial entrepreneurs were variously derided by metropolitan thinkers as unruly, 
expansionist, despotic, barbaric, and essentially uncivilized. The ambiguous and shifting 
civilizational status of the British colonizers themselves problematizes the assumption that 
discourses of civilization and savagery, stadial theories of progress, and ideologies of colonial 
difference targeted the colonizers’ non-European other. Relying on race and culture as the 
primary operators of colonial difference offers little leverage in explaining, for instance, why the 
Irish and the Scottish, whom the English initially viewed to be racially inferior, were gradually 
incorporated into the “white” race in the eighteenth century.  Similarly, why the enclosing and 
improving smallholder, who was hailed as the agent of civilization in seventeenth-century 
American colonies, was deemed in nineteenth-century Australasia to be stagnant or even 
regressive on the scale of human development? Focusing on socially heterogeneous, 
economically uneven, and politically asymmetric networks of imperial formation can offer some 
answers to these puzzles by embedding these specific instances of racialization in the relations of 
production, labor regimes, and social struggles around the slave-plantation complex as the hinge 
of Atlantic colonial capitalism. To put it summarily, the perspective of colonial capitalism can 
address those questions of universalism and cultural difference where the culturalist accounts 
remain in incomplete in their own terms. 
                                                
710 Travers, “Contested Despotisms.” 
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While the study presented here stages its principal intervention in the scholarship on 
liberalism and empire, it also opens up two trajectories of future inquiry in the field of political 
theory. I would like to conclude this section by foregrounding and clarifying these trajectories. 
 
Political Immanence of Capital 
An important theoretical question raised by this study concerns what I would like to call 
the “political immanence of capital.” Salvaging the notion of “primitive accumulation” from the 
narrow confines of Marxian economics and reformulating it as a category of political analysis 
casts familiar concepts of political theory in new light. This theoretical proposition already has 
precedents on which to build. For instance, Partha Chatterjee has brilliantly framed primitive 
accumulation as the destruction of non-capitalist forms of community, which brings into 
existence the social constructs that liberal thought treats as axiomatic: the individual of 
subjective rights, the totalizing politico-legal framework of the nation-state, and the market-cum-
civil society as the domain of voluntary association and transaction.712 In a similar vein, Hannah 
Arendt posited a genetic relationship between the accumulation of power and the accumulation 
of capital by construing nineteenth-century imperialism as the re-eruption of primitive 
accumulation.713 Finally, Max Weber himself resorted to the idea of the primitive accumulation 
of power in explaining how the modern state acquired its signature feature, namely, the 
sovereign monopoly of legitimate violence.714 What these formulations variously articulate is a 
constitutive link and perhaps even a structural analogy between, on the one hand, capitalism as 
                                                
712 Partha Chatterjee, The Lineages of Political Society: Studies in Postcolonial Democracy (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2011), and Nation and Its Fragments. Also see, Sanyal, Rethinking Capitalist Development. 
713 Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, part II. 
714 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 
329-41; H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1946), pp. 196-244. Also see Mara Loveman, “The Modern State and the Primitive Accumulation of 
Symbolic Power,” American Journal of Sociology 110 (2005): 1651-83. 
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an institutionalized system of exploitation of social labor and ecology, and on the other, 
organized political power of the modern state in its colonial and national variants.715 
The historical examination presented here strongly suggests that the constitutive 
symbiosis between capitalist relations and political power has been more endemic and originary 
than Arendt and others conceived (others also including the classical theorists of imperialism, 
including Hobson, Hilferding, Lenin, and Luxemburg). As discussed in the first and second 
chapters, colonial states have been directly and indirectly active in the instatement of the 
capitalist networks as early as the seventeenth-century, not least because these networks 
promoted the consolidation of the modern state apparatus itself.716 If we take seriously the 
ubiquity of political power in the global genealogy of capitalism, not only in the early modern 
period or the “classical” period of capitalist imperialism, but in our present moment where the 
putatively purest market strain of capitalism (neoliberalism) depends on the exercise of political 
power outside legal boundaries,717 then we can no longer treat political power as exogenous to 
the supposedly non-political institutional order of capitalism. Theorizing extra-economic and 
extra-legal political coercion as integral to the genesis and maintenance of capitalist relations 
essentially politicizes the concept of “capital,” that is, recasts it as an inherently political concept. 
Given that our contemporary reality is shaped more than anything by the dynamics of 
global capitalism (witness the fallout of the recent financial crisis), following the vector of 
“politicizing capital” and “historicizing the global” confronts us as an ever-urgent task, for which 
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the historical investigation in the previous chapters offers a sort of groundwork.718 Building on 
these grounds, the next step would be to develop the notion of the “political immanence of 
capital” as a theoretical viewpoint.  
While there is a number of ways this could be achieved, one line of political theorization 
that appears particularly suited to the task is the theories of “constituent power,” which have 
been conceived and honed in the field of democratic theory. The question of the “founding” of a 
political order, the legitimacy of which necessarily originates outside its endogenous legal 
framework, can apply with equal force to the origins of capitalism as a historically determinate 
social formation.719  What is brought into existence in this case is not a body politic but a specific 
set of social relations of reproduction, which nonetheless shares with the former a jagged process 
of founding punctuated by (to use Jason Frank’s felicitous term) “constituent moments.”720 
Earlier chapters of this study have selectively surveyed the historically discontinuous, locally 
sited, and globally networked constituent moments of global capital, ranging from the English 
enclosures to the slave-plantation complex, from the de-industrialization of India to settler 
colonialism in the Pacific. These instances of reconstruction and subordination of non-capitalist 
relations of social reproduction to the imperatives of power, profit, and accumulation give rise to 
profound questions of legitimacy, analogous to those explored by theories of political founding. 
This is because the three hinges of capital examined here, property, exchange, and labor are not 
                                                
718 Eley, “Historicizing the Global.” Also see, Nitzan and Bichler, Capital as Power. 
719 Democratic founding as an explicit problem of political theory can be traced back to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
Social Contract. Some prominent twentieth-century reappraisals of the problem include Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of 
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just “economic” problems but the very core of how human life is organized, with irreducible and 
immanent relations of power and domination, inequality and subordination, resistance and 
struggle.721 Yet the essentially extra-economic and extra-legal force of primitive accumulation 
that reconfigures this core cannot be referred to the capitalist economic system or the liberal 
juridical framework for its justification, precisely because it creates the very conditions of a 
capitalist economic system and does so precisely by violating liberal precepts. 
In a certain sense, constituent moments in the global genealogy of capitalism are at the 
same time instances of ideological difficulty for liberalism, which invite metaphysical 
explanations. Illuminating in this vein, for instance, is Burke’s insistence to have Warren 
Hastings, whom he called the “great criminal [who] has the law in his hands,” tried at the bar of 
“natural, immutable and substantial justice” rather than by the British common law.722 This 
insistence arguably indicates Burke’s perception that the socioeconomic transformation in India 
under the Company rule overflowed the boundaries of the British legal framework. The political 
violence that effectuated such transformation was at the order-founding and order-destroying 
level, and it could be captured and adjudicated only by the political power of the Parliament, 
                                                
721 One way of fruitfully incorporating theories of constituent power into the analysis of capitalism is to go beyond 
primitive accumulation by theorizing it more capaciously. Once the conceptual core of primitive accumulation, 
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wielded in the name of transcendental and substantive principles as opposed to positive or 
customary legal precepts. Likewise, when the “normal” conditions of capitalist reproduction 
threatened to implode in the colonies, Wakefield did not hesitate to call for the exercise of 
imperial executive fiat and “martial law” – that is, a state of exception723 – for re-instating the 
specific politico-legal order in which production and exchange could conform to the dictates of 
capitalist civilization. Locke’s theoretical rendering of the private and exclusive appropriation of 
American lands was undergirded in the first and last instances by a theological authority that 
commanded men to labor and subdue the earth for the benefit of mankind.724 In other words, at 
constituent moments of global capitalism one “appealed to heaven,” although the authority thus 
summoned did not have to be religious or metaphysical, such as God, natural law, or progress. 
As we have seen, when confronted by colonial primitive accumulation, all three authors invoked 
secular and immanent myths of universal agreement for capturing and domesticating this unruly 
political element: the universal tacit consent of mankind (Locke), the great primeval contract 
between generations (Burke), and the originary agreement of human beings to divide themselves 
into the owners of capital and wage laborers (Wakefield). 
The point raised above speaks directly to the status of extra-legal power in liberal 
political philosophy and government, a subject that has received growing scholarly attention in 
recent years. One prominent example is the theory of executive power or “prerogative” in 
Locke’s political philosophy. The interrogation of Locke’s ideas on prerogative has yielded 
several distinct yet convergent interpretations. Some scholars have shown that Locke reserved a 
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pivotal place for the sovereign executive power, bound by no law but prudence, to combat the 
unforeseen exigencies threatening the security of the commonwealth.725 The form of the Lockean 
prerogative has been characterized as fundamentally extra-constitutional and “natural,” and it has 
even been argued that the prince who wields of prerogative is accorded demi-Godly features in 
Locke’s discourse.726 Consequently, one finds the element of quasi-theological, sovereign power 
inscribed in one of the formative moments of liberalism as the indispensable foundation of 
liberalism’s rule-governed framework. The historical grounds on which liberalism and capitalism 
have been co-articulated would be particularly conducive to unearthing these foundations. 
Opening the analysis of capitalism to questions of constituent power and its metaphysical 
expressions problematizes the putative secularism of the domain of the economy. The corollary 
of bringing capitalism within the ambit of political theology is to rethink political economy as a 
species of political theory. Training this perspective on the history of political economy 
sensitizes us to substantive moral values in the name of which political power has been exercised 
to constitute capitalist social relations, such that property, exchange, and labor are categorically 
redefined and remade as private property, commodity exchange, and free labor.  
This dynamic is nowhere more clearly observable than in the terrain of colonial 
capitalism. The absence (or denial) of a shared legal or customary framework with the colonized 
left the colonizers with no recourse but to their own substantive moral values in accounting for 
the force they employed, in other words, in referring the extra-legal violence of colonial 
conquest, dispossession, and bondage back to a purportedly universal theological or secular legal 
order. Political economy as a field of knowledge and a rationale of government incubated within 
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this context, which means that it has questions of power and coercion, historical difference and 
alternatives, and legality and legitimacy inscribed in its genetic code. Conceiving of political 
economy as political theory, therefore, also posits as an object of inquiry the institutional and 
discursive strategies through which these political questions have been removed from the 
analysis of capitalism such that political economy has morphed into a morally sanitary, technical 
field of “economics,” and capitalism has been christened as “global economy.” 
 
Prehistory of Liberalism 
Another major avenue of political theorization that emerges from this study extends to 
Foucauldian analyses of biopolitics and governmentality by addressing a lacuna in Foucault’s 
brilliant account of liberalism as a mode of governing capitalism. An emphasis on colonialism 
and primitive accumulation in the genealogy of capitalism illuminates the illiberal historical 
conditions (or the “prehistory”) of liberalism as a modern philosophy of rule, a rationality of 
government, and a configuration of power relations. 
Foucault’s analysis of liberalism has gained salience with the publication in English of 
his College de France Lectures.727 In these lectures, Foucault offers a genealogy of liberalism as 
a specific modality of governing populations and resources and explicates the entanglement of 
biopolitics with the formation of capitalist relations of production.728 Foucault uses the term 
“governmentality” to refer to the characteristically liberal modality of power relations in 
capitalist society, which are relayed through “security apparatuses” and discourses of political 
economy. This political constellation is “liberal” by virtue of its reliance on “freedom” and 
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“efficiency” as both ideologies of power and techniques of government.729 Socioeconomic 
complexity, movement of people, circulation of things, proliferation of the productive powers of 
society, and a careful management (as opposed to crude planning) of social dynamism define the 
objectives of the liberal mode of government. Put summarily, in governmentality, the liberal self-
image of capitalism finds its practical representation. 
Foucault’s penetrating analysis of the liberal micropolitics of capitalism rests on a 
specific theory of subjectivity. The operability of liberalism as a modality of governing 
capitalism presupposes that individual behavior yields itself to prediction, in other words, that 
individuals react to circumstantial change in a manner so as to yield statistically estimable 
aggregate effects. Socially predominant motives of behavior should be of an order (a minimum 
common denominator beyond contextual and individual particularities) that generates systematic 
and probabilistic patterns of causal relations. Expressed differently, motives for behavior must 
take the form of “incentives,” that is, interests that animate individual behavior which are already 
embedded in quantifiable models of causation, calculi of probability, and fields of 
manipulability. In Foucault’s words, the subject through which liberal governmentality can 
operate is homo oeconomicus, or the “subject of incentives,” a person who “accepts reality” and 
responds to it in ways that can be prefigured in a probabilistic paradigm.730 
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The problem with this explication is that while liberal government of capitalism depends 
on the subject of incentives for its efficacy, the origins of this subject cannot be explained with 
reference to the liberal apparatus itself. Governmentality abandons the aspiration for directly 
dictating individual interests in favor of indirectly managing them through institutional 
manipulation. This “liberal” attitude to governing people therefore depends on other, logically 
prior forms of power for the production of subjects who have “rational,” predictable and 
governable interests. The same attitude also presupposes multiple and, from a liberal perspective, 
irrational and ungovernable forms of individual and collective subjectivity. One catches fleeting 
gestures at this problematic in Foucault’s lectures, for instance, when he invokes a notion of 
“people” as “those who, refusing to be the population, disrupt the system.”731 Later, he remarks 
“the individual becomes governmentalizable, that power gets a hold on him to the extent, and 
only to the extent, that he is a homo oeconomicus.”732  
Unfortunately, missing from Foucault’s account are the socioeconomic transformations 
and political mechanisms through which “people” are reconstituted as “population” and the 
individual is governmentalized qua homo oeconomicus. Put bluntly, the historical conditions of 
possibility of liberalism are left out. I believe this is because the origins of homo oeconomicus 
and population (and therefore the enabling parameters of governmentality) belong to the 
“prehistory of liberalism,” which remains outside the purview of Foucault’s analysis. 
The perspective of colonial capitalism developed in this study is particularly well suited 
for addressing this lacuna. For a foray into the prehistory of liberalism directs us back to the 
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sovereign and disciplinary forms of power as the violent and intrusive preconditions of liberal 
security apparatuses. A focus on primitive accumulation would illuminate the historical affinity 
between sovereign and disciplinary power on the one hand, and the constitutive violence behind 
capitalist relations, on the other.733 It can highlight the constituent moments of capital as the 
obliteration of the “strange multiplicity” of alternative livelihoods, and the coercion of men and 
women into accepting a historically specific, capitalist social reality.734 This inquiry would 
compound the role of primitive accumulation in fashioning the subject of liberalism as a political 
philosophy (the subject of rights) by the construction of the subject of liberalism as a modality of 
government (the subject of incentives). 
We have seen the quasi-theological expression of originary accumulation in Locke’s 
theory of property, which captured and advocated the historic reorientation of social 
reproduction away from subsistence and towards accumulation. The extralegal process of land 
enclosures on both shores of the Atlantic, combined with slave codes and vagrancy laws that 
criminalized “idleness,” crafted enterprising and laboring subjects, or “possessive” and 
“utilizable” individuals.735 Our analysis of Burke has illustrated the distinct colonial 
manifestations of the problem of “an ungovernable people.”736 Unhinged from the sovereign-
disciplinary apparatus of the metropole, unruly possessive individuals at the imperial frontier 
wrought havoc in India. Correspondingly, Burke called for the reassertion of sovereign power 
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and disciplinary control over the East India Company by way of punishing the culprits, 
reforming the Indian administration, and imposing parliamentary supervision over its 
activities.737 Wakefield’s concerns with colonial settlements shows how utilizable individuals, 
once they spread over colonial lands, ceased to be utilizable for purposes of capital accumulation 
and escaped government by the liberal rationality of political economy. While Wakefield was at 
pains to keep his policy proposals close to the parameters of the market (sufficient price) and 
consent (voluntary emigration), he did not shirk from recommending imperial states of exception 
(“law-martial of a man-of-war”) for reinstating the conditions of governmentality in the colonies 
and legitimating these exceptions by recourse to ideals of civilization. 
Colonial primitive accumulation can therefore provide a theoretical index to the 
experimental attempts to craft governable subjects that are at once inculcated with work 
discipline and enterprising spirit, and eminently governable through the management of 
freedom.738 The net I have cast in this study captures only a handful of instances in the genealogy 
of coercive subjectification that lies behind liberal capitalism. Other scholars have examined the 
role of spectacular executions, witch-hunts, torture, forcible transportation, and bondage in this 
genealogy.739 There remain great swathes to be explored in the “prehistory of liberalism,” where 
sovereign and disciplinary force were put to breaking individual and social bodies before they 
could be reassembled into liberal subjects animated by rational interests. Such explorations 
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Malthus and revered as the epitome of bureaucratic probity and administrative professionalism, would be forged. 
738 The theoretical vision that informs such experiments is particularly salient in political economy and pedagogical 
tracts in the seventeenth century, which that targeted the idleness, profligacy, and vice of the poor and the rich alike. 
See chapters 2 and 4 in this study for some reflections and secondary literature. 
739 Federici, Caliban and the Witch; Rediker, et al. (eds) Many Middle Passages; Hay, et al., Albion’s Fatal Tree; 
Linebaugh, London Hanged; Foucault, Discipline and Punish. 
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would help unpack the triangle of sovereignty-discipline-governmentality and reveal the specific 
configurations of possibility, operability, and legitimacy between the three modalities of power. 
In conclusion, a promising, if audacious, line of theorizing the “politics of capitalism” 
would syncretically draw upon Foucault’s refined analysis of the micropolitics of capitalism and 
governmentality, a heterodox Marxian perspective on colonial capitalism and primitive 
accumulation, and political theories of founding attuned to logics of constituent power and 
attendant ethico-political problems of legitimization. A framework thus pieced together would 
not be seamless, but it would generate political insight, theoretical innovation, and scholarly 
exchange. The promise of such syncretism is reflected in original and controversial works of 
political theory that have recently explored the intersection of biopolitics and sovereign violence, 
subjectivity and capitalist reproduction, and colonialism and governmentality.740 
Situating capitalism squarely in the field of political theory and treating capital as an 
inherently political concept calls for a critical rethinking of the history of cardinal notions of 
political reflection, including freedom, equality, rights, domination, violence, sovereignty, and 
legitimacy. Similarly, recasting political economy as a species of political theory requires 
scrutinizing such apparently self-evident categories of empirical inquiry as property, rule of law, 
civil society, development, and welfare. Taken together, these theoretical revisions promise a 
new vantage for constructing a history of the present. Most significantly, a colonial and political 
conception of capitalism can shine new light on the composite discourses of economic 
development and global governance that circulate in the current global constellation. Financial 
hubs of “global cities” amidst zones of austerity in Europe and North America, authoritarian 
                                                
740 Outstanding works in this vein are Agamben’s Homo Sacer, and Hardt and Negri’s trilogy of Empire, Multitude, 
and Commonwealth. Less well-known but worth attention are two attempts to synthesize Marx’s theory of social 
relations of production and Foucault's theory of disciplinary power and subjectification. See Jason Read, The Micro-
Politics of Capital: Marx and the Prehistory of the Present (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), and 
Richard Marsden, The Nature of Capital: Marx after Foucault (London: Routledge, 1999). 
  324 
industrial capitalism in China, and massive offshore land acquisitions for commercial agriculture 
and mining in Africa and Latin America connect capital accumulation to new forms of 
expropriation and exploitation.741 These political economic dynamics and the plethora of social 
struggles and insurgencies they trigger, from the Occupy movement in the US to the Arab Spring 
in North Africa, from the landless peasant movement in Brazil to rural revolt in China, make it 
an ever urgent task to break the compartmentalization between political theory, political 
economy, and social critique. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                
741 Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006); Stefan Halper, Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the 
Twenty-First Century (New York: Basic Books, 2010); Klaus Deininger and Derek Byerlee, Rising Global Interest 
in Farmland: Can It Yield Sustainable and Equitable Benefits? (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2011); Annelies 
Zoomers, “Globalization and the Foreignization of Space: The Seven Processes Driving the Current Global Land 
Grab,” Journal of Peasant Studies 37 (2010): 429-47. 
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